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 ABSTRACT  
 
When implementers use Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) without obtaining licenses – 
because parties cannot agree on royalties –, patent owners are entitled to bring 
infringement actions against them, seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of 
products. However, as SEP holders gave commitments to grant licenses to third parties 
on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms, alleged infringers accuse 
SEP owners of abusing their dominant positions for bringing the aforementioned actions.  
 
Due to an absence of express guidance from Standard Setting Organizations’ patent 
policies, there was a considerable degree of uncertainty as to the lawfulness of SEP 
holders’ behaviour. Accordingly, the European Commission – in Samsung and Motorola 
– and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – in Huawei v. ZTE – pronounced on the issue. 
 
Both treated that conduct as a specific and novel category of abuse within the meaning of 
Article 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, it should have been treated as a refusal to deal – to grant 
SEP licenses. In order to do that, it must be argued that bringing those infringement 
actions by SEP holders constitutes a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant licenses, in 
consistency with a critical review of IMS Health – issued by the ECJ. In this way, Huawei 
v. ZTE would be consistent with the ECJ’s case law on refusal to deal.  
 
Consequently, the compulsory license would emerge as the most proportionate and 
necessary remedy to end effectively the infringement of Article 102 TFEU committed by 
SEP owners. In US, de facto compulsory licenses – ‘ongoing royalties for future 
infringements’ – are also employed, although to remedy patent infringements. 
Nevertheless, that divergence between US and EU illustrates that when parties fail to 
enter into licensing agreements on FRAND terms, the compulsory license might be ‘the 
tool’ to make SEP licenses available to all stakeholders. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Background 
 
The relevant type of intellectual property (IP) right in this research is the patent right, 
whose specific subject-matter is to guarantee the reward of the inventive effort of the 
inventor, who has ‘the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing 
industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either directly or 
by the grant of licences to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements’1. 
 
Products protected by patents are part of our everyday lives. For instance, radio, 
television, smart phones, computers, laptops, tablets, wireless technologies – such as Wi-
Fi – or automobile ignition and transmission systems, are comprised by various patents. 
Usually, these patents cover technologies that have been declared essential to the 
implementation of a standard by a Standard Setting Organization (SSO), so they are 
renamed as Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). Namely, SEPs cover technologies that 
have been declared essential to the implementation of a standard by a SSO and in 
comparison with patents that are not essential to a standard, they possess peculiarities 
regarding licensing and enforcement that will be studied throughout this research. For 
greater understanding what SEPs are and how they are licensed, it is timely to make some 
references to the terminological framework around SEPs that will appear throughout the 
research, among others, to standards’ categories and the standardization process carried 
out by SSOs. 
 
The standard is a document that establishes the requirements for a specific item, material, 
component, system or service. It also describes, in detail, a particular method or procedure 
that brings a solid foundation upon which to develop new technologies and to enhance 
existing practices and other benefits2. Depending on the standards’ purpose, it is possible 
to distinguish between different categories. Although this research focuses on interface 
standards developed by SSOs, it is worth mentioning some of the most important 
categories3: vocabulary standards, measurement standards, safety standards, management 
standards and products standards. 
 
Interface (also known as technical, interoperability or compatibility) standards4 address 
especially the needs for interconnection and interoperability between products in a multi-
                                                
1 Case C-187/80 Merck & Co Inc. v Stephar BV and Petrus Stephanus Exler [1981] ECR I-2063, para 4.  
2 Competition Directorate-General, ‘Standard Essential Patent’ (2014) 8 Competition Policy Brief 1, paras 
1, 4 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/008_en.pdf> accessed  1 August 2018; ‘What 
is a European Standard (EN)?’ (CEN-CENELEC) 
<http://www.cencenelec.eu/standards/DefEN/Pages/default.aspx> accessed  1 August 2018. 
3 Rudi Bekkers and others, ‘Understanding patents, competition and standardization in an interconnected 
world’ (ITU 2014) 14-15 <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/Understanding-patents,-competition-
and-standardization-in-an-interconnected-world.aspx> accessed  1 August 2018. 
4 ‘Why standards? Benefits of standards’ (ETSI) <https://www.etsi.org/standards/why-standards> accessed 
28 January 2019. 
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vendor, multi-network and multi-service environment, which refers to the fact that 
complex Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) systems must 
communicate and interwork on all levels5. As an example, a laptop computer incorporates 
about 251 interoperability standards6. The fact that standards ensure interoperability and 
compatibility between related products, it brings many benefits7. Standards can 
encourage innovation and lower costs by increasing the volume of manufactured 
products. Standards can strengthen competition by enabling consumers to switch more 
easily between products from different manufacturers. Standards may also further the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) objective of achieving the 
integration of national markets through the establishment of an internal market. 
  
The technologies to implement interface standards are usually covered by SEPs, which 
means that implementers – the users of a standard – necessarily have to get a license if 
they want to manufacture standard-compliant products. If they want to avoid to pay what 
they consider excessive royalties to obtain that license, they can implement any other 
technology available on the market. However, it will not be standardized, so it will not 
address the needs for interconnection between products. Hence, one of the potential 
disadvantages of interface standards is the lack of technologies comparable to those 
protected by SEPs8. In contrast to that type of standards, safety standards – that help 
ensure safety, reliability and environmental care – are usually protected by copyright, so 
it is easier for manufacturers to ‘design around’ the IP right (IPR) by adopting a permitted 
alternative that is in a non-network market9. 
 
At the same time, interface standards may be classified according to their creational 
source. As it was mentioned before, this research revolves around technical standards 
created by voluntary private SSOs, so called formal standards or de jure standards. As it 
will be explained hereinafter, these standards facilitate the deployment of new 
technologies by supporting interoperability on the widest possible scale and by avoiding 
the cost, uncertainty, and delay of a competition between rival proprietary standards10. 
                                                
5 ‘Why standards? Interoperability & Testing’ (ETSI) <https://www.etsi.org/standards/why-standards> 
accessed 28 January 2019. 
6 Brad Biddle, Andrew White and Sean Woods, ‘How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical 
Questions)’ (2010) SSRN Electronic Journal <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1619440> accessed 2 August 
2018. 
7 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements Text with EEA 
relevance’ (2011) OJ C11/1, paras 263 and 308; Samsung (Case AT.39939) Commission Decision C(2014) 
2891 final [2014], para 22; Motorola (Case AT.39985) Commission Decision C(2014) 2892 final [2014] 
para 46.  
8 Bekkers and others, ‘Understanding patents’ (n 3) 25-29 (they mention more potential disadvantages and 
advantages of interface standards). 
9 Mark A. Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations’ (2002) 90(6) 
California Law Review 1889, 1898, para 2 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310122> 
accessed 2 August 2018. 
10 Yann Méniére, ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing Terms-Research 
Analysis of a Controversial Concept’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2015) 9, para 4 
<https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/fair-reasonable-and-
non-discriminatory-frand-licensing-terms-research-analysis-controversial> accessed 2 August 2018. 
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Hence, SSOs facilitate industry coordination on a common technological platform. 
Despite that fact, it is relevant to cite the other sources too: operation of the market, 
forums and consortia and government.  
 
Special reference should be made to de facto standards that arise from the operation of 
the market, as far as they constitute the pivotal feature of one of the cases (IMS Health) 
subject of study in this research. When consumers preferably employ a single product or 
protocol and reject that of competitors, it enjoys a widespread use and broad market 
acceptance, so it becomes the de facto standard in a given industry. For instance, Adobe’s 
PDF computer file format for printable documents was first a company standard (a 
standard created for company application, known as ‘proprietary specifications’11). Later 
on, when they made it available free of charge, it turned into a de facto standard. And 
once it was endorsed by the International Standardization Organization (ISO) – a SSO –, 
it became a formal standard. Another well-known example of a de facto standard is the 
Microsoft’s Office Open XML format for MS-Windows users12.  
 
Technical standards may also be developed by forums, consortia and other informal 
industry associations that are especially prevalent in the ICT industry. The idea lying 
behind their creation is that informal cooperation among a smaller group compound by 
similar companies of the same industry, can agree on a technical standard more quickly. 
Therefore, these organizations lie somewhere between single companies and formal 
SSOs. They may be established to develop a single standard, various standards or to serve 
a wider technology area. An example of a standard developed by a consortium was the 
Compact Disc standard13. 
 
The other possibility to create an interface standard is that the government identifies and 
sets the appropriate standard, compelling all participants in the market to use the standard 
to enforce regulations14.  
 
Focusing now on the SSOs as interface standards developers, these are private industry 
organizations compounded by companies that often compete on the same market and that 
voluntarily join them to collaboratively adopt standards. That is to say, SSOs’ primary 
activity is to develop and maintain standards by bringing together industry participants 
and relevant stakeholders to evaluate competing technologies for inclusion in standards15. 
As mentioned before, standardisation agreements usually produce significant positive 
economic effects. Therefore, even though standardisation is generally achieved by means 
of an agreement between undertakings that are usually competitors on the same market, 
subject to certain conditions, standardisation agreements normally do not restrict 
                                                
11 Bekkers and others, ‘Understanding patents’ (n 3) 17-19. 
12 Méniére, ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory’ (n 10) 9, para 4, fn 3. 
13 Bekkers and others, ‘Understanding patents’ (n 3) 20-21. 
14 Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ (n 9) 1899, para 2. 
15 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [23]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [47]. 
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competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. These conditions16 are the 
following: (i) the participation in standard-setting is unrestricted; (ii) the procedure for 
adopting the standard in question is transparent; (iii) the standardisation agreements do 
not contain obligation to comply with the standard (i.e. the members of a SSO remain free 
to develop alternative standards or products that do not comply with the agreed standard); 
and (iv) members provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND)17 terms – participants will have to assess for themselves 
whether the licensing terms and in particular the fees they charge fulfil the FRAND 
commitment, because SSOs are not required to verify it. 
 
SSOs also seek to ensure that industry participants contribute technology that will create 
valuable standards and that these standards are widely adopted. The broader the 
implementation of a standard, the greater the interoperability benefits. Participants in a 
standard-setting process can obtain significant benefits if their technology becomes part 
of a standard, because alternative competing technologies may disappear from the market. 
These benefits include potential royalties from licensees – implementers – that will 
manufacture products to be sold to millions of consumers, a large base of licensees, 
increased demand for their products and improved interoperability and compatibility with 
the other products using the standard18. 
 
Interface standards are produced for many different products and services, so their 
territorial power may vary depending on whether they were adopted by national, regional 
or international standardization bodies. For instance, in Europe, in the telecommunication 
and electro technical sectors, apart from national technical standards19, there are also 
standards created for regional and global application. Namely, European standards, 
adopted by European standardization bodies, such as the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN, 
by its French acronym) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC, by its French acronym). And international standards, adopted by 
international standardization organizations, such as the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards 
Association (IEEE-SA).  
 
Before explaining the standardization process of SSOs, it is appropriate to specify who 
the members are and their respective interests. These organizations have to integrate the 
business interests of multiple players (e.g. upstream and downstream manufacturers, as 
well as telecommunications network providers, universities, research organizations, non-
                                                
16 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
of the TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements’ (n 7), paras 280, 281, 282, 293.  
17 ibid, paras 285, 287, 288.  
18 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [24], [25] and [28]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [48] and 
[49]. 
19 ‘Supporting European Regulation’ (ETSI) <https://www.etsi.org/standards/supporting-european-
regulation> accessed 28 January 2019. 
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practicing entities and privateers), which is very complicated20. Generally speaking, there 
might be four types of members in a SSO: strictly SEP owners, implementers, SEP 
owners who are also implementers21 and Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs).  
 
Strictly SEP owners or pure innovators are only involved in the upstream market, so they 
just develop and commercialize their inventions. Their funding source comes from the 
incomes of patents they own. Their interest is to make the most profits out of the patent 
rights, for instance, setting royalty rates at the level that maximize their profits. 
 
Implementers are active only in the downstream market. They manufacture products or 
offer services that incorporate or contain inventions developed by third parties that are 
protected by patents. Their interest is to get the lowest possible royalty for the license to 
use the SEPs. 
 
Vertically integrated companies own patents and manufacture the products that 
implement these patents, so they are also involved in the downstream market. Hence, 
these SEP owners are also implementers.  Accordingly, they obtain incomes from patents 
they own. But they also have to pay royalties to implement other standardized 
technologies in the products they manufacture. Therefore, they will prefer to have a total 
royalty set equal to zero. They might obtain that through cross-licensing, where two firms 
license large blocks of their respective patents to one another, without paying monetary 
royalties. However, if they are more an implementer than a SEP owner, they will favour 
the lowest possible royalty. And if they are more a SEP owner than an implementer, they 
will prefer to have the profit-maximizing royalty22. 
 
NPEs own patents by acquisition, not because they invented the technology protected by 
them. Besides, they do not make or sell products or services implementing the patented 
technology. Instead, what they do is to seek licensing revenues from operating companies 
and assert patent rights against infringers, extracting settlement agreements or court-
awarded damages from allegedly infringing operating companies23. Transactions from 
producing firms to buyers who are NPEs are increasingly common24, a phenomenon 
                                                
20 Tim Pohlmann and Knut Blind, ‘Landscaping study on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)’ (IPlytics 2016) 
36, para 1 <www.iplytics.com/about/publications> accessed 25 July 2018. 
21 Aurea Suñol, ‘Patentes y hold-up: la acción de cesación ante compromisos FRAND’ (2015) 4 InDret 
Revista para el Análisis del Derecho 9, paras 5-7, 10, para 1 <www.indret.com/pdf/1189_es.pdf> accessed 
3 December 2018. 
22 Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck and Hans Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability, and Efficiency of 
SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing. A Report for the European Commission’ (Publications 
Office of the European Union 2016) 75, para 2 <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/study-transparency-
predictability-and-efficiency-sso-based-standardization-and-sep-0_en> accessed 2 August 2018. 
23 Marcel Canoy and others, ‘Patents and standards: a modern framework for IPR-based standardisation’ 
(European Commission 2014)  67, para 6 <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/public-consultation-
patents-and-standards-modern-framework-standardisation-involving_en> accessed 25 July 2018; Méniére, 
‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory’ (n 10) 13, para 6.  
24 Pohlmann and Blind, ‘Landscaping study on SEPs’ (n 20) 34, Table 5 (the table about the ‘Top 20 
declared SEP patent transfer deals’ relates to the years 1992 to 2015 and it shows that the largest declared 
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referred to as privateering25. 
 
There is a debate among economists and legal scholars about whether NPEs hinder 
innovation or not. According to one view26, the aim of NPEs is to purchase patents in 
order to extort revenues from operating companies via the threat of litigation. They reckon 
that NPEs have little or no value and the revenues earned by them are a pure transfer, 
producing a deadweight loss to the economy by discouraging operating companies from 
creating new products. This is why NPEs are also named as ‘patent trolls’. 
 
According to another view27, NPEs provide value by serving as intermediaries in the 
market for invention, providing insurance and liquidity to small and mid-sized companies  
specialized in technology development. When these companies try to license their patents 
to operating companies that manufacture consumer products, sometimes they infringe 
small and mid-sized companies’ patents instead of getting licenses, fighting any lawsuit 
that comes along as a strategy. 
 
As regards the standardization process carried out by SSOs – that is open and also 
published –, it usually starts when members propose to create a new standard (or to update 
                                                
SEP sellers are mainly manufacturers or patent aggregators, but it also identifies SEP buyers that are NPEs, 
as well as transactions among NPEs). 
25 John M. Golden, ‘Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement's Historical Survivors’ (2013) 26(2) Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 545; Björn Lundqvist, Standardization Under EU Competition Rules and 
US Antitrust Laws (Edward Elgar 2014) 25, para 1. 
26 Robert P. Merges, ‘The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform’ (2010) 
24(4) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1583; James E. Bessen, Jennifer Ford and Michael J. Meurer, 
‘The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls’ (2011) Boston University School of Law, Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 11-45. < http://www.bu.edu/law/workingpapers-
archive/documents/bessen-ford-meurer-no-11-45rev.pdf> accessed 2 August 2018; Mark A. Lemley and 
Douglas A. Melamed, ‘Missing the Forest for the Trolls’ (2013) 113(8) Columbia Law Review 2117, 2180, 
para 3 (‘That is not to say trolls are not a problem; they are a large and growing one. But they are not the 
problem. Rather, they are a symptom of systemic issues the patent system faces in the IT industry […]’); 
Catherine E. Tucker, ‘The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial 
Activity’ (2014) SSRN Electronic Journal <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611> accessed 3 August 2018; 
Fiona M. Scott Morton and Carl Shapiro, ‘Strategic Patent Acquisitions’ (2014) 79(2) Antitrust Law 
Journal 463; James E. Bessen and Michael J.Meurer, ‘The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes’ (2014) 99(2) 
Cornell Law Review 387; Robin Feldman and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean 
Innovation?’ (2015) 101(1) Iowa Law Review 137; Fiona M. Scott Morton and Carl Shapiro, ‘Patent 
Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to Contribution’ (2016) 16 Innovation Policy and the 
Economy 89; ‘Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study’ (Federal Trade Commission 2016) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-assertion-entities-pae-study> accessed 3 August 2018. 
27 James F. McDonough, ‘The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent 
Dealers in an Idea Economy’ (2006) 56(1) Emory Law Journal 189; John M. Golden, ‘'Patent Trolls' and 
Patent Remedies’ (2007) 85(7) Texas Law Review 2111; Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Jorge 
Padilla, ‘Elves or Trolls? The Role of Non-Practicing Patent Owners in the Innovation Economy’ (2008) 
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-018 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136086> accessed 3 August 2018; 
Michael Risch, ‘Patent Troll Myths’ (2012) 42(2) Seton Hall Law Review 457; Andrei Hagiu, and David 
B. Yoffie, ‘The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators and Super-Aggregators’ 
(2013) 27(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 45; Stephen Haber and Seth H. Werfel, ‘Patent Trolls as 
Financial Intermediaries? Experimental Evidence’ (2016) 149 Economics Letters 64; 
Noel Maurer and Stephen Haber, ‘Patent Trolls or Patent Elves? Evidence from Publicly-Traded Patent 
Assertion Entities’ (2017) IP² Working Paper No. 17003, 3 (‘PAEs […] are not evil trolls, but […] are 
hard-working patent elves’). 
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an existing one). Before the adoption of the standard begins, most SSOs request their 
members to disclosure their IPRs (ex ante disclosure). That is to say, they have to 
disclosure the patents they own, have pending (patent applications) or intend to file28, that 
might be or become relevant or ‘essential’ to the practice of the future standard. Ongoing 
research is not usually declared, since doing so might jeopardise the firms’ ability to 
obtain patent protection later on. There are two categories of ex ante disclosure: negative 
disclosure and specific disclosure29.  
 
Under the negative or blanket disclosure, patent owners only need to declare those patents 
they intend not to license on terms required by the SSO, that is, those that would not be 
subject to the SSOs’ rules on licensing terms. In consequence, SSOs cannot know about 
all existing technologies and whether they are patented or not. Therefore, the negative 
disclosure is complemented with patent owners’ declaration, assuring potential licensees 
that all non-declared patents that turn out to be essential (i) will be licensed and (ii) 
royalties will be subject to the pricing rule employed by the SSO.  
 
In the specific disclosure, patent owners identify the patents they think will be relevant to 
the standard (they do not need to explain how patents are related to it). These declarations 
are not subject to any external check about whether patent owners declared all the patents 
they own or not. Nevertheless, in order to avoid later accusations of withholding 
information, called ‘patent ambush’ – which might constitute an anti-competitive 
behaviour as it will be explained in Section 1.3.1.2. of Chapter 1 –, patent owners tend to 
declare also patents others than those which can clearly be expected to be of relevance to 
the standard, leading to a tendency named as ‘over-declaration’. The main drawback of 
the specific disclosure is that in patent-dense SSOs, patents involved in ex ante specific 
declarations are large and it is very costly for SEP owners to identify in their portfolios 
all relevant patents for the standard. Besides, as it was said, SSOs cannot look at all 
declarations. Therefore, some30 suggest that in these cases the negative disclosure would 
be a superior policy option, because the costs of specific disclosure would not justify the 
benefits. 
 
Once the ex ante disclosure is done, the technical committee – composed of 
representatives of the members of the SSO – considers the options for the best standard. 
That is to say, it researches and discusses the merits of alternative technologies with the 
goal of identifying the best available solution (technology) to a given problem by 
                                                
28 Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘Innovative or Indefensible? An Empirical Assessment of Patenting within Standard 
Setting’ (2008) SSRN Electronic Journal 1, para 1 (‘I reject the hypothesis that all patenting that takes place 
after a standard has been published must be opportunistic. Some may be, but an assessment of the available 
data suggests that much is not’) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1275968> accessed 2 August 2018. 
29 See trends in standards development (disclosure) at Rudi Bekkers and others, ‘Disclosure Rules and 
Declared Essential Patents’ (2017) Boston University Questrom School of Business Research 
Paper <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005009> accessed 2 August 2018. 
30 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 46, para 5, 47, para 2, 48, paras 
2 and 3, 52, paras 3-5, 53, para 1. 
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consensus31. Once it is chosen, the competition between the available technologies in the 
market ceases by design and the standard document is drafted. Afterwards, the document 
will be approved and published by the members of the SSO32, making the standard’s 
documentation available for use by all33. 
 
Subsequently, members of the SSO reveal specific information about their patents 
become SEPs (ex post disclosure), that could not be included in the ex ante specific 
disclosure. The information may include the following details: patent number, grouping 
of SEPs (e.g. patent families) or mapping of patents to a specific part of the standard. The 
above, allows implementers to know who are the SEP owners from whom they should 
get licenses, bringing more transparency to the licensing process34.  
 
Turning now to the concept of SEPs, these patents protect technologies required to 
implement formal standards – adopted by SSOs – in products that depend on 
interconnectivity and compatibility of different systems working together [e.g. fifth 
generation wireless (5G) and the Internet of Things (IoT)]. Namely, the use of SEPs is 
indispensable to all competitors which envisage manufacturing products that comply with 
standards to which they are linked. Furthermore, complex products and systems are often 
based on multiple standards from several SSOs. For example, Wi-Fi is based on a family 
of interface standards developed by the IEEE-SA. Before becoming a formal standard, 
there were other alternative wireless networking technologies available on the market 
competing among them. However, once the IEEE-SA decided to choose the Wi-Fi as the 
standard technology, the existing competition ceased. Thus, nowadays, Wi-Fi is the 
technology addressing the interoperability needs of products, so all manufacturers want 
their products to be compatible with it. Therefore, as the Wi-Fi technology is covered by 
a large number of SEPs owned by several companies, it is essential for implementers to 
obtain licenses to use them. 
 
The main difference between SEPs and non-SEPs is that when standardised technologies 
do not exist, manufacturers have different comparable technologies – also protected by 
patents, the so called ‘non-SEPs’ – available on the market, each of them with their own 
characteristics, because it is normally technically possible to design around a non-SEP. 
Namely, non-SEPs protect technologies that are not essential to any standard, so the 
election of one or another does not compromise the essential functions of the 
manufacturer's product35. For example, there are different technologies to unlock 
                                                
31 Bekkers and others, ‘Understanding patents’ (n 3) 21-24 (they also refer to more standards-development 
principles: transparency, balance, due process, openness, impartiality, effectiveness and relevance, 
coherence and development dimension). 
32 ‘Standards Making’ (ETSI) <https://www.etsi.org/standards/standards-making> accessed 28 January 
2019. 
33 Marc Rysman and Timothy Simcoe, ‘A NAASTy alternative to RAND pricing commitments’ (2011) 
35(11) Telecommunications Policy 1010, 4, para 3 (of the version available at < 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1978437> accessed 25 July 2018). 
34 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 49, para 4, 50, para 1, 54, para 
1. 
35 Case C-170/13 Huawei v ZTE (ECJ, 16 July 2015), paras 49 and 50.  
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smartphones’ screens. Among others, the 'slide to unlock', fingerprint sensors or facial 
recognition. Albeit all of them are patented, the industry has not developed any standard 
to unlock smartphones’ screens. Accordingly, manufacturers can elect the technology 
they want to use. They might obtain a patent license to use an existing technology or they 
might develop their own one without infringing anyone’s patent36. Whatever technology 
they choose to unlock screens, the essential functions of the smartphone will not be 
compromised, that is, the interconnectivity and interoperability between smartphones will 
be guaranteed. By contrast, an implementer has to use the technology protected by a SEP 
when manufacturing a standard-compliant product. 
 
Once the SSO develops a standard, the licensing process starts. It includes, among others, 
the verification of essentiality claims, the organisation of patent pools, the choice of 
royalty base, portfolio licensing and the use of injunctions or Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) mechanisms to solve SEP related disputes quicker. Previously, SSOs 
were reluctant to get involved in the ex post licensing process because standard setting 
was seen historically as an engineering task with little economic relevance37. Currently, 
depending on each SSO, they get involved in more or less aspects of the licensing process. 
But the overall trend is that they do not participate in SEP licensing negotiations – because 
they are commercial issues between the companies – and they do not serve as a forum for 
the resolution of FRAND disputes. Nevertheless, common to nearly all SSOs is the 
inclusion of specific licensing agreements in their IP policies. Hence, most of them 
request to their members to commit to license their SEPs under a specific licensing rule, 
while others give participants a choice as to which variant to use.  It is possible to 
distinguish among three broad types of licensing polices: FRAND38, royalty free and non-
assertion. 
 
According to various studies39, the most common one is the FRAND commitment, that 
refers to SEP holders having to license their patents on fair, reasonable and non-
                                                
36 Competition Directorate-General, ‘Standard Essential Patent’ (n 2) 2, para 5. 
37 Rudi Bekkers and Andrew S. Updegrove, ‘A Study of IPR Policies and Practices of a Representative 
Group of Standards Setting Organizations Worldwide’ (US National Academies of Science, Board of 
Science, Technology, and Economic Policy 2012) 3-5 
<http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/PGA_058712> accessed 4 August 2018. 
38 FRAND and RAND are used as synonyms, being RAND most common in the US and FRAND in the 
EU. See also National Research Council, ‘A Comparison of SSO Policies and Practices’ in Keith Maskus 
and Stephen A. Merrill (eds), Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from 
Information and Communications Technology (The National Academies Press 2013) 35, para 2; United 
States Department of Justice and United States Patent and Trademark Office, ‘Policy Statement on 
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/ RAND Commitments’ (2013) 1, fn 2. 
39 Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ (n 9) 1973, Appendix 1 (of 36 SSO patent policies reviewed, 29 
contained FRAND commitments); Biddle, White and Woods ‘How Many Standards in a Laptop?’ (n 6) 1, 
para 6 (of 251 standards embodied in a typical laptop computer, 75% were subject to FRAND 
commitments); Pohlmann and Blind, ‘Landscaping study on SEPs’ (n 20) 36, para 2 (based on the analysis 
of more than 200,000 SEP disclosures across a range of SSOs, they found that 68% of such disclosures 
contained FRAND licensing commitments); Justus Baron and Daniel F. Spulber, ‘Technology Standards 
and Standard Setting Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center Database’ (2018) Northwestern Law 
and Economics Research Paper No. 17-16, 23, para 2 (of 36 SSOs coded, they identified that 9 SSOs 
requested FRAND licensing and 22 permitted the licensor to choose from a menu of licensing options, 
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discriminatory terms40. Under FRAND terms, SEP owners give the commitment that they 
will grant licenses to all willing licensees, charging same fair and reasonable conditions 
to all of them.  In consequence, SEP owners are not allowed to refuse to grant licenses 
and nor can they grant exclusive licenses. Although the agreement signed voluntarily by 
patent holders is legally binding, SSOs do not impose automatic licensing obligations41. 
This aspect acquires special relevance when determining the nature of FRAND 
commitments. That is to say,  it means that SEP owners will enter into good faith 
negotiations with the ultimate objective of agreeing a licence on those terms42. 
Accordingly, it creates legitimate expectations on the part of third parties that the 
proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms43. But it does not create 
expectations on price level or that the SEP owner will never seek an injunction.  
 
The other type of licensing agreement is the royalty free. This rule means that SEP owners 
have to license their patents free of charge and the other licensing conditions (e.g. 
governing law, field of use, reciprocity or warranties) under FRAND. And under the 
patent non-assertion modality, patent holders must refrain from asserting their patents 
against potential infringers. 
 
In theory, FRAND commitments as licensing rules may seem as an appropriate tool to 
license SEPs because they facilitate access to the technology, while preserving its fair 
value. However, as they were adopted mostly in response to regulatory pressures44 and 
were not defined with sufficient detail, in practice, they are far from being non-
problematic because their ambiguity. Besides, the majority of SSOs patent policies do not 
specify their meaning or the scope of the obligation. In consequence, both the pricing 
aspect of FRAND terms (of ‘reasonable’, in particular) and the scope of that obligation, 
have been subject to many disputes and even litigation. 
 
Firstly, regarding the royalty payments due, concepts of fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory have been theoretically defined mainly by courts and scholars, but also by 
antitrust agencies, although there is not a consensus on the definition, because it depends 
on what is the goal of the SSO’s IP policy45. Accordingly, due to the fact that there are 
                                                
including FRAND as the least restrictive option) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073165> accessed 4 August 
2018. 
40 Bekkers and others, ‘Understanding patents’ (n 3) 89, paras 1 and 3. 
41 Bekkers and Updegrove, ‘A Study of IPR Policies’ (n 37) 32, para 3, 33, para 5. 
42 Nicolas Petit, ‘Antitrust Claims in a Standards Context’ (ASPI-LES, APEB Conference, Paris, 14 June 
2016) [PowerPoint slides] <http://www.les-france.org/offres/doc_inline_src/758/N%2BPETIT%2B-
%2BAntitrust%2BClaims%2Bin%2Ba%2BStandards%2BContext%2B-%2BASPI-
LES%2BAPEB%2BConference%2B-%2BParis%2B2016.pdf> accessed 4 August 2018. 
43 Huawei (n 35) [53]. 
44 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 37, paras 4-6, 38, paras 1 and 
2.  
45 On a comprehensive analysis of FRAND licensing terms, see Chryssoula Pentheroudakis, Justus A. 
Baron and Nikolaus Thumm, ‘Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis 
of Cases’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2017) 125-147 
<https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/licensing-terms-
standard-essential-patents-comprehensive-analysis-cases> accessed 26 July 2018. 
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not widely accepted methodologies to calculate FRAND royalties, there is an ongoing 
debate among economists and legal scholars about the appropriate methodology to 
calculate royalty rates and the suitable royalty base. 
 
According to some46, the reasonable price is the one that is just high enough to guarantee 
a patent holder a reasonable profit (zero economic profit) on their research investments 
and no higher. However, imposing this price eliminates the incentive to produce new 
inventions and participate in the standard-setting process, because it does not capture the 
rents produced by implementers’ sunk investments or coordination costs.  Others47 are of 
the opinion that the purpose of ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ in FRAND  is simply to avoid 
holdup (an abusive behaviour, see Section 1.3.1.1. of Chapter 1). Thus, a fair and 
reasonable royalty would be the one that independent patent holders would have been 
able to charge ex ante (i.e. before the standard was chosen). Some others48 consider that 
the fair and reasonable royalty could be also understood as the marginal price, that is, the 
additional value of the standard after incorporating the technology.  
 
The non-discrimination, that has largely been ignored, means that SEP owners should 
offer the same licensing terms to ‘similarly situated’49 licensees who are in similar 
objective conditions. That is to say, non-discrimination does not mean that licensing 
terms should be identical for all licensees as it would ignore economic realities50. 
Formally, price differences might be justified if costs varied across different groups of 
consumers. However, in practice, the issue becomes more complex because the following 
two reasons. One, licensing agreements include many other clauses in addition to royalty 
rates (e.g. volume discounts or different prices depending on the field of use). It is 
therefore very difficult to argue that a party is discriminated against just because its 
royalty payments are higher. Two, if SEP licensing agreements include confidentiality 
clauses which prevent either party from revealing the terms of the agreement, it is nearly 
impossible for a licensee to know whether or not he faces unlawful discrimination51.  
 
As there is not predictability of licensing fees, the dominant policy to determine 
appropriate royalties between licensors and licensees, has become vague FRAND 
promises followed by ex post negotiation and dispute resolution through ADR and 
judicial procedures. The latter is very costly in terms of time and fees, because litigations 
imply several judicial instances52. 
 
                                                
 
46 Rysman and Simcoe, ‘A NAASTy alternative’ (n 33) 8 and 9. 
47 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 27, para 1, 28, paras 1 and 2.  
48 Bekkers and Updegrove, ‘A Study of IPR Policies’ (n 37) 103, para 4. 
49 On a more detailed discussion of holdup and the definition of ‘similarly situated’, see Dennis W. Carlton 
and Allan Shampine, ‘An Economic Interpretation of FRAND’ (2013) 9(3) Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 531.  
50 Damien Geradin, ‘The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third-Party Determination 
of FRAND Terms’ (2014) 21(4) George Mason Law Review 919, 927, para 3, 928, para 1.  
51 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 28, para 3. 
52 Rysman and Simcoe, ‘A NAASTy alternative’ (n 33) 7, para 3. 
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Secondly, as it was previously mentioned, patent licensing agreements include many 
other important clauses besides those specifying the level of royalty payments due, such 
as licensing period, exclusivity, geographical scope, description of the technology, field 
of use, patents involved (few patents or large portfolios or patents granted after the 
agreement), reciprocity or transfer of patents. Furthermore, additional clauses like no-
challenge clauses – they prohibit licensees from challenging licensors’ patents validity – 
or grant-back clauses – the licensee agrees to grant the licensor a license with respect to 
any improvements to that patent made by the licensee – might also be considered53. 
 
It is important to take into account the extensive content of licensing contracts in order to 
know whether FRAND commitments, in addition to pricing, also apply to other 
dimensions of the licensing agreements. Namely, if FRAND is seen only as a 
commitment to make the technology available for a reasonable royalty payment, then this 
commitment can still be undermined by a licensor or a licensee threatening to impose 
other terms that are unpalatable to other parties (e.g. no-challenge clauses or limits on 
confidentiality clauses). Nonetheless, if the scope of application of FRAND is not limited 
to the amount of licensing fees, but it extends to other terms and conditions of the 
licensing contract, the risk that parties might impose a no FRAND clause is mitigated.   
 
For instance, the issue regarding the no-challenge clause was addressed by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case Huawei v. ZTE54 (it will be deeply analysed in Chapter 
4). It concluded that an alleged infringer could not be criticised either for challenging the 
validity and/or the essential nature of patents or for reserving the right to do so in the 
future. Namely, the licensor cannot demand the licensee to sign a no-challenge clause, 
renouncing his right to later dispute the validity or essentiality of the licensed patent. In 
consequence, the ECJ implicitly referred to the fact that not only the price must be 
FRAND, but also the challenge clause. It55 based its conclusion, first, on the fact that 
SSOs – during the standardisation procedure – do not check whether patents are valid or 
essential to the standard in which they are included. Indeed, only a court can decide on 
the validity and the issue of whether a standard-compliant product infringes a patent that 
has been declared essential to a standard and therefore whether the patent is essential as 
declared by its owner to the SSO. Until a court decides otherwise, a SEP is thus presumed 
valid, like any other patent56, and essential to the standard as declared by its owner to the 
SSO57. 
                                                
53 Canoy and others, ‘Patents and standards’ (n 23) 186, para 3 and 53, Table 2.9; Régibeau, De Coninck 
and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 24, para 5, 28, para 3. 
54 (n 35). 
55 ibid [69]; On the contrary, see the economic analysis that concludes that the European Commission and 
Advocate General erred to assume that consumers derive a net marginal benefit from the announced policy 
encouraging a licensee to challenge the validity of licensed SEPs: Gregory J. Sidak, ‘Evading Portfolio 
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges’ (2016) 39(2) World Competition 
191. 
56 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, para 362. 
57 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [33]. 
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And second, on the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU58. The ECJ did not refer to any other contractual 
dimensions along which parties could disagree, such as, the inclusion of confidentiality 
clauses.  
 
In order to verify that the licensor complies with the commitment to non-discrimination 
as part of FRAND, some authors reckon necessary to put some limits on confidentiality 
clauses59. This could take different forms60, being the most extreme the one that requires 
compulsory publication of SEP-licensing terms and their inclusion in a publicly 
accessible SEP data-base. However, the ECJ merely stated that in the absence of a 
licensing agreement made public, the proprietor of the SEP is best placed to check 
whether its offer complies with the condition of non-discrimination61. Therefore, due to 
the divergent content of both clauses (no-challenge and confidentiality), in order to verify 
compliance with the non-discrimination commitment, it would not be proper to argue as 
follows. As SEP holders  cannot insist on the inclusion of no-challenge clauses anymore, 
they cannot either insist on the inclusion of confidentiality clauses62. 
 
In conclusion, as FRAND-encumbered SEPs are increasingly viewed as strategic 
financial weapons and resources and not merely as legal assets, companies – who own a 
wide range of very relevant patent portfolios – and manufacturers engage in numerous 
patent buying and selling transactions, licensing agreements, as well as in numerous 
costly legal disputes that could jeopardize the positive effects associated with 
standardization. Patents are not only traded with regard to a merger or acquisition, which 
entails the reassignment of many declared SEPs, but also to strengthen the patent 
portfolios connected to particular technologies or standards. Or to enter in a new sector 
with a secure place in evolving markets (e.g. Google bought Motorola Mobility’s 
portfolio in order to enter the smartphone sector)63. 
 
In this regard, it is interesting to raise the results of an empirical study64 that compares 
declared SEPs transfer and litigation average, with control groups of patents that had not 
been declared as standard essential (but which were filed at the same patent office with 
the same publication year and which were categorized in the same main International 
Patent Classification classes). In the time period of 1992-2015, 12,36% of all declared 
SEPs were transferred at least once, whereas the percentage decreases to 9,87% in the 
control group. Taking into account only litigations that took place in the United States 
                                                
58 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/389 (the Charter). 
59 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 71, para 1. 
60 Méniére, ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory’ (n 10) 21, para 4 (he proposes, either on a voluntary 
or on a mandatory basis, (i) the ex ante disclosure of licensing terms – when the value of the standard is 
still uncertain; or (ii) the anonymous disclosure of actual licensing terms once the SEPs are effectively 
licensed – to be compiled in a database available to courts and negotiating parties).  
61 Huawei (n 35) [64]. 
62 Régibeau, De Coninck and Zenger, ‘Transparency, Predictability’ (n 22) 71, para 1. 
63 Pohlmann and Blind, ‘Landscaping study on SEPs’ (n 20) 31, paras 1 and 3. 
64 ibid 40, para 1, 41, Figure 24. 
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(US), 1,93% of all declared SEPs were litigated at least once, while patents in the control 
group were litigated in only 0.45% of all cases65. 
 
All in all, the aim of FRAND is to achieve a balance between the right to exclude (granted 
by patent law); and the right to access to markets (conferred by competition or antitrust 
law), ensuring that everybody has access to standardised technologies and that fair 
competition exists in an open-market economy. Remember that standardised technologies 
address the needs for interconnection and interoperability and that there are not any other 
alternative technologies on the market that do that (SEP owners are the sole licensors of 
standardised technologies). Hence, all manufacturers that want to produce interoperable 
products, need to obtain SEP licenses to use the standardised technologies. 
 
Therefore, the FRAND commitment pursues to avoid or at least, to mitigate the risk of 
opportunistic behaviours by SEP owners. By opportunistic behaviours (see Section 1.3. 
of Chapter 1) I am referring to the possibility of SEP owners abusing their dominant 
positions, leading potential licensees to a lock-in situation. That is to say, due to the 
binding effect of the FRAND commitment, if SEP owners exploit, exclude or 
discriminate willing licensees, their products cannot compete in the market for not being 
interconnectable and interoperable.  
 
For instance, SEP owners might request licensing conditions that are not fair or 
reasonable, thus exploiting willing licensees. These conducts known as ‘holdup’ and 
‘royalty stacking’, they will be explained further on. SEP holders might also decide not 
to grant licenses under FRAND terms (refusal to deal), in order to exclude willing 
licensees from the market.  
 
Pursuing that same purpose of exclusion, they might also bring actions seeking 
prohibitory injunctions or the recall of products against potential licensees, who are 
infringing their SEPs. As it will be explained below (see the 'Statement of the problem'), 
the core subject of study of my research revolves around this latter conduct. The idea 
lying behind considering that behaviour as abusive, it is that infringers want to get 
licenses but due to a lack of agreement – usually, on the price –, they are using the SEPs 
without paying any royalties (because otherwise, they could not implement the 
standardised technologies in their products). And basing on that fact, SEP owners sue 
potential licensees for patent infringement.  
 
SEP owners might also discriminate between willing licensees, charging them different 
prices. 
 
                                                
65 In the same vein, there are studies showing that SEPs are more likely to be litigated than non-SEPs. 
See Timothy S. Simcoe, Stuart JH Graham and Maryann P. Feldman, ‘Competing on Standards? 
Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies’ (2009) 18 Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy 775; Canoy and others, ‘Patents and standards’ (n 23). 
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Accordingly, in order to avoid SEP holders abuse their dominant positions, some SSOs, 
such as the IEEE-SA66, it went further and changed its patent policy in 2015 (only 
applicable with respect to IEEE standards). It was the first SSO regulating a methodology 
to calculate FRAND royalty rates and limiting the use of injunctions to the case the 
implementer refuses to accept a third party adjudicated rate. 
II. Statement of the problem 
 
Frequently, when parties disagree about the determination of FRAND royalties, the 
licensing negotiation breaks down, although the implementer continues using the SEP. 
Hence, when companies are considered to infringe patents, owners have several means 
available to enforce their IPRs in the EU and US.  
 
Article 28 of the Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement67 provides that a patent gives its owner the right to prevent others from 
making, using or selling the invention without its permission. In accordance with that, the 
Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights68 (IPRED) 
requires all Member States countries to provide effective, dissuasive, and proportionate 
measures against those engaged in IP infringements, and aims to create a level playing 
field for right holders in the EU. It means that all Member States will have a similar set 
of measures available for right holders to defend their IPRs. Accordingly, the IPRED 
enables patent owners to bring various actions for infringement to ensure a high level of 
protection for IPRs in the internal market. As it will be explained bellow, the behaviours 
object of study in Samsung, Motorola and Huawei v. ZTE consisted of bringing 
infringement actions seeking (and enforcing, only in Motorola) different measures. In 
Samsung, preliminary and permanent injunctions, while in Motorola only the latter one.  
Whereas in Huawei v. ZTE, an injunction prohibiting the infringement, the rendering of 
accounts, the recall of products and an award of damages. However, it is worth 
mentioning all of the measures provided by the IPRED, although only some of them raise 
anti-competitive concerns.  
 
The IPRED distinguishes between provisional measures (also known as interim 
measures) and measures resulting from a decision on the merits of the case finding an 
infringement of an IPR (permanent measures). The provisional measures consist of 
interlocutory/preliminary injunctions, the seizure of goods suspected of infringing an IPR 
and the precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the alleged 
infringer.  
                                                
66 IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws 2017, Arts 6(1) (a methodology to calculate FRAND royalty rates) 
and 6(2) (the use of injunctions) <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf> 
accessed 1 August 2018. 
67 Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement [as amended on 23 January 2017] of 15 
April 1994, contained in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (TRIPS Agreement). 
68 Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights [2004] OJ L157/45 (IPRED). 
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The interlocutory/preliminary injunction is intended (i) to prevent any imminent 
infringement of an IPR. Or (ii) to forbid the continuation of the alleged infringements of 
that right (the so-called prohibitory injunction). And where provided for by national law 
and the judicial authority considers it appropriate, the prohibition might be subject to a 
recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring compliance. Or (iii) to make the 
continuation of the alleged infringement subject to the lodging of guarantees intended to 
ensure the compensation of the right holder [Article 9(1)(a)], as it will be described in 
Section 6.2.2. of Chapter 5.   
 
Judicial authorities may also order the seizure or delivery up of the goods suspected of 
infringing an IPR so as to prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of 
commerce [Article 9(1)(b)]. 
 
In the case of an infringement committed on a commercial scale and if the injured party 
demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages, the judicial 
authorities may order the precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property 
of the alleged infringer, including the blocking of his bank accounts and other assets 
[Article 9(2)]. 
 
With regard to the measures resulting from a decision on the merits of the case, they 
consist of corrective measures, injunctions, alternative measures and damages. 
 
Firstly, without prejudice to any damages due to the right holder by reason of the 
infringement, and without compensation of any sort, the judicial authorities may order 
that appropriate corrective measures be taken with regard to goods that they have found 
to be infringing an IPR and, in appropriate cases, with regard to materials and implements 
principally used in the creation or manufacture of those goods. Such measures shall 
include: (a) recall from the channels of commerce, (b) definitive removal from the 
channels of commerce, or (c) destruction [Article 10(1)].  
 
Secondly, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at 
prohibiting the continuation of the infringement (prohibitory injunction), without being 
limited in time. And where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an 
injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view 
to ensuring compliance (Article 11).  
 
Thirdly, Member States have the option69 to provide that in appropriate cases and at the 
request of the person liable to be subject to the measures70, the competent judicial 
authorities may order – as an alternative measure – pecuniary compensation to be paid to 
                                                
69 Note that the transposition of the other provisional and permanent measures is compulsory for the 
Member States (‘Member States shall ensure’/ ‘Member States may provide’). 
70 Note that all the other provisional and permanent measures (except for injunctions) may be ordered at 
the request of the IPR holder. 
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the injured party instead of applying permanent measures if that person acted 
unintentionally and without negligence, if execution of the measures in question would 
cause him disproportionate harm and if pecuniary compensation to the injured party 
appears reasonably satisfactory (Article 12). This alternative measure will be studied in 
Section 6.2.1. of Chapter 5. 
 
And fourthly, the competent judicial authorities may also order the infringer who 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in an infringing activity, to pay 
the right holder damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered by him as a result of 
the infringement. However, even if the infringer engaged in infringing activity 
unknowingly, or without reasonable grounds to know, the judicial authorities may also 
order the recovery of profits or the payment of damages, which may be pre-established. 
When the judicial authorities set the damages: (a) they shall take into account all 
appropriate aspects, such as the negative economic consequences, including lost profits, 
which the injured party has suffered, any unfair profits made by the infringer and, in 
appropriate cases, elements other than economic factors, such as the moral prejudice 
caused to the right holder by the infringement; or (b) as an alternative to (a), they may, in 
appropriate cases, set the damages as a lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least 
the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation to use the IPR in question (Article 13). 
 
In addition, without prejudice to the measures laid down by the IPRED, Member States 
may apply other appropriate sanctions in cases where IPRs have been infringed (Article 
16). 
 
Section 283 of the Patent Act (35 U.S. Code)71 states that a court may grant an injunction 
(prohibitory injunction) in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the 
infringement of a patent right (equitable remedy). And Section 284 of the Patent Act 
provides that in the case of patent infringement, a court should award a patent holder 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty (legal remedy). The patent owner who succeeds in a claim seeking 
legal remedies – generally limited to monetary damages –, is entitled to those remedies 
as a matter of right. In contrast, the party does not have an absolute right to an equitable 
remedy, so judges have the discretion to grant or deny equitable relief. Generally, a court 
will award an equitable remedy where a remedy at law, such as monetary damages, would 
be inadequate72. 
 
Both in the EU and US, there has been a debate about the circumstances under which a 
SEP holder should be entitled to obtain a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products 
that infringe IPRs. The doubts in this regard arise because SEP holders state their 
willingness to license their patents on FRAND terms. Therefore, it would seem 
                                                
71 U.S Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 283. 
72 J. Gregory Sidak, ‘Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement’ (2016) 24(2) Texas Intellectual Property 
Law Journal 161, 167-168. 
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contradictory that, on the one hand, they are committed to grant licenses and, on the other 
hand, they bring the aforementioned infringement actions against alleged infringers who 
implemented their SEPs in their products, without being licensees. 
 
In the EU, the discussion has been framed in the abuse of a dominant position under 
Article 102 TFEU73: does a SEP owner abuse its dominant position if it brings actions 
seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products? The Recital 12 of IPRED 
states that the measures provided for in it, they should not be used to restrict competition 
unduly in a manner contrary to the Treaty. That is, these infringement actions may be 
liable to prevent products manufactured by SEP owners' competitors – that comply with 
the standard in question –, from appearing or remaining on the market. Other measures 
may also cause the exclusion of the infringer/competitor from the market, in the same 
vein as preliminary/permanent injunctions and the recall of products. I am referring to the 
seizure of goods suspected of infringing an IPR or the definitive removal from the 
channels of commerce and destruction of goods that they have found to be infringing an 
IPR. Therefore, all these six measures constitute the subject of study of this research.  
 
Whereas the rest of the measures available for right holders, do not affect the maintenance 
of competition in markets, because they do not allow them to impede the products 
manufactured by competitors from entering the market. I am referring to the 
precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the alleged infringer in 
favour of SEP owners, the pecuniary compensation, the rendering of accounts and the 
award of damages74. This is the reason why – from the competition law viewpoint – it 
has not been discussed whether it might be abusive the request of those measures by SEP 
owners. 
 
Therefore, the terms of the conflict are the following75: the patent owner whose IPRs have 
been violated, has the right to an effective measure [Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU76 and Article 47(1) of the Charter]. The alleged infringer, 
where appropriate, will be protected by the freedom to conduct a business in a position 
of free competition (Article 119 and Protocol No 27 of TFEU and Article 16 of the 
Charter).  
 
The Commission analysed this issue in Samsung77 and  Motorola78 cases. On the one 
hand, it studies whether SEP owners brought the action for a prohibitory injunction with 
                                                
73 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/1 (TFEU). 
I will refer to Article 102 TFEU that is in force. However, note that some case law cited in this research – 
that is prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon –, refers to Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, that 
was renumbered to Article 82 later on by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
74 Huawei (n 35) [72]–[76]. 
75 ibid [42]. 
76 (n 58), to read with Article 6(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ 
C202/13 (TEU) (‘[…] the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter […] shall have the same 
legal value as the Treaties’). 
77 (Case AT.39939) Summary of Commission Decision 2014/C 350/08 [2014] OJ C350/8; (n 7).  
78 (Case AT.39985) Summary of Commission Decision 2014/C 344/06 [2014] OJ C344/6; (n 7). 
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the objective of forcing implementers to pay excessive or disproportionate royalties 
(patent holdup and royalty stacking), that could be qualified as an exploitative abuse. And 
on the other hand, if that conduct of SEP holders could be qualified as an exclusionary 
abuse. The ECJ also ruled on this issue, for the first and only time, in the case Huawei v. 
ZTE79, where it analyses whether bringing an action for infringement seeking a 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products constitutes an exclusionary abuse.  
 
Focusing only on the perspective of the exclusionary abuse, the Commission and the ECJ 
qualified the conduct of SEP owners as a novel category of exclusionary abuse. In 
particular, they did not consider that the conduct could fit in the existing ‘refusal to deal’ 
category (see Section 1.3.2.5. of Chapter 1). The negative consequences derived from that 
qualification will be studied in Chapters 3 and 4 (and more systematically in Section 2 of 
Chapter 5).  
 
Accordingly, in this research, I will defend that SEP owners’ conduct should have been 
qualified as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses –, instead of as a novel 
category of abuse within the framework of Article 102 TFEU. That is to say, I reckon that 
when specific circumstances concur, it might be understood that SEP owners are not 
willing to grant SEP licenses to their competitors – they are implicitly refusing to grant 
licenses –, while their true aim is to exclude them from the market. And in order to achieve 
that, they bring infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of 
products against willing licensees.  
 
Otherwise, should not it be sufficient to request to order the payment of FRAND royalties 
in the form of awarding damages – increased, where appropriate, to stimulate 
implementers to apply for a license?  
III. Research questions  
 
This research will answer the following two questions: 
• Does bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products by SEP 
owners constitute an abuse of a dominant position, because it might be considered 
as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant IP licenses?  
• If yes, is compulsory license the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end 
the violation of Article 102 TFEU? 
 
Related questions derived from the main inquiries would be as follows:  
• What abusive conducts may arise when licensing SEPs?  
• The fact of bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products to 
remedy a SEP infringement, when does it constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
according to the Commission – in Samsung and Motorola – and the German Federal 
Supreme Court – in Orange Book –? 
                                                
79 (n 35). 
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• In accordance with the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE, during the negotiation of patent 
licenses, what specific actions do SEP holders have to perform not to be considered 
that they abuse their dominant positions when bringing infringement actions? And 
what are the obligations alleged infringers must comply with?  
• How did the Member State courts cover the legal gaps posed by Huawei v. ZTE? 
• What is the ECJ case law on refusal to grant IP licenses? 
• How should have been reviewed the IMS Health jurisprudence? 
• What are the legal basis on which other jurisdictions – US – have been based on, to 
impose compulsory licenses to solve SEP disputes? 
IV. Thesis outline 
 
For the purpose of examining when the exertion of its rights by a SEP holder may be 
considered an abuse of its dominant position, I will start by defining the elements that 
comprise the abuse of dominant position, the types of abusive behaviours and its 
enforcement under EU law, in Chapter 1.  
 
Then, I am going to laid the foundations to justify – later on, in Chapter 5 – that the 
Huawei v. ZTE case should have been treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to grant 
licenses – and not as a specific and novel category of abuse within the meaning of Article 
102 TFEU. Accordingly, in Chapter 2, I will carefully analyse the case law of the ECJ on 
refusal to grant IP licenses.  
 
Next, in Chapters 3 and 4, I will present and review the arguments of the European 
Commission (EC) and the ECJ that justify the qualification of SEP owners’ conduct as a 
novel category of abuse. 
 
Later, in Chapter 5, I will develop the previously cited argument in the following sense: 
to qualify as abusive the fact of bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction and the recall 
of products by a SEP holder, it must be argued that is a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant a 
license. In this way, the Huawei v. ZTE case would be consistent with the ECJ 
jurisprudence on refusal to deal. And consequently, the compulsory license would emerge 
as the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end the violation of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
To conclude, I will discuss the findings of the research and the future work in Chapter 6.  
 
V. Research objective 
 
With my research, in general terms, I would like to bring more legal certainty to SEP 
licensing and enforcement framework in the EU, to give licensors an adequate return on 
their investment and to implementers, the access to standardised technologies at a fair and 
reasonable cost. Specifically, its aim is to analyse the viability and usefulness of (i) 
qualifying the fact of bringing patent infringement actions as abusive, treating it as a 
‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses –; and (ii) ordering the grant of 
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compulsory licenses to remedy the anti-competitive practice, in favour of patent 
infringers. The finding of the infringement and the remedy design are two separate 
questions, and as such, I will keep them entirely apart in this research80. The approach 
defended in this research constitutes an ultima ratio solution when the principle of 
the freedom of the parties to arrange their own affairs turned out to be unsuccessful.  
 
The issue analysed in this research acquires special relevance with the development of 
the 5G – the goal is to deploy it across the EU by 2025 – and the IoT. A variety of 
European industries are engaging in further digital integration of a constellation of 
objects, devices, sensors and everyday items. These applications are found in key 
domains: from connected cars to smart cities.  
 
According to the EC, the benefits of IoT to businesses, citizens and public authorities 
may be delayed, due to regulatory uncertainty as regards the delineation, licensing and 
enforcement of SEPs. In other words, FRAND regime might dissuade future investments 
in standards-related innovations. It reckons that access to the protected technology 
attached to these standards remains unpredictable, notably for industries outside the ICT 
sector, due to factors such as risk of uncertainty in enforcement81. 
 
A harmonized and predictable framework, would provide a level playing field in the 
single market for technology providers, incentivising their investment in the 
standardisation, and in research and development applications for smart and connected 
products and services. Ando also to businesses that are preparing 5G deployment and to 
those using connectivity. 
 
VI. Methodology 
 
To answer the aforementioned research questions, I will use the following methodologies 
of legal research. 
 
Firstly, the ‘black letter’ methodology which primary aim is to collate, organize and 
analyse legal data mainly from Members States, EU and US to offer critical commentaries 
on them82. That is, normative sources (hard and soft law); case law; legal doctrine (as the 
scientific community which discusses, accepts or rejects positions taken by colleagues 
and the theories they propose on the others); antitrust cases (from competition authorities) 
and SSOs’ patent policies. 
                                                
80 Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Per Hellström and Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust 
Law’ (2009) 76(1) Antitrust Law Journal 43, 48, para 3. 
81 Commission, ‘Standard Essential Patents for a European digitalised economy’ (a roadmap provided for 
information purposes only, 2017) 1, paras 2 and 3. It resulted in the Communication: Commission, 
‘Communication from the Commission to the Institutions on Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents’ COM(2017) 712 final. 
82 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark Van 
Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of legal research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
2011) 11. 
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It is necessary to consider not only legal data from Member States but also data coming 
from EU bodies, since the case law of the ECJ, regulations and directives are binding for 
all Member States. Equally important is to take into account legal data emanating from 
courts of technologically more developed countries, such as US, where licensing and 
enforcement of SEPs have been discussed more broadly and deeply. Although the legal 
system of each other varies, the research questions posed in this research are subject of 
discussion both in the EU and US. 
  
Secondly, I will analyse that data, describing and explaining the problems that licensing 
and enforcement of SEPs entail. For a better understanding, I will also explain the whys 
and wherefores of legal concepts, rules, principles and constructions, as it is necessary 
for interpreting their meaning and scope correctly83. The aim of interpreting legal 
documents is not just to report facts (what is the current practice of the law), but also to 
question what should be the practice of the law to serve not only internal coherence, but 
broader issues of justice and other economic policies84.  
 
And thirdly, I will use foreign law as a tool for different purposes, because it is very useful 
in areas for potential reform or clarification, as it is the case of the subject matter of this 
research. The goal is to find a better solution to the legal problem I analyse and to conduct 
common rules for different Member States85.  
 
In particular, I will use German case law (Orange Book) to explain the origin of the issue 
analysed in this research. I will also analyse Member States case law to illustrate how 
national courts dealt with the legal gaps posed by the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE. In the same 
vein, I will use US case law to support the suitability of issuing compulsory licenses in 
the EU, when negotiations to enter into licensing agreements are deadlocked.  Namely, 
the purpose is to analyse how the law in a different jurisdiction – who pursues the same 
or akin objectives – employs different approaches to justify issuing compulsory licenses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 ibid 8, para 4. 
84 Samuel Geoffrey, ‘Is law really a social science? A view from comparative law’ (2008) 67 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 288, 292-296; Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine’ (n 82) 4, para 4, 5, para 2. 
85 Martha Louise Minow, ‘The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United 
States’ (2010) 52 Harvard International Law Journal Online 1, 18, para 2 (‘neglecting [...] international and 
comparative law could vitiate the vitality, nimbleness, and effectiveness of [national] law or simply leave 
us without the best tools and insights as we design and run institutions, pass legislation, and work to govern 
ourselves’) <https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/10511098> accessed 25 July 2018; Jan BM Vranken, 
‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’ in Hoecke (n 82) 120, para 2; 
John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Hoecke (n 82) 158, para 1; 
Irene Calboli, ‘The Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in Intellectual Property Law: From Good to 
Great?’ in Graeme B. Dinwoodie (ed), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 
2013) 5, para 2, 24, para 1. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT UNDER EU LAW 
Introduction 
 
Generally speaking, it is permitted – and indeed expected– that dominant undertakings 
compete aggressively on a given market. The above, as long as their behaviours reflect 
competition 'on the merits' and not restrictive practices. Namely, a competition reflecting 
the competitive advantages enjoyed by the dominant undertakings.  However, the 
distinction between abusive and legitimate (permissible) unilateral conduct by a dominant 
undertaking is not always straightforward86. 
 
In cases such as the one that concern us – to bring infringement actions seeking a 
prohibitory injunction or the recall of products by SEP owners –, it is hard to discern 
whether that behaviour constitutes an exclusionary abuse or not (a reflection of this is the 
wide academic debate that exists on the issue). In the same vein, when a dominant 
undertaking decides to refuse to deal to customers, suppliers or competitors, that conduct 
does not always constitute an abuse (in Chapter 2 will be studied under what 
circumstances a refusal to deal constitutes an exclusionary abuse).  
 
The aim of this research is to propose that the aforementioned conduct carried out by SEP 
holders, it should have been treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal, instead of as a 
novel category of abuse.  
 
To understand it better, firstly, I refer to Article 102 TFEU that governs the unilateral or 
‘abuse of dominant position’ conduct, that has four constituent elements: defining the 
relevant market, establishing dominance (if it holds a dominant position), assessing 
whether the unilateral conduct is abusive or not (each conduct is constructed as an abuse 
using different legal argumentations)87 and determining if the abuse may affect trade 
between Member States. 
 
Once the existence of an anti-competitive practice has been determined, it is time to 
enforce competition law. Accordingly, secondly, I mention the measures provided by 
Regulation 1/2003 that are divided in remedies, sanctions and binding commitments. As 
the main remedy ordered in cases of refusal to deal was the compulsory license, it also 
emerges as the most proportionate and necessary measure to remedy the abusive conduct 
carried out by SEP holders. Therefore, that measure will be studied in greater depth. 
 
 
                                                
86 ‘Abusing a dominant position–overview’ (Lexis Nexis), para 3 
<https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/competition/document/391329/55KB-7MK1-F187-53G2-
00000-00/Abusing_a_dominant_position_overview - > accessed 14 January 2019. 
87 ibid, para 4. 
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1. The abuse of dominance: Article 102 TFEU 
 
As a starting point, it is important to stress that the EU competition law – embodied in 
Article 102 TFEU – pursues the aim to protect competition, by regulating the actions of 
companies in dominant positions. That is, under the EU rules, monopolies are not 
prohibited as such, but the abuse of a dominant position. Whereas US antitrust law – 
embodied in section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 – essentially aims the same, but by 
prohibiting the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, rather than by regulating 
the actions of companies in dominant positions. 
 
According to Article 102 TFEU, ‘any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts’. 
 
In order to determine whether an undertaking abused its dominant position on the market 
contrary to Article 102 TFEU, the aforementioned four elements must be taking into 
account. First, it is necessary to define the relevant market and secondly, to determine 
whether the undertaking concerned is dominant on the market so defined (the existence 
of a dominant position)88. If so, thirdly, it has to be analysed if the conduct amounts to an 
abuse of that dominant position. And finally, it must be assessed if the trade between 
Member States may be affected by the abusive conduct. 
 
Bellow, I will define these elements. The analysis of their presence with regard to the 
specific behaviours subject of study in this research, it will be conducted in the respective 
Chapters 2 (regarding the refusal to deal) and 3 and 4 (with reference to SEP owners’ 
behaviour of bringing infringement actions).   
 
1.1. Relevant market definition 
 
In order to determine if an IP owner holds a dominant position, first of all, the relevant 
market – product/service and geographical market – needs to be identified. That is, the 
area of competition in which the market power of the allegedly dominant undertaking 
(and of any actual or potential competitors) is to be judged89. Hence, the objective of 
                                                
88 Case C-242/95 GT-Link v DSB [1997] ECR I-04449, para 36. 
89 IMS Health (Case COMP D3/38.044) Commission Decision 2002/165/EC [2001] OJ L59/18, para 45. 
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defining a market in both its product/service and geographic dimension is to identify those 
actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of constraining those 
undertakings' behaviour and of preventing them from behaving independently of effective 
competitive pressure90. 
 
Undertakings holding a dominant position always try to identify a broader relevant 
market. On the contrary, the Commission and Member State competition authorities 
generally tend to define relevant markets very narrowly. The definition of the relevant 
market is done for each individual case, as conditions of competition may change over 
time and will depend upon the peculiarities of a given case91. 
 
A market definition may also contain a temporal dimension where appropriate, that is, 
the moment of time in which the exchange of goods or services included in the relevant 
product market takes place. For instance, it may be convenient to define the temporary 
market regarding services with peak and off peak demands, such as transport, electricity 
or telecommunication services92. 
1.1.1. The relevant product or service market 
According to settled case law93, the relevant product or service market comprises all those 
products or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of their characteristics, prices and intended use.  
 
In theory, three are the principles to define the relevant product or service market: demand 
substitution, supply substitution and potential competition94. However, traditionally, the 
concept of market has been mainly linked to the demand substitution. The supply 
substitution may also be bear in mind, although only when its effects are equivalent to 
those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy. Otherwise, like 
potential competition, they are taken into account at the assessment stage of competition 
analysis, when assessing whether obstacles to enter in the market exist (see Section 
1.2.2.3. of this Chapter). 
 
                                                
90 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law’ (1997) OJ C372/5, para 2. 
91 ‘Abusing a dominant position–overview’ (n 86), paras 8 and 9.  
92 Fernando Jiménez Latorre and Enrique Cañizares Pacheco, ‘Dificultades para la definición del mercado 
relevante’ (Second Seminar on Law and Economics of Antitrust Law organized by the Rafael del Pino 
Foundation, Madrid, 18 October 2005) [paper] 33, 38, fn 8 <https://www.frdelpino.es/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/es_02-JIMENEZ-CAÑIZARES.pdf> accessed 14 January 2019. 
93 Case C-31/80 L'Oréal v De Nieuwe AMCK (ECJ, 11 December 1980), para 25; Case C-322/81 Michelin 
v Commission [1983] ECR I-3461, para 37; Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie [1991] ECR I-03359, para 51; 
Case T-30/89 Hilti [1991] ECR II-01439, para 64; Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak [1994] ECR II-00755, para 63. 
94 Case C-27/76 United Brands (ECJ, 14 February 1978), paras 22-35; Commission, ‘Commission notice 
on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), para 13.   
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The reason is that demand substitution constitutes the most immediate and effective 
disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product or service95, in particular in relation 
to their pricing decisions. A company cannot have a significant impact on the prevailing 
conditions of sale, such as prices, if its customers are in a position to switch easily to 
available substitute products or services. On the contrary, competitive constraints arising 
from supply side substitutability and from potential competition are in general less 
immediate and in any case require an analysis of additional factors. Accordingly, the most 
common is that the relevant market comprises all those products or services considered 
substitutes from the point of view of the demand96.  
 
1.1.1.1. Demand substitution 
 
The assessment of demand substitution entails a determination of the range of products 
or services which are viewed as substitutes by the consumer. The definition of the relevant 
product or service market depends on what would be the likely reactions of customers if 
the company made a small (in the range 5 % to 10 %) and permanent change in relative 
prices [the so called Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test]. 
They might decide to redirect their consumption towards other products or services 
(offered by existing competitors) that they would consider substitutes, either due to their 
objective characteristics, prices or, ultimately, because they were particularly suitable for 
satisfying their constant needs in a comparable way. Or they might opt to continue 
consuming the same products or services.  
 
If a sufficient number of consumers switched to the extent of making the price increase 
unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales, those additional substitutes would be 
included in the relevant market definition. This would be done until a set of products or 
services was identified, for which a permanent increase in the relative price would not 
induce a sufficient substitution in demand, so the price increase would be profitable. In 
that scenario, those additional products or services would be excluded from the relevant 
market definition97.  
 
Generally, the price to take into account will be the prevailing market price, bearing in 
mind that it might have already been substantially increased when the undertaking holds 
a dominant position98.  In that regard, it should be taken into account the 
Cellophane Paradox, that is one of the constraints that the SSNIP test presents. Namely, 
although the test is generally accepted and used in the field, it suffers from some 
constraints, such as the paradox previously mentioned. It refers to the case where 
companies that hold a dominant position, raise their prices to the level where further 
                                                
95 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), para 13; Case T-177/04 
EasyJet v Commission [2006] ECR II-1931, para 99. 
96 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), paras 13 and 14; Jiménez 
Latorre and Cañizares Pacheco, ‘Dificultades para la definición del mercado relevante’ (n 92) 36, para 6 
and 37, para 3.  
97 ibid, paras 15-18; ibid 36, para 4. 
98 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), para 19. 
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increases in prices are not profitable. Applying the aforementioned test, it would result 
that in response to an increase in those prices made by dominant companies, their 
consumers would be willing to switch towards products or services that they would not 
consider as substitutes in case the prices were placed at the competitive level. Hence, it 
might seem that these substitutes should also be included in the relevant market, when 
the truth is that consumers do not consider them substitutes. Accordingly, the relevant 
product market would be defined too broadly, diluting artificially the market power of 
the company in question99. 
 
1.1.1.2. Supply substitution 
 
Supply side substitutability may also be bear in mind when defining markets in those 
situations in which its effects are equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of 
effectiveness and immediacy.  
 
When a company markets a wide range of qualities or grades of one product, the different 
qualities will be grouped into one product market under the following circumstances, 
even if for a final customer different qualities of the product cannot be substitutable (e.g. 
standard writing papers and high quality papers to publish art books would not be 
substitutable in demand for the majority of consumers). If an undertaking (e.g. a paper 
plant) makes small and permanent changes in relative prices of a product and most of the 
potential competition suppliers are able to offer and sell those various qualities 
immediately and without the significant increases in costs described above, the relevant 
product market will encompass, besides all products that are substitutable in demand, also 
those that are substitutable in supply. And the current sales of those various qualities will 
be aggregated to estimate the total value and volume of the market100. 
 
Therefore, when the effects of supply side substitutability are equivalent to those of 
demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy, it is appropriate to take 
into account the supply substitutability to define the market. The above, due to the 
following two reasons. Firstly, a market definition based strictly on the demand 
substitutability might not make sense. For example, a consumer will not consider shoes 
of the size 42 substitutes for those of size 40. In the same vein, female and male clothes 
are not substitutes from the demand viewpoint. However, it would not make sense to 
conclude that there would be a different market for shoes of different sizes and different 
markets for female and male clothes. Nevertheless, bearing also in mind the supply side 
substitutability, markets would be defined as the market of shoes and the market of 
clothes. That, because probably manufacturers would dispose of enough tools 
(technology, image, distribution network etc.) to market immediately and without 
incurring in additions costs and risks, additional sizes of shoes and clothes for both 
genders. 
                                                
99 Jiménez Latorre and Cañizares Pacheco, ‘Dificultades para la definición del mercado relevante’ (n 92) 
40, paras 3-6. 
100 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), paras 20-22. 
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Secondly, it is also appropriate to take into account the supply side substitutability to 
avoid the risk of defining excessively narrow markets, when the competition authorities 
give crucial importance to the magnitude of market shares101. 
 
When supply side substitutability would entail the need to adjust significantly existing 
tangible and intangible assets, additional investments, strategic decisions or time delays, 
the effects of supply side substitutability will not be considered at the stage of market 
definition, but at a later stage. In the area of consumer products, usually the supply side 
substitution did not induce the Commission to enlarge the market, in particular for 
branded beverages. For instance, albeit bottling plants may in principle bottle different 
beverages, there are costs and lead times involved (in terms of advertising, product testing 
and distribution) before the products can actually be sold. In that case, other beverages 
would not be included in the relevant market102.  
 
1.1.1.3. Potential competition 
 
As it was mentioned before, the third source of competitive constraint is the potential 
competition, but it is not taken into account when defining markets. That, because the 
conditions under which potential competition would actually represent an effective 
competitive constraint depend on the analysis of specific factors and circumstances 
related to the conditions of entry. If required, this analysis is only carried out at a 
subsequent stage, in general once the position of the companies involved in the relevant 
market has already been ascertained, and when such position gives rise to concerns from 
a competition point of view103. 
1.1.2. The relevant geographical market  
The definition of the geographical market, as the one of the product market, calls for an 
economic assessment. The geographical market can be defined as the territory in which 
the objective conditions of competition to market the products or services that compound 
the relevant market, are similar or sufficiently homogeneous and differentiated from the 
nearest geographical areas104. That territory might be the internal market or a substantial 
part of it. According to settled case law, the territory of a Member State over which a 
dominant position extends is capable of constituting a substantial part of the common 
market105. 
 
                                                
101 Jiménez Latorre and Cañizares Pacheco, ‘Dificultades para la definición del mercado relevante’ (n 92) 
37, fn 5. 
102 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), para 23. 
103 ibid, para 24. 
104 United Brands (n 94) [44]; Michelin [ECJ, 1983] (n 93) [26]; Case C-247/86 Alsatel v Novasam (ECJ, 
5 October 1988), para 15; Tetra Pak [CFI, 1994] (n 93) [91]; Jiménez Latorre and Cañizares Pacheco, 
‘Dificultades para la definición del mercado relevante’ (n 92) 38, para 1.  
105 Michelin [ECJ, 1983] (n 93) [28]; Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de L· Crespelle [1994] ECR I-
05077, para 17.  
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The principles for the definition of the geographic market area are the same as those 
described for the definition of the relevant product or service market, that is, the demand 
and supply substitutions. Namely, the questions to be answered would be the following. 
 
Firstly, if an undertaking that markets a certain product or service in a given geographical 
area made a hypothetical small but permanent relative price increase, would a sufficient 
number of consumers switch to suppliers located elsewhere (in neighbouring 
geographical areas), to such the extent of making the price increase unprofitable because 
of resulting loss of sales? If they would, additional areas will also be included in the 
relevant geographical market. This would be done until a set of geographical areas was 
identified, for which a permanent increase in the relative price would not induce a 
sufficient substitution in demand, so the increase would be profitable (demand 
substitution)106. 
 
And secondly, if an undertaking that markets a wide range of qualities or grades of one 
product increased prices, would competing companies (from neighbouring geographical 
areas) decide to enter to compete in the area where the aforementioned company 
operates? If they would, the different geographic areas would be grouped to define the 
relevant geographical market (supply substitution)107. 
 
1.2. Holding a dominant position 
 
According to the traditional analysis, having defined the relevant market, the next step is 
to determine whether the undertaking holds a dominant position on the relevant market.  
1.2.1. Dominant position definition 
The idea of ‘dominant position’ is equivalent to what in economic theory is known by the 
term ‘market power’, a concept that does not enjoy unanimity. In US, the concept is 
clearly linked to the ability of a company to control prices108. Thus, a company has market 
power or holds a dominant position if it has the power to increase its profits by raising 
the price of its products (or decreasing the volume of its supply) to unacceptably high 
(low) levels, without suffering the punishment of the relevant market109. Namely, if the 
undertaking is capable of profitably increasing prices above the competitive level for a 
                                                
106 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), paras 17 and 18. 
107 Jiménez Latorre and Cañizares Pacheco, ‘Dificultades para la definición del mercado relevante’ (n 92) 
38, para 2. 
108 Cani Fernández, ‘Cuota de mercado y poder de mercado’ (Second Seminar on Law and Economics of 
Antitrust Law organized by the Rafael del Pino Foundation, Madrid, 18 October 2005) [paper] 61, 63, paras 
3 and 4 <https://espacioinvestiga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DE006-
03_Cuota_mercado_poder_mercado-Fernandez.pdf> accessed 17 January 2019. 
109 Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real, El abuso de posición dominante, MS, no date, para 1, in relation to the 
definition of ‘market power’ given by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 937, 939 (‘the ability to raise price and gain more from 
the increased margin than is lost from sales not made at the higher price’). 
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significant period of time, it is considered that it does not face sufficiently effective 
competitive constraints and can thus generally be regarded as dominant.   
 
Nevertheless, at the EU level, the concept of market power is broader. Hence, it is not 
disputed that a dominant position must be defined as a position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective 
competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave, to an appreciable extent, 
independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers110. Although 
that independence will be reflected, in many cases, in prices, it can also be noted in other 
types of actions, such as linked sales or tying111.  
 
There exists a consensus on the fact that the analysis of market power should be based on 
a global evaluation of several factors, being the market share one of the important ones. 
On that regard, the Commission112 states that ‘the existence of a dominant position cannot 
be established on the sole basis of large market shares’ and that ‘the existence of high 
market shares simply means that the operator concerned might be in a dominant position’. 
Therefore, it reckons that competition authorities ‘should undertake a thorough and 
overall analysis of the economic characteristics of the relevant market before coming to 
a conclusion as to the existence of significant market power’. Therefore, by way of 
example, it lists several criteria that could also be used as measure: overall size of the 
undertaking, control of infrastructure not easily duplicated, technological advantages or 
superiority, absence of or low countervailing buying power, easy or privileged access to 
capital markets/financial resources, product/services diversification (e.g. bundled 
products or services), economies of scale, economies of scope, vertical integration, a 
highly developed distribution and sales network, absence of potential competition and 
barriers to expansion. 
1.2.2. Relevant factors 
All in all, the factors that should have taken into account to assess if an undertaking holds 
a dominant position are its structure, market share and the existence of barriers to 
competitors entering the market113. 
 
1.2.2.1. Undertaking's structure 
 
The structure of the undertaking refers to various characteristics. For instance, whether it 
is vertically integrated to a high degree that guarantees its commercial stability and 
wellbeing. That is to say, it should be analysed if at the production stage, the undertaking 
                                                
110 See United Brands (n 94) [65]; Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche (ECJ, 13 February 1979), para 38; 
Michelin [ECJ, 1983] (n 93) [30]; Case C-311/84 Télémarketing [1985] ECR I-3261, para 16. 
111 Fernández, ‘Cuota de mercado’ (n 108) 64, paras 1 and 2.  
112 Commission, ‘Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services’ 
(2002) OJ C165/6, para 78. 
113 United Brands (n 94) [67]. 
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can comply with all the requests which it receives. And also, whether at the stage of 
packaging and presentation on its premises, the company has at its disposal factories, 
manpower, plant and material which enable it to handle the goods independently114.  
 
It might be also relevant to study if in the field of technical knowledge and as a result of 
continual research, the undertaking keeps on improving the productivity to the extent that 
competing firms cannot develop research at a comparable level. And therefore, in this 
respect, they are at a disadvantage compared with the undertaking in question115.  
 
On the same vein, if would be an important indicator the fact the distributor could not 
afford not to offer its product to consumer, because company’s constant marketing and 
promoting activity of its brand led it to that privileged position on the relevant market. At 
the selling stage, this distinguishing factor ensures that the company has regular 
customers and consolidates its economic strength116. 
 
1.2.2.2. Market share 
 
As it was aforementioned, competition authorities should bear in mind all the relevant 
factor to assess whether the undertaking holds a dominant position. For example, in 
United Brands117, the ECJ took into account all the factors to determine if the company 
held a dominant position, because only the market share did not allow to get that 
conclusion, being necessary to analyse the other factors too. Nevertheless, in subsequent 
cases (see Hoffmann-La Roche118 and AKZO Chemie119), it attached particular importance 
to the market share, using the additional two factors (the structure and barriers to entry) 
only to confirm that the undertaking held a dominant position based on its market share120.  
 
What is relevant is that from these two cases,  the ‘presumption of dominance’ based on 
market shares of undertakings in question, was raised121. In Hoffmann-La Roche122, the 
ECJ stated that ‘[..] very large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional 
circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position [...]’. In the same vein, 
in CMB and SETCA123, the Court of First Instance (CFI) stated that ‘a dominant position 
may be the outcome of a number of factors which, considered separately, would not 
necessarily be determinative. However, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
extremely large market shares are in themselves evidence of the existence of a dominant 
position’.  
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The existence of the presumption triggers the inversion of the burden of proof, 
corresponding then to the company in question to prove that despite its high market share, 
it lacks market power – an iuris tantum presumption. However, having the antitrust 
procedure a sanctioning nature and basing on the accusatorial principle, the Commission 
should be the one providing evidences124.  
 
The appropriate method for calculating market shares depends on the case in hand. 
Usually sales data by value and by volume are both informative. Often value data will be 
more informative, for example, where goods are differentiated. There are also other 
indications to calculate market shares that can offer useful information, depending on the 
specific products or industry in question. For example, capacity, the number of players in 
bidding markets, units of fleet as in aerospace, or the reserves held in the case of sectors 
such as mining125.  
 
However, once the market share is calculated, there are no market share thresholds 
established – regarding both the percentage and the period of time – for presuming that 
an undertaking holds a dominant position, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In 
that regard, the ECJ in AKZO Chemie126, considered a market share of 50% held for 3 
years to be a very large persistent share that constituted an evidence of the existence of 
dominant position. 
 
Curiously, the CFI in British Airways127 concluded that the undertaking’s market share 
(39.7%) in the total of air tickets sales handled by the Billing and Settlement Plan for the 
United Kingdom (UK) was large. And also, that it invariably constituted a multiple of the 
market shares of each of its five main competitors on the UK market for air travel agency 
services. That is an example of how the ECJ grants a great importance to the comparative 
analysis of market shares of the potential dominant company and of its (existing) 
competitors. 
 
For the purpose of analysing the market power, it is useful to refer to the guidelines of 
the Office of Fair Trading128 – referring to the British Competition Act of 1998 – 
published after the first ruling on British Airways –, where it ‘considers that it is unlikely 
that an undertaking will be individually dominant if its share of the relevant market is 
below 40%, although dominance could be established below that figure if other relevant 
factors (such as the weak position of competitors in that market and high entry barriers) 
provided strong evidence of dominance’.  
                                                
124 Fernández, ‘Cuota de mercado’ (n 108) 68, paras 2 and 3. 
125 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), paras 53-55; ‘Assessment 
of Market Power. Understanding Competition Law’ (Office of Fair Trading 2004) 13, para 4.7 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28440
0/oft415.pdf> accessed 17 January 2019. 
126 (n 93) [59] and [60]. 
127 Case T-219/99 British Airways v Commission [2003] ECR II-05917, para 211. It was confirmed by the 
Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I-02331. 
128 ‘Assessment of Market Power’ (n 125) 7, para 2.12. 
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1.2.2.3. Barriers to entry and expansion 
 
An undertaking with a persistently high market share may not necessarily have market 
power where there is a strong threat of potential competition (with very low entry 
barriers). Therefore, it might not be profitable for the undertaking in a market to sustain 
prices above competitive levels because this would attract new entry which would then 
drive the price down – if not immediately, then in the long term. However, an undertaking 
with a large market share in a market protected by significant entry barriers is likely to 
have market power. Hence, entry barriers would allow the undertaking to profitably 
sustain supra-competitive prices in the long term, without being more efficient than its 
potential rivals129. 
 
Entry barriers arise when an undertaking has an advantage (not solely based on superior 
efficiency) over potential entrants from having already entered the market and/or from 
special rights (e.g. to production or distribution) or privileged access to key inputs. There 
are many ways in which different types of entry barrier can be classified, but it is useful 
to distinguish between the following factors which, depending on the circumstances, can 
contribute to barriers to entry, making new entry to be less likely or less rapid130. 
 
Firstly, the sunk costs of entry that are those costs which must be incurred to compete in 
a market, but which are not recoverable on exiting the market (as if it was a non-
refundable deposit). Therefore, entry will occur only if the expected profit from being in 
the market exceeds any sunk costs of entry. Nevertheless, the mere existence of sunk 
costs in any particular industry does not necessarily mean that entry barriers are high131. 
 
If potential competition suppliers are able to offer and sell products immediately and 
without the significant increases in costs, there will be a supply side substitution (that will 
be taken into account to define the relevant product/service and geographical market) and 
not new entry. On the contrary, if potential rivals are only able to enter the market slowly 
and with a big sunk investment (new entry), it will be considered that an entry barrier 
exists132. 
 
Secondly, entry barriers may arise where the access to key inputs or distribution outlets 
are poor or scarce, and where an incumbent obtains an advantage over a potential entrant 
due to privileged access to essential facilities or special rights (IPRs) to those inputs or 
outlets133. 
 
Although the assessment of whether a particular facility is essential must be on a case by 
case basis, a facility will only be viewed as essential where it can be demonstrated that 
                                                
129 ibid 9, para 3.3, 15, paras 5.3 and 5.4.  
130 ibid 15, paras 5.5 and 5.6. 
131 ibid 16, paras 5.8, 5.9 and 5.11. 
132 ibid 21, fn 37.  
133 ibid 17, para 5.12. 
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access to it is indispensable in order to compete in a related market and where duplication 
is impossible or extremely difficult owing to physical, geographic or legal constraints (or 
is highly undesirable for reasons of public policy). Accordingly, not always difficulties 
accessing inputs or resources that constitute an entry barrier will be defined as essential 
facilities134.  Therefore, the decisive factor must be whether the undertaking in question 
is the only possible source of supply for the products which are produced on the primary 
market  and are necessary in order to carry on business on the secondary market135. If it 
is not the only source, there will be no entry barriers of that type, so other barriers to entry 
and factors (company’s structure and market share) should be bear in mind to evaluate 
the dominance.  
 
As regards IPRs, it is common ground that an undertaking does not hold a dominant 
position merely because it owns and exercises an IPR. Namely, when an IPR does not 
prevent others from competing in the relevant market, it will not normally be a barrier to 
entry. 
 
Notwithstanding, under certain circumstances, IPRs may constitute a barrier to entry. For 
instance, that occurs when IPRs relate to specific products (e.g. registered design for the 
front wings of a specific car) and the only products that can be substituted for them need 
to incorporate the IPRs in question. Hence, no substitutable goods exist that do not 
encroach upon the IPRs, which means that in the long term, a rival undertaking is not able 
to overcome the IPR by its own innovation136. The only way for competitors to market 
the substitutable products is obtaining licenses to use the IPRs. If IP owners refuse to 
grant them and rivals use them anyway, as soon as proprietors enforce their IPRs, the 
substitutable products cannot longer be produced.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that IPRs constitute a barrier to entry does not always imply that IP 
owners hold a dominant position, not even when the IPR is a SEP137 (see Section 5.2.2.1. 
of Chapter 3). The possession and exercise of IPRs would contribute to a dominant 
position, that is, they will serve to establish or to reinforce the dominant position138, as 
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long as the assessment of other factors (company’s structure, market share and other entry 
barriers) also leads to that same conclusion. The ECJ already held in various cases139 that 
for the proprietor of an IPR to hold a dominant position, it must be in a position to prevent 
the maintenance of effective competition over a considerable part of the relevant market, 
having regard in particular to the existence and position of any producers or distributors 
who may be marketing similar goods or goods which may be substituted for them and 
their market share.  
 
Thirdly, regulation may also be a barrier to entry, when, for instance, it limits the number 
of undertakings that can operate in a market through the granting of licences. In the same 
vein, when health and safety regulations, among others, set objective standards, they may 
also constitute a barrier to entry if they do not apply equally to all undertakings. That 
might happen when incumbents lobby for standards that are relatively easy for them to 
meet, but harder for a new entrant to achieve140. 
 
Fourthly, economies of scale and economies of scope may in some circumstances, 
constitute barriers to entry. In the first scenario, the average costs fall as output rises, so 
when the demand of the product increases, the price should decrease. And in the second 
one, the efficiencies are formed by variety, not volume.  Hence, it costs less to produce 
two types of products together than to produce them separately. Economies of scale and 
economies of scope may have similar implications, as a potential entrant would prefer to 
enter the market with many as opposed to few products, what would require relatively 
large sunk costs and might be more likely to attract an aggressive response from the 
undertaking in question141.  
 
Fifthly, network effects might also create barriers to entry. As opposed to economies of 
scale, network effects occur where users’ valuations of the network increase as more users 
join the network. For example, as new customers enter a telephone network, they will be 
benefited from being connected to more people on the same network, avoiding the 
incompatibility with other networks. In consequence, as opposed to economies of scale, 
if the demand of the product increases, the price should rise. Network effects, just like 
economies of scale, may make new entry harder where the minimum viable scale (e.g. in 
terms of users of the network) is large in relation to the size of the market, because the 
incumbent will have a well-established network, while the competitor has to establish its 
own one142.  
 
                                                
position, their possession is none the less capable, in certain circumstances, of creating a dominant position, 
in particular by enabling an undertaking to prevent effective competition on the market’). 
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And sixthly, exploitative and exclusionary behaviours (see Section 1.3. of this Chapter) 
may also create barriers to entry143.   
 
In addition to barriers to entry, barriers to expansion – that can be analysed in a similar 
way – must be also taken into account. They refer to factors that make it harder for 
existing competitors to become more forceful competitors or that even lead to the 
elimination of an existing competitor. Many of the factors discussed above that may make 
entry harder, they might also make it harder for undertakings that have recently entered 
the market to expand their market shares and hence their competitive impact144. For 
instance, exclusionary behaviours consisting of subscribing exclusive long-term contracts 
or granting discounts of a loyal nature145 may constitute barriers to expansion.  
 
1.3. The abuse of dominance: abusive behaviours 
 
As the ECJ holds146, to apply the prohibition stated in Article 102 TFEU, it is necessary 
that once the relevant market has been defined, three elements shall be present together 
(cumulatively): the existence of a dominant position, the abuse of this position and the 
possibility that trade between Member States may be affected by the abusive conduct.  
 
The concept of an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU 
is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position 
which, on a market where the degree of competition is already weakened precisely 
because of the presence of the undertaking concerned, through recourse to methods 
different from those governing normal competition in products or services on the basis of 
the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of 
the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition147. 
 
As it was already mentioned, in accordance with the case law, it is not in itself illegal for 
an undertaking to be in a dominant position and such a dominant undertaking is entitled 
to compete on the merits. However, the undertaking that holds a dominant position has a 
special responsibility not to impair, by conduct falling outside the scope of competition 
on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the internal market148. The scope of its 
special responsibility has to be considered in light of the specific circumstances of the 
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case149 and at the time when the abusive conduct takes place150. That is to say, the 
undertaking concerned cannot behave abusing its dominant position without objective 
justification. Therefore, it must often refrain from conduct which might otherwise be legal 
were it carried out by a non-dominant firm (e.g. pricing below cost or providing fidelity-
inducing rebates)151.  
 
In addition, the illegality of abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU is unrelated to its 
compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules and, in the majority of cases, abuses 
of a dominant position consist of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under branches of 
law other than competition law152. 
 
In that regard, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of 
Article 102 TFEU is to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular to safeguard 
the interests of consumers – rather than to protect the position of particular competitors153, 
to achieve an integrated internal market. Accordingly, that Article prohibits abusive 
practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also those which are 
detrimental to consumers through their impact on competition154. Furthermore, the fact 
that a dominant undertaking’s abusive conduct has adverse effects on a market distinct 
from the dominated one does not preclude the application of Article 102 TFEU155. 
 
As aforementioned before, the Article 102 TFEU only makes reference to a non-
exhaustive list of behaviours that may be abusive, so the practices mentioned there are 
merely examples of abuse of a dominant position156. Therefore, other non-listed 
behaviours may also be considered to be abusive. As it will be analysed down below, in 
general terms, abusive behaviours are divided into three different categories: exploitative, 
exclusionary and discriminatory abuses.  
 
The structure I will follow when studying each behaviour will be the following. First, I 
will describe the conduct. Second, I will mention the factors that are of particular 
importance in determining prima facie whether a given unilateral behaviour is abusive or 
not. And third, in order to confirm the above conclusion, it is necessary to examine the 
claims of the dominant undertaking assuring that its conduct is justified, demonstrating 
that is objectively necessary or that produces substantial efficiencies which outweigh any 
anti-competitive effects on consumers. If the conduct in question is indispensable and 
proportionate to the goal allegedly pursued by the dominant undertaking, the conduct will 
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not be considered abusive. If it is not (and only then), the conduct in question can be 
legally construed as an abuse157. Therefore, in those conducts where the claims of the 
dominant undertaking are likely, I will also refer to them. Note that although the burden 
of proof for the existence of circumstances that constitute an infringement of Article 102 
TFEU is borne by the Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking to raise any plea of 
objective justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. It then falls to the 
Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of an abuse of a dominant position to 
show that arguments and evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, 
accordingly, that the justification put forward cannot be accepted158. 
1.3.1. Exploitative abuse 
According to Article 102(a) TFEU, an abuse by an undertaking of a dominant position 
may consist in directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions. Through exploitative abuses, dominant firms can negatively 
affect rivals (and thereby, harm consumers indirectly) or they can harm consumers 
directly.  
 
The most common abuse consists of demanding or charging excessive prices to 
competitors or consumers – prices that are far in excess of both the dominant company's 
costs and comparable products. Nevertheless, in practice, the concern regarding excessive 
pricing is rarely enforced by the authorities as it involves a stipulation of the 'right' 
competitive price (or the tricky issue of determining what is 'fair' or 'unfair') and thus 
effectively entails price regulation159. 
 
However, in the framework of SEP licenses, it is not rare that SEP owners that hold 
dominant positions demand unreasonable terms – excessive royalties – to license their 
patents. As this anti-competitive behaviour may be performed in different manners, 
usually they are classified under three categories: ‘holdup’, ‘patent ambush’ and ‘royalty 
stacking’. Accordingly, SEP owners’ competitors sue them for abuse of dominant 
position. Nevertheless, SEP implementers might also cause a holdup problem in the 
opposite direction160, when they force SEP owners to accept royalties that are lower than 
the value of the contribution of their technologies to a standard, a conduct known as a 
‘reverse holdup’. Moreover, implementers may also refuse to take licenses on reasonable 
terms or delaying doing so, a behaviour known as ‘holdout’.  
 
While US Courts are more used to define prices, in the EU the ECJ is more reluctant to 
do it. Therefore, when in Huawei v. ZTE it had the chance to pronounce about the issue 
of whether the fact of bringing infringement actions by SEP owners constituted an abuse 
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of a dominant position, the Court argued that it was not a case about abusive exploitation, 
but abusive exclusion. The above, probably because it is not in favour of letting antitrust 
enforcers interfere with the price system, and believes that the national courts system 
adequately deals with such issues in the context of FRAND setting proceedings161. 
 
1.3.1.1. Holdup 
 
When SSOs select a patented technology as relevant to a standard – so it becomes a SEP 
–, the market power of patent holders’ increases. That is, their technology has been 
locked-in to the completed standard, so the existing competition between different 
available solutions for the same problem, ceases. Thus, the ex ante royalty price of the 
selected technology – before the standard is set – will be lower than the ex-post royalty, 
because patent owners will want to exploit their increased bargaining power.  
 
However, when the increase of patent holders’ market power leads to them to demand 
excessive royalties relative to the ex ante benchmark, manufacturers would be facing a 
holdup situation. Namely, SEP owners behave opportunistically taking advantage of 
manufacturers’ position. Potential licensees do not have any comparable substitute 
available on the market (i.e. technologies that support interconnectivity and 
interoperability) and they have already sunk irreversible costs implementing the SEP. 
Thus, holdup requires two conditions: difficulty to shift to another technology and 
opportunism on the part of the SEP owner.  Authorities have found this distortion 
problematic on the basis of competition analysis, because the ex post increase of SEP 
owners’ market power is not the direct result of competition on the merits162.  
 
If a manufacturer is facing a holdup situation, it would have five choices to choose 
from163: (i) accept the SEP owner’s royalties above the reasonable rate; (ii) refer the 
dispute concerning the determination of reasonable terms to conflict resolution 
mechanisms (judicial or ADR procedures);  (iii) make an inefficient investment which 
will lead to a lack of improvement in product quality (e.g. employ an outdated technology 
in his product in order to avoid paying the excessive royalties); (iv) proceed to a vertical 
backward integration (purchasing all of the necessary SEPs), although some are of the 
opinion that vertical integration can generate holdup problems for rivals164; or (v) infringe 
the SEP, assuming the risk of getting involved in expensive litigations. Basically, the cost 
of any of the choices will be passed on to consumers, resulting in higher prices for the 
devices; or it will be absorbed by profit margins, reducing the research and development 
budgets for future rounds of innovation.  Those five tough options would be then played 
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out across the entire industry of which this manufacturer is a part of, raising costs in the 
short run, and reducing market entry potential, competition, and the incentives to innovate 
in the long run. 
 
Although in theory the essential nature of SEPs may lead to a holdup situation, there is a 
debate among economists and legal scholars about whether, in practice, holdup 
constitutes a systemic problem or not. A large theoretical literature165 asserts that SEPs 
allow their owners to holdup innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental 
contribution to a final product. Some of them166 reach that conclusion basing on the fact 
that the threat of an injunction against infringement of a patent, can in certain 
circumstances, be profitable for the licensor and potentially harmful to consumers. While 
some others167,  note that there is very little empirical evidence that holdup actually 
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984&doclanguage=en> accessed 3 August 2018;  Damien Geradin, ‘Moving Away from High-Level 
 41 
occurs, taking into account that prices of SEP-reliant products (e.g. smartphones) have 
fallen at rates that are fast compared with non-SEP reliant products (e.g. cars)168. In that 
sense, there are those who169 challenge the view that patent holdup and patent ambushes 
(see below) are serious problems in practice and they consider that are rather SEP owners 
who face reverse holdup and holdout problems, that will be analysed subsequently, in 
Section 1.3.1.4. 
 
There is also another category named ‘government holdup’170 that may arise when market 
actors have to interact with the government. However, I will not refer to it because this 
type of patent holdup is neither reflected in judicial decisions nor in antitrust cases of 
competition authorities that compose the subject matter of this research. 
 
1.3.1.2. Patent ambush 
 
When SSOs choose a standard, it might occur that patents essential to its implementation 
are not subject to any SSO licensing rules. In consequence, they might exploit 
implementers forcing them to pay excessive royalties, threatening them with being sued 
for patent infringement otherwise. Thusly, they would create barriers to entry that distort 
competition within the market171. 
 
To prevent SEP owners from behaving opportunistically, it is crucial that SSOs establish 
rules which ensure fair, transparent procedures and ex ante disclosure of relevant patents. 
As it was mentioned in the introduction, two types of disclosure exist, the negative and 
the specific disclosures.  
 
In the negative disclosure, patent owners uniquely identify patents they intend not to 
license under the commitment requested by SSOs (e.g. FRAND terms). However, they 
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are also requested to declare they will license all non-declared patents that turn out to be 
essential, under the commitment requested by SSOs. Therefore, under this disclosure the 
patent ambush is not feasible.  
 
Nevertheless, under the specific disclosure patent owners identify patents that might be 
relevant to the standard, so SSOs are aware of what technology solutions are or not be 
patented – while in the negative disclosure, SSOs do not know if technologies available 
on the market are patented or not. Thus, they have enough information to make a 
technically efficient choice, having the certainty that the chosen technology will be 
licensed under reasonable terms. However, patent owners may opt not to declare all 
relevant patents they own with the aim of demanding excessive royalties to license them 
(patent ambushing competitors), in case the technology protected by them is chosen to be 
the standard in the industry. 
 
All in all, albeit the specific disclosure helps to clarify the landscape of patented 
technologies before selecting the standard, if patent owners do not declare some relevant 
patents, it fails to flag them as not available at committed terms. However, as it was also 
aforementioned when explaining the background at the beginning of the thesis, due to the 
antitrust-based fear of being accused of patent ambush and to better leverage them in 
future cross licensing negotiations, participants in SSOs tend to over-declare potentially 
essential patents. Hence, patent ambush is not a common practice172.  
 
Moreover, when SSOs’ rules do not sufficiently protect against the risk of patent ambush 
during their standard-setting procedures, they might be also acting anti-competitively. 
Precisely, the EC also conducted an antitrust investigation against ETSI, because its rules 
were not enough protective against the aforementioned risk. Nonetheless, the 
investigation was finally closed without imposing any penalty to the SSO, because the 
Commission reckoned that ETSI’s change in its rules minimized that risk173.  
 
The EC dealt for the first and only time with a patent ambush behaviour performed by 
Rambus174, opening an antitrust investigation against it. It was accused of abusing its 
dominant position, engaging in intentional deceptive conduct in the context of the 
standard-setting process, by not disclosing the existence of patents – under the specific 
disclosure – which later (after the standard was set) claimed were relevant to the adopted 
standard and claiming unreasonable royalties. The Commission argued that without its 
patent ambush, Rambus would not have been able to charge the royalty rates it currently 
did, since the patent would have been declared essential and it should have been licensed 
on FRAND terms, as it was requested by the SSO who developed the standard. At the 
end, although the Commission recognized that Rambus abused its dominant position, no 
                                                
172 Méniére, ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory’ (n 10) 21. 
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fines were imposed, considering that the commitments offered by the undertaking – 
royalty free licenses for five years regarding some patents and maximum royalty rates for 
others175 – were an appropriate remedy to such an abuse.  
 
The patent ambush behaviour might be also conducted by patent holders who do not take 
part in SSOs’ standardization processes – outsiders176 –, so they are not constrained by 
SSOs’ rules about disclosure or licensing terms. It is called the ‘external’ ambush, in 
contradistinction to ‘internal’ ambush (e.g. Rambus case). When there are patents held by 
outsiders, there is not a way for the SSO to find out at reasonable cost whether a chosen 
solution would infringe on some of those patents. Therefore, it might happen that the 
chosen standard would inadvertently infringe on unknown patents held by outsiders, 
leaving implementers exposed to royalty demands that are not reasonable177. 
 
1.3.1.3. Royalty stacking 
 
In technology complex industries, products such as laptops, tablets, or smartphones, use 
multiple technologies covered by complementary patents owned by different, 
independent owners. The alluded complementarity is double: the complementarity 
between SEPs reading on different aspects of a specific standard (e.g. Wi-Fi) and the 
complementarity between SEPs reading on different standards which must all be 
implemented within a given device (e.g. smartphones). It should be recalled that in the 
absence of a standard, there is competition among substitute technologies. Hence, if a 
patent owner raises royalties, manufacturers might get a license from a different patent 
owner. However, once a standard has been agreed upon, manufacturers will need to 
access the specific technology for which there are no comparable substitutes. Therefore, 
in those cases, in order to produce a final product manufacturers necessarily have to get 
licenses of multiple patented technologies (hundreds or thousands of SEPs178). This 
phenomenon of a dense web of overlapping IPRs, where a company must hack its way 
through in order to actually commercialize new technology, it is known as ‘patent 
thicket’179.  
 
Consequently, licensees have also to pay multiple royalties at the rates required by SEP 
owners (when setting the royalties, patent holders with large and high quality patent 
portfolios will not be constrained by the threat of litigation to challenge the validity of the 
patents180). When patent owners do not coordinate their royalties, it is said that these 
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royalties form a harmful ‘royalty stack’181 for licensees (excessive total royalties), that 
results in excessively high end-product prices and a reduction in the incentives to invest 
and innovate in product markets182.  
 
The arguments supporting that royalty stacking, they rely on theoretical models which 
reformulate the well-known Cournot complements problem in a licensing framework. 
According to Cournot183, consumers are better off when all products complementary from 
a demand viewpoint are produced and marketed by a single firm.  
 
In industries where each single product is covered by multiple patents owned by 
independent firms, a patent holder that is considering the royalty to charge, it may not 
fully take into account that an increase in that royalty is likely to result in a cumulative 
royalty rate that may be too high according to other licensors, the licensees, and their 
customers. Since this negative externality (or Cournot effect) is ignored by all patent 
holders, the royalty stack may prove inefficiently high184. Furthermore, they ignore the 
fact that lowering the price of their licenses would increase the demand for others, due to 
the complementarity. However, if SEPs were owned by the same patent holder, that 
company would recognize that lowering the price of SEP 1, it will benefit from greater 
licenses of SEP 2. In consequence, the sum of individual payments requested by different 
patent owners is higher, than the payment that a single owner would request if it owned 
all the complementary SEPs, because the incentives to raise prices are smaller185.  
 
All in all, if patent holdup is systematic, it will imply that SEP owners – being 
unconstrained by each others’ licensing policies – impose collectively a royalty stack on 
downstream industries, and consumers186. Accordingly, royalty stacking will be a much 
more important problem for SEPs than for other patents, as long as the holdup problem 
is relevant for the industry in question187. The above, because manufacturers do not have 
the option to get licences from other companies, in case SEP owners contribute to the 
royalty stacking problem.  
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There is a theoretical literature188 stating that royalty stacking is happening regarding SEP 
licenses, while some others189 challenge that conjecture, considering that royalty stacking 
is merely a theoretical problem.  
The empirical literature190 is rather thin due to the general methodological difficulties of 
identifying royalty stacking on the basis of market data – observing  the change in royalty 
rates. However, in the mobile phone industry, it does not show evidence of royalty 
stacking.  
 
Outside of the academic literature, there seems to be some contradictory evidence coming 
from the recent litigation experience. On the one hand, some191 reckon that high stacks, 
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due to the level of royalties demanded by some SEP owners, would imply very large total 
royalties for a single standard, if these royalties were applied proportionally to all declared 
SEPs. On the other hand, some others192 suggest that the total stack is in fact rather limited 
because these are far lower – specifically, less than 5% for all mobile-related standards. 
In between, others193 consider that being still so much ongoing litigation, it is too early to 
get reliable estimates on the extent of likely royalty stacking. That, because they 
understand that current actual payments are likely underestimate what the total stack will 
effectively be once litigation is concluded. 
 
1.3.1.4. Reverse holdup and holdout 
 
As it was already mentioned, SEP implementers might also cause a holdup problem in 
the opposite direction194. Namely, taking advantage of the fact that SEP holders are 
locked-in to the standard and have sunk research and development investments195, they 
might act in an opportunistic manner. These behaviours are known as ‘reverse holdup’ 
and ‘holdout’. 
 
Reverse holdup refers to the situation when licensees use their leverage to obtain rates 
and terms below what is reasonable, namely, when they force SEP owners to accept 
royalties that are lower than the value of the contribution of their technologies to a 
standard.  Theoretically, it seems difficult that SEP holders face reverse holdup situations 
because by the time licensing agreements are discussed (once the standard has been 
developed), implementers have to worry about competition on the downstream market 
for devices. The opposite happens for SEP holders who are no longer exposed to 
competition from other patent owners (hence, the holdup risk). Therefore, if a SEP owner 
demands royalties that are not reasonable to all implementers who use the SEP for 
producing a device that they all compete with, they could refuse to get licenses for the 
sake of forcing the SEP owner to relent and lower the royalties below what was expected 
ex ante for a successful innovation (group dynamics196). In that case, the effect might be 
that SEP owners reduce the future incentive for investment in research and development, 
depriving consumers of future consumption opportunities. However, there is a strong 
incentive for an individual implementer to deviate from this common posture and accept 
the initial royalties to ensure that he is first to market (the incentive to deviate is stronger, 
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the stronger the downstream market is). However, if there was only one implementer, the 
bargaining power would shift towards him (mitigating the holdup problem for 
implementers and making it larger for SEP owners – reverse holdup –), so he could simply 
refuse to accept, because without his implementation the SEP owner would not be able 
to obtain royalties197. Nevertheless, as it will be studied in Chapter 4 (see, in particular, 
Section 4.6.1.), the Framework provided in Huawei v. ZTE by the ECJ might lead to a 
reverse holdup behaviour by the SEP implementer.  
 
Holdout refers to the scenario where licensees either refuse to take licenses on reasonable 
terms or delaying doing so. Thus, they do not pay reasonable royalties during a long-term, 
while they are infringing SEPs198, until they are forced to do so by a court or an arbitrator. 
In practice, blanket refusals are not common. Instead, holdout takes various forms. For 
instance, the threat about going to court based on offering royalties that are not 
reasonable, combined with the challenge of validity and essentiality of SEPs. Or the 
demand for negotiating each SEP separately. Also endless litigation and appeals and 
similar practices199. I am not aware of any empirical study about whether holdout is a real 
problem in the sense of occurring to a significant extent, because it is very hard to know 
it. What is perceived by one party as delaying tactics, is interpreted by another as resisting 
royalties that exceed reasonable rates. Besides, even if some implementers may be 
pursuing a holdout strategy, there is also the question about its effects200.   
 
The first effect is that holdout leads to lower incentives for firms to invest in standard 
related innovations, which might be true in the following two cases. One, when SEP 
owners are cash constrained entities, so the fact of not being paid promptly but after a 
judge or an arbitrator orders to do so (including back interest), it might cause them not to 
invest in further research, because the costs of financing increase with lower cash flows. 
An option to avoid that effect is for small SEP holders to monetise disputed SEPs, selling 
the rights to a larger SEP holder or to NPEs, given the fact that patents are increasingly 
highly liquid assets. Two, when the delay is such that the implementer goes into 
bankruptcy, so he may not be able to pay past royalties and interest. Nevertheless, judicial 
systems – in Europe and US – have mechanisms to avoid that situation. For example, SEP 
owners can seek for preliminary injunctions arguing that if they wait until the decision on 
the merits, they would suffer an irreparable harm not receiving royalties or interest, 
because there is a significant probability to be implementers bankrupt by then. It is also 
common that court requires the licensee to put royalty payments into an interest-bearing 
escrow account until a final court decision or settlement is reached. In that case, SEP 
owners would suffer effects on innovation incentives only if they are cash constrained 
entities, since otherwise, the appropriate payments will be made eventually. 
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The second effect that holdout might cause is the increase of litigation costs for all parties, 
when they increase with the length of delay to an agreement. This problem is of little 
importance for innovators with large patent portfolios and implementers who use large 
numbers of patents, because litigation is only on a small subset of patents, so that 
litigation costs can be spread over a large number of patents. 
 
And the third one, is that holdout may lead to an unfair competitive advantage of 
implementers engaged in holdout, over implementers who have decided to pay the 
required fees. This argument can only hold if royalty payments are dependent on the 
output of the licensee, namely, if royalties are set as percentage of the output or the price 
and when implementers – who are holding out – behaviour in certain ways. As royalties 
are not the same for all implementers, those who are holding out might have an advantage 
because as they are not paying any royalties, they can low prices and sell more unities 
that implementers who are already paying royalties. However, implementers who are 
holding out should consider that each additional unit of the downstream device sold, will 
generate higher royalty payments in the future (when the payments are imposed by a 
judge or an arbitrator), so they should behave as if they were already paying the fees that 
will eventually come due.  Nevertheless, implementers who are holding out may decide 
not to behave that way – as if they were already paying fees – for several reasons, so 
competition distortions would arise. For instance, to have lower cost of raising capital 
and therefore investments costs (lowering the risk to go into bankruptcy). Or since there 
is a significant probability of going bankruptcy or just because they are acting with an 
economically short horizon. Regarding the last two cases though, the already mentioned 
rules (preliminary injunctions and depositions of royalties in interest-bearing escrow 
accounts) would be applicable to prevent unfair competitive advantages.   
 
All in all, only SEP holders with financial constraints would have difficulties to finance 
further innovation due to holdout. Solely owners with small patent portfolios would suffer 
the increase of litigations costs, because they could not be spread across a large number 
of patents. And just implementers who are financially weak, for whom bankruptcy is a 
real possibility, could enjoy an unfair competitive advantage lowering their investment 
costs. Therefore, there would not be serious effects associated with holdout when the 
financial position of implementers and SEP owners is extremely good. Although there 
might be other cases where the effects of holdout might be of relevance, in many 
jurisdictions they would be mitigated by legal rules. 
1.3.2. Exclusionary abuse  
Exclusionary abuses conducted by dominant undertakings aim to prevent competitors 
from entering or remaining active (expansion) in a given market, thus limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers [Article 102(b) TFEU]. 
Unlike exploitative abuses that may target competitors and consumers directly, 
exclusionary abuses only target rivals directly. Thereby, they only harm consumers 
indirectly, who could not benefit from competition through lower prices (excluding 
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competitors, the dominant firm is in a position to profitably increase prices above the 
competitive level), better quality and a wider choice of new or improved goods and 
services201. Accordingly, it would be wrong to conclude automatically that all 
exclusionary behaviours that will be studied below are abusive. What is relevant is to 
analyse if they are capable of preventing the entry or hindering expansion of competitors, 
even of those that are equally efficient in comparison with the dominant undertaking. 
The idea behind the prohibition of exclusionary abuses is that undertakings that hold 
dominant positions, cannot exclude their competitors by other means than competing on 
the merits of the products or services they provide. Therefore, it is important to protect 
an effective process and not simply to protect competitors202.  
 
1.3.2.1. Exclusive dealing: exclusive purchase, conditional rebates and exclusive supply  
 
A dominant undertaking may try to foreclose its competitors by hindering them from 
selling to customers through use of exclusive purchasing obligations or conditional 
rebates, together referred to as exclusive dealing203. 
 
An exclusive purchasing obligation requires a customer on a particular market to purchase 
exclusively or to a large extent only from the dominant undertaking. Certain other 
obligations, such as stocking requirements, which appear to fall short of requiring 
exclusive purchasing, may in practice lead to the same effect204. For example, in Van den 
Bergh Foods205  the obligation to use coolers exclusively for the products of the dominant 
undertaking was considered to lead to outlet exclusivity. 
 
In order to convince customers to accept exclusive purchasing, the dominant undertaking 
will have to compensate them, in whole or in part, for the loss in competition resulting 
from the exclusivity. If it is likely that consumers as a whole (including those currently 
not purchasing from dominant undertaking and the final consumers) will not benefit from 
the exclusive purchasing obligations, they might constitute an exclusionary abuse because 
they have the effect of preventing the entry or expansion of competing undertakings. This 
will be the case in the following scenario206.  
 
The starting point is that without existing exclusive purchasing obligations, potential or 
existing competitors are not able to compete for the full supply of the customers. That 
might be because the dominant undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner for all or 
                                                
201 ‘Abusing a dominant position–overview’ (n 86), paras 17-19; Commission, ‘Communication from the 
Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities’ (n 148), para 5.  
202 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 6. 
203 ibid, para 32. 
204 ibid, para 33. 
205 Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para 160.  
206 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 34. 
 50 
most customers on the market (e.g. because its brand is a ‘must stock item’ preferred by 
many final consumers). Or because the capacity constraints on the other suppliers are 
such that a part of demand can only be provided for by the dominant supplier. In 
consequence, when the dominant undertaking imposes exclusive purchasing obligations 
(even if they are of short duration), they are generally likely to hamper effective 
competition because even without these obligations, competitors were not able to 
compete on equal terms for each individual customer’s entire demand.  
 
Notwithstanding, whether competitors were able to compete for the full supply of the 
customers, exclusive purchasing obligations would not result in anti-competitive 
foreclose, unless the switching of supplier by customers was rendered difficult due to the 
duration of the exclusive purchasing obligation207. 
 
With reference to conditional rebates (also named loyalty rebates), they are discounts 
granted to customers to reward them for a particular form of purchasing behaviour, with 
the aim of attracting more demand. For instance, if a consumer’s purchase over a defined 
reference period exceeds a certain threshold, the rebate might be granted either on all 
purchases (retroactive rebates) or only on those made in excess of those required to 
achieve the threshold (incremental rebates). When such rebates are granted by a dominant 
undertaking, they can also have actual or potential foreclosure effects similar to exclusive 
purchasing obligations. However, it is important to bear in mind that unlike predation 
(see below) that always entails a sacrifice for the dominant undertaking, conditional 
rebates may constitute an exclusionary abuse without necessarily entailing a sacrifice208. 
 
As it was mentioned regarding exclusive purchasing obligations, if actual or potential 
competitors are not able to compete on equal terms for the entire demand of each 
individual consumer, it is likely that the system of conditional rebates is liable to result 
in anti-competitive foreclosure. That, because the dominant undertaking already has a 
‘non contestable’ portion of the demand of each customer, that is, customers thaw will 
purchase from it in any event. And then, there is the ‘contestable’ portion of demand, 
customers who may prefer and be able to find substitutes. Accordingly, the conditional 
rebate may enable the dominant undertaking to use the ‘non contestable’ portion of the 
demand of ach customer as leverage to decrease the price to be paid for the ‘contestable’ 
portion of demand, with the aim of making less attractive for customers to switch the 
contestable amount of demand to an alternative supplier209. In consequence, the dominant 
undertaking may end controlling the entire demand of each individual consumer, creating 
a maximum loyalty enhancing effect210.  
 
                                                
207 ibid, para 36. 
208 ibid, para 37. 
209 ibid, para 39; Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission [2003] ECR II-4071, paras 162 and 163; British 
Airways [CFI, 2003] (n 127) [277] and [278]. 
210 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 110) [89] and [90]; Case T-288/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II-
2969, para 213; British Airways [CFI, 2003] (n 127) [7]–[11] and [270]–[273]. 
 51 
The notion of exclusive dealing also includes exclusive supply obligations or incentives 
with the same effect, whereby the dominant undertaking tries to foreclose its competitors 
by hindering them from purchasing from suppliers. That conduct may be in principle 
abusive if the exclusive supply obligation or incentive ties most of the efficient input 
suppliers, and customers competing with the dominant undertaking, are unable to find 
alternative efficient sources of input supply211. 
 
If it is concluded that prima facie the dominant undertaking’s behaviour is abusive, its 
claims will be taken into account to confirm that conclusion. That is to say, it will be 
checked whether the dominant firm has an objective justification to exclusive dealing. 
The argument it will employ is that consumers as a whole benefit from the exclusive 
dealing. For instance, it will allege that rebate systems achieve transaction-related cost 
advantages which are passed on to customers212, especially with standardised volume 
targets rather than with individualised volume targets. Another argument that it could use 
is that incremental rebate schemes give resellers an incentive to produce and resell a 
higher volume than retroactive schemes213. It could also be considered as evidence 
demonstrating that exclusive dealing arrangements result in advantages to particular 
customers, if those arrangements are necessary for the dominant undertaking to make 
certain relationship-specific investments in order to be able to supply those customers214. 
 
1.3.2.2. Tying and bundling 
 
An exclusionary abuse may also consist in making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts 
[Article 102(d)]. Depending on what the supplementary obligations entail, the dominant 
firm will be tying or bundling competitors.  
 
‘Tying’ refers to situations where customers that purchase one product (the tying product) 
are required also to purchase another product from the dominant undertaking (the tied 
product). Tying can take place on a technical or contractual basis. Technical tying occurs 
when the tying product is designed in such a way that only works properly with the tied 
product (and not with the alternatives offered by competitors). And contractual tying 
occurs when the customer who purchases the tying product, undertakes also to purchase 
the tied product (and not the alternatives offered by competitors)215. 
 
‘Bundling’ refers to the way products are offered and priced by the dominant undertaking 
and it can be pure or mixed. In the case of pure bundling, the products are only sold jointly 
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in fixed proportions (at a discount). In the case of mixed bundling (often referred to as a 
multi-product rebate), it exists the option to buy the bundled products separately. 
However, the sum of the prices of the products when sold separately is higher than the 
bundled price216. 
 
Before considering prima facie that tying or bundling are abusive conducts, the following 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the undertaking should be dominant in the tying market 
(the product market of a tie), though not necessarily in the tied market. However, in the 
special case of tying in after-markets, the undertaking must be dominant in the tying 
market and/or the tied after-market. In bundling cases, the undertaking needs to be 
dominant in one of the bundled markets217. And second, the tying and tied products must 
be distinct products218. Two products are distinct if, in the absence of tying or bundling, 
a substantial number of customers would purchase or would have purchased the tying 
product without also buying the tied product from the same supplier, thereby allowing 
stand-alone production for both the tying and the tied product219. 
 
In order to assess if the tying or bundling practice is likely to be abusive, the following 
factors are generally of particular importance: the duration of the tying or bundling 
strategy, if the company holds a dominant position regarding various products in the 
bundle, whether the multi-product rebates are large, the lack of competitors in the tied 
market, the substitutable nature of tying and tied products, if the prices of the tying market 
are regulated and the complementary nature of the tied product.  
 
Firstly, if the dominant company makes its tying or bundling strategy a lasting one, the 
risk to exclude competitors is greater. For example, technical tying is costly to reverse 
and it also reduces the opportunities for resale of individual components220. 
 
Secondly, if the undertaking have a dominant position for more than one of the products 
in the bundle, the greater the number of such products in the bundle, the stronger the 
likely anti-competitive foreclosure, particularly if the bundle is difficult for a competitor 
to replicate, either on its own or in combination with others221. 
 
Thirdly, if the multi-product rebates are so large that equally efficient competitors 
offering only some of the components cannot compete against the discounted bundle, 
bundling may be anti-competitive on the bundling or bundled market. The effect of the 
rebate is assessed by examining whether the incremental price that customers pay for each 
of the dominant undertaking's products in the bundle, remains above or below the long-
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run average incremental cost (it is the average of all the variable and fixed costs that a 
company incurs to produce a particular product222) of the dominant undertaking from 
including that product in the bundle. If it remains above, it will not be considered that the 
multi-product rebates exclude competitors, because an equally efficient competitor with 
only one product should in principle be able to compete profitably against the bundle. 
However, if it is below, even an equally efficient competitor may be prevented from 
expanding or entering223. 
 
Fourthly, if there is not a sufficient number of customers interested in buying the tied 
product alone (the majority would buy it together with the tying product), there will not 
be competitors of the dominant undertaking in the tied market. Consequently, the tying 
can lead to those customers facing higher prices because there will be less or no 
competition for them224.  
 
Fifthly, when a dominant undertaking markets two distinct products (the customer would 
only buy one or the other) that can be used in variable proportions as inputs to a 
production process, they are demand side substitutes. Accordingly, if the firm increases 
the price of one of them, customers may react by increasing their demand for the other 
product, while decreasing the demand for the product that increased its price. Therefore, 
to avoid that substitution and to be able to raise its prices, the dominant company may 
decide to tie the two products225. Hence, tying may have exclusionary effects in both the 
tying and tied markets at the same time.  
 
Sixthly, if the prices the dominant undertaking can charge in the tying market are 
regulated, tying may allow the dominant undertaking to raise prices in the tied market in 
order to compensate for the loss of revenue caused by the regulation in the tying 
market226. Accordingly, tying might exclude competitors from the tied market.  
 
And seventhly, if the tied product is an important complementary product for customers 
of the tying product (so, most of the customers will buy the tying and tied products 
together, not being interested in buying the tied product alone), the entrance to the tying 
market alone may be more difficult227. Therefore, tying may lead to anti-competitive 
foreclosure in the tying market and in the tied market at the same time. 
 
In case tying or bundling are considered to be prima facie abusive, it is time to confirm 
that conclusion examining the claims that the dominant undertaking would make to 
justify its behaviour. Commonly, it will state that its tying and bundling practices may 
lead to savings in production or distribution that would benefit customers. Also, that such 
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practices reduce transaction costs for customers, who would otherwise be forced to buy 
the components separately and that they enable substantial savings on packaging and 
distribution costs for suppliers. It might also argue that combining two independent 
products into a new, single product might enhance the ability to bring such a product to 
the market to the benefit of consumers. In the same vein, another justification might be 
that these practices allow the supplier to pass on efficiencies arising from its production 
or purchase of large quantities of the tied product228.  
 
1.3.2.3. Predatory pricing 
 
The predatory conduct alludes to when a dominant undertaking deliberately incurs losses 
or foregoes profits in the short term, that could have been avoided. That is to say, as it 
was already aforementioned when referring to conditional rebates, the conduct must 
constitute a sacrifice for the dominant undertaking. And in order to consider the conduct 
to be abusive, its aim must be to exclude existing competitors or potential entrants. Hence, 
the dominant undertaking will strengthen or maintain its market power and will be able 
to charge supra-competitive prices and/or degrade its offering without consequences, 
thereby causing consumer harm229. 
 
Sometimes, it is possible to rely upon direct evidence consisting of documents from the 
dominant undertaking which clearly show a predatory strategy230 or evidence of concrete 
threats of predatory action231. However, when that is not the case, to assess whether prima 
facie the predatory conduct pursues the exclusion of competitors from the market, the 
following factors are borne in mind.  
 
For a dominant undertaking to incur losses in the short term, it can charge a lower price 
for all or a particular part of its output or it can expand its output when there is not such 
a demand. To asses if the firm incurred avoidable costs, the average avoidable cost (it 
only includes fixed costs) will be taken into account. Hence, if a dominant undertaking 
charges a price below the average avoidable cost for all or part of its output, it is not 
recovering the costs that could have been avoided by not producing that output. 
Accordingly, in most cases that conduct will be viewed as a clear indication of 
sacrifice232, because the conduct shows that the dominant undertaking cannot be 
interested in applying such price, because each sale generates a loss that could be 
avoided233.  
 
A dominant undertaking foregoes profits in the short term when it gets lower net revenues 
than those it could have been expected from an economically rational and practicable 
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alternative conduct (the conduct that would take into account the market conditions and 
business realities facing the dominant undertaking). Therefore, it incurs a loss that it could 
have avoided if it chose an alternative conduct. Accordingly, if a dominant undertaking 
engaged in a conduct taken in a good faith, because it reasonably expected that it was 
going to be more profitable (ex ante) and it turns out that it incurred losses (ex post), the 
dominant undertaking should not be penalised234. 
 
Once it is prima facie determined that the predatory conduct is abusive, in order to 
confirm that, it is necessary to take into account if the conduct would create efficiencies. 
The dominant undertaking may argue that the low pricing enables it to achieve economies 
of scale or efficiencies related to expanding the market235. For example, a dominant 
undertaking can make sales promotions – sales below costs – to introduce its product to 
new consumers, in the hope that they will be willing to continue buying the product at a 
higher price. 
 
1.3.2.4. Margin squeeze 
 
A vertically-integrated undertaking that is dominant in an upstream market for the supply 
of an essential input, may supply it to wholesale customers who are also retail 
competitors, so they are competitors in the downstream market. Holding a dominant 
position, it may exclude these competitors squeezing their margins, that is, the gap 
between the cost of its required inputs and the price it can achieve on the downstream 
market. The dominant firm can achieve that by charging a high wholesale price, a low 
retail price or a combination of both236. In consequence, that conduct does not allow even 
an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting 
basis. As it was mention regarding the multi-product rebates, to determine the costs of an 
equally efficient competitor, the long-run average incremental cost of the downstream 
division of the integrated dominant undertaking will be taken into account237. 
 
1.3.2.5. Refusal to deal 
 
In general terms, any undertaking, whether dominant or not, has the freedom to choose 
with whom it conducts business and to dispose freely of its property. Even when the 
dominant firm is a vertically integrated one, that is, it is dominant in an upstream market 
for the supply/ownership of an essential facility, input of IPR. Accordingly, it has also 
the right to decide whether it wants to deal with its competitors on the downstream market 
or prefers to refuse to deal238.  
 
                                                
234 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 65 and fn 43. 
235 ibid, para 74. 
236 ‘Abusing a dominant position–overview’ (n 86), para 18. 
237 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 80. 
238 ibid, para 75; ‘Abusing a dominant position–overview’ (n 86), para 18. 
 56 
The concept of refusal to deal covers a broad range of practices, such as a refusal to supply 
goods or services, a refusal to grant access to an essential facility or a refusal to license 
IPRs. All of these types of possibly unlawful refusal to supply will be studied in Chapter 
2, giving particular relevance to refusal to grant IP licenses239. 
The refusal may cause a disruption of previous supply, namely, the refused input had been 
already traded by the dominant firm and with the refusal, the supply arrangement 
terminates. Or a de novo refusal to supply, when the dominant company never had a 
supply relationship with the competitor240. Therefore, it is sufficient that there is demand 
from potential purchasers and that a potential market for the input at stake can be 
identified241, not being necessary for the refused product to have been already traded. 
 
Likewise, it is not necessary for there to be actual refusal on the part of a dominant 
undertaking, so the ‘constructive’ refusal is sufficient (see Section 3.1. of Chapter 5). For 
instance, it might take the form of unduly delaying or otherwise degrading the supply of 
the product or involve the imposition of unreasonable conditions in return for the 
supply242. 
 
In order to consider that a refusal to deal might prima facie constitute an abuse, the 
following circumstances must be present. First, the refused input is objectively necessary 
in order to manufacture a product or provide a service by dominant undertaking’s 
competitors and thus, to be able to compete effectively on the downstream market. 
Second, the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm. And third, the refusal is likely to 
lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market243.  
 
Once ensured that the aforementioned three elements are fulfilled, it is necessary to asses 
if the dominant undertaking behaviour is objectively justified or it is an arbitrary refusal. 
For instance, if a dominant undertaking has previously supplied the input in question, this 
can be relevant for the assessment of any claim that the refusal to supply is justified on 
efficiency grounds244. Although at the same time, the fact that the owner of the essential 
input in the past has found it in its interest to supply, it might be an indication that 
supplying the input does not imply any risk that the owner receives inadequate 
compensation for the original investment. Therefore, it would be up to the dominant 
company to demonstrate why circumstances have actually changed in such a way that the 
continuation of its existing supply relationship would put in danger its adequate 
compensation245.  
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1.3.2.6. Enforcing patent rights  
 
The dominant undertaking whose IPRs have been violated, has the right to enforce them, 
even when it owns SEPs. Therefore, it can bring actions for a prohibitory injunction and 
the recall of products in SEP infringing proceedings.  
 
However, as it was briefly explained in the Section ‘Statement of the problem’ of the 
Introduction – and it will be deeply analysed in Chapters 3 and 4 –, the EC and the ECJ 
reckon that in certain circumstances, the aforementioned SEP owners’ conduct may 
amount to an abuse. That is to say, when the conduct does not pursue the defence of IPRs, 
but the exclusion of competitors.  Accordingly, they treat the issue as a specific and novel 
category of abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
Nevertheless, the aim of this research is to defend that SEP owners’ conduct should have 
been qualified as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses – that would be 
remedied with compulsory licenses (see Chapter 5), instead of as a novel category of 
abuse. 
1.3.3. Discriminatory abuse 
 
The abuse of a dominant position may also consist in applying dissimilar conditions 
(prices or other terms) to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, where that 
difference cannot be justified, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage 
[Article 102(c)]246. 
 
Although some247  defend that there are three types of abuse in Article 102 TFEU (the 
exploitative, the exclusionary and the discriminatory) – as it was explained so far –, I 
consider that discrimination constitutes either an exploitative abuse or an exclusionary 
abuse248. Namely, when a dominant undertaking charges different prices (usually, 
excessive prices) or compels some customers to buy under unfair terms, it is exploiting 
them. In the same vein, when the dominant firm refuses to deal with a specific competitor 
(discriminating it against others), it is excluding it from the market.   
 
1.4. Effects on trade between Member States 
 
The last legal element of Article 102 TFEU to conclude that the abusive conduct is 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market, it requires that the abuse of a 
dominant position may affect trade between Member States. The purpose of that 
condition is to define, in the context of the law governing competition, the boundary 
between the areas respectively covered by EU law and the law of EU Member States, 
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because the EU competition rules are not intended to remedy situations which are purely 
internal to a Member State.  
 
It follows from the case law that for that requirement to be fulfilled, the following three 
elements must be present.  
 
First, trade between Member States must be affected. The concept of trade is not limited 
to traditional exchanges of goods and services across borders, but covers all cross-border 
economic activity. In addition, it also encompasses practices affecting the competitive 
structure of the internal market by eliminating or threatening to eliminate a competitor 
operating within the territory of the European Union (EU)249. 
 
Second, a practice must be capable of having an effect on trade between Member States. 
This notion implies that it must be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability on 
the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that the practice in question may have 
an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member States. Where a dominant undertaking engages in abusive conduct in more than 
one Member State, such abuse is normally, by its very nature, capable of affecting trade 
between Member States250.  
 
Third, the effect on trade between Member States must be appreciable. This is assessed 
primarily with reference to the position of an undertaking on a relevant product market. 
The stronger the position of an undertaking, the more likely it is that the effect on trade 
between Member States of a practice will be appreciable. Moreover, when the holder of 
a dominant position obstructs access to the market by competitors, it makes no difference 
whether such conduct is confined to a single Member State, as long as it is capable of 
affecting patterns of trade and competition on the common market251. 
2. Enforcement of competition law: Regulation 1/2003 
 
Article 105(1) TFEU states that the EC shall investigate cases of suspected infringement 
of Articles 101 (collusive practices) and 102 (abuse of dominant position) TFEU and 
propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end, that are provided for in Regulation 
1/2003252. As it will be studied below, these measures are divided into three categories: 
remedies, sanctions and binding commitments. At the same time, remedies are classified 
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as behavioural and structural remedies. And sanctions are sorted as fines and periodic 
penalty payments.  
 
In addition, the competition authorities of Member States253 – acting on their own 
initiative or on a complaint – and the national courts254 have also the power to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in individual cases, imposing the same antitrust measures 
that the Commission is empowered to order, as well as any other penalty provided for in 
their national law. Furthermore, under Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003, where a 
National Competition Authority or national court applies national competition law to any 
conduct that would also be illegal under Article 102, it must also apply Article 102 
TFEU255.  
 
2.1. Remedies 
 
In accordance with Article 7(1)256 of Regulation 1/2003, if the Commission, acting on a 
complaint or on its own initiative, finds there is an infringement of Article 101 or 102 
TFEU, it may impose any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to 
the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. 
According to the ECJ257, it means the Commission has the power not only to prohibit ‘the 
continuation of certain action, practices or situations which are contrary to the Treaty’, 
but also to ‘include an order to do certain acts or provide certain advantages which have 
been wrongfully withheld’. In the same vein, the ECJ258  and the CFI259 expressly 
acknowledged that the Commission must be able to exercise the right to take decisions 
conferred upon it, in the most efficacious manner, best suited to the circumstances of each 
given situation. 
 
In addition, Article 8(1) of Regulation allows the Commission, in cases of urgency due 
to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition, to order interim remedies on 
the basis of a prima facie finding of infringement. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that unlike fines (see below), remedies are not intended to 
punish, but to restore competition in the sense of eliminating the consequences of the 
infringement, for instance, of the abuse of a dominant position. Besides, in contrast with 
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fines, the imposition of remedies does not require a finding of negligence, let alone 
intent260. 
2.1.1. Behavioural remedies 
Behavioural remedies try to redress specific conducts in a context where incentives 
remain essentially unchanged. They can be subdivided into conduct remedies and 
performance remedies.  
 
Conduct remedies oblige to act in a certain way or prohibit a certain conduct. For instance, 
when Article 102 TFEU is violated because the dominant undertaking abused its 
dominant position for refusing to deal (Chapter 2), it is common to impose a conduct 
remedy that consist in the general obligation to do what the dominant undertaking refused 
to do (to oblige to deal). Bearing in mind that the concept of refusal to deal covers a broad 
range of practices, the conduct remedies also impose different obligations to fulfil them 
on a non-discriminatory basis. Hence, when the dominant company refused to supply 
goods or services, it will be ordered to supply third parties with them. If the dominant 
firm refused to grant access to an essential facility or network, the conduct remedy will 
consist in imposing the obligation to provide third parties with access to them. In the same 
vein, whether the dominant undertaking refused to license IPRs, the conduct remedy will 
consist in the obligation to grant licenses (the so-called compulsory license, that will be 
analysed in detail in Section 5 of Chapter 2, because it constitutes the main measure to 
remedy the refusal to license IPRs).   
 
And performance remedies directly prescribe or prohibit certain market outcomes. Such 
remedies would include, for instance, production level maintenance, price control, 
production increases or export increases. The Commission, in its past practice in antitrust, 
has generally not used these types of remedies that seem to amount more to a regulatory 
approach, than to that of an antitrust enforcement agency.  
 
In contrary to structural remedies (see below), the compliance with behavioural remedies 
has to be monitored and enforced261. 
2.1.2. Structural remedies 
In light of Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003, structural remedies are aimed at changing the 
structure of an undertaking by a transfer of property rights regarding tangible or intangible 
assets, including the transfer of an entire business unit. The most common one is the 
divestiture of an existing business in merger cases.  
 
                                                
260 Maier-Rigaud, Hellström and Wenzel Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’ (n 80) 50, para 2. 
261 Delegation of the European Commission to the Competition Committee, ‘Roundtable on remedies and 
sanctions in abuse of dominance cases’ DAF/COMP/WD(2006)34 (OECD), paras 38-42 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2006_june_remedies_sanctions.pdf> accessed 
4 August 2018. 
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Structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally effective 
behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more 
burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. If both types of 
remedies are considered ‘equally effective’, the least ‘burdensome’ remedy for the 
undertaking has to be chosen262. However, it is not obvious prima facie that these 
categories of remedies (behavioural and structural) are more or less burdensome in terms 
of fundamental rights. While behavioural remedies bear upon the freedom to conduct a 
business, including the freedom to contract, structural remedies may have a bearing on 
property rights if, for instance, a sale of assets is required. As a result, even in those rare 
cases where behavioural and structural remedies are equally effective, structural remedies 
cannot automatically be considered more burdensome263. 
 
2.2. Sanctions 
2.2.1. Fines  
According to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may impose fines on 
undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently: (i) infringe Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU; or (ii) contravene a decision ordering interim measures under Article 8 of 
Regulation 1/2003; or (iii) fail to comply with a commitment made binding by a decision 
pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 (see below the ‘binding commitments’).  
 
Unlike remedies, fines cannot be considered as an instrument capable of restoring 
competition because their aim is to punish. So far, the ECJ has not ruled out other 
objectives that remedies – in a broad sense – may also pursue, such as deterrence, 
compensation, or punishment. However, fines do not either constitute a perfect deterrent. 
Otherwise, remedies would be unnecessary264.  
2.2.2. Periodic penalty payments 
In accordance with Article 24(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the EC might also impose periodic 
penalty payments for each day of delay in compliance to compel undertakings, among 
others: (i) to put an end to an infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU; (ii) to comply 
with a decision ordering interim measures; or (iii) to comply with a commitment made 
binding. 
 
 
 
                                                
262 On the concepts of ‘equally effective’ and ‘burdensome’, see Michael Adam and Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 
‘The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC and the Commission Guidance Paper on Exclusionary Conduct’ 
(2009) ZWeR online 131 <https://www.zwer-online.de/heft-1-2009/zwer-2009-131-the-law-and-
economics-of-article-82-ec-and-the-commission-guidance-paper-on-exclusionary-conduct/> accessed 4 
August 2018. 
263 Maier-Rigaud, Hellström and Wenzel Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’ (n 80) 47, para 3. 
264 ibid 44, para 2, 45, para 1, 46, para 1 and 48, para 3. 
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2.3. Binding commitments 
 
When the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be 
brought to an end, the undertakings concerned may offer commitments to meet the 
concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment. 
Accordingly, the Commission may – by decision – make those commitments binding 
based on Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified 
period and shall conclude that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.  
 
However, the Commission may also, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen the 
proceedings: (i) where there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the 
decision was based; (ii) where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their 
commitments; or (iii) where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or 
misleading information provided by the parties. 
 
The commitment decisions do not state that there was not an abuse of a dominant position 
or that, if these commitments are met, the existence of competition law infringements can 
be excluded. The only thing that they establish is that, if the commitments are fulfilled, 
the Commission will not impose fines for the investigated conducts. And in case of non-
compliance, this will generate the same consequences that would be applicable if the 
decision would have declared the existence of an abuse of a dominant position. In that 
case, the Commission would not have to proof the existence of the abuse265. 
Conclusion 
 
In order to conclude that a conduct is abusive according to Article 102 TFEU, it is 
necessary to begin from defining the relevant market that consists in identifying the 
relevant products or services and the geographical location where they are offered 
(sometimes, it may also be relevant to define the temporal time in which they are 
marketed). In summary, the relevant market comprises all those goods or services 
considered substitutes from the demand perspective. That is to say, if when a firm 
increases prices its customers are in a position to switch easily to available substitute 
products or to supplier located elsewhere, those effective alternative sources of supply, in 
terms both of products/services and of geographic location of suppliers, will compound 
the relevant market. And under certain circumstances, the market could be expanded by 
attending to considerations of substitutability from the point of view of the supply.   
 
Then, it must be determined if the undertaking in question holds a dominant position. 
That is to say, competition authorities or courts have to determine whether it behaves, to 
an appreciable extent, independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of 
consumers. In that regard, the EC has applied the ECJ’s case law that establishes a 
‘presumption of dominance’ according to which very large shares are in themselves, and 
save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position. 
                                                
265 Alfaro Águila-Real, El abuso de posición dominante (n 109), para 282. 
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Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that although market share may provide an 
indication of dominance – and sometimes a very strong indication –, in the end a full 
economic analysis of the overall situation (e.g. undertaking’s structure and barriers to 
entry) is necessary. For instance, it is unlikely that an undertaking with a persistently large 
market share holds a dominant position, if it is a market with very low entry barriers, 
because it is constantly threatened by potential competitors. While an undertaking with a 
large market share in a market protected by significant entry barriers is likely to have 
market power. 
 
Focusing on those dominant undertakings that own SEPs (that may make their owners to 
be powerful in the market), due to the divergent interests among members of SSOs that 
develop interface standards, organizations usually request them to commit that they will 
license their patents under FRAND terms, to prevent them from behaving 
opportunistically. However, that mechanism does not prevent that their conducts may be 
abusive. Regarding exploitative abuses, there is still an ongoing debate among economists 
and legal scholars about the existence, in practice, of systematic holdup and royalty 
stacking. Nonetheless, the exclusionary conduct of bringing actions for a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products is the subject matter of the following chapters. And 
specifically, their aim is to defend that this conduct should be treated as a ‘constructive’ 
refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses – and not as a novel category of abuse in the 
framework of Article 102 TFEU.  
 
To confirm the conclusion that prima facie a specific conduct is abusive, it is relevant to 
assess the claims of the dominant undertaking to determine if the conduct may be 
justified, demonstrating that is objectively necessary or that produces substantial 
efficiencies which outweigh any anti-competitive effects on consumers.  
 
The last legal element to take into account to find an infringement according to Article 
102 TFEU, is that the abuse of a dominant position may affect trade between Member 
States. 
 
Once the existence of the infringement is determined, the competent authority – based on 
the Regulation 1/2003 – could impose remedies or/and fines to the dominant undertaking 
or make commitments binding by a decision.  
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CHAPTER 2. REFUSAL TO DEAL. REFUSAL TO LICENSE IPRs 
Introduction  
 
As it was explained before – Section 1.2.2.3. of Chapter 1 –, the existence of IPRs may 
constitute an entry barrier, when they are essential in order to market goods or services 
by competitors. In the same vein, exclusionary behaviours, such as the refusal to deal and 
more specifically, the refusal to license IPRs, may also create barriers to entry. 
Accordingly, these barriers to entry will be taken into account to determine if the 
undertaking holds a dominant position.  
 
Whereas in this chapter, it will be analysed whether the refusal to license IPRs constitutes 
an abuse of dominant position.  To that end, it is appropriate to take as a starting point, 
the principle of freedom of the parties to arrange their own affairs. Moreover, it is also 
important to refer to the range of practices that the concept refusal to deal covers, apart 
from the refusal to license IPRs. In fact, I am referring to the refusal to supply goods or 
services and the refusal to grant access to an essential facility. Accordingly, generally 
speaking, the required circumstances to determine if a refusal to deal is abusive are 
common to all range of practices. First, the refused input is objectively necessary in order 
to manufacture a product or provide a service by dominant undertaking’s competitors and 
thus, to be able to compete effectively on the downstream market. Second, the refusal is 
likely to lead to consumer harm. Third, that the refusal is arbitrary. And fourth, the refusal 
is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market.  
 
However, as the subject of study of this chapter is the refusal to license IPRs, I will focus 
on the specific circumstances that must be present to consider that behaviour to be 
abusive. In order to do that, firstly, I will briefly describe the case law that deals with the 
refusal to grant IP licenses and also the procedural framework of each case for a better 
understanding.  
 
Secondly, I will analyse together (referring to all the cases subject of study), some of the 
elements of the antitrust infringement required by Article 102 TFEU, that is to say, the 
relevant market definition, the dominance position and the effects on trade between 
Member States.  However, the element regarding the abuse of dominance will be studied 
in respect of each case, because each of them uses different criteria to determine if a 
refusal to grant IPRs is abusive. In general terms, the above causes an uncertainty about 
the required circumstances to assess if the behaviour is abusive or not, so a proposal to 
avoid the inconsistency is necessary, as it will be explained in Chapter 5, where I defend 
the following. That SEP owners' behaviour of bringing infringement actions should have 
been treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to grant IP licenses –, based on a revised 
version of the case law that causes the inconsistency. Nevertheless, the ECJ in Huawei v. 
ZTE (Chapter 4) treated that behaviour as a specific and novel category of abuse within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 
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With reference to the enforcement of competition law, out of the six cases that will be 
deeply studied in this chapter, only in two of them is considered – on the merits – that the 
refusal to grant IP licenses is abusive. And in a third case, the behaviour is also considered 
abusive but only at prima facie (not being confirmed by the decision on the merits). In 
the three cases, the measure (the interim one, included) imposed to remedy the anti-
competitive infringement is the compulsory license, for being the most appropriate one. 
Consequently, thirdly, I will specifically refer to that behavioural remedy in general terms 
and later on, I will develop the particularities that the measure presents in each case 
studied.  
1. The principle of the freedom of the parties to arrange their own affairs 
 
The right to choose one's trading partners and freely to dispose of one's property, that is, 
the freedom to contract, are generally recognised principles in the laws of the EU, 
Member States and US, as a fundamental aspect of freedom of trade. And in some cases, 
even with constitutional status. Therefore, incursions on those rights require careful 
justification. This is why, as it will be explained below, a dominant undertaking may be 
obliged to contract only in exceptional circumstances. That, because the general rule is 
that the dominant undertaking is free to decide that does not want to contract, because for 
example, it wants to choose the company’s client or to improve efficiency266.   
 
According to the US courts and the ECJ, one of those exceptional circumstances is 
justified in terms of competition policy. In that regard, they state that a dominant 
undertaking might be compelled to enter a binding contract when the refusal to supply 
goods or services or to grant IP licenses entails the elimination or substantial reduction of 
competition. And in consequence, it may lead to higher prices or decrease of the quality 
of services or goods – in relation to price – to the detriment of consumers. 
2. Types of abusive refusal to deal 
 
The concept of refusal to deal covers a broad range of practices, such as the refusal to 
supply goods or services, the refusal to grant access to an essential facility and the refusal 
to license IPRs.  
 
2.1. Refusal to supply goods or services 
 
In two early cases (Commercial Solvents and United Brands), the ECJ made it clear that 
the cutting off of supplies to an existing customer might constitute an abuse relying on 
Article 102 TFEU, when the behaviour of the dominant undertaking does not respond to 
a business strategy, but it aims to reserve the downstream market for itself, eliminating 
all the competition from it. And subsequently, in another case (Télémarketing), basing on 
Commercial Solvents, the ECJ extended that conclusion to cases where the dominant 
                                                
266 Bronner AG (n 153) [56]. 
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undertaking conditioned the supply of a service, to the acceptance of an unfair contractual 
condition. The EC also considered instances of refusal to supply in a long line of cases. 
 
In Commercial Solvents267, the Court held that an undertaking in a dominant position as 
regards production of a raw material, could not cease supplying an existing customer who 
manufactured derivatives of the raw material, simply because it decided to start 
manufacturing the derivative itself and wished to eliminate its former customer – one of 
the principal manufacturers of the derivative – from the downstream market. 
 
Similarly, in United Brands268, the ECJ held that an undertaking in a dominant position 
marketing a specific brand of bananas (known to and valued by consumers), could not 
stop supplying a long standing ripener-distributor, only because it also began promoting 
another brand of bananas and taking less care in the ripening of dominant company’s 
bananas. As it was already aforementioned, a dominant undertaking is allowed to protect 
its own commercial interests if they are attacked (the principle of the freedom of the 
parties to arrange their own affairs). However, the aim of the dominant undertaking was 
to send a message to other ripener/distributors, discouraging them from supporting the 
advertising of other brand names if they wanted to continue being supplied by it. Namely, 
the goal was to eliminate competing banana brands from the downstream market. 
Therefore, the Court understood that that behaviour could not be countenanced. 
 
In Télémarketing269, a broadcasting company that run a television station and its 
subsidiary company that was its exclusive agent for television advertising, held a 
dominant position on the specific market of television advertising. During a year, a 
company that operated in the telemarketing activity concluded an agreement to conduct 
telemarketing operations on the television station. The telephone number shown to 
television viewers was that of the company in question, which made its telephone lines 
and team of telephonists available to advertisers and to the television station. However, 
on the expiry of that agreement, the dominant company stated that would no longer 
conclude agreements unless the telephone number used was that of the subsidiary 
company. As the refusal was not justified by technical or commercial requirements 
relating to the nature of the television, the broadcasting company’s aim with that 
behaviour was to reserve to its subsidiary the telemarketing activity, excluding 
competitors from the market, what would enable it to raise prices to advertisers.  
 
The ECJ reckoned that the reasoning developed in Commercial Solvents with respect to 
the cut off of goods, it was applicable to the case of a dominant undertaking who 
conditioned the supply of a service to the acceptance of an unfair contractual conditions, 
a service that was indispensable for the activities of another undertaking on another 
market. Therefore, the Court270 stated the principle that an undertaking holding a 
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dominant position on a particular market commits an abuse where without any objective 
justification refuses to supply a service and hence, eliminating all competition on a on 
neighbouring but separate market (i.e. television telemarketing).  
 
All in all, according to the case law on refusal to supply goods or services, the following 
elements must be present to consider that it is an abusive behaviour. The good or service 
must be essential in order to manufacture a product or provide a service by dominant 
undertaking’s competitors. The refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm (e.g. less offer 
or higher prices). And the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective 
competition on the downstream market, to reserve it for itself.  
 
Albeit I will not go into a detailed analysis, it is worth mentioning that the EC also 
considered instances of refusal to supply goods and services in a long line of cases, 
pushing the dominant party to supply them, as long as they were essential to offer goods 
and services in the market. Examples include the following cases. The Commission 
issued a Statement of Objections (SO) against International Business Machines (IBM) for 
refusing to supply certain software installation services to users of non-IBM central 
processing units, although the Commission finally suspended the proceedings because 
the company agreed to supply271. The Commission also started an investigation into a 
possible abuse of a dominant position by Polaroid for refusing to supply instant film 
without any guarantee as to where the film would be resold. However, as it also agreed 
to supply, the Commission closed the file on the case272. The Commission also 
investigated the refusal to supply industrial sugar to a producer of refined sugar, by 
reducing the price difference between retail and industrial sugar to a point at which the 
margin for an independent producer of retail sugar was inadequate273. And also the refusal 
by an airline to allow a competing airline access to a computer reservation system, in 
order to put pressure on the other airline to raise fares or withdraw from a route274. Or the 
refusal to interline (to issue tickets on behalf of another airline), when another airline 
began to compete on a route275.  
 
2.2. Refusal to grant access to an essential facility 
 
Although neither the General Court (GC) or the ECJ have never referred in their case law 
to the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ that has its origins in US antitrust law, some 
commentators276 have seen the rulings in Commercial Solvents, Télémarketing and 
                                                
271 Commission, ‘Averting the Danger of an Abuse of a Dominant Position: the IBM Case’ (1984) 17(No 
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274 London European v Sabena (Case IV/32.318) Commission Decision 88/589/EEC [1988] OJ L317/47. 
275 British Midland v Aer Lingus (Case IV/33.544) Commission Decision 92/213/EEC [1992] OJ L96/34. 
276 Among others, Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘The “Essential Facilities” Doctrine in EC Competition Law’ 
(1999) 58(3) The Cambridge Law Journal 490, 491-492; Mats A. Bergman, ‘The Role of the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine’ (2001) 46 The Antitrust Bulletin 403, 406, para 3; Sébastien J. Evrard, ‘Essential 
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especially Magill (see below) as endorsements by the ECJ and the CFI of that doctrine. 
According to it, a company that holds a dominant position in the provision of facilities – 
that are essential for the supply of goods or services on another market –, abuses its 
dominant position if without objective justification refuses access to them. Accordingly, 
in certain cases, a dominant undertaking must not merely refrain from anti-competitive 
actions, but must actively promote competition by allowing potential competitors access 
to the facilities it owns277. 
 
Nevertheless, that doctrine has increasingly employed by the Commission in its decisions. 
Its first express reference to the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ was made in B&ILine plc v. 
Sealink Harbours Ltd and Sealink Stena Ltd278 and Sea Containers v. Stena Sealing279, 
where it imposed two interim measures. In both cases, the port operator held a dominant 
position on the market in port services and it also operated in the secondary market 
offering ferry services. When potential competitors requested access to the port of 
Holyhead to offer ferry services, the dominant company refused access without objective 
justification, even though that access was essential for potential competitors to provide 
ferry services. Therefore, the dominant undertaking used its power in the main market 
(port services) in order to protect or strengthen its position in the ancillary market (ferry 
services), so competitors could not provide ferry services to their customers. 
 
In deciding whether a facility is essential, the Commission estimated the extent of the 
handicap and whether it was permanent or merely temporary. The test to be applied was 
described by Temple Lang280, as whether the handicap resulting from the denial of access 
was one that could reasonably be expected to make competitors' activities in the market 
in question either impossible or permanently, seriously and unavoidably uneconomic. If 
so, that would be an insurmountable barrier to entry. If competitors had an economic 
alternative, no such barrier to entry would be created or raised, and there would no duty 
to provide access. 
 
The reason why some scholars understood that the ECJ and the CFI tacitly endorsed this 
doctrine in their judgments is because the Commission – who expressly referred to the 
‘essential facilities doctrine’ in the aforementioned two decisions – based the statement 
of the law concerning the access to the port of Holyhead, on the previous rulings of the 
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ECJ in Commercial Solvents281 and Télémarketing282 and on the judgment of the CFI in 
Magill283 (see below). 
 
2.3. Refusal to license IPRs 
 
After ruling on the cases of refusal to supply goods and services, the ECJ dealt with the 
issue of whether a refusal to grant IP licenses by a dominant company might constitute 
an abuse. So far, the objects of the refusal were goods or services, but not IPRs. Hence, 
factors such as cutting off of supplies to an existing customer (Commercial Solvents and 
United Brands) or conditioning the supply of the service to the acceptance of an unfair 
contractual condition (Télémarketing) were no present. 
 
As it will be analysed below, the issue of determining under which circumstances a refusal 
to grant IP licenses might be abusive is a very controversial one. Therefore, first of all, it 
is convenient to explain the statement of the problem and to summarize the background 
of the decisions and judgments of the EC and the ECJ, as well as their procedural 
framework. That is to say, how the case got to the CFI or the ECJ. Either through a 
reference for a preliminary ruling, an action for annulment of Commission decision or a 
combination of both (preliminary ruling and action for annulment). As it will be 
explained, the procedural framework of IMS Health requires special attention due to its 
complexity.  
3. Refusal to license IPRs: the case law 
 
3.1. Statement of the problem  
  
The problem that arises before the ECJ, first, in Volvo and Renault, and afterwards in 
Magill and in the cases subsequent to it (Tiercé Ladbroke, IMS Health and Microsoft) – 
where the same line of argument applies –, is the following. Whether a holder of an IPR, 
who refuses to grant a license, abuses its dominant position because that conduct limits 
production, the market or technical development to the prejudice of consumers, insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States, according to Article 102 (b) TFEU. 
 
This issue emerges when the IP owner holds a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it and refuses to grant a license to its competitor to use 
the IPR in question. In consequence, the competitor is not able to offer its product and 
compete in the same (downstream or secondary) market where the dominant company 
also operates, because the use of the protected invention or creation is essential for it.  
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Accordingly, parties’ interests conflict with each other. The owner has the right to the 
legitimate exert of its IPR [Articles 16 and 17(2) of the Charter284]. And given the case, 
the competitor will be protected by the right to conduct a business under conditions of 
free competition (Article 119 and Protocol No 27 of TFEU and Article 16 of the Charter).  
 
3.2. Case briefs and procedural framework 
3.2.1. Volvo and Renault 
The High Court of Justice of England and Wales (in Volvo285) and the Tribunale Civile e 
Penale of Milan (in Renault286), brought before the ECJ requests for preliminary rulings 
on the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU, that was relevant to solve their pending IP 
infringement proceedings. 
 
By virtue of the questions submitted, the Court was essentially confronted by the 
following problem. Whether, under Article 102 TFEU, motor vehicle manufacturers were 
abusing their dominant position when refusing to grant licences, even in return for 
reasonable royalties. Specifically, they did not want to grant licenses of protected rights 
in respect of front wings models (in Volvo) and ornamental designs (in Renault) of 
bodywork components for vehicles manufactured by them. The aim of the refusal was to 
prevent the marketing of copies of original bodywork components, by independent 
traders (in Volvo) or producers (in Renault).  
3.2.2. Magill  
Most television viewers in Ireland and Northern Ireland could receive at least six 
television channels that were broadcasted by three companies: Radio Telefis Eireann 
Authority (RTE), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Independent 
Television Publications Ltd (ITP). In the framework of their television broadcasting 
activities, each of them prepared weekly programme listings for their channels indicating 
the channel, the dates and times of the transmissions and the titles of the programmes, 
that were protected by copyright at the national level. Therefore, they enjoyed the 
exclusive right to reproduce and market their respective individual weekly programme 
listings in their own television guides, that typically also contained programme 
summaries, comments, background articles and so forth. 
 
In addition, the daily and weekly newspapers received advance weekly listings together 
with any programme summaries free of charge on request from the three companies. 
However, the publication of the listings by newspapers was subject to certain conditions. 
In principle daily newspapers were permitted to publish listings for a period of 24 hours, 
                                                
284 (n 58) Art 16 (freedom to conduct a business) and Art 17 (right to property). 
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or 48 hours at weekends. And weeklies were allowed to publish ‘highlights’ of the 
programmes to be broadcast during the following week.  
As a consequence, unlike in other Member States, in Ireland and Northern Ireland there 
were not television guides containing all weekly programme listings for the channels 
(comprehensive weekly television guides), because of the refusal of the three companies 
to grant licences permitting third parties to publish their weekly programme listings 
without restrictions (channel, day, time and title of programmes). 
 
Magill was a publishing company that published a weekly newspaper that complied with 
the licensing conditions required by the three companies. However, it wanted to publish 
a comprehensive weekly television guide, but it could not do it due to the refusal of the 
three companies. Therefore, Magill lodged a complaint with the EC claiming that 
television broadcasting companies were abusing their dominant position on the market 
by refusing to grant licences. The Commission in its decision287 decided in favour of 
Magill, stating that companies abused their dominant positions288 according to Article 
102 TFEU and it imposed on them the obligation to grant licenses to third parties (as a 
permanent measure), to remedy the aforementioned abuse. 
 
Accordingly, IP owners applied for annulment of Commission decision, but  the CFI289 
ruled in favour of the Commission, dismissing the action for annulment. The judgment 
of the CFI was appealed by two (RTE and ITP) of the three infringing companies before 
the ECJ290, who dismissed the appeal against the opinion of the Advocate General 
Gulmann291. 
3.2.3. Tiercé Ladbroke  
The French Pari Mutuel Urbain (PMU) was an economic interest grouping set up by the 
principal French sociétés de courses that organized horse races in France and it had 
exclusive responsibility for organizing off-course betting in France. Besides, PMU had 
also exclusive rights to take bets abroad on races organized in France and bets in France 
on races organized abroad. In addition, the sociétés de courses granted the right to market 
television pictures and sound commentaries on horse races organized by them in France 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘French sound and pictures’ protected by copyrights) to PMU. 
The scope of the right for the commercial exploitation of French sociétés de courses’ 
copyrights referred to: broadcasting in real time over PMU bet-taking network in France 
and retransmission in Germany and Austria.  
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Pari Mutuel International (PMI), a French company in which PMU was the majority 
shareholder, exploited outside France televised pictures and information on horse races 
organized in France. As PMU assigned the right to market French sound and pictures to 
PMI, PMI opted to grant Deutscher Sportverlag Kurt Stoof GmbH & Co. – a German 
company specialized in publishing horse-racing newspapers covering, among other 
things, French races –, the exclusive right to exploit French sound and pictures in 
Germany and Austria (‘the licensed territory’).  
 
Tiercé Ladbroke, whose business consisted in admitting in Belgium individual bets on 
horse races run abroad, asked principal French sociétés de courses to grant rights for the 
commercial exploitation of their French sound and pictures in Belgium, but they refused 
to grant copyright licenses. Therefore, Tiercé Ladbroke lodged a complaint with the EC 
asking to bring to an end the infringement of Article 102 TFEU committed by principal 
French sociétés de courses. However, by a decision292, the Commission rejected 
Ladbroke’s complaint against French racing companies that held copyrights, on the 
grounds that they did not infringe Article 102 TFEU293. 
 
Accordingly, Tiercé Ladbroke applied for annulment of Commission decision before the 
CFI294 who ruled in favour of the Commission, so Tiercé Ladbroke appealed the judgment 
before the ECJ295, although later on, the appeal was removed from the register296.  
3.2.4. Bronner  
Unlike the previous cases, Bronner is a case about a refusal to supply a service 
(newspapers' home-delivery system) and not about a refusal to grant an IP license. 
Nevertheless, the interest of its analysis lies in the fact that the ECJ examined whether 
the undertaking (Bronner) seeking access to the service could successfully rely on Magill 
case. This would imply to broaden the scope of application of Magill to any refusal to 
deal, regardless of the property right (tangible or intangible) that would constitute its 
object. 
 
Having nuanced the above, the facts of the case in question were the following. The 
company Mediaprint published two Austrian daily newspapers: Neue Kronen Zeitung and 
Kurier. The marketing and advertising business of those newspapers was carried through 
its two wholly-owned subsidiaries. For the distribution of its newspapers, Mediaprint 
established a nationwide home-delivery scheme, put into effect through one of those 
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intermediaries. The scheme consisted of delivering the newspapers directly to subscribers 
in the early hours of the morning.  
 
The Bronner company, whose object was the editing, publishing, manufacture and 
distribution of the Austrian daily newspaper Der Standard, it asked Mediaprint to include 
its newspaper in its home-delivery scheme paying a reasonable remuneration. 
Nevertheless, Mediaprint refused to supply the service, so Bronner brought an action 
against the owner of the service before the national court, claiming that Mediaprint was 
abusing its dominant position on the ground that such refusal deprived it of a means of 
distribution that it judged as essential for the sale of its newspaper. That is, by reason of 
Der Standard’s small circulation, Bronner alleged that was unable either alone or in 
cooperation with other publishers to set up and operate its own home-delivery scheme in 
economically reasonable conditions297. 
 
In the framework of that proceedings, the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of 
Vienna brought before the ECJ a request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
Article 102 TFEU. The referred question was whether the refusal by a newspaper group 
– that held a substantial share of the market in daily newspapers in Austria – to allow the 
publisher of a competing newspaper to access to its home-delivery network (the only one 
nationwide), it constituted an abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 102 
TFEU298. 
3.2.5. IMS Health 
Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS) Health was a company that provided a broad 
range of market research, marketing, and sales management services to the 
pharmaceutical industry. In particular, it provided, through its German subsidiary, 
regional wholesaler data report services to interested pharmaceutical companies in 
respect of sales of pharmaceutical products by pharmacies throughout Germany. The 
services were based on a ‘brick structure’ that divided a country into artificially 
designated geographic areas or bricks that were used to report and measure sales of 
individual pharmaceutical products299. 
 
The IMS Health brick structure segmented Germany into 1860 or its derivatives – 2847 
or 3000 – geographical areas, generically referred to as the ‘1860 brick structure’. It was 
copyrighted in Germany as a database and it was created by taking account of various 
criteria, such as the boundaries of municipalities, postcodes, population density, transport 
connections and the geographical distribution of pharmacies and doctors' surgeries. In the 
development process of the ‘1860 brick structure’, IMS Health set up a working group in 
which undertakings in the pharmaceutical industry – that were its clients –, participated 
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298 ibid [10], [11], [37] and [42]; Bronner AG (n 153) [1]. 
299 Case T-184/01 R IMS Health [2001] ECR II-02349, para 1. 
 74 
making suggestions for improving and optimising market segmentation300. In 
consequence, the German brick-structure-based information services soon constituted the 
central feature of IMS Health.  
 
Moreover, IMS Health knew that in order to implement its strategy, it had to take into 
account the network effect. That is, when the demand of the product increases, the price 
should rise (as opposed to economies of scale), because as the size of the network 
increases, so does the market share301. Therefore, IMS Health was aware that in order to 
convince consumers that its structure would become the standard, it had to develop a large 
customer base (note that the value of the product for each consumer increases, as it does 
the number of users of the product)302. Accordingly, IMS Health did not only sold its 
brick structure, but it also distributed it free of charge among pharmacies and medical 
offices303. However, the sales promotions – sales below costs – are not predatory per se 
(see Section 1.3.2.3. of Chapter 1). The aim of IMS Health was to make the structure 
known, in the hope that consumers were going to be willing to continue buying the 
product at a higher price304. 
 
Therefore, these practices helped the ‘1860 brick structure’ to become the de facto 
industry standard in Germany, to which its clients adapted their information and 
distribution systems, as it was recognized by pharmaceutical companies305. Namely, those 
laboratories made exceptional organisational and financial efforts in order to acquire the 
studies on regional sales of pharmaceutical products presented on the basis of the 
protected structure. Consequently, knowing that the brick structure was copyrighted, they 
placed themselves in a situation of technical dependency regarding it. 
 
Although IMS Health also induced pharmaceutical companies to that situation, that 
behaviour could not be classified as abusive according to Article 102 TFEU. It is true that 
these companies organized their establishments and activities in accordance with the 
brick structure of IMS Health, with whom they had a long-term commercial relationship. 
Hence, a reorganization could only be accomplished with great damages for the 
dependent company306.  Nonetheless, it would be difficult to sustain the existence of that 
infringement, because IMS Health ‘placed’ the pharmaceutical companies in that 
situation using legal means (i.e. setting up a working group and free of charge 
distribution). In case these companies had celebrated contracts whereby IMS Health 
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placed them in the situation of technical dependency through illegal practices, they should 
have included the protection they considered convenient in their agreements, to address 
the abuse according to contract law307. 
 
On the German market, there were two competitors: AzyX Deutschland GmbH 
Geopharma Information Services (AzyX) and Pharma Intranet Information AG (PII), 
whose founders were former managers of IMS Health. Both companies were also 
engaged in tracking sales of pharmaceutical products, but they started selling services 
based on alternative structures. However, potential clients manifested reticence towards 
them, claiming that the data was not usable unless it could be presented within the format 
of Germany's industry standard (the ‘1860 brick structure’). Therefore, competitors 
started using copies of the protected structure owned by IMS Health308.  
 
As a consequence, IMS Health commenced copyright infringement proceedings in 
Germany before the Regional Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt am Main, who granted an 
interlocutory order prohibiting PII from using the ‘1860 brick structure’. The order was 
later on confirmed by the judgment of the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of 
Frankfurt am Main. During the aforementioned copyright infringement proceeding, 
National Data Corporation (NDC) acquired PII, who requested a licence from IMS Health 
to use the ‘1860 brick structure’ in return for an annual licence fee. But IMS Health 
refused to enter into negotiations arguing that it was not essential for NDC to use the 
structure to compete on the German market. Therefore, NDC lodged a complaint with the 
Commission alleging that IMS Health refusal to licence constituted an infringement of 
Article 102 TFEU. Subsequently, in respect of NDC, the Regional Court issued the same 
aforementioned prohibition regarding the use of the protected structure, by an 
interlocutory order309. 
 
The EC found in favour of NDC through the Decision 2002/165/EC310, concluding that 
the three elements required by the case law to impose a compulsory license (together with 
a periodic penalty payment) as an interim measure in the course of a competition 
investigation – see Section 5.4.2.1. of this Chapter –, were present. Among them, the one 
concerning that legal and factual elements showed a reasonably strong prima facie 
evidence of the existence of an abuse of a dominant position by IMS Health (fumus delicti 
commissi). 
 
Right after Commission’s decision, the interlocutory order prohibiting NDC from using 
the protected structure was also confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am 
Main. Due to the contradiction between the provisional measure ordered by the 
Commission (compulsory license) and the Regional Court’s prohibition, the same day the 
court on which the Higher Regional Court confirmed the order, the Regional Court 
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decided to stay the copyright infringement proceedings. And it was referred to the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling the question of whether the refusal to grant IP licenses constituted 
an abuse of a dominant position, on the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. Thereby, the 
ECJ addressed for the first time a case that involved an IPR (copyright) that protected a 
creation that became a de facto industry standard. The reason of the reference is to ensure 
the uniform application of EU competition law. According to Article 16 of Regulation 
1/2003 and settled case law311, if a Member State court rules on facts that later on can be 
subject of a Commission decision on the implementation of Article 102 TFEU, the 
national court must avoid giving judgments which would conflict with a decision 
contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the 
national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. Namely, national 
courts remain free to decide lawsuits pending before them as long as EU law is respected. 
This prohibition is based on the duty of cooperation provided for in Article 4(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU)312 and on the binding force of Commission decisions.  
 
Then, IMS Health requested the annulment of the Commission Decision 2002/165/EC or, 
alternatively, the annulment of the compulsory license. And, as a provisional measure, it 
requested the suspension of the application of the Decision. The President of the CFI313 
ordered the temporal suspension of the application of that Decision, so IMS Health and 
NDC did not have time to enter into a license agreement. Later on, issuing another 
Order314, it suspended its application permanently, until the CFI  delivered judgment 
in the action for annulment. The suspension was based on the following two arguments.  
 
Firstly, on the consideration that basing on the Magill case, the Commission – in its prima 
facie assessment that IMS Health infringed Article 102 TFEU– did not correctly interpret 
what circumstances had to be present to consider that a refusal to grant IP licenses 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position. Namely, according to Magill, the refusal to 
grant IP licenses must prevent the emergence of a new product and the aim of the refusal 
must be to reserve a secondary market. Whereas in IMS Health (see Sections 4.5.2.1. and 
4.5.3. of this Chapter), the EC considered that IMS Health abused its dominant position 
when the refusal prevented the appearance of a product that was already offered by the 
IP owner (so it was not a new product) on another stage of production (instead of on a 
market separate from that on which the undertaking in question was dominant). 
 
And secondly, because the interim measure was inappropriate since it did not preserve 
the previous status quo in order to ensure the effectiveness of the final decision to be 
given in the main action. Instead, it altered that status by forcing IMS Health to negotiate 
licences with its competitor who, as it was found by the Regional Court of Frankfurt am 
Main in its prima facie assessment, it was actually infringing its copyright. That is to say, 
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the Commission required IMS Health to legitimise the IP infringement315. Therefore, the 
application of the compulsory license would cause an immediate, serious, enduring and 
potentially irreparable damage to the IP owner316. 
 
Accordingly, NDC appealed against the latter Order (the one that suspended the 
application of Commission’s decision permanently) before the ECJ317, but it was 
dismissed as inadmissible in part, and unfounded in part. Consecutively, the annulment 
procedure was also suspended318 until the ECJ decided about the preliminary ruling 
regarding the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
In these circumstances, the Commission adopted the Decision 2003/741/EC319 that 
withdrew the Decision 2002/165/EC on interim measures. The EC did not rule on the 
merits, that is, on whether IMS Health abused its dominant position or not. That, because 
there was a material change in circumstances – i.e. in the status of competition – in which 
the first decision was based on, so there was no longer any urgency to impose an interim 
measure. First, NDC began to provide a data service based on a new structure that did not 
infringe any IPR of IMS Health. Consequently, its market share increased. And second, 
AzyX – the other competitor –, also created a new structure to access the German market. 
Nonetheless, it experienced losses that were not assumable, so it ceased its activities. 
Therefore, the Commission did not withdraw its first decision as a result of changing its 
initial position as regards the existence of a reasonably strong prima facie case 
establishing an abuse of a dominant position. 
 
Notwithstanding, regardless of the material change in circumstances and that the EC 
considered it was not necessary to take a position on the likely outcome of the pending 
proceeding, the Commission should have ruled on the merits in accordance with the 
principles of consistency and legal certainty. Moreover, the Decision 2002/165/EC on 
provisional measures caused the Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main to bring a request 
for a preliminary ruling. And the content of the question submitted by the German court 
was the same as that of the Commission’s investigation. In that regard, it is appropriate 
to mention the case Motorola (it will be studied in Section 3.2. of Chapter 3) about the 
abuse of dominant position by a SEP owner (Motorola) who brought an action seeking a 
prohibitory injunction, where the status of competition had also changed before the 
Commission adopted the decision. Namely, the status improved from the moment the 
Commission sent to Motorola the SO, until the antitrust investigation was closed, because 
Motorola and Apple signed a licensing agreement (‘Settlement Agreement’). Despite this, 
the Commission opted to rule on the merits, concluding that the SEP owner abused its 
dominant position. However, it did not follow the same line in IMS Health. Therefore, in 
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order to analyse – according to the Commission – under what circumstances the refusal 
of IMS Health to grant licenses constituted an abuse, we only have its prima facie 
assessment. 
 
After the Decision 2003/741/EC of the Commission, the ECJ320 – following the proposal 
of the Advocate General Tizzano321 – gave a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
Article 102 TFEU, based on the facts provided by the German court, that were prior to 
the modification of the status of the competition (to which Commission referred in that 
decision).  
 
Subsequently, the CFI322 declared that the action for annulment of the Decision 
2002/165/EC – that imposed provisional measures –, had become without object. As IMS 
Health did not justify why it retained an interest in the prosecution of annulment 
proceedings – when the decision was already withdrawn –, the CFI stated there was no 
longer any need to give a decision in the annulment procedure.  
 
In conclusion, to analyse – in Section 4.5. of this Chapter – if the refusal to grant copyright 
licenses by IMS Health constituted an abuse of a dominant position, there are several 
relevant decisions to take into account. For instance, the Decision 2002/165/EC, because 
the Commission considered that legal and factual elements showed a reasonably strong 
prima facie case establishing an abuse of a dominant position by IMS Health. In addition, 
the Commission did not modify its assessment in the subsequent Decision 2003/741/EC 
(that withdrew the first decision). Equally relevant are the Orders323 from the President 
of the CFI about suspending the application of the Decision 2002/165/EC, based on the 
fact that the Commission interpreted erroneously the circumstances that should be present 
to consider IMS Health’s conduct as abusive. And also the preliminary ruling of the ECJ, 
that along with previous cases (Volvo, Renault, Magill, Tiercé Ladbroke and Bronner), 
constitutes settled case law on refusal to grant IP licenses. 
3.2.6. Microsoft  
Microsoft designed, developed and marketed a wide variety of software products for 
different kinds of computing devices. These software products included, in particular, 
operating systems for client personal computers (PC) and operating systems for work 
group servers. The latter was used by office workers in their day-to-day work for three 
sets of distinct services: sharing files stored on servers, sharing printers, and the 
administration of the manner in which users and groups of users could access network 
services. That operating system was designed and marketed to deliver those three sets of 
services collectively to a relatively small number of client PC linked together in a small 
to medium-sized network.   
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As Sun Microsystems also supplied operating systems for work group servers, it asked 
Microsoft to disclose to it the information necessary to allow interoperability between 
Windows client PC operating systems and its server operating systems (‘client-to-server 
interoperability’). It specifically asked for the so-called Interoperability Information that 
is the complete and accurate specifications for all the Protocols, for the purpose of 
developing and distributing products competing with Microsoft’s own products on the 
work group server operating system market. Protocols are set of rules of interconnection 
and interaction between various instances of Windows Work Group Server Operating 
Systems and Windows Client PC Operating Systems running on different computers in a 
Windows Work Group Network324. Therefore, the disclosure of protocols did not entail 
a transfer of the essential value of the Windows operating system, because they only 
described what was expected from the software in question, in contrast to 
‘implementations’ constituted by the running of the code on the computer. Accordingly, 
a competitor wishing to write a server operating system that understood Microsoft’s 
protocols would have to write a code in its product that implemented the specifications. 
Two programmers implementing  the  same  protocol  specifications  would  not  write  
the  same  source  code  and  the  performances  of  their  programmes  would  be  
different325. Consequently, without the requested technology, Sun could not compete on 
the work group server operating system market. However, Microsoft refused to license 
its copyright. And thus, consumers’ purchasing decisions in respect of work group server 
operating systems were channelled towards Microsoft’s products. 
 
As a consequence, Sun Microsystems lodged a complaint with the Commission and after 
various exchange of correspondence between the EC and Microsoft, the Commission 
adopted a decision326 considering that Microsoft abused its dominant position according 
to Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA)327. To remedy and sanction that conduct, the Commission imposed on Microsoft, 
as permanent measures, the obligation to grant licenses to third parties and a fine. 
 
Accordingly, Microsoft applied for suspension of Articles 3 and 5 of the decision that 
imposed the fine and the compulsory license respectively, due to the impact they were 
going to cause on the exercise of Microsoft’s IPRs and trade secrets, but it was dismissed 
in its entirety by the CFI328. Microsoft also applied for annulment of the Commission 
decision and alternatively, it also applied for annulment of or a substantial reduction in 
the fine. Nevertheless, the action for annulment was also dismissed by the CFI329.  
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4. Refusal to license IPRs: elements of the antitrust infringement 
 
In order to determine whether a refusal to license IPRs constitutes an anti-competitive 
behaviour according to Article 102 TFEU, first it is necessary to define the relevant 
market. And once it is done, it must be analysed if the undertaking in question held a 
dominant position, if it abused that position and whether the trade between Member States 
might be affected by the refusal. All these elements, except for the abuse, were already 
deeply explained in Section 1 of Chapter 1. Accordingly, in Sections 4.1. to 4.3. of this 
Chapter, I will focus on mentioning how those three elements were present in the 
aforementioned case law on refusal to license IPRs. 
 
The controversial element when determining if a refusal to license IPRs constitutes an 
abuse of a dominant position is indeed the abuse, that is, the definition of the 
circumstances that must be present to consider that the undertaking abused its dominant 
position.   Therefore, in Sections 4.4. to 4.6., I will analyse the different criteria considered 
in the case law to assess the abusive nature of the refusal. In this regard, three blocks can 
be clearly differentiated. Firstly, the criteria used in Volvo and Renault, where competitors 
wanted to use the protected IPRs to manufacture duplicated products. Secondly, the 
criteria set in Magill, where the aim of the competitor was to use the copyright to 
manufacture a new product. And thirdly, the use of the Magill test in cases where the facts 
were different, for instance, when competitors’ goal was to use the IPR to offer the service 
that the IP owner already offered. 
 
4.1. Relevant market definition 
 
In Volvo and Renault, the relevant product market was defined as the market for spare 
parts for the cars which they produced.  
 
In Magill, it was concluded that television broadcasting companies held dominant 
positions on the Irish and British (Northern Ireland) market for television guides giving 
weekly listings. 
 
Where the definition of the relevant market was most contested was in Tiercé Ladbroke. 
The Commission analysed whether the relevant product market was the market in the 
transmission of pictures and sound commentaries of horse races in general, or the one of 
French sound and pictures. Basing on the percentages of the bets placed and the races 
retransmitted in the Belgian and German markets330, it took the view that transmission of 
French sound and pictures were substitutable for the transmission of sound and pictures 
of other races (German, British, French), in terms of the conditions of competition and 
the structure of supply and demand on the market in question. 
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With regard the conditions of competition, the Commission analysed the extent to which 
the transmission of sound and pictures of races had particular characteristics influencing 
the choice of customers (bookmakers). And it concluded that the choice made by them – 
as to the races transmitted in their betting outlets – did not derived solely, as Tiercé 
Ladbroke maintained, from the supposed wish of bettors to see only the races on which 
they bet retransmitted. The choice made by German bookmakers as between sound and 
pictures of different origins was also based on other factors such as the terms of the 
licensing agreements and/or whether there were other betting outlets offering other sound 
and pictures331.  
 
Concerning the structure of supply and demand, the Commission compared the market 
shares of betting on the various horse races and the market shares of sound and pictures 
of such races. And it concluded that demand on the German market in sound and pictures 
was subject to continual variations as compared with demand on the betting market. In 
consequence, it stated that the substitutability of the various race transmissions existed 
because the demand of the transmission was not constant.  
 
To define the relevant geographical market, the CFI declared that conditions of 
competition existing on the market in sound and pictures had to be considered in relation 
to betting outlets, that were the demand side for sound and pictures for retransmission to 
final consumers (the bettors). The conditions in which the main betting market operated 
were characterized by close geographical links between bettors and betting outlets, in so 
far as the mobility of bettors was necessarily limited and marginal (the cross-frontier 
betting market between Belgium and France was marginal, because in general, bettors 
bet in their national countries). Therefore, the competition between the various betting 
outlets developed essentially within national geographical areas. In conclusion, unlike 
what was sustained by Tiercé Ladbroke – who considered that the relevant geographical 
market was the Community market or a market comprising at least France, Germany and 
Belgium –, the EC reckoned that it was confined to Belgium, because the market in sound 
and pictures of horse races was divided into national markets332. All in all, the CFI found 
that the Commission had correctly identified the relevant market as the Belgian market 
in sound and pictures of horse races in general333. 
 
In Bronner, as the Commission pointed out, it was for the national court to define the 
relevant market. In that regard, only if the court would maintain that a separate market in 
home-delivery schemes existed and that Mediaprint held a dominant position in that 
market (in order to do that, the court should also take account of the possible existence of 
regional home-delivery schemes), its refusal to include Bronner in that network might 
constitute an abuse. However, it seems more reasonable to define the relevant market as 
the Austrian daily newspaper market, because apart from the home-delivery scheme, 
other methods of distributing daily newspapers such as sale in shops or at kiosks or 
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delivery by post, seem sufficiently interchangeable with it, as to take them into account 
also to define the relevant market (substitutability from the demand viewpoint)334.  
 
In IMS Health, the CFI found that the EC had correctly identified the relevant market as 
the German regional sales data services335. The relevant geographic market was 
considered to be Germany, the one with the largest market for regional sales data services 
in Europe, because the data in question related to fundamental aspects which differed 
from one Member State to another, such as the name of the drug, the packaging, the 
product code, the therapeutic category and the method of reimbursement336.  
 
In Microsoft, the EC concluded that by reason of their specific characteristics and the lack 
of realistic substitutes on the demand and supply side, the client PC operating systems 
and the work group server operating systems formed two distinct relevant product 
markets. For instance, for work group server operating systems, there were no substitute 
products from the demand side perspective, among others, because Microsoft’s work 
group server operating system was the only interoperable one with its client PC operating 
system337. With regard to the geographical aspect, the Commission found that the relevant 
geographic market was worldwide338. 
 
4.2. Holding a dominant position 
 
As it was already mentioned in the previous chapter, the factors that should be borne in 
mind to assess if an undertaking holds a dominant position are its structure, market share 
and the existence of barriers to competitors entering the market. Nevertheless, the EC has 
traditionally followed the approach of the ECJ of giving much importance to the market 
share, considering it as the conclusive factor to assess if an undertaking holds a dominant 
position. As explained below, clear examples thereof are the cases of Magill, IMS Health 
(in the prima facie assessment) and Microsoft.  
 
In Magill, the Commission stated that by force of circumstance, RTE, BBC and ITP 
enjoyed a de facto monopoly over the information used to compile listings for the 
television programmes received in most households in Ireland and 30% to 40% of 
households in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, IP owners were in a position to prevent 
effective competition on the market in weekly television magazines. That conclusion was 
confirmed by the CFI and the ECJ339.  
 
In Tiercé Ladbroke, that company considered that the sociétés de courses occupied a joint 
dominant position on the Belgian market in the sound and pictures of French races. 
                                                
334 Bronner (n 297) [29] and [34]. 
335 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [56]. 
336 ibid [54], [55] and [60].  
337 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324) [324]–[401]. 
338 ibid [427].  
339 Magill [ECJ, 1995] (n 257) [47]. 
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However, as it was previously stated, the relevant product market was defined as the 
sound and pictures of horse races in general. 
 
In Bronner, in order to determine whether Mediaprint held a dominant position, the 
national court should take account of the existence of other regional home-delivery 
schemes. And if there was an insufficient degree of interchangeability between 
Mediaprint's nationwide scheme (the only one in Austria) and other regional schemes, the 
national court could determine that Mediaprint was de facto in a monopoly situation in 
the relevant market, and thus held a dominant position340. 
 
As in Magill, in IMS Health and Microsoft there was also considered that IP owners held 
a dominant position on the relevant markets, relying on their market share. To reach that 
conclusion, in the first case, the market shares of the existing three providers (IMS Health, 
NDC and AzyX) were taken into account341. And in the second one, the EC declared that 
Microsoft held a dominant position in the client PC operating system market – more than 
90% of market share (considered as ‘super-dominant’) – and on the work group server 
operating system market – at least 60% of market share. In order to confirm that 
statement, the Commission also took into account other factors, such as the maintenance 
of the market shares over time. And  also the existence of numerous barriers to entry, 
attributable to the fact that Windows was not only a dominant product on the market for 
client PC operating systems but, in addition, it was the de facto standard for those 
systems342. 
 
4.3. Effects on trade between Member States 
 
Once the relevant market is defined and it is determined that the undertaking holds a 
dominant position on it, in order to consider if the refusal to license IPRs is abusive, the 
other legal element provided for in Article 102 TFEU requires that the refusal may affect 
trade between Member States.  
 
The potential effect on trade between two or more Member States may be determined by 
reference to the potential level of trade in products potentially manufactured by the 
competitor using the IPR. Namely, whether those products would be also demanded in 
another Member State.  
 
For example, in Magill, if Magill was to publish a comprehensive television guide that 
were the best-selling magazines in Ireland, it was obvious that there would be a demand 
for such a guide also in Northern Ireland (UK), where viewers could receive the same 
programmes as in Ireland. Therefore, the CFI found that television broadcasting 
companies’ conduct of eliminating a competitor modified the structure of competition in 
                                                
340 Bronner (n 297) [34] and [35]. 
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342 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324) [430]–[435], [448]–[452] and [472]–[499]. 
 84 
the market for television guides in Ireland and Northern Ireland and thus affected 
potential trade flows between two Member States343. 
 
In Bronner, the national court – before referring the question to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling – considered that Mediaprint might hold a dominant position in the Austrian home-
delivery scheme, so the refusal to that scheme could have the effect of completely 
excluding Bronner from the daily newspaper market. And as Bronner also sold abroad its 
Austrian daily newspaper, it considered that the refusal may have affect trade between 
Member States344. However, after the ECJ judgment, it would seem more reasonable to 
define the relevant market as the Austrian daily newspaper market where Mediaprint 
would not probably hold a dominant position. In any case, with regard to the effect on 
trade between Member States, the Commission and Mediaprint argued that the facts were 
confined to Austria and that Bronner distributed fewer than 700 copies of its newspaper 
abroad daily, amounting to less than 0.8% of the newspaper's total circulation345.  
 
In Microsoft, the Commission346 based its conclusion regarding that the refusal to supply 
interface information had an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States, on 
the case United Brands347, where the ECJ stated the following. If the occupier of a 
dominant position established in the common market aims at eliminating competitors also 
established in the common market, it is immaterial whether this behaviour relates directly 
to trade between Member States once it has been shown that such elimination will have 
repercussions on the patterns of competition within the common market. Indeed, in the 
case in question, the Microsoft refusal brought about a risk of elimination of competition 
on the worldwide market for work group server operating systems.  
 
4.4. The abuse of dominance: different criteria 
 
Focusing now on the core element of the prohibition stated in Article 102 TFEU – the 
abuse –, it will be analysed when the behaviour of refusing to license IPRs by dominant 
undertakings may constitute an abuse of that position. It is important to emphasize that 
the refusal to grant IP licenses does not imply an abuse of a dominant position per se.  
 
Coinciding with EC’s conclusion, the ECJ concluded that the refusal to license IPRs was 
abusive in Magill and according to the CFI, also in Microsoft. In IMS Health, the 
Commission also considered that the dominant undertaking abused its dominant position, 
in the prima facie assessment it made in order to adopt interim measures. Nevertheless, 
that decision was later on withdrawn. And the ECJ in the preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of Article 102 TFEU, it concluded that the refusal to license the IPR was 
not an anti-competitive behaviour in that specific case (in IMS Health).  
                                                
343 Magill [CFI, 1991 (RTE)] (n 283) [51] and [77]; Magill [CFI, 1991 (BBC)] (n 283) [36] and [65]. 
344 Bronner (n 297) [10]. 
345 ibid [15]. 
346 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324) [991]–[993]. 
347 (n 94) [201]. 
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4.4.1. The refusal as a legitimate exercise 
As mentioned, IPRs proprietorship is not of itself sufficient to automatically create a 
dominant position, so a fortiori, its exercise by a dominant undertaking cannot either 
amount to abuse of such a position per se348. IPRs represent the fruit of substantial 
investment and generally their exercise will restrict competition for a limited period, in 
contrast with monopolies over tangibles goods that may in certain cases lead to a 
permanent exclusion of competition on a related market. The fact that IPRs are not 
granted permanently involves to carefully balance the conflicting interests, that is, the 
free competition with that of providing an incentive for research and development and for 
creativity. In that regard, if the refusal is considered to be abusive, the interest in 
protection of free competition will prevail over the protection of IPRs and the economic 
freedom of their owners. 
 
According to settled case law, the exercise of an IPR consisting of refusing to grant IP 
licenses in return for the payment of a reasonable royalty, with a view to prevent third 
parties from manufacturing and selling or importing products incorporating that right, it 
constitutes the very subject-matter of the IP owner’s exclusive right. So, even if it holds 
a dominant position, the refusal cannot in itself constitute an abuse of that position349.  
 
Nevertheless, as the right to property or the freedom to conduct business are not absolute 
rights but they are subject to public interest restrictions350, the refusal to license IPRs may 
be abusive but only if it pursues an aim manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article 
102 TFEU. That is to say, when it pursues to exclude competition, to the prejudice of 
consumers, preventing the emergence of a new or an existing product for which the use 
of IPRs is essential351. And not because the refusal restricts competition, because that is 
precisely the aim of IPRs. 
 
On that regard, the case law determines different criteria to assess the existence of an 
antitrust infringement. In essence, the ECJ bases on two different legal arguments, 
depending on what is the purpose of the competitor who requests the license. Namely, if 
it is to simply duplicate products that are already offered by the IP owner on the market 
(Volvo and Renault), the refusal might be abusive if it involves certain abusive conduct. 
If on the contrary, the aim is to produce a new product for which there is a potential 
demand on the part of consumers, the refusal might be abusive if exceptional 
circumstances are present, even in the absence of abusive additional conduct. Those 
exceptional circumstances were mentioned in Magill for the first time but they were not 
wholly clear and they continued to develop up to the Microsoft case. As it will be analysed 
below, the discussion regarding the exceptional circumstances revolved around 
                                                
348 Renault (n 286) [15]; Renault AG (n 286) [56], [65] and [69]. 
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determining the scope of some of them and around whether they were alternative or 
cumulative. 
4.4.2. Manufacturing of duplicated products  
In Volvo352 and Renault353, the aim of competitors was to use the registered designs of car 
bodies to manufacture spare parts similar to those already manufactured by the IP owners. 
The ECJ understood that their refusal to grant IP licenses did not constitute an abuse of 
their dominant positions, unless the refusal involved certain abusive conduct that was 
liable to affect trade between Member States. And by way of example, it mentioned three 
of them: (i) the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers; (ii) the 
fixing of prices for spare parts at unfair level; or (iii) a decision no longer to produce spare 
parts for a particular model, even though many cars of that model were still in circulation. 
 
4.4.2.1. Arbitrary refusal  
 
If the IP owner refuses to grant IP licenses to allow manufacturing by independent 
repairers and it also refuses arbitrarily to supply them spare parts, it is excluding 
competitors. This behaviour limits other companies to enter the market in order to drive 
down prices, which prejudices consumers. That goes within the meaning of subparagraph 
(b) of the second paragraph of Article 102 TFEU, that states that the abuse of a dominant 
position may consist in ‘limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers’. 
 
4.4.2.2. Unfair pricing 
  
If the dominant undertaking, in addition to refusing to grant IP licenses, fixes prices for 
spare parts at unfair level, it is exploiting competition within the meaning of subparagraph 
(a) of the second paragraph of Article 102 TFEU, that provides that the abuse of a 
dominant position may consist in ‘directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’. Actually, independent producers of 
spare parts maintained that bodywork components produced by Volvo and Renault were 
sold by their concessionaires at exaggeratedly high prices354. 
 
However, with reference to the difference in prices between components sold by the 
manufacturer and those sold by independent producers, it should be noted that the ECJ 
holds355 that a higher price for the former than for the latter does not necessarily constitute 
an abuse. That, because the IP owner is entitled to recover not only his production costs 
in the strict sense and a reasonable profit margin, but also his research and development 
expenditure. Nevertheless, when assessing the prices of bodywork components of cars 
sold as spare parts by IP owners, national courts should take into account the fact that part 
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of the research and development expenditure has probably already been recovered from 
the sale of new cars356. 
 
4.4.2.3. Cessation of production  
 
If the dominant company refuses to grant IP licenses and also adopts the decision no 
longer to produce spare parts for a particular model, even though many cars of that model 
are still in circulation, that behaviour also goes within the meaning of the aforementioned 
subparagraph (b), because it limits the production with the aim of excluding competitors 
in prejudice of consumers, who own that particular model of car.   
4.4.3. Manufacturing of a new product 
On the contrary in Magill, the objective of the third party was to create a new product (a 
comprehensive weekly television guide) that was not offered on the market. The ECJ357 
– confirming the analysis conducted by the EC and the CFI – concluded that dominant 
undertakings’ refusal that prevented the emergence of a new product was abusive if four 
cumulative circumstances were present (the so called Magill test). First, that the IPR in 
question was objectively necessary in order to manufacture a product or provide a service 
by dominant undertaking’s competitors and thus, to be able to compete effectively on the 
downstream market. Second, that the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product, 
from which consumers would likely benefit. Third, that the refusal was arbitrary. And 
fourth, that the refusal was likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on 
the downstream market. 
 
In Magill, the ECJ concluded that television broadcasting companies infringed 
subparagraph (b) of the second paragraph of Article 102 TFEU, in so far as they used 
their copyrights as an instrument of abuse to prevent the introduction of a new product 
on the market for television guides, where they held dominant positions. Hence, the 
refusal excluded competitors from the market, limiting it, to the prejudice of consumers.  
 
Accordingly, for the first time, the ECJ determined that the refusal to license IPRs that 
prevented the emergence of a new product, might also be abusive if exceptional 
circumstances were present, even in the absence of abusive additional conducts 
mentioned in Volvo and Renault.  
 
4.4.3.1. Essentiality  
 
According to Magill, the first358 circumstance to evaluate the abusive nature of the refusal 
is to determine if the IPR is objectively essential or indispensable for the exercise of 
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competitor’s activity and be able to compete effectively on the market, in the sense that 
there is no real or potential substitute of the protected IPR in question. 
 
In Magill359, the basic information on programme scheduling protected by copyrights – 
owned by television broadcasting companies – constituted the indispensable raw material 
for Magill to compile weekly television guides.  
 
4.4.3.2. Emergence of a new product 
 
The second360 circumstance set in Magill is that the refusal prevents the emergence of a 
new product for which there is a potential, constant, specific and regular demand on the 
part of consumers. Consequently, consumers would be harmed, because that impediment 
had an adverse impact on their welfare in the form of reducing their choice. By ‘new 
product’, the ECJ understood a product that was not limited essentially to duplicate the 
product already offered on the secondary market by the IP owner.  
 
Accordingly, what it must be examined is whether, for consumers, the likely negative 
consequences of the refusal to license IPRs in the relevant market outweigh over time the 
negative consequences of imposing an obligation to license. If they do, normally it will 
be considered that the refusal impacts on consumer welfare361.   
 
In Magill, this circumstance constituted the essence of the case, where television 
broadcasting companies were preventing the emergence of comprehensive weekly 
television guides, for which there was a potential demand. The existing comprehensive 
daily listings published by newspapers were only to a limited extent substitutable by the 
new product in terms of the information they provided to consumers, because they were 
permitted to publish listings only for a period of 24 hours, or 48 hours at weekends. The 
fact that many consumers were prepared to purchase one or more of the weekly television 
guides published individually by television broadcasters, when information on a daily 
basis was available in newspapers (albeit with temporal limitations), demonstrated the 
demand for more advance information, that is, for the new product that Magill wanted to 
offer (a comprehensive weekly television guide). 
 
4.4.3.3. Arbitrary refusal  
 
According to Magill, the third362 circumstance required is that the refusal is arbitrary, that 
is to say, a refusal not justified by requirements of secrecy, research or development or 
other objectively verifiable considerations363. Namely, in order to consider that the refusal 
is justified, the dominant undertaking must demonstrate that the refusal is objectively 
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necessary or that produces substantial efficiencies which outweigh any anti-
competitive effects on consumers, because the refusal is indispensable and proportionate 
to the goal allegedly pursued by the dominant undertaking.  
 
In Magill, there was no justification either in the activity of television broadcasting or in 
that of publishing television magazines, to refuse to authorize Magill and other potential 
competitors to enter into the weekly television magazine market. Hence, the aim of the 
refusal was merely to prevent the emergence of a competing product on that market.  
 
4.4.3.4. Reservation of the secondary market 
 
The fourth364 circumstance considered in Magill refers to the fact that the dominant IP 
holder must be present in both the main and the ancillary markets and the refusal is liable 
to, or is likely to, eliminate, immediately or over time, all effective competition in the 
downstream market (the marginal presence in certain niches on the market cannot be 
suffice). Therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate that all competition on the market 
would be eliminated. Thus, the refusal would pursue the aim of reserving the secondary 
market, preventing the entry or survival of competitors on the downstream market in order 
to maintain the monopoly enjoyed.  
 
The likelihood of effective competition being eliminated as a result of the refusal is 
generally greater in the following scenarios: the higher the market share of the dominant 
undertaking in the downstream market; the less the capacity of the dominant undertaking 
is constrained relative to competitors in the downstream market; the closer the 
substitutability between the dominant undertaking's output and that of its competitors in 
the downstream market; the greater the proportion of competitors in the downstream 
market that are affected; and when the more likely it is that the demand that could be 
served by the foreclosed competitors, would be diverted away from them to the advantage 
of the dominant undertaking365. 
 
In Magill, the purpose of the refusal by television broadcasting companies was to exclude 
one of their competitors – Magill – from the publishing market of weekly programme 
listings. 
 
4.5. The Magill test subsequently applied to diverging facts: modification of the 
‘original’ circumstances 
 
Although Magill could be seen as quite a narrow precedent because it referred to a specific 
and wholly-new product366, the decision-making bodies decided to apply the criteria set 
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in that case to subsequent cases, where facts were divergent, being possible to 
differentiate three distinct categories. The Magill test was applied when the object of the 
refusal was not the licensing of an IPR, but the supply of a tangible property, that is, a 
service and a good (Bronner367 and Microsoft368, respectively). Also to cases where the 
aim of the refusal was to prevent the emergence of existing products – no new products 
–, that were already offered by the IP owner (Tiercé Ladbroke369, IMS Health370 and 
Microsoft). And likewise, when the IP owner was not presence in a secondary market, 
but in a vertically related one (IMS Health). In order to apply the test to these diverging 
facts, it was necessary to adapt the ‘original’ circumstances defined in Magill. 
 
Consequently, the EC, the CFI and the ECJ issued decisions and judgments that were not 
entirely consistent among them, regarding the required circumstances to determine that a 
refusal to license IPRs was abusive. That, because as said previously, they did not agree 
about the scope of some circumstances and nor about their alternative or cumulative 
nature. 
 
Before analysing the use of the Magill test in subsequent cases, it should be underline that 
as in Magill, also in IMS Health (as a prima facie assessment) was considered that the 
dominant undertaking abused its dominant position because the refusal limited the 
market. Note that this conclusion was not confirmed in the decision on the merits since 
there was a material change in the status of competition. In Microsoft, the refusal was 
also considered abusive but due to the fact that the refusal limited the technical 
development (among others, it impeded the interoperability371). Whereas in Bronner and 
Tiercé Ladbroke, it was concluded that property owners did not abuse their dominant 
positions, because their refusal did not prejudice consumers. 
4.5.1. Refusal to supply a service/good 
The first category in which the Magill test was applied was to cases where the object of 
the refusal was not the licensing of an IPR, but the supply of a tangible property 
(service/good).  
 
Specifically, the test was used in Bronner372, where the object of the refusal was the 
supply of the home-delivery scheme service. And also in Microsoft, where the EC373 was 
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of the opinion that the Interoperability Information (the complete and accurate 
specifications for all the Protocols), unlike software, it was not protected by copyright. 
However, the Commission finally presumed that it was covered by the IPR and therefore, 
it applied the Magill test. Precisely already in Magill374, the Commission stated that its 
analysis of the abuse of copyright regarding information about television programmes, it 
was applicable also to situations different from that at issue in that case, in the area of 
computer software for example. 
 
In both cases (Bronner and Microsoft), the decision of applying the Magill test was taken 
because it was more favourable to IP owners, than the case law on refusal to supply 
services and goods. That is, the use of the criteria set in Magill involved the presence of 
more circumstances to consider that the service/good owner abused its dominant position, 
compared to those required in Commercial Solvents375 and Télémarketing376 – that 
specifically dealt with the refusal to supply goods and services, respectively. As it was 
already stated in Section 1.3. of Chapter 1, the primary purpose of Article 102 TFEU is 
to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular to safeguard the interests of 
consumers – rather than to protect the position of particular competitors377. Therefore, if 
the case law establishes different requirements depending on whether the refusal to deal 
concerns a tangible or an intangible property, decision-making bodies might be 
overprotecting owners of services/goods when they apply them the Magill test that deals 
specifically with IPRs. And that might prejudice consumer welfare.  
 
In that regard, it is worth mentioning that although the intangible assets in Magill 
(television programme listings) and IMS Health (‘1860 brick structure’) were protected 
by copyright, it was a matter of discussion whether they were the result of great creative 
effort and considerable investment378.  For instance in IMS Health,  the structure was 
based to a large extent on the borders of the German postal codes and was brought into 
existence thanks to the decisive contribution of the pharmaceutical industry379. 
Nevertheless, that debate was out of the scope with regard to the issue of whether the 
refusal to license IPRs constituted an abuse of dominant position. 
 
Notwithstanding, as was it will be explained below, the great contribution of Bronner was 
that the ECJ clarified how to determine whether a ‘potential substitute’ – to which the 
first circumstance of Magill refers –, exists or not. Namely, in Magill was considered that 
an IPR was essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity if there was no real or 
potential substitute of the protected IPR in question. 
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4.5.1.1. Definition of ‘potential substitute’ 
 
The ECJ had to conclude if the home-delivery scheme owned by Mediaprint was essential 
for the exercise of Bronner’s activity or not, in the sense that there were no real or 
potential substitutes. In order to do that, firstly, the ECJ concluded that other methods of 
distributing daily newspapers, such as by post and through sale in shops and at kiosks, 
even though they might be less advantageous, they represented equivalent actual 
alternatives to home-delivery offered by Mediaprint. Therefore, there were actual 
substitutes in existence for that distributing scheme380. 
 
The ECJ could have ceased the analysis regarding the essentiality of the Mediaprint 
distributing system at that point, not being necessary to analyse the existence of potential 
substitutes. It would have been more appropriate if the ‘potential substitute’ concept 
would have been defined in Magill, where real substitutes did not exist. Nonetheless, the 
ECJ in Bronner decided to define that concept as follows. If there were any technical, 
legal or economic obstacles capable of making impossible or even unreasonably difficult 
for other publishers of daily newspapers (competitors of Mediaprint) to establish their 
own nationwide home-delivery scheme, it would be considered that no potential 
substitutes existed. When assessing the presence of these obstacles to determine the 
existence of potential substitutes, different entry barriers (see Section 1.2.2.3. of Chapter 
1), such as sunk costs or regulation, that are taken into account to determine if the 
undertaking holds a dominant position, they might be considered as economic or legal 
obstacles.  
 
The obstacle that Bronner claimed existed was the economical one. To consider that 
Bronner was facing that obstacle, it would be necessary at the very least to establish, that 
it was not economically viable to create a second home-delivery scheme for the 
distribution of daily newspapers with a circulation comparable to that of the daily 
newspapers distributed by the existing scheme owned by Mediaprint. Therefore, it was 
not enough Bronner’s argument that it was not economically viable by reason of the small 
circulation of the daily newspaper or newspapers to be distributed381. Therefore, as none 
obstacles were present in that case, the ECJ concluded that there were not only real 
substitutes, but also potential alternatives to the refused home-delivery scheme service. 
In consequence, the access to the existing system was not indispensable for the exercise 
of Bronner’s activity. 
 
The existence of the aforementioned obstacles was analysed in IMS Health, where the 
‘1860 brick structure’ protected by copyright was considered to be essential by the EC in 
its prima facie assessment, because there were no real or potential substitutes. It 
considered that was evident that there were not real substitutes for the protected brick 
structure owned by IMS Health, because it constituted the de facto industrial standard, 
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mainly because pharmaceutical companies – the clients of IMS Health –, participated in 
its elaboration.  
 
In addition, when analysing the existence of potential substitutes, the Commission took 
the view that there were several obstacles for competitors that made unreasonably 
difficult – although not impossible – to create alternative structures in which regional data 
services could be formatted and marketed in Germany. Firstly, there were technical 
obstacles because to build the structure, competitors would need to use the parameters 
that were in the public domain and fixed, but without infringing the IMS Health copyright. 
For instance, postcode boundaries, location of pharmacies and doctors or 
sociodemographic data. Secondly, they would also have to face legal constraints, 
avoiding to infringe: (a) the German data protection law, because by the creation of a 
second brick structure it would be possible to compare its data with that in the ‘1860 brick 
structure’, being possible to identify information about individual pharmacies; and (b) the 
IMS Health copyright. And thirdly, pharmaceutical companies became ‘locked-in’ to that 
de facto standard, so to switch away from it to buy sales data formatted in a non-
compatible structure, whilst theoretically possible, would be an unviable economic 
proposition due to the exceptional organizational and financial efforts that laboratories 
would have to make382. Therefore, competitors might be obliged to offer their alternative 
structures on terms that would rule out any economic viability of business on a scale 
comparable to that of IMS Health that controlled the protected structure383. 
 
In conclusion, the Commission concluded that the ‘1860 brick structure’ was 
indispensable to compete on the relevant market. It was not a realistic possibility for 
undertakings that wished to offer regional sales data services in Germany, to employ 
another structure that would not infringe IMS Health copyright. 
 
Nevertheless, it is striking that NDC – the complainant competitor –, parallel to 
Commission's investigation and legal proceedings, managed to celebrate contracts based 
on an alternative structure it created, even with some of the 20 largest pharmaceutical 
companies. The other competitor (AzyX) was not so successful and ceased its activities 
due to the losses experienced with its structure. Accordingly, the Commission withdrew 
the decision that stated prima facie that IMS Health abused its dominant position, because 
there was no longer any urgency to impose interim measures. 
 
I ignore how the status of competition changed from considering the existence of 
technical, legal and economic obstacles that made unreasonably difficult the marketing 
of substitutes, to considering the increase of competitor’s market share. A possible 
argument could be that actually, these obstacles did not make unreasonably difficult the 
marketing of substitutes, but they make it merely difficult. And accordingly, the 
Commission interpreted the concept ‘essential’ too broadly. As a consequence, the IPR 
                                                
382 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [71]–[123] and [138]. 
383 IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [29]. 
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was considered essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity, when potential 
substitutes existed – i.e. the structure developed by NDC. Hence, inefficient rivals were 
protected, damaging therefore the productive efficiency.  
 
In IMS Health, competitors did not have market power so their only way to take customers 
from the dominant company was improving the efficiency of their alternative 
structures384. Instead of working on improving them, competitors might have considered 
easier to sell studies based on the structure of IMS Health, so they did it without getting 
licenses to use it. Once IMS Health sued them for IP infringements, competitors requested 
IMS Health to grant them licenses, but it refused to do so. When the Regional Court of 
Frankfurt am Main issued prohibitory injunctions against competitors, prohibiting them 
to use the protected structure, one of the competitors (NDC) filed a complaint with the 
Commission, alleging that IMS Health abused its dominant position, refusing to grant 
licenses. The aim of the complaint might have been that the Commission’s investigation 
ended imposing IMS Health the obligation to grant licenses to third parties. Hence, NDC 
could use the protected structure without infringing copyrights, instead of working to 
improve the efficiency of its own structure.  
 
In that regard, it is important to highlight that when a dominant firm’s competitors desire 
to use a protected IPR in their own products, they are entitled to compete in the market 
with their own assets, not with protected ones unless they get licenses for it385. Hence, 
decision-making bodies should conduct a detailed analysis to conclude whether the IPR 
in question is essential or not. Namely, the ability of a determined rival to compete around 
the protected facility – with resulting benefits to consumers – has often been 
underestimated, particularly with respect to fast moving technologies, where 
technological and market developments can present multiple opportunities to work 
around a competitor’s IP386. 
 
Note that in a given case, the opposite may also occur, namely, that the ‘essential’ concept 
is interpreted too narrowly. Accordingly, even though potential substitutes do not exist, 
the IPR is not considered essential. Thus, efficient rivals will be excluded, which could 
cause effects totally contrary to those initially envisaged: foster investment and the 
economic development reinforcing competition in the market387.  
                                                
384 Alfaro Águila-Real, El abuso de posición dominante (n 109), para 93. 
385 Glen O. Robinson, ‘On Refusing to Deal with Rivals’ (2002) 87(5) Cornell Law Review 1178, 1191, 
para 2. 
386 Derek Ridyard, ‘Compulsory access under EC competition law – A new doctrine of ‘convenient 
facilities’ and the case for price regulation’ (2004) 11 European Competition Law Review 669, 673, para 
2 ('By requiring compulsory access to a facility without which it is inconvenient (rather than essential) for 
rivals to do business, the Commission has in effect declared an ability to micromanage competition in a 
way that goes well beyond the "last resort" intervention that normally characterises compulsory access 
cases’); Jorge Padilla, Douglas H. Ginsburg and Koren Wong-Ervin, ‘Antitrust Analysis Involving 
Intellectual Property and Standards: Implications from Economics’ (2019) SSRN Electronic Journal 25, 
para 1 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119034> accessed 23 February 2019. 
387 Alfaro Águila-Real, El abuso de posición dominante (n 109), para 198. 
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4.5.2. Emergence of existing products 
The second category in which the Magill test was applied was to cases where the refusal 
prevented the emergence of existing products, that were already offered by the IP owner. 
Namely, in Tiercé Ladbroke, IMS Health and Microsoft, the purpose of competitors was 
not the manufacture of new products. Therefore, the second circumstance foreseen in 
Magill, that the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is a 
potential, constant, specific and regular demand on the part of consumers, was not present 
in those cases. That circumstance was required in Magill because it referred to a specific 
and wholly-new product (a comprehensive weekly television guide), that was not the case 
in Tiercé Ladbroke, IMS Health and Microsoft. Nonetheless, the decision-making bodies 
applied the Magill test. 
 
Accordingly, in order to overcome the lack of presence of the second circumstance of 
Magill, they adopted different solutions to determine if the refusal was abusive. In some 
cases, they challenged the indispensability of the second circumstance. Namely, they 
considered that the presence of that circumstance was an alternative one along with the 
first circumstance about the essentiality (the CFI in Tiercé Ladbroke). And they also 
stated that the second circumstance was not necessary at all (the ECJ in Bronner and the 
EC in IMS Health). Whereas in some other cases, they broadened the concept of ‘new 
product’ compared to the definition given in Magill (CFI in Tiercé Ladbroke and the EC 
and the CFI in Microsoft). 
 
4.5.2.1. The indispensability of the second circumstance challenged  
 
In Tiercé Ladbroke, although both the Commission and the CFI agreed on concluding 
that the refusal to grant IP licenses was not abusive, they relied on different legal 
arguments.  
 
The Commission388 understood that in order to determine the existence of the abuse, the 
four circumstances required in Magill had to be present. Namely, that the IPR was 
essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity (the first circumstance); that the refusal 
prevented the emergence of a new product for which there was a potential demand (the 
second circumstance); that the refusal was arbitrary (the third circumstance); and that the 
objective of the refusal was to exclude competition from a secondary market (the fourth 
circumstance).  
 
On the contrary, the CFI389 considered that the first circumstance about the essentiality 
and the second one set in Magill were alternatives, so that it was sufficient that either of 
them were present, together with the third and fourth circumstances. In order to conclude 
that, the CFI alluded to the judgment of the ECJ in Magill. Consequently, it might be 
understood that the CFI interpreted that the ECJ considered both circumstances as 
                                                
388 Tiercé Ladbroke Commission Decision (n 292). 
389 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294) [131]. 
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alternative in Magill. Nevertheless, I understand that in Magill, the ECJ confirmed the 
analysis conducted by the EC and the CFI, who considered that dominant undertakings’ 
refusal that prevented the emergence of a new product, was abusive if four cumulative 
circumstances were present. However, there are those390  that in the same vein of the CFI 
in Tiercé Ladbroke, are of the opinion that in Magill, the ECJ did not state that each of 
the factors that previously the CFI had identified were necessary conditions for an overall 
finding of exceptional circumstances. And in consequence, they understand that the ECJ 
appeared to leave open the possibility of other points being taken into account. 
 
Accordingly, first, the CFI391 in Tiercé Ladbroke stated that the license to broadcast 
French sound and pictures was not essential for the exercise of Ladbroke’s activity 
consisting in taking of bets, because the transmission was not indispensable since it took 
place after bets were placed (the first circumstance was not present). And consecutively, 
as the first and second circumstances were alternatives and the IPR was not essential, it 
analysed whether the second one was present, that is, if the refusal prevented the 
emergence of a new product.  
 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the general principle of the freedom of the parties to 
arrange their own affairs, it seems unreasonable to oblige the IP owner to grant licenses 
of the IPR when there are not essential for the competitor’s activity.  
 
In IMS Health, the Commission in the Decision 2002/165/EC392 on provisional measures, 
considered prima facie that it was not necessary the presence of the second circumstance 
regarding the emergence of a new product. Note that the Commission considered the 
opposite in Tiercé Ladbroke, that is to say, that the presence of the four circumstances 
was necessary. In that regard, when the President of the CFI393 in IMS Health suspended 
the application of the aforementioned Decision, he based his order on the fact that the 
Commission misinterpreted the circumstances that had to be present in order to consider 
that a refusal to grant IP licenses was abusive. Therefore, the President stated that the 
second circumstance had to be always present. The ECJ394 in the preliminary ruling – and 
following the opinion of the Advocate General Tizzano395 –, shared the opinion of the 
President of the CFI, forwarding the determination of the existence of the second 
circumstance to the Member State court. That is to say, it stated that it was clear from the 
previous judgments in Magill and in Bronner – paragraph 40 –, that the presence of the 
four circumstances was necessary.  
 
                                                
390 Reynolds and Best, ‘Article 102 and innovation’ (n 366) 7, para 3. 
391 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294) [132]. 
392 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [69] and [70]. 
393 IMS Health [CFI Order, Aug. 2001–temporarily] (n 299) [24]; IMS Health [CFI Order, Oct. 2001–
permanently] (n 314) [102] and [105]. 
394 IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [37], [38], [49] and [52]. 
395 IMS Health AG (n 321) [66]. 
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Notwithstanding, I do not think that in Bronner396 the ECJ considered that the presence 
of the four circumstances was necessary. Precisely, I understand that it considered that 
the second circumstance was unnecessary. My conclusion derives from reading paragraph 
41 of the judgment, together with paragraph 40. Namely, as it was aforementioned before, 
in paragraph 40, the ECJ indicated that according to Magill, four cumulative 
circumstances had to be present to determine if a refusal was abusive. Nevertheless, when 
in paragraph 41 the ECJ applied these circumstances to the case that concerned it, it 
omitted to mention the second circumstance regarding the emergence of a new product.  
 
Besides, it was precisely on that judgment of the ECJ in Bronner, where the Commission 
based397 its aforementioned Decision 2002/165/EC in IMS Health, where it stated that the 
second circumstance was not required. Due to these two arguments is that I consider that 
in Bronner the ECJ stated that the presence of the second circumstance was not required. 
Nevertheless, there are those398 who take the opposite view, that is, that the ECJ stated 
that the four circumstances of Magill had to be present – i.e. the second circumstance 
included. But in order to reach that conclusion, they take into account only the paragraph 
40 – as the ECJ did in IMS Health –, but not the following one that applies the Magill test 
to the specific facts of the case. 
 
In any case, I am of the opinion that the presence of the second circumstance – about the 
emergence of a new product –, together with the first one – regarding the essentiality – is 
indispensable. However, as it will be argued in Chapter 5, I consider necessary to broad 
the scope of the second circumstance and define it as follows. The refusal must prevent 
the emergence of a product. And the impossibility of that emergence, it must prejudice 
consumer welfare whether, for instance, in the form of higher prices, less choice or lack 
of interoperability. 
 
Otherwise, if the second circumstance would not be required, the refusal that prevents the 
emergence of a product already offered by the IP owner – which absence does not 
prejudice consumer welfare in the form of higher prices nor less choice –, it might be 
considered abusive. Accordingly, competition rules would limit the exercise of specific 
IPRs by its owner in pursuit of enabling competitors to enter the market with a similar 
product. That, in order to allow the driving down of prices, which is an important goal of 
competition law, but not of IPRs. Nonetheless, whether the second circumstance is 
understood to be fundamental, the limitation would pursuit the goals of competition law 
and it would also encourage innovation, that is an overall goal shared with the broader 
system of IP399.  
 
  
                                                
396 (n 297) [41]. 
397 IMS Health [ECJ Order, 2002] (n 317) [17]. 
398 Reynolds and Best, ‘Article 102 and innovation’ (n 366) 8, para 1. 
399 ibid 7, para 2 and 9, para 1. 
 98 
4.5.2.2. Broadening the concept of ‘new product’ 
 
In Tiercé Ladbroke, the CFI besides stating that the first and second circumstances set in 
Magill were alternatives, it also considered appropriate to modify the concept of ‘new 
product’ contained in the second circumstance. In Magill, the ‘new product’ was defined 
as the one that is not limited essentially to reproduce or duplicate the product (goods or 
services) already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the IPR. Instead, the 
CFI400 described it as one that is a far more suitable for consumers. That is, the second 
circumstance would require that the refusal to license IPRs impeded the appearance of a 
far more suitable product for consumers in the ancillary market, for which there is a 
potential, constant, specific and regular demand on the part of consumers. It is striking 
that the CFI did not justify in any way the broadening of the concept, especially when 
even doing that, the sound and pictures could not be considered a new product for bettors. 
 
In Microsoft, the Commission401 and the CFI402 also broadened the concept of ‘new 
product’ given in Magill, because according to the original definition, the second 
circumstance would not be present, because the purpose of competitors was to use 
Microsoft’s IP to essentially replicate the functionality of existing Microsoft products. 
Therefore, to consider a product as ‘new’, they considered sufficient that it contained 
substantial elements contributed by the licensee's own efforts.  
Thereby, if Microsoft had licensed the Interoperability Information to its competitor Sun 
Microsystems – who also supplied operating systems for work group servers –, it would 
have implemented it in order to be its products interoperable with Windows client PC 
operating systems. And as that implementation could take very different forms, there 
would exist significant possibilities for product differentiation that could enhance 
competition and benefit consumers. Hence, Microsoft's competitors' products would 
implement the same set of protocols as Windows work group server operating systems 
did, but they would differ widely in terms of performance, security and functionality. 
Therefore, according to the broadened concept of ‘new product’, Sun Microsystems’ 
products would be considered as new ones403. 
 
To broaden that concept, the Commission and the CFI argued that the second 
circumstance relating to the emergence of a new product, as envisaged in Magill and IMS 
Health, could not be the only parameter which determined whether a refusal to license an 
IPR was capable of causing prejudice to consumers. According to Article 102 TFEU, 
such prejudice might arise where there was a limitation not only of production or markets 
– as in Magill and IMS Health –, but also of technical development – as in Microsoft. 
 
                                                
400 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294) [121]. 
401 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [626]. 
402 Microsoft [CFI Order, 2004] (n 328) [190]. 
403 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324) [24], [25], [693]–[701], [782] and [702]–[708]; 
Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [643]–[665]. 
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4.5.2.3. Outcome 
 
As explained before, in IMS Health and Microsoft (the two cases where together with 
Magill, it was concluded that the refusal to license IPRs was abusive) the problem lied on 
the lack of presence of the second circumstance regarding the emergence of a new 
product. That, because the refusal prevented the emergence of products that duplicated 
those already offered by the IP owner, while in Magill the refusal prevented the 
emergence of a wholly-new product. Nevertheless, the decision-making bodies applied 
the Magill test in both cases, employing different arguments to overcome that absence.  
 
In IMS Health, the Commission directly considered that the presence of the second 
circumstance was not necessary. Otherwise, it could not have concluded that the refusal 
was abusive, because it prevented the emergence of a product that duplicated the one 
offered by it. Besides, even broadening the concept of ‘new product’, it could not have 
been considered a new one.  
 
Whereas in Microsoft, it was already established that the specifications for Microsoft’s 
communications protocols were essential404 to ensure the functionality of an 
independently-created work group server operating system by a competitor. 
Consequently, the Commission and the CFI chose to consider the presence of the second 
circumstance necessary, but broadening the concept of ‘new product’. In that way, the 
implementation of the Interoperability Information made by Microsoft’s competitor (the 
licensee) would be considered to be a new product, because it would contain substantial 
elements contributed by it.  
 
Thusly, the ad hoc modifications made by the decision-making bodies enabled the 
application of the Magill test in cases where the second circumstance was not present. 
And accordingly, they could conclude that in both cases (IMS Health and Microsoft) IP 
owners abused their dominant positions. 
4.5.3. Presence in a vertically related market 
The third category in which the Magill test was applied was to a case where the IP owner 
was not present in a secondary market, but in a vertically related one. Namely, according 
to the fourth circumstance of Magill, the dominant IP owner must be present in both the 
main and the ancillary markets and the refusal is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate, 
immediately or over time, all effective competition in the downstream market. 
 
However, in IMS Health, the IP owner was not present in two different markets, but in a 
vertically related one. Namely, the refusal to grant copyright licenses by IMS Health 
caused the exclusion of competitors from the downstream production stage, aiming to 
reserve the upstream stage of production to itself. Consequently, the fourth circumstance 
                                                
404 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [369]–[436]. 
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foreseen in Magill – that the refusal aimed to reserve a secondary market where 
competitors operate –, was missing. In order to overcome that absence to be able to apply 
the Magill test, the Commission in the Decision 2002/165/EC405 and the ECJ406 in the 
preliminary ruling, broadened the scope of that circumstance.  
 
The Commission took the following view. The fact that Magill involved two markets did 
not preclude the possibility that the refusal to license by IMS Health might be abusive, so 
in order for a refusal to be considered abusive, it was not essential for there to be two 
distinct markets. Hence, it submitted that it was not necessary for the infrastructure in 
question to be in a separate market and that is sufficient that it is at an upstream production 
stage. To get that conclusion, it focused its attention on the fact that as in Magill the 
information about television programmes was an indispensable input, so it was the use of 
the ‘1860 brick structure’ in IMS Health. And also on the important distinction between 
the product, which was regional sales data services, and the brick structure in which data 
used to create these services was formatted. Namely, it recognized the absence of two 
different markets and the existence of two different stage production in the vertical 
market.   
 
In the same vein, the ECJ stated that was not necessary to identify a separate market, 
being sufficient that a potential market or even hypothetical market could be identified. 
And applying that statement to the case in question, it reckoned sufficient that the IMS 
Health refusal caused the exclusion of competition in a vertically related market, that is, 
in a downstream production stage. Hence, it was not required the existence of two 
separate markets, being sufficient to exist two different stages of production 
interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream product (‘1860 brick structure’) was 
indispensable for the supply of the downstream product (regional sales data services). 
 
Consequently, while the Commission and the ECJ did not share the opinion about the 
indispensable presence of the second circumstance set in Magill (it was not necessary for 
the Commission, but for the ECJ), they did agree on broadening the scope of the fourth 
circumstance.  
4.5.4. Recap about the required circumstances 
To sum up, in some cases the decision-making bodies understood that in order to 
determine if a refusal to grant IP licenses was abusive, it was necessary the presence of 
the four circumstances established in Magill by the EC407, that was confirmed by the 
CFI408 and the ECJ409. Namely, the IPR must be essential for the exercise of competitor’s 
activity (first); the refusal shall prevent the emergence of a new product for which there 
is a potential demand (second); the refusal must be arbitrary (third); and it has to pursue 
                                                
405 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [184]; IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [33]. 
406 IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [44]–[47]; IMS Health AG (n 321) [56]–[59]. 
407 Magill Commission Decision (n 287).  
408 Magill [CFI, 1991 (RTE)] (n 283); Magill [CFI, 1991 (BBC)] (n 283); Magill [CFI, 1991 (ITP)] (n 283). 
409 Magill [ECJ, 1995] (n 257). 
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the aim of excluding competition from a secondary market or a vertically related market 
(fourth). In some cases, they directly applied the original circumstances set in Magill (the 
Commission410 in Tiercé Ladbroke). Although in most of the cases, in order to apply the 
Magill test, they made some ad hoc modifications of the original circumstances in order 
to adapt them to the facts that were divergent with respect to those in Magill.  
 
Thus, in some cases, they extended the concept of ‘new product’ regarding the second 
circumstance of Magill (the CFI411 in Tiercé Ladbroke; and the Commission412 and the 
CFI413 in Microsoft). In some other cases, they broadened the scope of the market object 
of reservation, concerning the fourth circumstance of Magill (the Commission414 and the 
ECJ415 in IMS Health). 
 
Whereas in other cases, they stated that the presence of the four circumstances established 
in Magill was not indispensable to determine if a refusal to grant IP licenses was abusive. 
That is to say, they considered that the first  and second circumstances were alternatives 
(the CFI416 in Tiercé Ladbroke), or even that the presence of the second circumstance was 
not necessary at all (the ECJ417 in Bronner; and the Commission418 in IMS Health, 
whereas the President of the CFI419 and the ECJ420 considered the presence of the fourth 
circumstances necessary). 
 
Wherefore, the only circumstance from those originally set in Magill that did not suffer 
any clarification or alteration was the third one, the one relating to the arbitrary nature of 
the refusal. An example of an objectively justified refusal was the one of sociétés de 
courses in Tiercé Ladbroke421 in respect of sound and pictures, where this third 
circumstance was developed in deep. It was considered that the refusal to the applicant 
was commercially justified, because licences in respect of sound and pictures constituted 
promotional back-up for bet-taking by their commercial agent (PMU) in France and 
Switzerland. Accordingly, it was natural that sociétés de courses refused to grant licences 
to competitors operating in the same markets as their commercial agent. Whereas an 
example of an unjustified refusal was the one in Microsoft422, where the dominant 
undertaking unsuccessfully tried to proof that the refusal was justified by the need to 
protect its incentive to innovate, when in fact, it was based on economic reasons. 
 
                                                
410 Tiercé Ladbroke Commission Decision (n 292). 
411 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294) [121]. 
412 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [626]. 
413 Microsoft [CFI Order, 2004] (n 328) [190]. 
414 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [184]; IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [33]. 
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418 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [69] and [70]. 
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421 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294) [118]. 
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When assessing if a refusal to license IPRs is arbitrary or not, it is important to bear in 
mind that the infringement of IPRs by competitors does not constitute a justified refusal 
as it became clear in IMS Health. In that case, even though it was incumbent on IMS 
Health to address any perceived harm it had suffered through alleged copyright 
infringement through appropriate lawful means, it could not address it by attempting to 
eliminate competition on the relevant market. In the same vein, it also became clear in 
that case, that the fact that the competitor offered only a nominal sum for a licence, it did 
not constitute an objective justification, because IMS Health could have made a counter-
proposal, suggesting a quantity that it considered acceptable423. 
 
All in all, from the previous analysis it emerges that on the whole, the interpretation 
considering that the four circumstances must be present cumulatively is the one that 
predominates in the case law. Therefore, the threshold for intervention of competition law 
is lower, but also uncertain (see below, Section 4.6.1.) due to the lack of unanimity 
between the decision-making bodies with regard to the required circumstances, their 
definition and scope. In consequence, the uncertainty makes it difficult to determine what 
level of harm to the consumer welfare (in the form of innovation, prices, offer...etc.) is 
required to trigger the intervention of competition law424.  
 
4.6. Consequences of adopting ad hoc modifications: non-compliance with general 
principles of law 
 
In order to apply the Magill test to facts that were diverging with regard to those in that 
case, decision-making bodies made ad doc modifications of some circumstances of the 
test in order to adapt them to the case in question. From that fact, derived several 
consequences that result in the non-compliance of the decision-making bodies with some 
of the general principles of law. Thus, as it will be explained below, it exists legal 
uncertainty about the required circumstances to assess if the refusal to license IPRs is 
abusive. And some of the decisions and judgments lack motivation or reasoning. 
4.6.1. Legal uncertainty: a proposal to avoid the inconsistency 
Although the criteria set in Magill proved sufficient to solve that specific case, it was not 
formulated to be applicable – in a consistent manner – to subsequent similar cases. This 
is why when decision-making bodies applied the Magill test to subsequent cases making 
ad hoc modifications, their decisions and judgments caused legal uncertainty425, with 
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regard to the required circumstances to determine if a refusal to grant IP licenses was 
abusive. That, because they were not clear or precise and sometimes they were even 
contradictory. For instance, in IMS Health, the EC considered that the second 
circumstance established in Magill was not necessary, whereas it was for the ECJ. 
Therefore, the legal implications could not be foreseeable with all the consequences it 
implies, especially when measures to remedy the antitrust infringement involved 
compulsory licenses (see below, Section 5). 
 
According to the Commission’s426 statement in Microsoft, that legal uncertainty would 
not exist because it considered that did not exist an exhaustive checklist of exceptional 
circumstances that should be applied to any refusal to deal. That, because to assess 
whether a refusal to supply was abusive, the case law took into account different 
exceptional circumstances (i.e. in Commercial Solvents, Télémarketing and Volvo). 
Accordingly, the Commission considered necessary to analyse the entirety of the 
circumstances surrounding a specific instance of a refusal to supply and take its decision 
based on the results of such a comprehensive examination. Hence, applying that statement 
to the specific refusal to license IPRs, when determining if it was abusive or not, it would 
be necessary to analyse the entirety of the circumstances surrounding that conduct, that 
might be the same as those identified in Magill and IMS Health – the Magill test –, or not. 
That, because the automatic application of that test would be problematic.  
 
On this basis, in that specific case (Microsoft), the Commission427 pointed to three 
exceptional circumstances, in addition to those of the Magill test: (i) the refusal concerned 
interoperability in the software industry, to which the Commission legislature attached 
particular importance; (ii) Microsoft used its extraordinary market power in the client PC 
operating systems market to eliminate competition in the market for work-group server 
operating systems, which it had rapidly risen to dominate; and (iii) the refusal involved 
disruption of previous supplies.  
 
However, the CFI arrived at the conclusion of abuse by simply applying the Magill test, 
because it did not see the need to examine other special circumstances428. Accordingly, it 
did not confirm or deny if a refusal to grant IP licenses might be abusive when other 
exceptional circumstances (apart from those of the Magill test) were present. Moreover, 
the Commission had already taken the same view previously in Tiercé Ladbroke and IMS 
Health, where it directly applied the Magill test, making the ad hoc modifications of the 
circumstances when it considered it appropriate. 
 
It is true that Article 102 TFEU is considered as a flexible instrument, designed to deal 
with complex factual scenarios, and to intervene where the conduct of dominant 
                                                
426 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324) [555], [558] and [573]–[584]. 
427 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [317]. 
428 John Vickers, ‘A Tale of Two EC Cases: IBM and Microsoft’ (2008) 4(1) Competition Policy 
International 3, 19, para 2.  
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companies has an effect on competition which is contrary to the Treaty429. Therefore, it 
offers a dynamic interpretation of what constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. 
However, I do not agree with Commission’s view because legal certainty is needed 
regarding what circumstances must be present in a refusal conduct in order to be 
considered as abusive. The above, without prejudice that as the antitrust infringement 
assessment is done case by case, the entirety of the facts surrounding the specific refusal 
must be taken into account.  Otherwise, the result would be inconsistent decisions and 
judgments as occurred regarding the case law on refusal to license IPRs.  
 
Therefore, in my view, to avoid that inconsistency about the required circumstances 
established in Magill – as decisive to determine the abusive nature of a refusal to licence 
IPRs –, they should have been reviewed in IMS Health. Besides, as it will be explained 
in Chapter 5, I consider that the Magill test – in its reviewed version –constitutes the 
appropriate legal criteria to assess whether SEP owners abuse their dominant positions 
when they bring infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction or the recall of 
products. Moreover, given the case, the compulsory license would emerge as the most 
effective measure to remedy that infringement.   
 
The fact that Magill was the first case establishing what circumstances had to be present 
to consider that a refusal to grant IP licenses was abusive, it does not mean that they 
cannot be reviewed to be applied to other similar cases of refusal. Therefore, before 
proceeding to automatically apply a certain legal approach (in this case, the criteria set in 
Magill), it is convenient to first analyse all the circumstances of the case in detail. And 
then, determine whether it is opportune to use the existing legal approach, or if it would 
be more appropriate to adapt it to the case in question or to suggest a different one. In any 
case, the Commission and the ECJ should always justify the adopted choice precisely. 
4.6.2. Lack of reasoning 
In line with the above, there were cases about refusal to license IPRs, where decision-
making bodies did not expressly motivate the reason why they employed specific legal 
arguments in their decisions and judgments. 
 
In Bronner, where the subject matter of the case was a refusal to supply a service, the ECJ 
applied the criteria set in Magill, where the object of the case was a refusal to grant a 
copyright license, without explicitly justifying why it did so430. It can be inferred from 
the judgment, that the ECJ made that choice to protect the owner of the service 
(Mediaprint). That, because in order to conclude that a refusal to deal was abusive, the 
Magill test required more circumstances than those required by the case law on refusal to 
supply services. Something similar happened in Microsoft, where the EC was of the 
opinion that protocols – unlike software –, were not protected by copyright. 
Notwithstanding, in order to be able to apply the Magill test, the Commission finally 
                                                
429 IMS Health AG (n 321) [34]. 
430 Bronner (n 297) [41]. 
 105 
considered them as an IP asset, because that test was more favourable to Microsoft than 
the case law on refusal to supply goods.  
 
Nevertheless, the ECJ should have explicitly mentioned that considered that the criteria 
set in Magill was equally applicable when the object of the refusal were services or goods. 
For example, in Télémarketing431, the ECJ stated that the legal approach established in 
Commercial Solvents regarding a refusal to supply goods, was likewise usable when 
dealing with refusals to supply services.  
 
In the following three cases (IMS Health, Tiercé Ladbroke and Microsoft), the 
Commission, the CFI and the ECJ also omitted to expressly justify why they reviewed 
the circumstances set in Magill.  
 
In IMS Health, to conclude the existence of a prima facie case of abuse of a dominant 
position, the Commission (in the Decision 2002/165/EC) considered that the presence of 
the second circumstance – that the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product for 
which there was a potential demand – set in Magill was not necessary. However, 
previously (in Tiercé Ladbroke) the Commission just took the opposite view. When the 
President of the CFI suspended the application of the Decision 2002/165/EC, it also 
considered the presence of the second circumstance necessary. And so did the ECJ in the 
preliminary ruling. However, the ECJ stated in Bronner that its presence was not 
indispensable. And in Tiercé Ladbroke, the CFI considered sufficient the presence of the 
first – that the IPR was essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity – or the second 
circumstance, alternatively.   
 
In that same case (IMS Health), the Commission broadened the scope of the fourth 
circumstance established in Magill – the refusal had to pursue the aim of excluding 
competition from a secondary market. That is, it considered sufficient that the refusal 
excluded competition from a vertically related market. That interpretation was also 
adopted by the ECJ in the preliminary ruling. 
 
In Tiercé Ladbroke (the CFI) and in Microsoft (the Commission and the CFI), decision-
making bodies also broadened the concept of ‘new product’ with regard to the second 
circumstance set in Magill – that the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product 
for which there was a potential demand. The ‘new product’ was originally defined as the 
one that was not limited essentially to duplicate the product already offered by the IP 
owner. Nonetheless, they stated that in order to consider a product as ‘new’, it was 
sufficient that it was a far more suitable for consumers (in Tiercé Ladbroke) or that it 
contained substantial elements contributed by the licensee's own efforts (in Microsoft).  
 
It is not clear why in Tiercé Ladbroke, the CFI considered the first (essentiality) and 
second (new product) circumstances of Magill as alternative when in order to oblige an 
                                                
431 (n 110) [25] and [26]. 
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IP owner to grant licenses, it is indispensable that the protected right in question is 
essential. Otherwise, the general principle of the freedom of the parties to arrange their 
own affairs would devoid of any content. In the same vein, the CFI should have motivated 
why it broadened the ‘new product’ concept, because even broadening it, the sound and 
pictures would not be considered a new one for bettors. Besides, note that just as the 
second circumstance was not present in Tiercé Ladbroke, neither was the fourth one. That 
is to say, sociétés de courses were not present in the Belgian horse race betting market 
(main market) or in the market for the exploitation of their copyright (ancillary market)432. 
Nevertheless, the CFI did not consider it appropriate to modify it.  
 
However, it can be inferred from the decisions and judgments in IMS Health and 
Microsoft, that the ad hoc modifications were made in order to protect competitors, whose 
aim was not to produce a new product, but an existing one (and in IMS Health, with the 
addition that did not exist two separate markets). Applying the Magill criteria as it was 
originally stated, they would have to conclude that the conduct of IP owners was not 
abusive. In that sense, as it was established by the Advocate General Jacobs433 – who 
based on the authors of the Chicago School, whose approach to the concept of abuse was 
economic –, it is important not to lose sight of the primary purpose of competition law in 
general, and of the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position (Article 102 TFEU) more 
specifically. As aforementioned before (Section 1.3. of Chapter 1 and Section 4.5.1. of 
this one), that purpose is to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular to 
safeguard the interests of consumers – rather than to protect the position of particular 
competitors. This is the approach adopted also by the European legislator in Article 
101(3) TFEU434. 
5. Compulsory license to remedy anti-competitive practices 
 
Among the cases studied so far, in addition to Magill, in IMS Health and Microsoft the 
refusal to license IPRs was also considered to be abusive. Note that in IMS Health, the 
application of the Commission's Decision 2002/165/EC that stated the existence of an 
anti-competitive infringement in a prima facie assessment was suspended and it was 
subsequently withdrawn.  
 
In these three cases, among the measures imposed – interim measures in IMS Health – to 
remedy the infringement, the compulsory license was always present for being the most 
appropriate one. Accordingly, in the following sections I refer to that behavioural remedy 
in general terms, making also reference to the particularities that the measure presents in 
each of those three cases.  
 
                                                
432 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294) [117] and [121]. 
433 Bronner AG (n 153) [58]. 
434 Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real, ‘Delimitación de la noción de abuso de una posición de dominio’ en Santiago 
Martínez Lage y Amadeo Petitbò Juan (dirs), El Abuso de la Posición de Dominio (Marcial Pons 2006), 
194, para 3 and 195, para 4. 
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Besides, as it will be argued in Chapter 5, I consider that compulsory license is also the 
most effective measure to remedy, given the case, the abuse of dominant position of SEP 
owners, when they bring patent infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction or 
the recall of products. The above, because I am of the opinion that if specific 
circumstances are present – i.e. those of the Magill test, but in a reviewed version as I will 
propose – the conduct of SEP owners might be considered to be a ‘constructive’ refusal 
to patent licensing.  
 
5.1. Concept 
 
As it was mentioned in Section 2.1.1. of Chapter 1, when after a judicial or administrative 
process – conducted by a Competition Authority –, a practice has been determined to be 
anti-competitive, a compulsory license might be issued by the court or public authority to 
remedy that behaviour, who then will lay down the corresponding terms. Hence, 
compulsory licenses under competition law, are those licenses which undertakings are 
required to grant by courts or competition authorities on the basis of competition rules435. 
 
Compulsory licenses are common remedies when the abusive behaviour is related to ways 
in which IPRs were exercised. For instance, compulsory licenses can be ordered when 
IPRs are used to charge excessive prices (see Section 1.3.1. of Chapter 1 on exploitative 
abuse), but also as merger remedies, when IPRs are exercised to strengthen monopoly 
power through mergers (see Section 5.2. of Chapter 5).  
 
A compulsory license can also be issued to remedy the abusive behaviour that has been 
studied in this chapter, that is, a refusal to license IPRs that unjustifiably forbids access 
to protected creations or inventions, thus, excluding competitors from the market. In that 
case, the compulsory license forces the IP owner to grant licenses of its IPRs to third 
parties, enabling them to make certain uses of the protected invention or creation, on 
payment of royalties.  
 
Notwithstanding, note that the compulsory license constitutes an exceptional remedy, 
because the general rule is that if IP law confers an exclusive right, that must be respected 
by competition law. That, because IPRs of the Member States have duly balanced the 
various interests that must be protected by society, including on the one hand, the 
protection of the interests of the IP owners, and on the other, the undistorted competition 
(it must not be forgotten that to a certain extent, IPRs also serves to promote 
competition)436. In that regard, Article 345 TFEU provides that ‘the Treaties [in our cases, 
the Article 105(1) TFEU437] shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership’. 
                                                
435 Magill AG (n 291) [13]. 
436 ibid [13, fn 10]. 
437 (n 73) (‘Without prejudice to Article 104, the Commission shall ensure the application of the principles 
laid down in Articles 101 and 102. On application by a Member State or on its own initiative, and in 
cooperation with the competent authorities in the Member States, which shall give it their assistance, the 
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Therefore, the possibility of issuing compulsory licenses relies on the fact that although 
IP law gives IP owners the exclusive right to exploit the protected invention or creation 
– i.e. the right to restrict competition –, it does not confer unrestricted exclusive rights on 
owners438. Hence, one of the limits on the exclusive right is the abusive exercise of it by 
its owner – a dominant undertaking –, that might result in the imposition of a compulsory 
license.  
 
Actually, the objective of safeguarding the competitive process is a very high-ranking 
one since free competition is a basic principle underpinning the EU economic policy 
according to Article 119 TFEU (as well as Protocol No 27 of TFEU)439.  
 
5.2. Imposing compulsory licenses: competence and principles 
 
As regards the competence to impose compulsory licenses, a debate arose about whether 
the EC and competition authorities of Member States (when applying Article 102 TFEU, 
that requires, among other elements, that the abusive conduct has an effect on trade 
between Member States)  are entitled to impose compulsory licenses of IPRs.  
 
According to Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, where the Commission finds there is an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU, it may require the undertakings to bring such 
infringement to an end. And for this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural 
remedy that is proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the 
infringement effectively to an end.  The competition authorities of Member States and 
the national courts, when applying the aforementioned Articles in individual cases, they 
also have the power to require that an infringement be brought to an end (Articles 5 and 
6 of Regulation 1/2003). 
 
However, although Article 7(1) refers to behavioural remedies, neither the TFEU nor the 
Regulation 1/2003 expressly refer to compulsory licenses to remedy an anti-competitive 
behaviour, consisting of forcing a dominant company to grant IP licenses. Therefore, 
when the ECJ was dealing with a suspension, confirmations or annulment of 
Commission’s decisions that imposed compulsory licenses of IPRs, it was a matter of 
discussion if Article 7(1) entitled the Commission to impose them or not.  
 
The ECJ addressed that issue confirming that the Commission was empowered to impose 
compulsory licenses. Besides, the Commission’s power with regard to imposing 
compulsory licenses of patents, in particular, is endorsed by international law. What it is 
important to highlight is that above all, the compulsory license must comply with 
proportionality and essentiality principles. 
                                                
Commission shall investigate cases of suspected infringement of these principles. If it finds that there has 
been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end’). 
438 Magill AG (n 291) [11]. 
439 Maier-Rigaud, Hellström and Wenzel Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’ (n 80) 43, para 3. 
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5.2.1. ECJ’s confirmation 
As it was already mentioned before (see Section 2.1. of Chapter 1), according to the 
ECJ440, the statement of Article 7(1) means that the Commission has the power not only 
to prohibit ‘the continuation of certain action, practices or situations which are contrary 
to the Treaty’, but also to ‘include an order to do certain acts or provide certain advantages 
which have been wrongfully withheld’. In the same vein, the ECJ441  and the CFI442 
expressly acknowledged that the Commission must be able to exercise the right to take 
decisions conferred upon it, in the most efficacious manner, best suited to the 
circumstances of each given situation. 
 
Therefore, the power of the Commission (and competition authorities of Member States 
when applying Article 102 TFEU) to order to do certain acts or provide certain advantages 
which have been wrongfully withheld, it includes the power to order compulsory licenses 
of IPRs. 
 
In that regard, the Advocate General Mischo in Volvo443 expressly stated that the 
Commission was empowered under Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003 to impose one or 
more compulsory licenses on the proprietor of the IPR, if it considered that it was the best 
way of bringing the abuse to an end. 
5.2.2. Endorsement of international law  
With reference to compulsory licensing of patents to remedy anti-competitive practices, 
the power to impose that remedy is consistent with the EU’s and Member States’ 
international obligations under the Paris Convention444, administered by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), that has a total of 177 contracting parties. 
And also under the TRIPS Agreement, administered by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), of which all the WTO members (162 countries – 28 Member States included –) 
are part. 
 
As it will be explained below, both international treaties allow their members to use 
compulsory licenses as long as their national law allows to use them. Hence, as Article 
7(1) of Regulation 1/2003 empowers the Commission to impose compulsory licenses, it 
can be concluded that the international law endorses that competence.  
 
Article 5A(2) of Paris Convention provides that ‘each country of the Union (countries to 
which the Convention applies) shall have the right to take legislative measures providing 
                                                
440 Commercial Solvents (n 249) [45]. 
441 Camera Care (n 258) [17]; Ford (n 258).  
442 La Cinq (n 259).  
443 Volvo (n 285) [2]–[4]; Volvo AG (n 138) [31]. 
444 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property [as amended on September 28, 1979] of 20 
March 1883, TRT/PARIS/001 (1883) (Paris Convention).  
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for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent’.  
 
Article 8(2) of the TRIPS states that Members may adopt appropriate measures ‘to 
prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology’. And Article 30, 
specifically establishes that Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, as long as the exceptions do not unreasonably: (1) conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent; and (2) prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
 
In the same vein, the first paragraph of Article 40 of the TRIPS states that ‘[WTO] 
Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to IPRs which 
restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of technology’. Bearing it in mind, the second paragraph states that nothing 
in the TRIPS shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing 
practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of IPRs having an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. By way of example, it mentions the 
following practices: exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to 
validity and coercive package licensing. Although it does not refer to the refusal to license 
IPRs, it might also be an abusive practice according to Article 102 TFEU.  
 
In consequence, in the light of its relevant laws and regulations, the EC may adopt, 
consistently with the other provisions of the TRIPS – that will be studied below, see 
Section 5.3. –, appropriate measures to prevent or control the abuse of dominant position 
when the dominant undertaking refuses to grant IP licenses. 
 
In conclusion, there is nothing in the provisions of the Paris Convention nor TRIPS 
Agreement to prevent the EC nor the competition authorities of Member States (when 
they apply Article 102 TFEU) from imposing remedies, such as compulsory licensing of 
patents, which limit or regulate the exploitation of IPRs held by an undertaking in a 
dominant position where that undertaking exercises those rights in an anti-competitive 
manner445. The above, as long as compulsory licenses are, according to Article 7(1) of 
regulation 1/2003, proportionate and necessary (see the next Section 5.2.3.) and they 
fulfilled the requirements prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement (see also Section 5.3.).  
 
When competition authorities of Member States apply their national competition law (that 
mostly are modelled on article 102 TFEU), each Member State446 will decide whether it 
                                                
445 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [498]. 
446 For a complete landscape of countries providing compulsory licenses to remedy anti-competitive 
practices, see: WIPO, ‘Survey on compulsory licenses granted by WIPO Member States to address anti-
competitive uses of intellectual property rights’ (2011) CDIP/4/4 REV./STUDY/INF/5 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4_rev_study_inf_5.pdf> accessed 4 August 
2018. 
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wants to include compulsory licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices or not. And if 
it does, the regulation of compulsory license in that Member State will be comprised, in 
addition to national law, of international law, so compulsory licenses will need to respect 
the aforementioned conditions required by the TRIPS Agreement.  
5.2.3. Principles: proportionality and necessity 
The Commission’s decisions imposing compulsory licenses must meet the exigencies of 
various principles (i.e. no punishment, equal treatment and legal certainty447), but mainly 
the principles of proportionality and necessity that are explicit in Article 7(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003. As the ECJ has maintained, these principles mean that the charges 
imposed on market participants must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to 
attain the objective sought. Thus, the Commission is empowered to impose obligations 
on the undertakings concerned, for the sole purpose of bringing the infringement of 
competition law to an end, namely, the re-establishment of compliance with the rules 
infringed448.  
 
Therefore, although it will depend on the specific case, in general terms, a compulsory 
license imposed to remedy the abusive behaviour of refusing to license IPRs (e.g. Magill 
and Microsoft), it is directly proportional to the infringement, because it forces the 
dominant undertaking to do exactly what it refused to do. And for that same reason, it 
also constitutes a necessary measure to bring the infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
effectively to an end, that is, to end with the refusal behaviour.  
 
5.3. Requirements of compulsory licensing of patents under the TRIPS  
 
As it was mentioned before, the TRIPS Agreement does not specifically list the reasons 
that might be used to justify compulsory licensing of patents, but it referrals to national 
legislations. Nevertheless, Article 31 states that if the law of a Member allows for the use 
of compulsory licensing, it shall respect some provisions. Although in general terms most 
of the requirements are applicable to all compulsory licenses when the IP in question is a 
patent, there are some particularities that are only relevant for those compulsory licenses 
granted to remedy anti-competitive practices – what concern us –, as it will be explained 
below. 
 
In any case, it is worth mentioning that it is not necessary to the user to try first for a 
voluntary license. Namely, it is not required that (1) the proposed user has made efforts 
to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions; and (2) that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period 
of time449.  
                                                
447 Maier-Rigaud, Hellström and Wenzel Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’ (n 80) 50 and 51. 
448 Magill [ECJ, 1995] (n 257) [93]; Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [1276]. 
449 TRIPS Agreement (n 67), Art 31(k) in relation to Article 31 (b). 
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5.3.1. Individual merits 
Issuing a compulsory license must be decided case by case, considering the individual 
merits of each particular case450. 
5.3.2. Limited scope and duration  
The scope and duration of the compulsory license shall be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized, that is, to remedy the practice considered to be anti-competitive 
after judicial or administrative process451 (e.g. the refusal to license patent rights). 
5.3.3. Non-exclusivity 
The compulsory license shall not be exclusive, so the patent holder can still continue to 
produce under the patent452.  
5.3.4. Non-assignability 
The compulsory licence can only be assigned along with the part of the applicant’s 
business that enjoys the use of the patented invention453. 
5.3.5. Liability  
Competent authorities shall have the authority to review the continued existence of the 
circumstances (i.e. the antitrust infringement) which led to the authorization of the 
compulsory license. If they cease to exist and are unlikely to recur, competent authorities 
will order termination of authorization. On the contrary, they will refuse termination if 
the conditions are likely to recur454. 
5.3.6. Remuneration 
The right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, 
taking into account the economic value of the authorization. That is, the patent owner has 
the right to be paid for use under the compulsory licence455. Nevertheless, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not define the concepts of ‘adequate remuneration’ or ‘economic value’, 
but it specifies that the need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into 
account in determining the amount of remuneration456. 
 
As regards the determination of the due royalties for the compulsory license, a zero-
royalty rate will promote the entry of inefficient competitors and have a major negative 
                                                
450 ibid, Art 31 (a). 
451 ibid, Art 31 (c).  
452 ibid, Art 31 (d).  
453 ibid, Art 31 (e). 
454 ibid, Art 31 (g) and (k). 
455 ibid, Art 31 (h). 
456 ibid, Art 31 (k). 
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effect on investment. If the royalty rate is high, however, the compulsory license may not 
provide meaningful access (of competitors). Sharing a monopoly among several 
competitors does not in itself increase competition unless it leads to improvements in 
price and output, otherwise nothing would be achieved in terms of enhancing consumer 
welfare. Competition would be improved only if the terms upon which access is offered 
allow the licensing parties to compete effectively with the dominant firm on the relevant 
market457. 
 
In any case, the authorities of the country that ordered the compulsory license would 
decide whether the payment is ‘adequate’, since the TRIPS Agreement states the patent 
owner must be given the right to appeal in that country458. 
5.3.7. Reviewability 
The legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization to grant a compulsory 
license shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher 
authority in the Member ordering the compulsory license459. 
5.3.8. Linked patents 
Where a compulsory licence is granted in order to permit the exploitation of a patent (‘the 
second patent’) which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent (‘the first 
patent’), specific additional conditions shall apply460. 
5.3.9. Production for domestic market or exportation 
The compulsory license shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market of the Member that orders it461. However, Members can also issue compulsory 
licenses to remedy antitrust conducts with the aim of producing products for export462. 
  
5.4. The compulsory license case by case: the particularities 
5.4.1. Magill: several equally proportional and effective remedies  
In Magill, the Commission463 suggested two alternative measures to bring the 
infringement to an end, that were subsequently confirmed by the CFI and the ECJ. Hence, 
                                                
457 Padilla, Ginsburg and Wong-Ervin, ‘Antitrust Analysis Involving Intellectual Property’ (n 386) 13, para 
4. 
458 TRIPS Agreement (n 67), Art 31 (j). 
459 ibid, Art 31 (i). 
460 ibid, Art 31 (l) requires 3 conditions for the use of linked patents: (i)  the invention claimed in the second 
patent shall involve an important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the 
invention claimed in the first patent; (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on 
reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and (iii)  the use authorized in respect 
of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second patent. 
461 ibid, Art 31 (f). 
462 ibid, Art 31 (k) in relation to Article 31 (f). 
463 Magill Commission Decision (n 287) Art 2. 
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undertakings were obliged to supply to third parties, on request and on a non-
discriminatory basis, the creations protected by copyrights (individual advance weekly 
programme listings) and to permit their reproduction (without any limits) by such parties. 
 
They could comply with the imperative simply by sending the listings, free of charge and 
without defining any other terms (supply agreement).  Or, by means of licenses which 
include terms – upon which companies considered third parties should be permitted to 
publish the advance weekly programme listings –, such as reasonable royalties or other 
conditions which take account of the parties’ legitimate preoccupations (supply under 
licensing agreement). For instance, the necessary terms to ensure comprehensive, high-
quality coverage of all licensors’ programmes. 
 
In principle, when several equally proportional and effective remedies are available, there 
is a role for the infringing undertaking in selecting the appropriate remedy464. I do not 
think the first option was proportional to the infraction committed because it implied a 
transmission free of charge. However, it was more effective because it would bring the 
infringement to an end immediately, while in the second alternative, the terms of the 
license had to be previously approved by the Commission. Bearing in mind that the third 
party (Magill) – from the moment it requested the license for the first time – was willing 
to pay a reasonable remuneration, infringing undertakings would have probably opted to 
grant licenses.  
 
In both scenarios, the Commission limited the scope of application of the measures, 
stating that the requirement was limited to the listings themselves, without extending it 
to any additional information. Besides, television broadcasting companies could continue 
publishing individual television guides on a market where comprehensive television 
guides were available, if they considered consumers would be best served by their own 
guides. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that Article 2 of the Commission’s Decision did not include 
any periodic penalty payment – a sanction – (see Section 2.2.2. of Chapter 1) in the event 
of non-compliance. It merely specified how companies could comply with the obligation 
to bring the infringement to an end, taking into account the constraints inherent in the 
specific drawing up of such a licensing system. 
5.4.2. IMS Health  
The EC found in favour of NDC through the Decision 2002/165/EC465, where it imposed 
on the dominant a compulsory license as an interim measure, which included a 
mechanism for determining the remuneration. Hence, IMS Health had to grant licenses 
to third parties so that they could use the protected structure. Besides, that remedy was 
imposed together with a periodic penalty payment for each day of delay in its compliance. 
                                                
464 Case T-24/90 Automec Srl [1992] ECR II-2223, paras 51 and 52.  
465 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [217]. 
 115 
5.4.2.1. Compulsory license as an interim measure 
 
According to the case law466, three elements must be present to impose a compulsory 
license as an interim measure in the course of a competition investigation. Firstly467, the 
Commission considered that legal and factual elements showed a reasonably strong prima 
facie case establishing an abuse of a dominant position by IMS Health (fumus delicti 
commissi). Secondly468, it stated there was a likelihood of serious and irreparable harm to 
competitors and intolerable damage to the public interest, unless protective interim 
measures were ordered (periculum in mora). The Commission understood that unless 
NDC was granted a licence to the ‘1860 brick structure’, its German operation would go 
out of business, and that there would be intolerable damage to the public interest. And 
thirdly469, there was an urgent need for protective measures, because the refusal of access 
to the structure was likely to eliminate all competition on the relevant market, because 
competitors were infringing IPRs.  
 
Nevertheless, the Commission adopted the Decision 2003/741/EC that withdrew the 
Decision 2002/165/EC470 on interim measures (compulsory license and periodic penalty 
payment) due to a material change of circumstances underlying its adoption, namely the 
state of competition – no because the Commission altered its initial position as regards 
the existence of a prima facie case of abuse of a dominant position. However, the 
Commission did not rule on the merits (although as it was mentioned in Section 3.2.5. 
above, it should have done it). In the event the Commission had asserted that IMS Health 
infringed Article 102 TFEU, it should have withdrawn – as it did it – the compulsory 
license and the periodic penalty payment. That, because the status of the competition 
changed, so there would not exist the need to remedy any abuse. And it should have 
sanctioned the abusive behaviour, imposing a fine. 
 
As it was mentioned previously in the aforementioned section, in the case Motorola 
investigated by the Commission (see Section 3.2. of Chapter 3), the status of the 
competition had also changed before the EC adopted the decision, because parties 
achieved to sign a licensing agreement regarding the SEPs (the Settlement Agreement). 
Despite this, the Commission opted to rule on the merits, concluding that the SEP owner 
abused its dominant position. However, it did not impose a fine to sanction the 
infringement, because until that moment, there was no Union decisional practice or case 
law regarding whether the conduct of SEP holders constituted an abuse of a dominant 
                                                
466 Camera Care (n 258) [14] and [18]; Ford (n 258) [13]; La Cinq (n 259) [2]. 
467 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) [45] and [46] (analysis of the relevant market), [57]–
[62] (dominant position), [63]–[174] (the abuse of a dominant position), [175]–[178] (effect on trade 
between Member States). 
468 ibid [187]–[201]. 
469 ibid. 
470 The IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89) was suspended throughout the period of its 
potential application by the IMS Health [CFI Order, Aug. 2001–temporarily] (n 299) and the IMS Health 
[CFI Order, Oct. 2001–permanently] (n 314). And subsequently, it was withdrawn by the IMS Health 
Commission Decision [2003] (n 319) [13]–[16].  
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position or not. And also because national courts had reached diverging conclusions on 
the question. 
 
Accordingly, to be consistent with the argument used in Motorola, in case the 
Commission had ruled on the merits in IMS Health concluding that the dominant 
undertaking infringed Article 102 TFEU, it should impose a fine. That, because until that 
moment, both the Commission and the ECJ had already ruled (in Volvo, Renault, Magill, 
Tiercé Ladbroke and Bronner) on the issue of whether the refusal to grant IP licenses was 
abusive. Otherwise, it might be understood that the argument for the non-imposition of 
fines when it is concluded that Article 102 TFEU was infringed, it is based on the fact 
that the status of competition changed in the interim of the investigation, instead of being 
due to the lack of previous decisions on the matter investigated by the Commission.  
 
In any event, I am of the opinion that even when there is no need to remedy an 
infringement – because the status of competition changed –, the infringement should 
always be sanctioned. In so doing, the dominant company assumes the consequences of 
its behaviour and it may serve as a deterrent measure for potential future infringers.  
 
5.4.2.2. Mechanism for determining the remuneration 
 
When parties do not reach an agreement on the royalties of the licenses that must be 
granted compulsorily, it might cause that the IP owner does not grant them within the 
deadline established by the Commission. Therefore, to avoid the non-compliance, it is 
appropriate that the EC foresees a solution for these cases.  
 
Curiously, such a solution was only adopted in IMS Health, in the Decision 
2002/165/EC471 that ordered a compulsory license as an interim measure (note that its 
application was suspended and subsequently withdrawn by Decision 2003/741/EC472). 
While it was omitted, strikingly, in Magill and Microsoft, where compulsory licenses 
were imposed as permanent remedies.  
 
The solution at issue stated that if parties failed to reach a mutual agreement about the 
royalties to be paid within the deadline set by the Commission, they would be determined 
by one or several independent experts chosen by agreement of the parties. If they did not 
reach an agreement on the identity of the expert(s), they would be appointed by the 
Commission from a list of candidates provided by the parties or, if appropriate, the EC 
would choose one or several suitably qualified person(s). 
 
In any event, competition authorities and courts are responsible, ultimately, for 
determining the payable royalties – as well as the other terms of the compulsory license. 
                                                
471 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89), Art 2. 
472 IMS Health Commission Decision [2003] (n 319). 
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Thereon, it is noteworthy the statement of the US Supreme Court473, who recognized that 
this is a ‘role for which they (competition authorities and courts) are ill suited’. 
 
5.4.2.3. Double measure: periodic penalty payment 
 
In order to achieve the aforementioned same objective – that the dominant undertaking 
grants licenses within the deadline established by the Commission –, it would also be 
appropriate if the Commission imposed periodic penalty payments together with 
compulsory licenses. Hence, the dominant undertaking could envisage the consequence 
of the non-compliance. 
 
In the same vein of the mechanism for determining the remuneration, it is striking that 
the Commission only issued the two measures combined in IMS Health474, but not in 
Magill. Whereas in Microsoft (see below), the periodic penalty payment per day for non-
compliance with the obligation to grant licenses, it was imposed once that order was 
breached, so the sanction did not fulfil its purpose of preventing the non-compliance. 
5.4.3. Microsoft  
In Microsoft, the Commission concluded that the company infringed Article 102 TFEU, 
when refusing to supply the Interoperability Information. To bring that infringement to 
an end, it ordered Microsoft to make that information available and to allow its use on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to any undertaking having an interest in 
developing and distributing work group server operating system products. 
Notwithstanding, as it was already highlighted, in contrary to what happened in Magill 
or IMS Health (interim measure), in Microsoft the compulsory license did not have any 
impact on the exercise of its IPRs (copyrights and patents) and trade secrets, because it 
was compiled solely to license the protocols to allow the interoperability, not the software 
products that integrate the Windows Client PC Operating System475.   
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (see Section 2.1.1.), in contrary to structural 
remedies, the compliance with behavioural remedies, such as compulsory licenses, has to 
be monitored and enforced. Accordingly, in order to oversee Microsoft’s compliance with 
the imposed obligation of granting licenses of the protected information, the Commission 
also imposed to the dominant undertaking the obligation to propose a mechanism that 
assisted the Commission with the monitoring duty.  
 
According to what was stated before, the Commission is empowered to impose 
compulsory licenses based on Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003. However, the additional 
obligation imposed by the Commission to Microsoft about proposing a mechanism that 
                                                
473 Case Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
408 (2004). 
474 IMS Health Commission Decision [2001] (n 89), Art 1 (compulsory license) and Art 3 (periodic penalty 
payment). 
475 Microsoft [CFI Order, 2004] (n 328) [173]. 
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included a monitoring trustee to track its compliance, it was considered as an excess of 
power by the CFI. 
 
In addition to impose the compulsory license to remedy the infringement, the 
Commission also sanctioned Microsoft’s behaviour imposing a fine and a periodic 
penalty payment. 
 
5.4.3.1. Abuse of power 
 
The EC, in addition to imposing a compulsory license to Microsoft in Article 5 of the 
Decision 2007/53/EC476, it also ordered, in Article 7, that the dominant undertaking had 
to submit a proposal for the establishment of a suitable mechanism assisting the 
Commission in monitoring its compliance with the imposed obligation. That mechanism 
had to include a monitoring trustee who had to be independent from Microsoft and of the 
Commission itself, in so far as he was required to act on his own initiative and upon 
application by third parties in the exercise of his powers. Besides, he should have full 
access to the source code of the relevant Microsoft products and all costs of establishment 
of the monitoring trustee, including a fair remuneration for his activities, should be borne 
by Microsoft477.  
 
Accordingly, Microsoft made several proposals, but all of them were considered 
insufficient by the Commission. Therefore, through the Decision C(2005) 2988 final (the 
Trustee Decision), the Commission imposed a monitoring mechanism, by providing for 
the appointment, functions and obligations of a Monitoring Trustee.  
 
In any case, Microsoft had already applied for the annulment of the Commission Decision 
2007/53/EC that imposed the compulsory license (Article 5) and the obligation to propose 
the aforementioned mechanism (Article 7). As regard the compulsory license, the CFI 
rejected the application as unfounded. However, it did annul478 the Article imposing the 
additional obligation about the monitoring trustee, because it did not have a legal basis in 
Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003479. Namely, according to the CFI, the Commission had 
exceeded its powers of investigation and enforcement under that Regulation. It noted that 
the Commission does not have unlimited discretion when formulating remedies to be 
imposed on undertakings for the purpose of putting an end to an infringement. 
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality requires that the burdens imposed on 
undertakings in order to bring an infringement to an end, do not exceed what is 
appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought, namely re-establishment of 
compliance with the rules infringed. 
 
                                                
476 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324), Art 5. 
477 ibid, Art 7 and [1048]. 
478 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [1268]–[1273] and [1276].  
479 Note that the judgment refers to the Ex Article 3(1) of Regulation 17/62 (n 256). 
 119 
Therefore, the EC, through the Decision 2010/C 348/08480, it deleted the Article 7 in 
question, and it repealed the Decision C(2005)2988 final, in which it appointed the 
Monitoring Trustee. 
 
5.4.3.2. Triple measure: fine and periodic penalty payment  
 
There is also the possibility that the Commission imposes a compulsory license along 
with a fine, as it did it in Microsoft, punishing the dominant undertaking. Namely, in 
Article 3 of the Decision 2007/53/EC481 the Commission imposed a fine of euros (EUR) 
497.2 million.  
 
Moreover, as (since March 2004) Microsoft failed to comply with its obligation to make 
Interoperability Information available to interested undertakings pursuant to the 
aforementioned Article 5, through the Decision 2008/C 138/07482 the Commission 
imposed a periodic penalty payment of EUR 2 million per day. Later on (between June 
2006 and October 2007), Microsoft began charging unreasonable prices for access to 
interface documentation for work group servers, so it continued without complying with 
the remedy imposed.  Therefore, the Commission in the Decision 2009/C 166/08483, it 
fixed the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment in EUR 899 million. 
Microsoft applied for the annulment of the Decision that fixed the amount and, in the 
alternative, the cancellation or reduction of the periodic penalty payment imposed.  And 
the GC484 ended reducing it to EUR 860 million.  
 
Although the Commission had previously imposed compulsory licenses (in Magill, as a 
final measure and in IMS Health, as a provisional measure together with a periodic 
penalty payment – although its application was suspended and subsequently, withdrawn 
–), it was in Microsoft where it imposed the three measures together for the first time: a 
compulsory license, a fine and a periodic penalty payment. And ever since, the 
Commission has not opened any other investigation on refusal to grant IP licenses. 
Accordingly, the triple measure might have had a deterrent effect among dominant 
companies – even though, in Microsoft, the periodic penalty payment was not imposed 
together with the other two measures, but only once the company did not comply with 
the order to grant licenses to third parties. 
 
I do not consider that the inexistence of investigations by the Commission during this 
time, it may be due to the certainty regarding the circumstances that must be present to 
consider to be abusive a refusal to grant IP licenses. Indeed, the situation is precisely the 
opposite, it exists a legal uncertainty in that regard. And as it will be argued in Chapter 5, 
that makes the review of the Magill test – applied in IMS Health –, necessary. 
                                                
480 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 2010/C 348/08 [2009] OJ C348/8. 
481 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] (n 324). 
482 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 2008/C 138/07 [2006] OJ C138/10, Art 1. 
483 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 2009/C 166/08 [2008] OJ C166/20, para 23.  
484 Case T-167/08 Microsoft (GC, 27 June 2012). 
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Conclusion 
 
Generally speaking, from the description of the cases previously made, it follows that a 
company commits an abuse of a dominant position, if without justification, cuts off 
supplies of goods or services to an existing customer for whom these inputs are essential 
(Commercial Solvents and United Brands) or it refuses to supply them to a new customer. 
But also if it does that to reserve to itself an ancillary activity that might be carried out by 
another undertaking on a neighbouring but separate market, being possible to eliminate 
all competition on it, on prejudice of consumers (Télémarketing).  
 
Furthermore, an abuse may also consist in an unjustified refusal to grant IP licenses, 
which are indispensable to allow a new product to come on a secondary market, in 
competition with the dominant undertaking's own product (Magill, IMS Health and 
Microsoft). Nevertheless, the definition and scope of the specific circumstances that must 
be present to consider that that refusal is abusive, they are not harmonized. Accordingly, 
they vary depending on who is the decision-making body, that is, the EC, the GC or the 
ECJ. 
 
In my opinion, the presence of the first circumstance set in Magill regarding the essential 
nature of the protected IP for competitor’s activity, it is indispensable. Otherwise, it would 
not be respected the general principle of the freedom of the parties to arrange their own 
affairs as they consider more convenient. Namely, the dominant undertaking is entitled 
to exercise its IPRs – the due recompense for its great creative and inventive effort and 
the considerable investment – as it wishes, for instance, refusing to license them. 
Therefore, I consider unreasonable to state that its presence and that of the second 
circumstance about the emerging of a new product, are alternatives, as it did the CFI in 
Tiercé Ladbroke. Moreover, it is important that the assessment of the essential nature is 
made thoroughly. That is to say, not defining it too narrowly. But neither too broadly, as 
it might have occurred in IMS Health, where the ‘1860 brick structure’ was considered 
essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity, when potential substitutes existed. And 
consequently, the entrance of inefficient rivals was allowed, although it did not happen 
in practice, because the application of the Decision imposing the compulsory license as 
an interim measure was suspended and subsequently, withdrawn. Consequently, there 
was no time for IMS Health to grant licenses.  
 
In the same vein, I am also of the opinion that the presence of the second circumstance 
established in Magill is indispensable, albeit it is necessary to broad its scope – as it will 
be argued in Section 4.2.2. of Chapter 5 –, in the sense that the refusal must prevent the 
emergence of a product. And the impossibility of that emergence, it must prejudice 
consumer welfare whether, for instance, in the form of higher prices, less choice or lack 
of interoperability. Otherwise, as it was said before, it would prevail the general principle 
of the freedom of the dominant undertaking to arrange their own affairs. 
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Once concluded that Article 102 TFEU was infringed by a dominant undertaking who 
refused to license IPRs, the measure commonly imposed – as a remedy – is the 
compulsory license. That obligation imposed upon the proprietor of an IPR to grant 
licenses to third parties, leads to the owner being deprived of the substance of its exclusive 
right under national law. 
 
Therefore, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the general rule is that IP owners 
cannot be obliged, except in exceptional circumstances, to allow the use of their IPRs by 
third parties, therefore they cannot be forced to grant licenses. Accordingly, in order for 
the Commission to impose a compulsory license based on Article 7(1) of Regulation 
1/2003, it must constitute a proportionate and necessary remedy to bring the infringement 
of competition law effectively to an end. Otherwise, it would be manifestly incompatible 
with Article 345 TFEU that provides that the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules 
in Member States governing the system of property ownership. In consequence, even 
when the Commission concluded that the refusal to grant licenses was abusive, IPRs 
might prevent it from imposing a compulsory license when that remedy was not 
proportional and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end.  
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CHAPTER 3. SEEKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRELIMINARY AND 
PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN SEP INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS. 
SAMSUNG AND MOTOROLA 
Introduction  
 
ECJ’s case law on refusal to license IPRs has been carefully analysed in the previous 
chapter. In this and the following chapters, I focus on the behaviour that constitutes the 
object of this research. That is, on SEP owners’ conduct of bringing infringement actions 
for a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products in patent infringing proceedings.  
 
Accordingly, it will be studied how the EC (in this chapter) and the ECJ (Chapter 4) 
treated that behaviour as a specific and novel category of abuse within the meaning of 
Article 102 TFEU. The Commission analysed the anti-competitive nature of that conduct 
in two cases, in Samsung and Motorola. In Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ dealt for the first and 
only time with the issue and generally speaking, its judgment was very criticised due to 
different reasons. In my opinion, it missed the long-awaited opportunity to resolve the 
SEP licensing problem once and for all.  
 
As it will be argued in Chapter 5, I think the ECJ should have treated SEP owners’ 
conduct as a refusal to license, instead of as a novel category of abuse. That, because 
when specific circumstances concur, it may be understood that the aim of SEP owners’ 
behaviour is to exclude competitors from the market. But instead of directly refusing to 
grant licenses – which may be considered an abuse of dominant position –, they bring the 
aforementioned infringement actions. And if the court ordered the prohibitory injunction 
and the recall of products, infringers – that are SEP owners’ competitors – would be 
excluded from the market. Therefore, SEP owners would achieve their goal, in spite of 
having committed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.  
 
Focusing on this chapter, the assessment of the antitrust infringement is the same in 
Samsung and Motorola cases, so they will be studied together below, with the nuance that 
in Samsung the assessment included in the SO was preliminary, in contraposition with 
the one contained in the Prohibition Decision in Motorola. Namely, the nature of the 
decisions adopted by the Commission is diverge in both cases. In Samsung the 
Commission’s proceedings ended with a Commitments Decision that made 
the commitments offered Samsung legally binding. Whereas in Motorola, the 
Commission concluded in its Prohibition Decision that there was an infringement, even 
though by then, there had been a material change in the status of competition. That is to 
say, once the SO was sent by the Commission, Motorola and Apple signed the Settlement 
Agreement. However, the fact that the abusive behaviour has ended during the antitrust 
investigation, it does not entail that the Commission cannot adopt a prohibition decision 
finding that an infringement was committed in the past, as long as it has a legitimate 
interest to do it.  
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Albeit it is more appropriate to first analyse the assessment of the infringement and then 
the decision adopted in that regard, I am going to alter the logical order for the sake of a 
better understanding of how the Commission analysed the abusive nature of SEP owners’ 
behaviour in Samsung and Motorola. Thus, once I describe the facts of the cases (Section 
3), firstly I will refer to the decisions adopted by the Commission (Section 4) and secondly 
to the antitrust assessment (Section 5). 
1. Statement of the problem 
 
As already explained (see Section ‘Background’ of the Introduction), SEPs protect 
inventions that have been declared essential to implement a specific industry standard by 
a SSO. It is not possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds to manufacture 
products that comply with a certain standard without accessing these patents by obtaining 
a licence485. So, access to those SEPs is a precondition for any company to sell 
interoperable products in the market. This may give companies owning SEPs significant 
market power. 
 
As a result, SSOs generally require their members – the owners of patents that are 
essential for the implementation of a standard – to commit to license theirs SEPs on 
FRAND terms. This commitment is designed to ensure effective access to the 
standardised technology for all market players and to prevent holding up users (see 
Section 1.3.1. of Chapter 1) by a single SEP holder. That is to say, to prevent them from 
behaving in anti-competitive ways by refusing to license the necessary IP or by extracting 
excess rents by way of excessive royalty fees thereby preventing effective access to the 
standard. At the same time, it allows SEP holders – who invested money in inventing and 
patenting standard-specific technologies – to be fairly remunerated for making their 
standardised technology available to third parties. However, in order to guarantee 
undistorted competition and to reap the positive economic effects of standardisation – e.g. 
a wider choice of interoperable products for consumers – it is important that FRAND 
commitments be fully honoured by SEP owners486.  
 
When SEP owners and willing licensees cannot agree on the amount of the royalty to be 
paid, there are implementers who decide to use the SEPs without obtaining licenses. 
Accordingly, patent owners have the right to enforce their patents bringing infringement 
actions seeking among other measures, prohibitory injunctions or the recall of products. 
However, as SEP holders gave commitments to grant licenses to third parties on FRAND 
terms, it might be considered that they misuse their SEPs to distort competition, 
contravening the commitment given to the SSO. Namely, while recourse to injunctions is 
a possible remedy for patent infringements, such conduct may be abusive where SEPs are 
                                                
485 ETSI Rules of Procedure. Annex 6: Intellectual Property Rights Policy 2018, para 15(6) 
<https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf> accessed 5 March 2019. 
486 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission accepts legally binding commitments by Samsung Electronics on 
standard essential patent injunctions’ IP/14/490, para 3.  
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concerned and the potential licensee is willing to enter into a license agreement on 
FRAND terms. 
 
Due to an absence of express guidance from SSOs’ patent policies, there was a 
considerable degree of uncertainty as to the lawfulness of bringing infringement actions 
by FRAND-encumbered SEP holders487. Consequently, the EC and the ECJ pronounced 
on the issue, as it will be analysed here below and in the next chapter.  
2. Distinguishing elements 
 
Before entering into the analysis mentioned before, it is important to highlight two 
distinguishing elements with respect to facts and legal standards, between the cases 
investigated by the Commission (in this chapter) and the one judged by the ECJ (in 
Chapter 4). 
 
2.1. Facts 
 
The first element regards the facts of the cases. In Samsung and Motorola, SEP owners 
brought actions for infringement seeking (and enforcing – in Motorola –) injunctions 
prohibiting the continuation of patent infringements. Such injunctions can be preliminary 
– as a precautionary measure typically for the time of the assessment of the case on the 
merits by the court – and also permanent – as a result of the decision on the merits by a 
court488. 
 
Whereas in Huawei v. ZTE, in addition to the prohibitory injunction, the SEP owner also 
sought other measures provided by patent law, such as, the recall of products, the 
rendering of accounts and the award of damages (see Section ‘Statement of the problem’ 
of the Introduction). The effect of the recall of products is comparable to that of the 
prohibitory injunction.  Nevertheless, the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of 
use of the SEP and the award of damages in respect of those acts of use, do not have a 
direct impact on products manufactured by competitors appearing or remaining on the 
market489. Therefore, according to Article 102 TFEU, only the lawfulness of bringing 
infringement actions seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products was under 
discussion. 
 
2.2. Legal standard 
 
And the second element is related to the legal standard adopted by decision-making 
bodies within the framework of Article 102 TFEU. In Samsung and Motorola, the 
Commission investigated the anti-competitive nature of SEP owners’ conduct from two 
                                                
487 Huawei AG (n 137) [7]. 
488 Commission, ‘Samsung – Enforcement of ETSI standards essential patents (SEPs)’ MEMO/12/1021, 1st 
question.  
489 Huawei (n 35) [72] and [74]–[76]. 
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perspectives. It studied if SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking and enforcing injunctive 
reliefs might constitute an exclusionary abuse, because injunctions prohibit the 
continuation of the infringement and they generally involve a prohibition of the product 
infringing the patent being sold. In consequence, such recourse risks excluding products 
from the market without justification and may distort licensing negotiations unduly in the 
SEP holders’ favour.  
 
And it also analysed whether the threat of seeking injunctions by SEP owners might 
amount to an exploitative abuse. That is, whether that behaviour allow them to impose 
royalty rates or other licensing terms, such as broad cross licenses, which a licensee would 
not agree to, absent the threat of having its products excluded from the market. This may 
unduly distort licensing negotiations and cause harm to consumers by increasing prices, 
reducing product choice and stifling differentiating innovation in the markets 
concerned490. 
 
Whereas in Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ only analysed whether bringing an action for 
infringement seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products might constitute 
an exclusionary abuse.  
 
In any case, both the Commission and the ECJ qualified the conduct of SEP owners as a 
novel category of exclusionary and exploitative abuse. In particular, they did not consider 
that the conduct could fit in any existing category of abuse, such as, the ‘refusal to license 
IPRs’ category studied in Chapter 2. The consequences derived from the legal standards 
adopted by decision-making bodies will be studied through this chapter (regarding 
Samsung and Motorola) and Chapter 4 (with respect to Huawei v. ZTE) – and more 
systematically in Section 2 of Chapter 5.  
 
3. Case briefs  
 
Basing on Article 105(1) TFEU that states that the EC shall investigate cases of suspected 
infringement of Articles 102 TFEU, in Samsung and Motorola cases, the Commission 
opened two proceedings for abuse of dominant positions against these companies that 
owned several SEPs. Both Samsung and Motorola were some of the largest SEP holders 
in the telecommunication industry and they were also active players on the downstream 
market for the sale of mobile telephones implementing the relevant telecommunication 
standards, competing against other implementers of those standards, such as Apple. 
 
The facts in Samsung and Motorola cases are almost identical. The differences lie in the 
numbers of countries in which SEP owners sought their injunctions. And also in the fact 
that while Samsung sought preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunctions, Motorola 
sought and enforced an injunction.  
                                                
490 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission consults on commitments offered by Samsung Electronics 
regarding use of standard essential patents’ IP/13/971, paras 5 and 12.  
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3.1. Samsung 
 
The Samsung company designed, developed, manufactured and sold a wide range of 
products in the area of electronics and Information Technology (IT), including 
smartphones and it was present in most countries within the EEA. The company held a 
worldwide portfolio of SEPs, some of them were declared essential to implement the 
European third generation wireless (3G) universal mobile telecommunications system 
(UMTS) standard, a key industry standard for mobile and wireless communications (it 
ensured, together with other standards, the compatibility and interoperability of telecom 
networks and devices). Accordingly, Samsung gave the commitment to the ETSI that it 
would license the SEPs declared essential to the UMTS standard, on FRAND terms. Note 
that ETSI is one of the three European Standardisation Organisations and it is officially 
responsible for producing standards and specifications supporting EU and European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) policies and enabling an internal market in 
telecommunications491.  
 
Nonetheless, Samsung requested before the courts of Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK, preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunctions against 
Apple – a competing mobile device maker492 – based on alleged infringements of certain 
of its 3G UMTS SEPs. Although the reason why Samsung sued Apple might have been 
because they could not agree on the amount of the royalty to be paid for the UMTS SEPs, 
it might be inferred from the facts that it might also have done it because Apple sued 
Samsung first since some of Samsung's Galaxy products were infringing certain of its 
non-SEPs493. 
 
Accordingly, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission opened an 
ex officio (in its own initiative) investigation against Samsung to investigate whether 
seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against Apple, it failed to honour its 
irrevocable FRAND commitment in licensing negotiations made to ETSI, which might 
amount to an abuse of a dominant market position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. That, because Samsung might have abusively, and in 
contravention of a commitment given to the SSO, used certain of its SEP rights to distort 
competition in European mobile device markets. The Commission’s preliminary 
conclusion included in the SO concluded that Samsung’s conduct was anti-competitive. 
 
After the sending of the SO to Samsung, it announced494 unilaterally the withdrawal of 
preliminary and permanent injunctions against Apple before national courts, although the 
withdrawal did not prevent Samsung from seeking injunctions based on SEPs in the 
future. The Commission took note of Samsung's announcement, although that did not 
                                                
491 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [7], [8], [11], [29] and [34].  
492 ibid [12].  
493 ibid [2] and [53].   
494 See Samsung's press statement of 18 December 2012: ‘[…] Samsung has decided to withdraw our 
injunction requests against Apple on the basis of our standard essential patents pending in European courts, 
in the interest of protecting consumer choice’. 
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alter the Commission's preliminary conclusion included in the SO, who continued with 
its investigation495. Thus, by the time the Commission adopted its Commitments 
Decision, Samsung’s conduct that was considered preliminarily to be abusive, it had 
already ended. 
 
3.2. Motorola   
 
The Motorola company designed and sold wireless network infrastructure equipment and 
it also produced smartphones and it was present in most countries within the EEA. The 
company owned the ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ that was declared essential to the ETSI 
GSM/GPRS (Global System for Mobile communications/ General Packet Radio Service) 
standard – a key industry standard for mobile and wireless communications that together 
with other standards, it ensured the compatibility and interoperability of telecom 
networks and devices –, so Motorola committed to license it on FRAND terms496. To be 
more specific, GRPS standard was an integrated part of the digital second generation (2G) 
GSM standard. Therefore, technology combined with GPRS was sometimes described as 
‘2.5G’, that is, a technology between the second (2G) and third (3G) generations of digital 
mobile telephony497. As a note of information, Motorola submitted that in the early 1990s, 
its practice was to charge a royalty rate of 5% of the price of the relevant end product, 
that was reduced to 2.25% during the 1990s498. 
 
Notwithstanding, Motorola sought injunctions against different Apple Inc.’s subsidiaries, 
before the courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, specifically, in the Regional Court 
(Landgericht) of Mannheim on the basis that Apple was infringing three of its patents, 
among them, the ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’, with the view to ordering Apple, inter alia, to cease 
and desist from selling in Germany any Apple products that implement the asserted 
patents. Motorola also sought an injunction in the Regional Court of Düsseldorf on the 
basis of the same three patents, but it finally withdrew its action499. Subsequently, Apple 
asserted three non-SEPs against Motorola in the Regional Court of Düsseldorf, a further 
three non-SEPs in the Regional Court of Munich and a further non-SEP in the Regional 
Court of Mannheim500.  
 
Due to the fact that the Orange Book judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof-BGH) will be studied below – in Section 2.1. of Chapter 4 –, it is 
appropriate to mention that notwithstanding the differences, that judgment was developed 
and applied to SEPs in proceedings between Motorola and Apple by lower German 
Courts (i.e. the Regional Court of Mannheim and the Higher Regional Court of 
Karlsruhe). That is to say, the judgment ruled on the conditions under which a defendant, 
in a non-SEP infringement case, could rely on a competition law defence under German 
                                                
495 Commission MEMO/12/1021 (n 488), 3th question. 
496 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [5], [6], [95] and [96]. 
497 ibid [86] and [87].  
498 ibid [101].  
499 ibid [115] and [116].  
500 ibid [117]. 
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and Union law against an injunction claim. Moreover, the non-SEP read on a de facto 
standard and not on a de jure one developed by a SSO, so no FRAND commitments were 
given501.  
 
Returning to Motorola and Apple proceedings, the Regional Court of Mannheim granted 
an injunction against Apple with respect to the Cudak GPRS SEP, because it considered 
that the SEP had been infringed by Apple (in particular, by the iPhone 4S). Consequently, 
Apple applied for a stay of the enforcement of the injunction and it also filed an appeal 
against the judgment of the Regional Court of Mannheim with the Higher Regional Court 
(Oberlandesgericht) of Karlsruhe. Nevertheless, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe 
handed down a decision in which it rejected Apple's request to stay the enforcement of 
the injunction, finding inter alia that Apple's Fifth Orange Book Offer was insufficient to 
meet the requirements of the Orange Book judgment, so Apple was not availed of the 
competition law defence502. As Motorola was going to proceed to enforce the injunction 
(for which it had to deposit a security bond with the Regional Court of Mannheim to 
secure damages in case Apple’s appeal on the substance of the case would be successful), 
Apple had the choice of either having its products excluded from the market (which may 
lead it to incur significant costs due to lost sales and damage to reputation) or accepting 
the disadvantageous licensing terms requested by Motorola as a condition for not 
enforcing the injunction.  
 
In the end, on the same day Motorola enforced the injunction, Apple chose, via its Sixth 
Orange Book Offer – its last licensing offer –, to accept the disadvantageous licensing 
conditions with a view to availing itself of the competition law defence established by the 
Orange Book judgment. And on the basis of that offer, Apple filed with the Higher 
Regional Court of Karlsruhe a second application to stay the enforcement of the 
injunction granted by the Regional Court of Mannheim503. Initially, Motorola rejected the 
Sixth Orange Book Offer and asked the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe to dismiss 
Apple's second motion for suspension of the execution of the injunction. But then, Apple 
clarified certain terms of the offer to address Motorola’s concerns, in which the rejection 
was based on504. In these circumstances, the Higher Regional Court handed down a 
decision in which it ruled that Apple’s Sixth Orange Book Offer, as clarified by Apple, 
met the requirements of the Orange Book judgment, so it stayed the enforcement of the 
injunction for the duration of the appeal505. Therefore, the enforcement of the injunction 
led only to a temporary (few hours) ban on Apple’s online sales. Thus, according to the 
Higher Regional Court, the implementer could use the competition law defence, because 
it was a willing licensee, so it would not make sense to enforce the injunction since 
Motorola was going to be remunerated.  
 
                                                
501 ibid [80]–[84]. 
502 ibid [130], [131], [142], [157] and [158].  
503 ibid [144]–[146].  
504 ibid [159] and [161]. 
505 ibid [151. 
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As a consequence, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, acting on a complaint 
submitted by Apple, the Commission opened an investigation against Motorola to 
investigate if when seeking and enforcing an injunction against Apple, Motorola failed to 
honour its irrevocable FRAND commitment given to ETSI.  That behaviour might 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU and Article 
54 of the EEA Agreement, because it might restrict competition. The Commission’s 
preliminary conclusion included in the SO concluded that Motorola abused its dominant 
position and that statement was confirmed in the prohibition Decision.  
 
Once the Commission sent the SO to Motorola, Apple and Motorola signed a licensing 
agreement (the ‘Settlement Agreement’) that was based on Apple’s Sixth Orange Book 
Offer in its clarified version and it contained disadvantageous licensing terms to Apple506. 
The agreement entailed granting licenses of all German patents and of German parts of 
European patents declared to be essential for various standards, among others the 
GSM/GPRS standard, on FRAND terms507. And subsequently, following the execution 
of the Settlement Agreement, Motorola filed a declaration with the Higher Regional Court 
of Karlsruhe and the Regional Court of Mannheim that the injunction proceedings against 
Apple were moot. It, however, kept open the proceedings pending before the Higher 
Regional Court of Karlsruhe with respect to damages for past infringement and 
accounting in accordance with German law. Apple also filed declarations with the same 
German courts confirming it also considered the proceedings moot and that subsequent 
to the Settlement Agreement, it was paying royalties into escrow, in line with the 
requirements of the Orange Book judgment508. This portfolio-wide effect of patent 
litigation – German litigation with respect to one patent – was described by Motorola as 
a general strategy in the telecoms industry: ‘As a result, patent owners typically litigate 
just a few key patents but with the expectation of ultimately reaching a portfolio-wide, 
mutually beneficial settlement’509. 
 
Afterwards, Motorola instituted proceedings before the Regional Court of Mannheim 
against Apple asking for the setting510 of the FRAND royalty rate in accordance with the 
Settlement Agreement and for further damages and rendering of accounts for the use of 
Motorola’s technology511. Nevertheless, these facts did not affect the Commission’s 
assessment of the abusive nature of Motorola’s conduct contained in the Prohibition 
Decision. 
                                                
506 ibid [266]. 
507 ibid [162] and [163]. 
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510 ibid [174]: Notwithstanding, the Regional Court of Mannheim stayed the rate-setting proceedings and 
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Article 102 TFEU. 
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4. EC’s decisions 
 
4.1. Commitments Decision: Samsung  
 
Samsung disagreed with the Commission’s assessment set out in the SO in which it 
reached the preliminary view that Samsung’s seeking of preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against Apple – before the courts of various Member States on the basis of its 
SEPs covering the UMTS technology without any objective justification –, it was anti-
competitive under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement512.  
 
Nevertheless, just after Samsung withdrew the injunctions in Europe, it voluntarily 
offered formal commitments513 (the ‘Initial Commitments’) to the EC in accordance with 
Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003. Their purpose was to remedy Commission’s concerns 
and to get the confirmation from the Commission that there were no grounds for further 
action in relation to its conduct that was under investigation. Note that in the SO, the 
Commission submits its competition concerns and constitutes a preliminary assessment, 
which means that the EC intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be 
brought to an end. And the SO gives the dominant undertaking the opportunity to offer 
commitments to meet the Commission’s concerns514. 
4.1.1. Commitments’ content 
In essence, for a period of five years from the date of adoption of the Commitments 
Decision, Samsung offered to abstain from seeking injunctions in the EU and EEA on 
the basis of any of its SEPs (including all existing and future SEPs) that related to 
technologies reading on a standard (‘Mobile Standard’) implemented in smartphones and 
tables (‘Mobile SEPs’), against a potential licensee that agreed to a particular licensing 
framework for the determination of FRAND terms (the ‘Licensing Framework’, that will 
be explained later on, in Section 5.3.4.3.), who would be considered a ‘willing licensee’.  
The Licensing Framework encompassed either a unilateral licensing agreement covering 
Samsung's Mobile SEPs or, if either Samsung or the potential licensee so requested, a 
cross-licensing agreement covering both Samsung’s Mobile SEPs and certain of the 
potential licensee’s SEPs or non-SEPs covered by the reciprocity rules of SSOs515. 
Accordingly, Samsung could not make access to its SEPs conditional on the cross-
licensing of patents not covered by the reciprocity rules of SSOs, because otherwise, 
Samsung could force a potential licensee to (cross-) license its patents516. 
 
                                                
512 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [6]. 
513 Commission, ‘Case COMP/C-3/39.939 – Samsung Electronics Enforcement of UMTS Standard 
Essential Patents – Commitments Offered to the European Commission’ (2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39939/39939_1301_5.pdf> accessed 27 
February 2019. 
514 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [15].  
515 ibid [77]. 
516 ibid [102] and [110].  
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However, as an exception, the proposed commitments allowed Samsung to seek an 
injunction against a potential licensee where three cumulative conditions were met517: (i) 
a potential licensee sought an injunction against Samsung on the basis of certain of its 
Mobile SEPs; (ii) Samsung offered to grant a licence for its own Mobile SEPs on 
FRAND terms; and (iii) Samsung offered to take a licence on FRAND terms for the 
Mobile SEPs of the company alleging an infringement by Samsung. This exception to 
use injunctions defensively518  only applied in scenarios where Samsung would not be 
able to claim reciprocity, which means making an offer to license Mobile SEPs on 
FRAND terms with the condition that the other party will also offer its Mobile SEPs – 
that read on the same Mobile Standard – in those terms519.  
 
To conclude, an independent trustee would advise the Commission in overseeing the 
proper compliance with the commitments.  
 
The Commission invited comments from interested parties on the commitments offered 
by Samsung. In light of the 18 responses received520, the Commission informed Samsung 
of the observations it considered relevant, because not all of the issues raised by certain 
respondents were considered to be suitable, necessary or proportionate to address its anti-
competition concerns, as they will be mentioned below. 
  
Firstly, certain respondents suggested that the commitments should be worldwide in 
scope, so Samsung could not use its Mobile SEP-based injunctions outside the EEA as 
leverage for negotiations that have an impact within the EEA. However, in Commission’s 
opinion, there was no evidence that Samsung's seeking of injunctions in jurisdictions 
outside the EEA had had an appreciable anti-competitive effect in the internal market521.  
 
Secondly, regarding the product scope of the commitments, some respondents also 
proposed that the commitments should cover the seeking of injunctions on the basis of 
Samsung’s all SEPs and not only of its UMTS SEPs.  That, in order to constrain fully 
Samsung's ability to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions. Nevertheless, the 
Commission stated that broadening the scope of the commitments would go beyond what 
was necessary to remedy the competition concerns522. 
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Thirdly, in light of the potential length of a FRAND determination, certain respondents 
also commented that the duration of the commitments should be double, that is, ten years. 
In Commission’s view, taking into account the fast-moving nature of the mobile device 
sector where new products often being launched at short intervals523, the important 
changes that the industry may continue to undergo in the short to medium term, may alter 
the competitive dynamics. Therefore, it concluded that the established duration was 
adequate524.  
4.1.2. Decision’s nature 
Accordingly, based on Commission’s suggestions, Samsung offered revised 
commitments (the ‘Final Commitments’525) and the Commission concluded526 that they 
were suitable, necessary and proportionate in order to address the concerns expressed in 
its SO. Therefore, pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission brought 
the proceedings to an end by means of the Commitments Decision527, making the Final 
Commitments legally binding (see Section 2.3. of Chapter 1) on Samsung. Note that after 
the expiry of the commitments, Samsung would remain subject to all contractual 
obligations entered into during the term of the commitments – e.g. the third-party FRAND 
determination. Accordingly, this would contribute to the effectiveness of the 
commitments by encouraging potential licensees to sign up to the Licensing 
Framework528. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the decision that makes the commitments binding does 
not conclude whether or not there has been or still is an infringement of EU antitrust rules, 
but it states that there are no longer grounds for action and it legally binds the dominant 
company to respect the commitments offered (Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003). 
Therefore, as stated before, the Commission made only a provisional assessment of the 
antitrust infringement that was included in the SO. However, the commitment decision is 
without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and courts of the Member 
States to find the infringement and decide upon the case. Accordingly, as the Commission 
did not find any infringement, the imposition of measures (remedies or sanctions) is not 
appropriate. This is why the aforementioned Recital stated that ‘Commitment decisions 
are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine’. 
 
Notwithstanding, according to Article 9(2) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission might, 
upon the request of Samsung or on its own initiative, reopen the proceedings in three 
circumstances. Firstly, where there was a material change in any of the facts on which the 
decision was based. In that regard, Samsung stated in its commitments that in particular, 
                                                
523 Google/Motorola Mobility (Case COMP/M.6381) Commission Decision 2012/C 75/01 [2012] OJ 
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the Commission might, on the request of Samsung or on its own initiative, reopen the 
proceedings in light of a judgment delivered by the ECJ regarding the circumstances 
under which the seeking of an injunction on the basis of a SEP could constitute an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Samsung was referring to the case Huawei v. ZTE that 
was pending before the ECJ, in case it might be considered that according to its antitrust 
assessment, Samsung would not have abused its dominant position. However, as it will 
be analysed in the next chapter, although the ECJ did not base on Commission’s antitrust 
assessment – but on the one developed by it –, Samsung’s behaviour would also have 
amounted to an abuse.  
 
Secondly, if the company broke the binding commitments. In that case, according to 
Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission could impose a fine of up to 10% of 
its annual worldwide turnover without having to find an infringement of the EU antitrust 
rules. And thirdly, where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading 
information provided by the parties. 
 
As the ECJ has consistently held, the principle of proportionality is one of the general 
principles of the EU law [it is enshrined in Article 5(4) of the TEU] and the ECJ has 
interpreted this principle as meaning that measures adopted by institutions of the Union 
must be suitable and not exceed what is appropriate and necessary for attaining the 
objective pursued529. And when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, 
recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued530.  
 
This principle was examined in Section 5.2.3. of Chapter 2, regarding the specific case of 
compulsory licenses that may be imposed to remedy the infringement according to Article 
7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, as long as they are proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to bring the infringement to an end. 
 
In the context of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 in which Commission’s 
Commitments Decision bases on, the application of the principle of proportionality 
requires that commitments must be proportional. That entails for the Commission to 
assess that the commitments in question address the concerns expressed in its Preliminary 
Assessment – in the SO – and that the undertakings concerned have not offered less 
onerous commitments that also address those concerns adequately. And when carrying 
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out that assessment, the Commission must take into consideration the interests of third 
parties531.  
 
In Samsung, the Commission considered that the Final Commitments (not the Initial 
Commitments, because it took into consideration the interests of respondents) offered by 
Samsung addressed adequately the competition concerns it expressed in the SO, because 
they ensured that Samsung would not seek injunctions on the basis of its Mobile SEPs 
against any potential licensee willing to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms. 
It also stated that Samsung did not offer less onerous commitments. And according to 
Commission, it also took into consideration the interests of third parties (not only of 
respondents), because it struck a balance between the fundamental rights (those linked to 
IP and the right of access to a tribunal) and the freedom to conduct a business, as well as 
the public interest in maintaining effective competition532.  
 
4.2. Prohibition Decision: Motorola 
 
Albeit Motorola's abusive conduct ended (due to the ‘Settlement Agreement’ signed 
between Motorola and Apple) by the time the Commission concluded its investigation, 
according to Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission found that Motorola 
infringed Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement by seeking and 
enforcing against Apple in the Federal Republic of Germany, an injunction on the basis 
of the ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’, for which it gave an irrevocable commitment to license it on 
FRAND terms to the ETSI (Article 1 of the Prohibition Decision533). In particular, the 
infringement lasted 7 months 3 weeks and 4 days, from the date of Apple’s Second 
Orange Book Offer that provided for full judicial determination of the FRAND royalties 
– when it was considered that Apple was a willing licensee –, until de declaration by 
Motorola to the Regional Courts of Mannheim and Düsseldorf pursuant to the German 
Code of Civil Procedure that the injunction procedures against Apple were moot534.  
 
Indeed, the Commission may adopt a prohibition decision finding that an infringement 
was committed in the past, as long as it has a legitimate interest to do it535. Particularly in 
Motorola, there were three reasons to do it536. First, because the likely anti-competitive 
effects of Motorola's conduct persisted, as the Settlement Agreement was still in force 
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and certain of its provisions might affect the FRAND royalty rate and the amount of 
damages that Apple would be ordered to pay to Motorola. Second, because there was no 
Union decisional practice concerning the legality of the seeking and enforcement of 
injunctions by SEP holders. And national courts that dealt with this issue arrived at 
substantively different outcomes. For instance, regarding the case Motorola, on the basis 
of their interpretation of the requirements of the Orange Book judgment, the Regional 
Court of Mannheim granted the injunction and the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe 
allowed it to be enforced537. However, the judgment by the District Court of The Hague 
in Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. SK Kassetten GmbH & Co. KG538 explicitly 
rejected the approach taken by the German Orange Book case law. In addition, the 
Commission adopted the Decision on 29 April 2014, but already on 5 April 2013, a 
request for a preliminary ruling was lodged by the Landgericht Düsseldorf in case Huawei 
v. ZTE (see below, Section 1 of Chapter 4) as a consequence of the apparent contradiction 
between the legal argument that was going to be applied by the Commission in Samsung 
and Motorola and the one used by the German Federal Supreme Court in Orange Book. 
And third, in light of the multitude of on-going disputes over FRAND encumbered SEPs 
between industry players. 
 
As it was already mentioned in Section 2 of Chapter 1, European competition law offers 
an array of tools to tackle the consequences of the ascertained antitrust infringement. 
Namely,  remedies – intended to bring the infringement to an end – and fines – meant to 
deter firms from engaging in unlawful behaviour539. In Motorola, the infringement had 
already come to an end. Consequently, the Commission did not order to do any acts or 
provide certain advantages which were wrongfully withheld or prohibited the 
continuation of certain acts, practices or situations which were contrary to the Treaty. 
However, in order to ensure that the Decision was effective, the Commission adopted two 
remedies540 to prevent the continuation of the likely anti-competitive effects and the 
reoccurrence of the same or similar abusive conduct (Articles 2 and 3 of the Prohibition 
Decision). Both remedies were proportionate to attain the objective sought, namely re-
establishment of compliance with the rules infringed. 
 
First, in order to ensure that the Decision was effective, Motorola should bring to an end 
the infringement found by the Commission insofar as it had not done so. And it should 
also refrain from repeating any act or conduct having the same or similar object or effect 
to the conduct identified as abusive541. And second, because the likely anti-competitive 
effects of Motorola's conduct persisted (see below, Section 5.3.3.), Motorola should be 
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required to eliminate them. In particular, the anti-competitive effects resulting from: the 
definition of Old Products that covered explicitly the iPhone 4S [Section 1(3) of the 
Settlement Agreement]; Apple’s acknowledgement regarding Motorola’s claims for 
damages [Section 4(4)]; and the termination clause if Apple challenged the validity of 
SEPs [Section 7(1)]. If the Commission had not imposed that second remedy, the anti-
competitive effects derived from the Settlement Agreement would not have been 
eliminated. That, because when the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe considered that 
Apple’s Sixth Orange Book Offer – on which the Settlement Agreement was based – met 
the requirements of the Orange Book judgment (so Apple could use the competition law 
defence because it was a willing licensee), it did not consider that the licensing terms 
included in the Settlement Agreement were disadvantageous to Apple. 
 
It is remarkable, however, that although Motorola infringed Article 102 TFEU and Article 
54 EEA, the Commission opted not to impose upon it, according to Article 23(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003, a fine of up to 10% of its annual worldwide turnover. 
Notwithstanding, the Commission has discretion when choosing whether to impose it or 
not and it may exceptionally decide, based on objective reasons, not to impose a fine. The 
Commission exercises that discretion in the specific context of each case when assessing 
whether it is appropriate to impose a fine in order to penalise the infringement found and 
to protect the effectiveness of competition law542.  
 
The objective reasons on which the Commission relied not to impose a fine in Motorola 
were the following ones taken in combination543 –  indeed, they constituted one of the 
reasons why the Commission decided to adopt a prohibition decision finding that an 
infringement was committed in the past. First, there was no Union decisional practice or 
case law regarding whether a SEP holder, which gave a commitment to license that patent 
on FRAND terms, abused a dominant position when it sought and enforced an injunction 
on the basis of that SEP against a potential licensee, that was not unwilling to enter into 
a licence agreement on FRAND terms. It is important to take into account that the fact 
that the Commission and the Union courts have not yet had the opportunity to rule 
specifically on certain conduct does not, in itself, prevent the Commission from imposing 
a fine544. And second, national courts had reached diverging conclusions on this question.  
 
All in all, Motorola was aware that was committed to license its SEP on FRAND terms, 
albeit it did not have legal certainty as to whether seeking and enforcing injunctions 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. However, note that 
the negligent infringement may also result in the imposition of a fine and not only when 
it is intentional, regardless of whether the dominant undertaking ended the abuse before 
the Commission handed the Prohibition Decision. The above, because the EC may adopt 
that decision finding that an infringement was committed in the past and impose a fine, 
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as long as it has a legitimate interest to do it. But if the Commission had fined Motorola, 
it should also fine Samsung, because both behaved in the same way.  
5. Assessment of the antitrust infringement 
 
Note that in Samsung, given the provisional nature of the SO545, the Commission’s view 
was preliminary regarding that the SEP owner’s seeking of preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against Apple before the courts of various Member States was abusive 
according to Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Whereas in 
Motorola, the Commission rendered a Prohibition Decision concluding that there was an 
infringement. Accordingly, it did not alter but confirmed its preliminary assessment 
against the SEP owner at a later stage of the proceedings – at the ending.  
 
As it will be studied next, in both cases, the Commission analysed each of the four 
constituent elements of Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. That is 
to say, the relevant market, the dominance, the abuse and the effects on trade between 
Member States and between Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. 
 
5.1. The relevant market 
5.1.1. Technology market: demand side substitutability 
As it was explained in Section 1.1.1. of Chapter 1, a relevant product market comprises 
all the products or services which are regarded as substitutable by consumers, by reason 
of their characteristics, their prices and their intended use546. When IPRs are marketed 
separately from the products to which they relate, the relevant technology market has to 
be defined as well. Technology markets consists of the technology and the IP protecting 
that technology and their close substitutes, referring to other technologies and related 
IPRs which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the licensee, by reason of 
the technology rights’ characteristics, the royalties payable in respect of those rights and 
their intended use547. 
 
Hence, the Commission548 differentiates between: (a) an input market, which is the 
market for the technology in question; and (b) an output market, which is the market for 
the downstream products incorporating that technology. In Samsung and Motorola, the 
relevant output market comprised the downstream products on which UMTS and GPRS 
standard-compliant products, such as mobile devices, were sold. However, both cases 
focused on the input market, that is, the market for the licensing of the technology. 
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the TFEU to categories of technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ L93/17 (Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation, TTBER), Art 1(1, k); Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [190]. 
548 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of 
the TFEU to technology transfer agreements’ (2014) OJ C89/3, paras 19 et seq. 
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The methodology for defining technology markets follows the same principles as general 
product market definition549, that is to say, demand substitution, supply substitution and 
potential competition, although as it was mentioned before (see Section 1.1.1. of Chapter 
1), the first methodology constitutes the most immediate and effective disciplinary force 
on the suppliers of a given product550.  
 
Supply side substitutability may also be taken into account when defining markets in 
those situations in which its effects are equivalent to those of demand side substitution.  
However, the competitive constraints arising from supply side substitutability are in 
general less immediate than those arising from demand side substitution551. Both in 
Samsung and Motorola, due to the fact that the technologies on which the UMTS SEPs 
and the ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ read were part of the UMTS and GPRS standards, there was 
a lack of supply side substitutability, because it was impossible for any other holder of 
SEPs (relating to UMTS, GPRS or any other standards), of non-SEPs or of unpatented 
technologies, to provide customers with alternatives to the technologies as specified in 
the aforementioned standards technical specifications that would fulfil the same 
functions552.  
 
In technology markets, particular emphasis must be placed on potential competition. If 
companies which do not currently license their technology are potential entrants on the 
technology market, they could constrain the ability of the parties to profitably raise the 
price for their technology553. However, potential competition is not taken into account 
when defining markets, but when the abusive nature of the conduct is being analysed. 
The same reason exposed above regarding the supply side substitutability is applicable to 
potential competition.  
 
Accordingly, the Commission only focused on identifying, starting from the technology 
which was marketed by Samsung and Motorola, those other technologies to which 
customers could switch in response to a small but non-transitory increase in relative prices 
by SEP owners, that is to say, on the demand side substitution. The Commission reached 
the conclusion that for manufacturers of mobile devices in the EEA, there were no 
substitutes to Samsung’s and Motorola's technologies, as specified in the UMTS and 
GPRS standards technical specifications, on which each of Samsung’s SEPs and 
Motorola's ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ read. Namely, for undertakings willing to manufacture 
mobile devices compliant with the UMTS and GPRS standards in the EEA, there were 
no substitutes to the technologies as specified in the UMTS and GPRS standards technical 
specifications that were protected by SEPs. 
                                                
549 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
of the TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements’ (n 7), paras 116 and 117.  
550 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), para 13; EasyJet (n 95) 
[99]. 
551 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), paras 14 and 20-23.  
552 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [43]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [209]–[211].  
553 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
of the TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements’ (n 7), para 118. 
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This conclusion was based on the following three elements554. Firstly, the UMTS (the 
standard for 3G mobile telecommunication technology in the EEA) and GPRS (2G/2.5G 
technology) could not be substituted by mobile standards of other generations. That is to 
say, the UMTS could not be substituted, for instance, by the GSM (2G) or the Long Term 
Evolution (LTE, 4G). In the same vein, the GPRS could not be substituted by the UMTS 
or LTE (among others, due to the geographic and signal coverage). Secondly, due to the 
fact that UMTS could not be substituted by other 3G standards used in the US or in China. 
And the GPRS neither could it be substituted by any other 2G standard. And thirdly, 
because UMTS and GPRS could not be lawfully implemented without having access to 
each of Samsung's UTMS SEPs and Motorola’s Cudak GPRS SEP that read on the 
standards, that is to say, without infringing them. Samsung and Motorola declared that 
the technology covered by theirs SEPs was essential and must be implemented in order 
to comply with the technical specifications of the UMTS and GPRS standards (and 
indeed, Motorola sought and obtained an injunction in Germany on this basis). Thus, the 
SEPs could not be designed around when manufacturing UMTS/GPRS standard-
compliant products. 
 
All in all, the Commission reached the conclusion that the relevant technology markets 
encompassed only the technologies as specified in the UMTS and GPRS standards 
technical specifications, on which each of Samsung’s UMTS SEPs and Motorola's 
‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ read, because there were no other viable technologies (from the 
technical viewpoint) to which licensees could switch in a timely manner in response to a 
small but permanent increase in relative prices of Samsung’s and Motorola's licenses for 
these patents555. 
5.1.2. Geographical market  
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2. of Chapter 1, the relevant geographic market comprises 
the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of 
products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous 
and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those areas556. 
 
Both in Samsung and Motorola, the Commission concluded that the relevant products 
markets – i.e. the licensing market for the technologies, as specified in the UMTS and 
GPRS standards technical specifications, on which each of Samsung’s SEPs and 
Motorola's ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ read – were at least EEA-wide in scope, even though, for 
instance, the ‘GPRS Cudak SEP’ was only enforceable in six Member States (it was 
actually enforced in Germany). The Commission based its conclusion on the following 
two reasons. Firstly, the SEPs were European patents declared to ETSI as being essential 
to the UMTS and GPRS standards and secondly, there was a mobile devices market that 
                                                
554 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [193]–[208]; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [42]. 
555 ibid [184], [186], [191], [192], [212] and [213]; ibid [41]. 
556 Commission, ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market’ (n 90), para 8.  
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was EEA-wide, which meant that manufacturers essentially distributed the same handsets 
to all their customers in the EEA, prices were similar for the same products offered across 
the EEA, and products were manufactured globally and shipped to customers throughout 
the EEA557.  
 
5.2. Dominance 
 
Note that dominance is ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market 
by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of its consumers’558. The existence of a 
dominant position derives in general from a combination of several factors which, taken 
separately, are not necessarily determinative559.  
 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission concluded that SEP owners held a dominant 
position on the EEA market for the licensing of technologies, as specified in the UMTS 
and GPRS standards technical specifications, on which Samsung’s SEPs and Motorola’s 
‘GPRS Cudak SEP’ read. And it reached that conclusion on the basis of two factors, high 
market shares and the existence of barriers. Namely, apart from the fact that SEP owners 
held a persistently high market share, there was not a strong threat of potential 
competition in the market because there were very high entry barriers. 
5.2.1. Market share  
Once the technologies that comprise the relevant technology market are identified, market 
shares can be calculated by dividing the licensing income generated by the parties by the 
total licensing income of all licensors. Note that the turnover achieved with the licensing 
of the SEPs is different from the turnover achieved with UMTS and GPRS standard-
compliant products in the output market560. Therefore, in Samsung and Motorola, the 
calculation of market shares was not based on the sales of the products incorporating the 
licensed technology on downstream products markets561, but on the licensing income.   
 
Due to the fact that UMTS and GPRS were de facto the only 3G and 2G/2.5G standards 
in the EEA (see the reasons below, in Section 5.2.2.) and Samsung owned various SEPs 
that were essential to the implementation of the UMTS standard and Motorola owned the 
Cudak SEP essential to implement the GPRS standard, the Commission concluded that 
Samsung and Motorola held 100% share of the market in each of the relevant markets, 
i.e. the markets for the licensing of the technologies as specified in the aforementioned 
                                                
557 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [44]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [214]–[220] and [270].  
558 TeliaSonera (n 149) [23]; Tomra (n 147) [38].  
559 United Brands (n 94) [66].  
560 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [185]. 
561 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
of the TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements’ (n 7), paras 117 and 118.  
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standards technical specifications, on which Samsung’s and Motorola’s SEPs read562. 
According to the ECJ case law563 (see Section 1.2.2.2. of Chapter 1), it exists the 
presumption that very large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional 
circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position (the ‘presumption of 
dominance’).  
 
Accordingly, taking into account that the antitrust procedure has a sanctioning nature and 
it bases on the accusatorial principle, in theory, it should be always the Commission the 
one providing evidences. Nevertheless, in practice, the potential dominant undertaking is 
who should prove that despite its high market share, it lacks market power. Hence, in 
Samsung and Motorola, SEP owners alleged that due to the countervailing buyer power 
of certain potential licensees of their SEPs (e.g. Apple), they did not enjoy a dominant 
position.  
 
One of the key elements of countervailing buyer power is the buyer's ability (or credible 
threat) to switch to competing suppliers, which differs from the general bargaining power 
that refers to the ‘negotiation power’ of certain other licensees of SEPs564. The 
Commission considered that companies wishing to implement the UMTS and GPRS 
standards could not switch to other suppliers, because there were no viable substitutes to 
the technology, as specified in the standards’ technical specifications, on which each of 
Samsung's SEPs and Motorola’s SEP read. And there were also no viable substitutes to 
the UMTS and GPRS standards in the EEA as it was explained above, when analysing 
the demand side substitutability565. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the alleged 
countervailing buyer power of certain potential licensees was not an effective constraint 
on Samsung’s and Motorola’s dominance on the relevant markets. 
 
Albeit the evidence alleged by Samsung and Motorola was not an effective constraint on 
their dominance – based on their high market shares –, the analysis of market power 
should be based on a global evaluation of several factors (and not only on the market 
share). Consequently, the Commission also took into account the existence of barriers to 
entry and expansion in order to confirm whether Samsung and Motorola enjoyed 
dominant positions in the relevant markets.  
5.2.2. Barriers to entry and expansion 
In Samsung and Motorola, the presence of two factors (or barriers) were of particular 
importance to confirm the assessment that SEP owners held a dominant position based 
on their high market share. First, the standards on which Samsung’s SEPs and Motorola's 
                                                
562 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [46]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [225]. 
563 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 110) [41]; AKZO Chemie (n 93) [60]; Case T-342/07 Ryanair v Commission 
[2010] ECR II-3457, para 41. 
564 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [243] and [257].  
565 ibid [237]–[268]; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [50] and [51].  
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‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ read were indispensable for manufacturers of standard-compliant 
products. And, second, the industry was locked-in to these standards566.  
 
Both the indispensability and the lock-in derived from the widespread adoption of the 
UMTS and GPRS standards in the EEA, which resulted in them becoming de facto the 
only 3G and 2G/2.5G standards in the EEA. In the case of UMTS, the widespread 
adoption occurred due to several facts, but mainly because pursuant the Decision 
128/1999/EC567, ETSI was appointed to develop the European standard needed to deploy 
UMTS services and Member States were required to implement it. And the widespread 
adoption of GPRS was mainly due to its inclusion into the GSM standards specifications 
in GSM Release 97 (and subsequent versions) and the wide implementation of that 
standard by networks operators in their 2G networks568. A common reason for the 
widespread adoption of both standards was since the commitments to license on FRAND 
terms given by the owners of UMTS and GPRS SEPs, including Samsung and Motorola, 
encouraged network operators and device manufacturers to adopt the UMTS and GPRS 
standards, because these commitments guaranteed the availability of the necessary 
licences for their implementation569. 
 
According to the Commission, the fact that UMTS and GPRS became de facto the only 
3G and 2G/2.5G standards conferred an advantage to Samsung and Motorola over 
potential entrants, from having privileged access to technologies essential to implement 
the standards because they owned the SEPs that protected these technologies. Moreover, 
it also granted an advantage to existing Samsung’s and Motorola’s competitors from 
having already entered the market, being locked-in to the standard. And these advantages 
constituted barriers to entry for other new technology developers that wished to enter in 
the market, as it will be explained below.  
 
5.2.2.1. SEPs’ ownership: the indispensability of standards 
 
Due to the widespread adoption of the UMTS and GPRS standards – they were de facto 
the only 3G and 2/2.5G standards in the EEA, because there were not viable alternatives 
– , it was indispensable for manufacturers of mobile devices to comply with them570. And 
in order to comply with them, it was indispensable for manufacturers of mobile devices 
to get SEP licenses that protected technologies specified in the aforementioned standards 
technical specifications, so that devices could communicate with the network.  
 
                                                
566 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [226]. 
567 Parliament and Council Decision 128/1999/EC of 14 December 1998 on the coordinated introduction 
of a third-generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the Community [1999] OJ 
L17/1; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [35], [36] and [47].   
568 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [228]. 
569 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [48]. 
570 ibid [47]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [227]–[230].  
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As a consequence, albeit the mere ownership (or exercise) of SEPs does not, on its own, 
confer a dominant position so it must be assessed on the basis of all relevant factors571, in 
Samsung and Motorola, the ownership contributed to that position because it constituted 
a barrier to entry and expansion in the licensing markets for the technologies as specified 
in the UMTS and GPRS standards technical specifications. That, because Samsung’s 
UMTS SEPs and Motorola’s GPRS Cudak SEP protected technologies that were essential 
to implement the aforementioned widely adopted standards. 
 
5.2.2.2. Lock-in to standards 
 
As a consequence of the widespread adoption of the UMTS and GPRS standards, industry 
players invested heavily in UMTS and GPRS infrastructure and had incurred other sunk 
costs of entry – costs that must be incurred to compete in a market, but which are not 
recoverable on exiting it. For instance, European operators paid over EUR 100 billion 
alone for 3G radio spectrum licenses572. Thus, industry players were ‘locked-in’ to the 
UMTS and GPRS standards on which Samsung's UMTS SEPs and Motorola’s ‘GPRS 
Cudak SEP’ were relevant for their implementation573.  
 
Therefore, even if theoretically there were viable substitutes to the aforementioned 
standards in the EEA, it would be economically unviable for implementers of the 
standards to switch to other suppliers, due to the exceptional organizational and financial 
efforts that would have to make. Accordingly, the industry lock-in to standards 
constituted a barrier to entry and expansion, because it prevented potential competitors 
from having access to the licensing markets for the technologies as specified in the 
aforementioned standards technical specifications, or actual competitors from expanding 
their activities on the relevant technology markets.  
 
5.3. The abuse: the required elements 
 
A patent holder, including a holder of SEPs, is generally entitled to seek and enforce 
injunctions as part of the exercise of its IPRs. The seeking and enforcement of injunctions 
cannot therefore, in itself, constitute an abuse of a dominant position574. Notwithstanding, 
as Samsung and Motorola held dominant positions on the EEA markets for the licensing 
of the technologies, as specified in the UMTS and GPRS standards technical 
specifications, on which Samsung’s SEPs and Motorola's ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ read, both 
SEP owners had a special responsibility to ensure that their conduct in relation to their 
                                                
571 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
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SEPs did not impair genuine undistorted competition in the internal market575 (see 
Section 1.3. of Chapter 1).  
 
As it was analysed in Chapter 2, according to the ECJ case law, the exercise of an 
exclusive right by its owner – i.e. refusal to grant licenses – might, in exceptional 
circumstances and absent any objective justification, involve abusive conduct576 – note 
that the list of exceptional circumstances was not exhaustive577.  In order to assess 
whether the behaviour of Samsung and Motorola constituted an abuse of dominant 
positions, the Commission took into account the previous statement of the ECJ, because 
in both cases dominant undertakings were exercising their exclusive rights – SEPs – when 
seeking and enforcing injunctions against alleged infringers. 
 
Accordingly, the Commission came to the conclusion (preliminarily in Samsung) that  the 
exercise of exclusive rights – seeking and enforcing preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against Apple on the basis of Samsung’s UMTS SEPs and Motorola’s ‘GPRS 
Cudak SEP’ – by Samsung and Motorola, in the exceptional circumstances of both cases 
and in the absence of any objective justification, it amounted to an abuse of dominant 
positions under Article 102 TFEU578. Therefore, the limitation of SEP owners’ right to 
access a tribunal would be justified. 
 
In order to get that conclusion, the Commission considered necessary the presence of 
three elements. Firstly, the existence of two exceptional circumstances, that is, the UMTS 
and GPRS standards-setting context (referring to the widespread adoption of these 
standards in the EEA) and Samsung's and Motorola’s commitments to license their 
UMTS SEPs and the ‘GPRS Cudak SEP’ on FRAND terms. Secondly, that SEP owners’ 
conduct caused anti-competitive effects. And thirdly, that SEP owners did not have any 
objective justification for their behaviour. 
5.3.1. The right to access a tribunal 
Regarding the behaviour of refusing to license IPRs, in Section 5.3.1. of Chapter 3 was 
stated that the general principle is that the IP owner has the right both to refuse to license 
an IPR and to obtain remuneration should it decide to license the IPR. 
 
In the same vein, where a competitor infringes a patent, the patent owner may suffer direct 
losses due to increased competition by the infringer and the resulting lower revenues from 
the sales of its patented products. In such a scenario, according to Articles 17(2) – the 
rights linked to IP – and 47(1) – the right of access to a tribunal – of the Charter, SEP 
owners whose patents have been infringed, have the right to access a tribunal to obtain an 
                                                
575 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [279]. 
576 Volvo (n 285) [9]; Magill [ECJ, 1995] (n 257) [50]; Bronner (n 297) [39]; IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 
241) [35]; Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [331]. 
577 Volvo (n 285) [9]; Bronner (n 297) [40]; IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [36]–[38]; Microsoft [CFI, 
2007] (n 156) [332]. 
578 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [3], [52] and [56]. 
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effective remedy, such as an injunction. That is to say, the seeking and enforcement of 
injunctions by a patent holder will typically be a legitimate exercise of an IPR in order to 
obtain the removal of infringing products from the market and protect the patent owner 
from further losses, because it forms part of the specific subject matter of that property579. 
 
However, according to the Commission, it would be justified to limit SEP owners’ 
fundamental rights to regulate the abusive use of SEPs in order to avoid effects which 
harm competition when the aforementioned three elements are present. That is to say, 
when the two exceptional circumstances exist, the seeking and enforcement of injunctions 
causes anti-competitive effects and there is an absence of any objective justification for 
that behaviour. Note that on the other hand, according to Article 119 and Protocol No. 
27580 of TFEU and Article 16 of the Charter, implementers are protected by the freedom 
to conduct a business in a position of free competition.  
 
To get that conclusion, the Commission referred to Article 52(1) of the Charter, according 
to which fundamental rights may be restricted only if the restriction (i) is provided for by 
law; (ii) corresponds to objectives of general interest recognised by the Union; (iii) does 
not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very 
substance of fundamental rights; and (iv) is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others. Besides, regarding the rights linked to IP, when interpreting Article 17(2) of 
the Charter, the ECJ581 made clear that there is ‘nothing whatsoever in the wording of 
[the Charter] or in the Court's case law to suggest that that [IP] right is inviolable and 
must for that reason be absolutely protected’.  
 
Consequently, when considering that SEP owners’ behaviour constituted an abuse of 
dominant positions under Article 102 TFEU (first condition), the Commission’s decisions 
fulfilled the aforementioned conditions, because the restriction on SEP owners’ 
fundamental rights corresponded to an objective of public pursued by the Union law, as 
it is the interest in maintaining effective competition in the internal market (second 
condition). In addition, the restriction did not involve a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference, because SEP owners’ right to seek and enforce injunctions against unwilling 
licensees and to seek damages and other alternative measures for an infringement of their 
SEPs, they would remain untouched because they do not affect the maintenance of 
competition in markets582 (third condition). However, the restriction imposed by the 
Decisions on SEP owners’ right to seek and enforce an injunction would prevent 
dominant undertakings from seeking ‘other corrective measures’, although the 
Commission583 erroneously stated the opposite. That, because as said before (see Section 
‘Statement of the problem’ of the Introduction), all corrective measures provided by 
                                                
579 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [282], [283] and [502].  
580 See also TeliaSonera (n 149) [20] and [21]. 
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582 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [72]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [510]–[523]. 
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Article 10(1) of the IPRED – the recall of products, their definitive removal from the 
channels of commerce and destruction –, like preliminary/permanent injunctions 
[Articles 9(1)(a) and 11] and the provisional measure consisting of the seizure of goods 
suspected of infringing an IPR [Article 9(1)(b)], they may cause the exclusion of the 
infringer/competitor from the market, preventing products manufactured by them from 
appearing or remaining on the market. Therefore, only damages, alternative measures – 
the pecuniary compensation –, the rendering of accounts and the precautionary seizure of 
the movable and immovable property of the alleged infringer would be the measures that 
would not allow SEP owners to exclude competitors’ products from the market, so 
seeking and enforcing them would not infringe Article 102 TFEU.  
 
And lastly, the restriction was necessary to protect willing licensees’ freedom to conduct 
a business and to protect their right to access to a tribunal to challenge the validity and 
infringement of the SEP in order not to end up paying for invalid or non-infringed patents 
(fourth condition). Note that in Motorola, the enforcement of the injunction led Apple to 
accept the termination clause. So Apple would be ‘forced’ to that acceptance if 
Motorola’s right was restricted and no injunction would be granted584.  
 
All in all, Commission’s Decisions’ limitation of Motorola’s and Samsung’s right to seek 
and enforce injunction stroke a fair balance between the fundamental rights and freedoms 
at stake585.  
 
Moreover, the Commission also argued that there was nothing in the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement to prevent the competition authorities of members of the WTO from 
imposing remedies which limited or regulated the exploitation of IPRs held by an 
undertaking in a dominant position where that undertaking exercises those rights in an 
anti-competitive manner586 (see Section 5.2.2. of Chapter 2). Accordingly, the 
Commission’s conclusion about the infringement of Article 102 TFEU would be 
consistent with the Union’s international obligations. 
5.3.2. The exceptional circumstances 
According to the Commission in Samsung and Motorola, the exemption of the general 
principle regarding the right to access a tribunal is justified on the grounds that the 
situation is different in the standard-setting context (first exceptional circumstance) where 
the owner of the patent has voluntarily committed to license its essential patent on 
FRAND terms (second exceptional circumstance), and where the benefits of the standard-
setting process in terms of increased compatibility, interoperability, competition and 
innovation, lower production and lower sales costs to consumers and business alike, may 
be endangered by the seeking and enforcement of an injunction on the basis of a SEP by 
                                                
584 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [524] and [525]. 
585 ibid [526]. 
586 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [799] and [1192]; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [71]; Motorola 
Commission Decision (n 7) [498] and [499].  
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a dominant undertaking587. Namely, if FRAND commitments given during a standard-
setting process are not respected, the public interest might be prejudiced.  
 
This is why the EC’s concern derives from the existence of these two exceptional 
circumstances in the specific cases of Samsung588 and Motorola589: the standards setting 
context and the associated commitment to license SEPs on FRAND terms590. 
 
5.3.2.1. The widespread adoption of the UMTS and GPRS standards in the EEA 
 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission referred to the UMTS and GPRS standards-
setting process as the first exceptional circumstance. Although specifically, it was 
alluding to the widespread adoption of both standards in the EEA what made them 
became de facto the only 3G and 2.5G/2G standards in the EEA (see the previous Section 
5.2.2., regarding the barriers to entry and expansion). 
 
Due to the widespread adoption of UMTS and GPRS standards – among other reasons, 
due to the agreement of patent holders to grant access to their SEPs on FRAND terms –, 
the access to technologies as specified in the standards technical specifications that were 
protected by Samsung’s and Motorola’s SEPs, became indispensable for implementers, 
because there were no other viable substitutes (neither of the technology nor of the 
standards). Another consequence of the widespread adoption was that the industry 
became locked-in to these standards. In these circumstances, SEP holders might be able 
to behave in anti-competitive ways, for example by holding up implementers of the 
standard after its adoption by demanding excessive royalty fees (see Section 1.3.1.1. of 
Chapter 1) or by refusing to license the necessary IPRs591. 
 
5.3.2.2. The FRAND commitments 
 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission (preliminarily in Samsung) concluded that 
the second exceptional circumstance in both cases was Samsung's and Motorola’s 
commitments to ETSI to license their UMTS SEPs and the GPRS Cudak SEP on FRAND 
terms592.  
 
In order to ensure effective access to the UMTS and GPRS standards, SEP holders were 
required by ETSI, as a quid pro quo for their patents being included in the UMTS and 
GPRS standards, to commit to license their SEPs on FRAND terms. Actually, ETSI IPRs 
Policy does not allow the adoption of a standard that includes technology covered by a 
patent for which no irrevocable FRAND commitment has been given. That, in order to 
                                                
587 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [284]. 
588 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [56]. 
589 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [281]. 
590 Commission MEMO/12/1021 (n 488), 11th question. 
591 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [57] and [58]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [289]. 
592 ibid [60] and [61]; ibid [293]. 
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guarantee that a SEP holder does not exploit the market power it enjoys following the 
inclusion of its patented technology in the standard. 
 
Accordingly, Samsung and Motorola should expect to obtain remuneration for their SEPs 
by means of licensing revenues rather than using theirs patents to exclude (or exploit) 
competitors from using it, provided that they were going to be appropriately remunerated 
for the use of their technology. In that sense, Motorola explicitly recognised that ‘where 
a counterparty is willing to license on FRAND terms, there is no basis for the patentee to 
seek an injunction’593. 
 
5.3.2.3. The proposal of the ‘essentiality’ approach 
 
All in all, the Commission stated that the first element to assess the abusive nature of SEP 
owners’ behaviour was to analyse the existence of the aforementioned two circumstances. 
Hence, the UMTS and GPRS standardisation context and Samsung’s and Motorola's 
commitment to license theirs SEPs on FRAND terms, constituted exceptional 
circumstances that distinguished both cases from those where a patent holder seeks to 
enforce its exclusive right on the basis of a patent that does not read on standardised 
technology and that is not encumbered by a commitment to license under FRAND 
terms594.  
 
In my opinion, the Commission should have defined the first element in the following 
way:  the SEP must be essential for the exercise of implementers’ activity. In order to 
determine that, it might take into account the definition of ‘essentiality’ given by the case 
law of the ECJ on refusal to license IPRs. Accordingly, it would be avoided the legal 
uncertainty posed by that case law when stating that ‘the list of exceptional circumstances 
is not exhaustive’, referring to those on the basis of which the exercise of an exclusive 
right (i.e. refusal to grant licenses) might be abusive. Namely, the ECJ nor the 
Commission defined fixed elements that should be present in order to conclude that a 
specific exercise of an IPR constitutes an abuse of a dominant position.  
 
Therefore, if the first element was defined in the way I mentioned above (linked to 
essentiality), that element would be useful to assess the abusive nature of any exercise of 
an exclusive right, whether refusal to grant licensees, the seek and enforcement of an 
injunction or any other. So the presence of that first exceptional element would always 
be compulsory to assess those conducts, which would contribute to legal certainty 
regarding when they would amount to an abuse of dominant position. On the contrary, 
keeping the definition given by the Commission in Samsung and Motorola, there could 
derive the following consequences.  
 
                                                
593 ibid [59]; ibid [290]–[292], [294] and [297]. 
594 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [300]. 
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The first exceptional circumstance defined by the Commission referred to the existence 
of a standard that had a widespread adoption and consequently, the access to the SEP 
related to that standard became indispensable and the industry locked-in to that standard. 
Therefore, it is not certain whether the assessment of the abusive nature of SEP owners’ 
conduct would be the same if the standard did not have that widespread adoption, but the 
use of the SEPs in question would be indispensable for competitors’ activity. 
Nevertheless, if the first element was defined as mentioned above (linked to essentiality), 
it would be applicable regardless of whether the standard was de facto the only one in the 
area or it did not have a widespread adoption at all, because the essential nature of the 
SEP is what would be relevant.  
 
Moreover, the Commission argued that Samsung and Motorola cases derived from the 
associated commitment to license SEPs on FRAND terms (the second exceptional 
circumstance). So it might be inferred that there would not be any source of concern for 
the Commission if the dominant company sought injunctions on the basis of non-SEPs, 
i.e. patents for which no commitment to license on FRAND terms had been given in a 
standardisation context, because that conduct would be within the framework of their 
right to access a tribunal. However, seeking prohibitory injunctions regarding patents that 
are not SEPs might also be considered to be abusive, if they were essential or 
indispensable for the exercise of competitors’ activities. Hence, that constitutes another 
argument to support the definition of the first element as linked to the essentiality, when 
assessing the abusive nature of SEP owners’ behaviour by the Commission. 
 
This proposal will be extensively developed in Chapter 5 – where I defend that SEP 
owners’ behaviour should have been treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal –, but it 
was appropriate to raise it already here. 
5.3.3. Anti-competitive effects 
According to the Commission, the second element that had to be present in order to 
consider SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking and enforcing injunctions abusive, is that it 
tends to restrict competition or is capable of having that effect595, regardless of its success. 
Namely, the fact that an act by an autonomous judicial body (i.e. the granting of an 
injunction by a court) is a precondition for the likely anti-competitive effects resulting 
from the conduct to materialise cannot affect the abusive nature of the conduct596. So for 
that purpose, it is not relevant whether courts ultimately granted injunctions or not. 
 
Samsung’s seeking of preliminary and permanent injunctions against Apple in various 
Member States on the basis of its SEPs was an autonomous act by the dominant 
undertaking, which was a prerequisite for the grant of injunctions by courts. Samsung 
                                                
595 Tomra (n 147) [68]. 
596 AstraZeneca [GC, 2010] (n 56) [377] and [347], confirmed on appeal in AstraZeneca [ECJ, 2012] (n 
138) [106], [109] and [111]; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [63] and [64]; Motorola Commission 
Decision (n 7) [308] and [309]. 
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was not required to start the proceedings seeking the injunctions. So when exercising that 
discretion, Samsung had to ensure that the conduct it elected to pursue was consistent 
with its obligations – to grant licenses on FRAND terms – under Article 102 TFEU, that 
prohibits behaviour that tends to restrict competition or is capable of having that effect597. 
The same applies to Motorola’s seeking and enforcement of an injunction against Apple 
in Germany on the basis of the ‘GPRS Cudak SEP’, which was a prerequisite for the grant 
of the injunction by the Regional Court of Mannheim and its subsequent enforcement. 
Accordingly, Motorola was neither required to start or continue – after Apple's Second 
Orange Book Offer that was a clear indication that Apple was a willing licensee (see 
below, Section 5.3.4.3. – the proceedings seeking the injunction, nor to enforce the 
injunction once it was granted598. 
 
Consequently, the Commission concluded that Samsung’s and Motorola’s choices 
regarding the injunction proceedings were capable of causing two anti-competitive 
effects on Apple – the rival manufacturer of UMTS and GPRS compliant mobile devices 
– 599: (i) its exclusion from the market and (ii) to induce it to accept disadvantageous 
licensing terms. Moreover, in Motorola600, the Commission also understood that 
dominant undertaking’s behaviour was capable of (iii) having a negative impact on 
standard-setting. All in all, these anti-competitive effects would lead to restrict 
competition and ultimately, harm consumers who would have less choices and higher 
prices. Moreover, they would be detrimental to innovation.  
 
5.3.3.1. Exclusion 
 
Firstly, the conduct might provoke the exclusion of Apple from the market, because 
injunctions involve to end the infringement and generally, they also entail a prohibition 
of the product infringing the patent being sold. In turn, the elimination of competing 
products from the market might limit consumer choice and partially eliminate 
downstream competition. 
 
Particularly in Motorola601, according to the injunction that was granted by the Regional 
Court of Mannheim, Apple had to cease and desist from offering the infringing GPRS-
compatible products for online sales to consumers in Germany. Although the enforcement 
of the injunction led only to a temporary ban on Apple’s online sales – because the Higher 
Regional Court stayed the enforcement –, as mentioned before, for the purpose of Article 
102 TFEU it is irrelevant that the desired result was achieved only for a short period of 
time. The same would be applicable even if the temporary exclusion had not been 
achieved at all. Because what matters is that Motorola’s behaviour was capable of 
                                                
597 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [63] and [64]; See, to that effect, Deutsche Telekom (n 156) [177] 
et seq. and [253] et seq.; TeliaSonera (n 149) [62] et seq.; Post Danmark (n 148) [26], [42] and [44]; 
AstraZeneca [ECJ, 2012] (n 138) [109] and [111]. 
598 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [310]; Deutsche Telekom (n 156) [84] and [85].  
599 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [62]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [311]. 
600 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [280]. 
601 ibid [312]–[319] and [326].  
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excluding Apple, which could have resulted in significant profit losses due to the fast 
moving nature of the markets for mobile devices and short product cycles. 
 
5.3.3.2. Exploitation 
 
Secondly, SEP owners’ behaviour might also induce Apple to accept disadvantageous 
licensing terms, compared to those which it may have accepted in the absence of 
injunctions being sought. That is to say, the threat of injunctions could distort FRAND 
licensing negotiations and lead to licensing terms that the licensee of the SEP would not 
have accepted absent SEP owners’ threat. Hence, implementers might be compelled to 
accept excessive or disproportionate royalties, having to face holdup and royalty stacking 
problems (see Sections 1.3.1.1. and 1.3.1.3. of Chapter 1, respectively). Moreover, these 
disadvantageous licensing terms are also capable of producing more general anti-
competitive effects602. 
 
Indeed, in Motorola, the short duration of the ban on Apple’s products was precisely 
because the enforcement of the injunction by Motorola, led Apple to accept the 
disadvantageous licensing terms requested by it that were contained in the Sixth Orange 
Book Offer, on which the Settlement Agreement was based. Had Apple not accepted 
these terms, the injunction – the ban on Apple’s online sales – would have remained in 
force. It was therefore not the underlying value of the patented technology which drove 
the negotiation process and the licensing conditions Apple, as an implementer, was ready 
to agree to, but rather the potential cost of lost sales and damage to reputation603.  
 
The disadvantageous licensing terms that Apple accepted – capable of having anti-
competitive effects – were the following604: Motorola's entitlement to terminate the 
licence if Apple challenged the validity of the SEPs covered by the Settlement Agreement 
(‘the termination clause’); the inclusion of the iPhone 4S in the list of infringing products 
that were already sold, prior to the signing of the Settlement Agreement (‘Old Products’); 
and Apple’s acknowledgment of Motorola's claims for past damages. 
 
I will focus on the number of anti-competitive effects that the termination clause was 
capable of having, because as it will be studied in Section 4.3. of Chapter 4, that clause 
was also a debated issue in Huawei v. ZTE. First, it might limit Apple’s ability to influence 
the level of FRAND royalties it had to pay to Motorola for the use of the SEPs covered 
by the Settlement Agreement, because Apple could not initiate invalidity actions that 
might influence the level of royalties and the resulting level of damages, because that 
would allow Motorola to terminate the Settlement Agreement and Apple needed a license 
to Motorola’s relevant SEPs in order to lawfully sell GPRS-compliant products605. In 
addition, even in the case of patents where it considered the chances of invalidation to be 
                                                
602 ibid [328]. 
603 ibid [320], [322], [324], [327] and [412]. 
604 ibid [329]–[406]. 
605 ibid [336]–[338]. 
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high, the foregone profits from not being able to sell standard-compliant products in 
Germany would be much larger than any possible gain from reduced royalties after the 
invalidation. So the termination clause effectively led Apple to refrain from validity 
challenges for patents under the Settlement Agreement606. Moreover, as a result of the 
termination clause, initiating invalidity actions would entitle Motorola to seek and 
enforce an injunction against Apple on the basis of any of the SEPs covered by the 
Settlement Agreement607. Consequently, a termination clause in a licensing agreement 
concerning IP, which is technically essential to implement a standard, amounts to a de 
facto obligation not to challenge the validity of that IPR608. 
 
Second, the termination clause might lead other potential licensees of the SEPs covered 
by the Settlement Agreement to pay for invalid IP, which might increase the production 
costs of standard-compliant products and might be passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices. Therefore, the termination clause was likely to be contrary to the public 
interest in ensuring effective competition609, because the ‘prohibition’ of patent invalidity 
litigation was capable of generating an undue competitive advantage for Motorola and 
distorting competition on the merits610. 
 
Besides, the termination clause would be contrary to ECJ’s case law and Commission’s 
Regulation and Communication. In Windsurf International611, the ECJ held that it is in 
the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic activity which may arise when 
a patent is granted in error. Article 5(1)(b) of the Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation (TTBER)612 excludes the following restriction from the scope of 
the exemption provided for by it (except in the case of an exclusive license): ‘any direct 
or indirect obligation on a party not to challenge the validity of IPRs which the other party 
holds in the Union’. In the same vein, the Technology Transfer Guidelines613 state that 
‘in the interest of undistorted competition and in accordance with the principles 
underlying the protection of IP, invalid IPRs should be eliminated. Invalid IP stifles 
innovation rather than promoting it’. 
 
5.3.3.3. Undermining confidence in the standard-setting process 
 
And thirdly, according to the Commission, Motorola's seeking and enforcement of an 
injunction against Apple in Germany on the basis of its Cudak GPRS SEP might, in 
addition, undermine confidence in the standard-setting process and deprive consumers of 
its benefits614. In Samsung, the Commission did not consider this consequence as an anti-
                                                
606 ibid [341]. 
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609 ibid [376] and [377]. 
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611 Case C-193/83 Windsurfing International [1986] ECR I-611, paras 92 and 93. 
612 (n 547). 
613 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of 
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614 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [415]. 
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competitive effect, but it referred to it as an invalid argument to consider that SEP owner's 
conduct was objectively necessary (see below, Section 5.3.4.2.). 
 
In view of the standardisation process that led to the adoption of the standard and SEP 
owner’s voluntary commitment to license the SEP on FRAND terms, implementers of 
the GPRS standard had a legitimate expectation that the SEP holder would grant them a 
licence, provided they were not unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND 
terms. And thus, consumers would enjoy the benefits of interoperability among various 
operating systems and devices. Therefore, the Prohibition Decision – once parties signed 
the Settlement Agreement – promoted the proper functioning of standard-setting by 
ensuring the accessibility of the technology included in the standard enabling 
implementers to sell lawfully standard-compliant products and by preventing holdup, 
because Motorola would obtain appropriate remuneration for the use of its SEP since 
Apple explicitly agreed to enter into a license agreement and be bound by the FRAND 
royalty rate set by the competent German court615.  
5.3.4. Absence of objective justifications 
As it was stated when studying the different types of abusive behaviours (see Section 1.3. 
of Chapter 1), in order to assess the abusive nature of a conduct, first it must be analysed 
whether the elements of the specific type of abusive behaviour are present or not (in 
Samsung and Motorola, they were the exceptional circumstances and the anti-competitive 
effects). If they are, it could be determined, prima facie, that the conduct is abusive. 
However, in order to confirm the above conclusion, it is necessary to examine the claims 
of the dominant undertaking assuring that its conduct is justified, demonstrating that 
produces substantial efficiencies which outweigh any anti-competitive effects on 
consumers or that is objectively necessary616. If the dominant undertaking does not proof 
any of the statements, the conduct will be legally construed as an abuse617. Ultimately, 
the evaluation of the presence of objective justifications forms an integral part of the 
assessment of the abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU, as if it constituted the last 
element of the abusive behaviour. 
 
The Commission concluded in Samsung (preliminarily) and Motorola that SEP owners’ 
behaviour of seeking and enforcement of preliminary and permanent injunctions against 
Apple on the basis of their UMTS and GPRS SEPs could not be justified, because they 
did not show any valid objective justification, that is to say, their conduct did not produce 
possible advantages in terms of efficiencies that also benefited consumers nor it was 
objectively necessary. 
 
 
 
                                                
615 ibid [416], [418] and [420]. 
616 See, to that effect, Case C-311/84 CBEM [1985] ECR I-3261, para 27.  
617 Post Danmark (n 148) [41]. 
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5.3.4.1. Efficiency gains 
 
In order to conclude that the anti-competitive effects of the conduct produce possible 
advantages in terms of efficiencies, the dominant undertaking has to show that the 
following four cumulative conditions are met: (i) the efficiency gains likely to result from 
the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare in the affected markets; (ii) that those gains have been, or are likely to 
be brought about as a result of that conduct; (iii) that such conduct is necessary for the 
achievement of those gains in efficiency; and (iv) that it does not eliminate effective 
competition by removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition618. 
 
Bearing the above in mind, the Commission619 concluded that was unlikely that the 
exclusionary and exploitative effects of Samsung's and Motorola’s conduct could be 
counterbalanced or outweighed by any advantages in terms of efficiency which also 
benefited the consumer.  
 
Particularly in Motorola, the dominant undertaking put forward two alleged advantages 
in terms of efficiency which it claimed counterbalanced and outweighed any anti-
competitive effect produced by the termination clause – that de facto prevented Apple 
from challenging the validity or infringement of the SEPs licensed under the Settlement 
Agreement. Firstly, the termination clause avoided further litigation between Motorola 
and Apple. And secondly, termination clauses in general maintained the incentives of 
licensors to innovate. Notwithstanding, the Commission considered that neither of these 
alleged advantages provided justification for the termination clause as they did not 
counteract the likely negative effects of Motorola's conduct (the aforementioned first 
condition). As it was explained before (see above, Section 5.3.3.2.), the termination 
clause was capable of having a number of anti-competitive effects. Namely, it might limit 
Apple’s ability to influence the level of FRAND royalties it had to pay to Motorola and 
it might lead other potential licensees of the SEPs to pay for invalid IP. Besides, the 
termination clause was not proven to be necessary for the achievement of the alleged 
efficiency gains (the aforementioned third condition) 620.  
 
5.3.4.2. Objectively necessary 
 
In Samsung and Motorola, SEP owners advanced various justifications to consider the 
conduct of seeking and enforcement of injunctions as objectively necessary, but none of 
them was accepted by the Commission. Both referred to (i) the need to protect their 
commercial interests. In addition, Samsung also claimed (ii) the need to protect its IPRs; 
and (iii) the public interest in an effective standardisation process. And Motorola621 
                                                
618 British Airways [ECJ, 2007] (n 127) [86]; TeliaSonera (n 149) [76]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 
7) [480]. 
619 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [70]. 
620 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [481]–[483] and [486]. 
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affirmed that (iv) it acted in line with the applicable German case law; and (v) that the 
ETSI IPR Policy did not prescribe a waiver of the right to seek injunctions. 
 
First, regarding the protection of SEP owners’ commercial interests, an undertaking in a 
dominant position is allowed to take such reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to 
protect its commercial interests622. It must, however, refrain from behaviour the specific 
purpose of which is to strengthen its dominant position and abuse it623. In that regard, the 
Commission concluded that a SEP holder was entitled to take reasonable steps to protect 
its interests, by seeking and enforcing preliminary and permanent injunctions against a 
potential licensee in, for example, the following scenarios: (1) a potential licensee was in 
financial distress and unable to pay its debts; (2) a potential licensee's assets were located 
in jurisdictions that did not provide for adequate means of enforcement of damages; or 
(3) a potential licensee was unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms. 
The fact is that the corollary of a patent holder committing, in the standardisation context, 
to license its SEPs on FRAND terms is that a potential licensee should not be unwilling 
to enter into a FRAND licence agreement for the SEPs in question624.  
 
The Commission's assessment focused on the third scenario, because the first two 
scenarios were clearly not present in these cases, because Apple was a US based, 
financially strong company with substantial assets in the EEA625. As it will be studied 
below (see Section 5.3.4.3.), the Commission also concluded that Apple was not 
unwilling to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms for Samsung’s UMTS 
SEPS626 and Motorola’s GPRS SEP. 
 
In that regard, the Commission627 did not accept Motorola’s claim regarding that damages 
actions did not adequately protect its commercial interests as such actions are slow, 
expensive and generally only retrospective, due to the fact that they need ‘to be conducted 
on a patent-by-patent basis and can therefore only be brought with respect to a handful of 
patents’. That, because injunction proceedings also have to be conducted on a patent-by-
patent basis. And due to the fact that Motorola was seeking damages and rendering of 
accounts from Apple in Germany, which showed that Motorola nonetheless considered 
that such actions do provide it with a certain level of protection of its commercial 
interests. 
 
Second, with reference to the need to protect Samsung's SEPs, the Commission stated 
that the mere holding of IPRs could not, in itself, constitute an objective justification for 
the seeking of an injunction by a SEP holder against a potential licensee that was willing 
                                                
622 United Brands (n 94) [189]. 
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624 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [67]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [427]. 
625 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [429]. 
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to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms. Otherwise, that justification would 
be inconsistent with the purpose of the exception with regard to the exercise of IPRs 
which the case law recognises in favour of free competition (see above, Section 5.3.1.). 
That is to say, the exception could never be applied, so SEP owners’ conduct could never 
be considered to constitute an infringement of Article 102 TFEU628.  However, if the 
potential licensee was unwilling to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms, the 
SEP owner’s behaviour would be justified for the sake of protecting its SEP.  
 
Third, with regard to the public interest in an effective standardisation process, it is 
appropriate to mention that it will be effective when FRAND commitments are fully 
honoured by SEP owners, which would make that implementers have access to the 
standard and SEP owners would be fairly remunerated for making their standards 
technology available to third parties. In consequence, the competition would not be 
undistorted and the positive economic effects of standardisation would be reaped. For 
instance, consumers would have a wider choice of interoperable products, standards also 
encourage innovation and lower costs by increasing the volume of manufactured 
products.  
 
Basing on that, the Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that ensuring that 
preliminary and permanent injunctions are not sought against potential licensees that are 
willing to enter into licence agreements on FRAND terms, it safeguards the accessibility 
of the IP included in the standard (and the SEP owner would be remunerated) and thereby 
promotes the proper functioning of standard-setting process629. And conversely, seeking 
them against potential licensees that are unwilling, it would also promote the proper 
functioning of standard setting process, because infringers would cease using SEPs 
without paying royalty fees.   
 
Fourth, Motorola claimed that was entitled to seek and enforce an injunction against 
Apple in Germany on the basis of the ‘Cudak GPRS SEP’ because it was acting in line 
with the requirements of the Orange Book judgment. The Commission did not accept this 
argument because when a national legislation merely makes it easier for undertakings to 
engage in autonomous anti-competitive conduct, they remain subject to Article 102 
TFEU, because the national legislation does not preclude undertakings from engaging in 
autonomous conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts competition. A different matter 
would be if the anti-competitive conduct would be required of undertakings by national 
legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility 
of competitive activity on their part. In that case, Article 102 TFEU would not be applied 
because the restriction of competition would not be attributable to the autonomous 
conduct of the undertakings. Hence, Motorola had full discretion throughout the German 
proceedings to decide whether to seek an injunction in the first place and whether to 
                                                
628 ibid [423]; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [66]; See, in the same vein, Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 
156) [690], basing on Magill [ECJ, 1995] (n 257) and IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241). 
629 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [69]. 
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enforce the injunction once it was granted by the Regional Court of Mannheim630. 
Moreover, the Commission has to guarantee, subject to the control of the Union 
judicature, the uniform application of Union competition law – that is in line with the 
principle of legal certainty –, so it cannot be bound by a decision given by a national court 
in application of Article 102 TFEU, even if the Commission’s decision conflicted with 
the national court’s one631.  
 
Fifth, Motorola’s claim regarding that was entitled to seek and enforce injunctions 
because the ETSI IPR Policy did not prescribe a waiver of the right to seek injunctions, 
it was not either taken into account, because as it was already mentioned (see Section 1.3. 
of Chapter 1), the illegality of abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU is unrelated to its 
compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules. So whether or not the ETSI IPR 
Policy prescribed a general waiver of the right to seek injunctions, it could have no 
bearing on the existence of an abuse under Article 102 TFEU632. 
 
5.3.4.3. The ‘willing licensee’: nature, definition and implementation  
 
Before analysing the definition and implementation of the ‘willing licensee’ concept in 
Samsung and Motorola, I consider it relevant to refer to the nature of the ‘unwillingness 
to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms’. As I aforementioned before, the 
evaluation of the presence of objective justifications – such as the fact that the potential 
licensee is unwilling – forms an integral part of the assessment of the abusive conduct 
under Article 102 TFEU, as if it constituted the last element of the abusive behaviour, 
together with the exceptional circumstances (see above, Section 5.3.2.) and the anti-
competitive effects (see above, Section 5.3.3.) in the cases of Samsung and Motorola.  
 
In Motorola, the Commission633 took the same view when it stated that ‘the unwillingness 
to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms is considered as a potential objective 
justification the analysis of which forms an integral part of the assessment of the abusive 
conduct under Article 102 TFEU’. However, subsequently, it634 stated that ‘this Decision 
has assessed Apple’s willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms and 
conditions under objective justification and not as part of the assessment of whether 
Motorola's conduct is liable to be caught by the prohibition under Article 102 TFEU. The 
notion of abuse is an objective concept, referring to the behaviour of the undertaking in a 
dominant position, and the general principle of legal certainty requires that the dominant 
undertaking should be able to assess the lawfulness of its own conduct on the basis of 
factors known to it and under its control635’. 
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I do not share the latter statement of the Commission, because is indeed the definition of 
the concept of ‘willing licensee’ what brings legal certainty, enabling the dominant 
undertaking to know whether seeking and enforcement of an injunction will be considered 
to be abusive or not. Accordingly, potential licensee’s willingness to enter into a license 
agreement on FRAND terms is to be assessed under the heading of whether SEP owner’s 
conduct is liable to be caught by the prohibition under Article 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, 
it is true that both interpretations would lead to the same conclusion as the same legal 
arguments would in any event be applicable. 
 
The Motorola Prohibition Decision defined the concept of a ‘willing licensee’, keeping 
what it already stated preliminarily in the SO636. In Commission’s view, a potential 
licensee would be a willing licensee if in the event that bilateral negotiations do not come 
to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be bound by a third party’s (a court or mutually 
agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate. As this process would allow 
for adequate remuneration of the SEP holder, seeking or enforcing injunctions would be 
no longer justified once a potential licensee accepted such a process, because its right to 
be appropriately remunerated for the use of its SEPs would be safeguarded by the judicial 
determination of the FRAND royalties and the possibility to obtain damages for 
unauthorised use by the implementer through actions before the courts637.  
 
Moreover, the Commission nuanced that the fact that the potential licensee challenged 
the validity, essentiality or infringement of the SEP did not make it unwilling, where it 
otherwise agreed to be bound by the determination of FRAND terms by a third party. It 
referred to it because in Motorola, in the Second Orange Book offer, Apple did not accept 
Motorola’s requirement to include clauses that prohibited Apple to challenge validity and 
infringement by the iPhone 4S and the acknowledgement of the unconditional liability 
for damages for past infringement. However, Apple did agree to be bound by a German 
court’s determination of a FRAND royalty rate, whereby both parties could submit their 
own evaluations, calculations and reasoning for consideration to the competent court – in 
the First Orange Book Offer, Apple proposed only a limited review by the competent 
court, so for instance, it would be unable to change or review the method established 
between parties for the calculation of the royalties638. Therefore, the Commission 
understood that Apple’s Second Orange Book Offer was a clear indication that Apple was 
not unwilling to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms, despite its initial refusal 
to agree to the prohibition clauses and damages acknowledgment639.  
That, because Apple’s initial reluctance only amounted to its reluctance to accept the 
disadvantageous licensing terms sought by the SEP owner against the backdrop of its 
seeking and enforcement of an injunction, but not to unwillingness to enter into a license 
agreement on FRAND terms. Note that finally, Apple ended accepting both prohibition 
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clauses and the liability for past damages in the Sixth Orange Book Offer, upon which 
the Settlement Agreement between Motorola and Apple was based (see above, Section 
5.3.3.2.), following the enforcement of the injunction by Motorola640. 
 
The reference to the rationale of the statement that licensees should be able to challenge 
the validity of a SEP, it was already made above, regarding the anti-competitive effects 
that the termination clause might have (see Section 5.3.3.2.). In that regard, it should be 
added that licensees should also be able to challenge the essentiality or infringement of 
a SEP because it is not within SSOs’ mandate to check the validity of declared SEPs or 
their relevance to a standard. Indeed, only a court can decide on the validity and the issue 
of whether a standard-compliant product infringes a patent that was declared essential to 
a standard and therefore whether the patent is essential as declared641 by its owner to the 
SSO. Accordingly, until a court decides otherwise, a SEP is thus presumed valid, like 
any other patent642, and essential to the standard. Consequently, as it is only a 
presumption, it is in the public interest that licensees should be able to challenge 
potentially invalid, non-essential or non-infringed SEPs. For instance, as it was 
mentioned in the aforementioned Section, it is for the benefit of all if a court concludes 
that a SEP is not valid, because companies, and ultimately consumers, they would not be 
obliged to pay for patents that were not infringed643. 
 
By contrast, a potential licensee which remains passive and unresponsive to a request to 
enter into licensing negotiations or is found to employ clear delaying tactics, it cannot be 
generally considered as ‘willing’. 
 
Note that although the court or arbitration tribunal making the FRAND determination 
may require a reasonable security in accordance with the applicable rules during the 
FRAND determination process, where it considers that this is necessary to safeguard the 
rights of the SEP holder to be adequately compensated for its SEPs, making escrow 
payments was not considered by the Commission to be a requirement to be a willing 
licensee644. On the contrary, the Orange Book judgment did request it (see below, Section 
2.1.2.1. of Chapter 4). 
 
As a consequence, the Motorola Prohibition Decision provided a ‘safe harbour’ for 
standard implementers who were willing to take a license on FRAND terms. That is to 
say, if they wanted to be safe from being the subject of injunctions based on SEPs brought 
by the patent holder, they could demonstrate that they were willing licensees by agreeing 
                                                
640 ibid [414].  
641 Under most of the SSOs’ IPRs policies, their members have an obligation to inform the SSO about all 
patents they may hold in a future standard, the so-called specific disclosure (see Section ‘Background’ of 
the Introduction). 
642 AstraZeneca [GC, 2010] (n 56) [362]. 
643 Commission MEMO/14/322 (n 537), 8th question; Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [33] and [34]. 
644 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [95] and [117]. 
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that a court or a mutually agreed arbitrator adjudicated the FRAND terms and to be bound 
by such a determination645. 
 
Samsung's commitments implemented in that case the ‘safe harbour’ concept – that was 
established in the Motorola Prohibition Decision– in practical terms. Accordingly, a 
willing licensee would be the one that within 30 days of receipt of an invitation to 
negotiate agrees to the Samsung’s Licensing Framework to settle disputes over FRAND 
terms.  
 
With the invitation to negotiate, Samsung ought to provide sufficient details of its 
proposed licensing terms in order to allow potential licensees to assess whether to sign 
up to the Licensing Framework. For instance, it should provide information about (i) the 
relevant Mobile Standards; (ii) the Mobile SEPs that Samsung claims are infringed or (iii) 
the value these Mobile SEPs contribute to the Mobile Standards. Certain respondents – 
in their observations sent to the Commission – considered that Samsung should also give 
information about the requested royalty rate, including the underlying calculation method 
used by Samsung646. However, the Commission did not consider necessary for the 
effectiveness of the commitments to also provide that information, because the rate 
would, in any event, be the focus of the initial 12 months’ negotiation period and the 
ensuing FRAND determination (see below). Nevertheless, if it wished so, Samsung could 
provide such information to potential licensees on a case by case basis647. 
 
The Licensing Framework at issue consists of648: (i) a negotiation period of up to 12 
months and (ii) if no agreement is reached at the end of the negotiation period, a third 
party determination of FRAND terms. The third party determination consists of the 
submission of the dispute to either a court or an arbitrator, as agreed by the parties, in 
order to determine the FRAND terms of either unilateral licensing or cross-licensing 
agreement. If the parties could not agree on either submitting to court or arbitration, the 
dispute would be submitted to court adjudication. 
 
The default venue for FRAND determination was one of the most discussed aspects of 
the commitments. In the Initial Commitments, Samsung obliged that in case parties did 
not agree on the venue for a third-party determination, the default option would be 
arbitration649. However, interested parties – the respondents – were of the opinion that the 
default option should be the courts because otherwise, Samsung could prevent potential 
licensees from bringing the dispute before a court. Hence, the risk of Samsung 
withholding its agreement to submit the dispute to a court and force potential licensees 
into arbitration, it would be eliminated, which would bring several consequences650.  
 
                                                
645 Commission MEMO/14/322 (n 537), 4th question, para 1.  
646 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [87].  
647 ibid [100] and [108].  
648 ibid [16].  
649 ibid [78]. 
650 ibid [83], [84] and [106].  
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Firstly, potential licensees would not be deprived of their right to have the dispute decided 
by a court and they would not be compelled to give up their right to make invalidity, non-
essentiality or non-infringement claims with regard to Samsung's Mobile SEPs before 
national courts. 
 
Secondly, proceedings before a court are subject to public scrutiny and the produced 
judgments are public and with precedent value, so the court is a more transparent venue 
for determining FRAND terms. Besides, courts are better placed to evaluate invalidity or 
non-essentiality claims. And as courts’ finding on invalidity have an erga omnes effect, 
they contribute to the public interest of eliminating any obstacle to economic activity 
which may arise where a patent is granted in error651. 
 
So eventually, Samsung made a change in the Final Commitments stating that the default 
venue for FRAND determination was going to be courts, specifically, Patents Court, High 
Court of England and Wales or the Unified Patent Court. Nevertheless, if they declined 
jurisdiction, arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce or the arbitration 
centre652 would remain an option (and obviously, also in case both parties agreed to 
submit the dispute to arbitration)653. The Commission considered the venues provided for 
by the commitments were sufficient to ensure their effectiveness, without being necessary 
to extend the list of the court and arbitration tribunals as it was suggested by certain 
respondents654.  
 
Moreover, the arbitration tribunal would be composed by individuals from a broad field 
of specialisation, including those from the IT industry – because mobile devices contain 
many IT standards – and not only by those with experience in the telecommunications 
industry. Accordingly, with that subjective scope, any possible bias in favour of parties 
from the telecommunications industry would be avoided655.  
 
In addition, although arbitration tribunals’ determination of FRAND terms would be 
confidential, the Commission required Samsung to include in its commitments that non-
confidential versions of FRAND determinations by arbitration tribunals – in particular, 
the method applied to calculate the FRAND rate – would be made public in accordance 
with the applicable rules of the tribunal. That would contribute to the creation of a body 
of case law upon which future FRAND determinations could draw656. 
 
All in all, Samsung commitments provided a ‘safe harbour’ for all potential licensees of 
Samsung’s Mobile SEPs that submitted to the Licensing Framework provided for by the 
                                                
651 Windsurfing International (n 611) [92]. 
652 The arbitration centre will be established under Article 35(1) of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 
[2013] OJ C175/1 (as of 12 June 2019, the date of entry into force of the intergovernmental treaty is 
unknown). 
653 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [98]. 
654 ibid [96] and [118]. 
655 ibid [91], [104] and [112].  
656 ibid [90], [103] and [111].  
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commitments, because they would be protected against injunctions sought by Samsung 
on the basis of such SEPs657. Nevertheless, according to Commission, although a potential 
licensee would choose not to sign up to the Licensing Framework, it could not be 
automatically regarded as unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms. 
Rather, the court or tribunal called upon by Samsung to grant injunctive relief would need 
to evaluate all the circumstances of the case at hand in order to decide whether a potential 
licensee is indeed unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms. 
Notwithstanding, if the willing licensee is the one who signs up to the Licensing 
Framework, I cannot think about a scenario in which the potential licensee is willing to 
enter into a license agreement – but it does not sign up to – and therefore, the SEP owner’s 
behaviour of seeking injunctions would be considered to be abusive658.   
 
In conclusion, the Commission defined the concept of ‘willing licensee’ in the Prohibition 
Decision in Motorola. And Samsung’s commitments implemented that concept for that 
specific case, in practical terms. Namely, they provided a particular licensing framework 
in order to resolve disputes on SEPs without having recourse to injunctions in a way that 
could harm competition. Due to the nature of the commitments under Article 9(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003, Samsung’s dispute resolution mechanism was only applicable with 
reference to Samsung’s Mobile SEPs.  
 
5.4. Effects on trade between Member States/Contracting Parties 
 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits an abuse of a dominant position as incompatible with the 
internal market ‘in so far as it may affect trade between Member States’ and Article 54 
of the EEA Agreement prohibits an abuse of a dominant position as incompatible with 
the functioning of the EEA Agreement ‘in so far as it may affect trade between 
Contracting Parties’. 
 
The three elements of the effect on trade criterion (see Section 1.4. of Chapter 1) were 
met in both Samsung and Motorola cases: (i) the trade between Member 
States/Contracting Parties must be affected; (ii) a practice must be capable of having an 
effect on trade between Member States/Contracting Parties; and (iii) the effect on trade 
between Member States/Contracting Parties must be appreciable. 
 
Namely, the trade between Member States/Contracting Parties was affected because SEP 
owners’ practices affected the competitive structure of the internal market/functioning of 
the EEA by threatening to eliminate a competitor – Apple – operating within the territory 
of the EU/EEA (first element). Consequently, the practices were capable of affecting 
trade between them too (second element). In addition, Samsung and Motorola had a 
dominant position with regard to UMTS and the GPRS Cudak technology, as specified 
in the standard technical specifications, on which their SEPs read. The effect on trade 
resulting from their conduct was therefore appreciable (third element).  
                                                
657 Commission MEMO/14/322 (n 537), 4th question, para 2.  
658 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [123]. 
 163 
 
Accordingly, Samsung’s and Motorola’s conduct affected trade between Member 
States/Contracting Parties within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU/Article 54 of the EEA 
Agreement659. 
6. Remarks 
 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission analysed for the first time in the Union the 
issue of whether seeking and enforcing injunctions by SEP holders might constituted an 
abused of a dominant position. After analysing both cases, there are several 
considerations I would like to raise.  
 
6.1. Two novel categories of abuse: exclusionary and exploitative  
 
As already mentioned (see Sections 5.3. and 5.3.1.), the refusal to grant licenses and the 
seeking and enforcement of injunctions by a patent holder will generally be a legitimate 
exercise of an IPR – even if it is the act of a SEP owner holding a dominant position –, 
because these exercises of exclusive rights constitute their very substance.  Therefore, 
these behaviours cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of a dominant position. However, 
the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an IPR by the proprietor may, in exceptional 
circumstances, involve abusive conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
In order to assess the abusive nature of seeking and enforcing injunctions, the 
Commission took as a reference the settled case law of the ECJ on refusal to deal (see 
Chapter 2), because both conducts constituted exercises of IPRs. Notwithstanding, the 
Commission should have gone beyond and treat SEP owners’ behaviour as a 
‘constructive’ refusal to deal, in the sense that seeking and enforcement of injunctions in 
SEP infringement proceedings against willing licensees may amount to an effective 
refusal to deal (that is the approach I defend in Chapter 5). 
 
Instead, the Commission decided to treat SEP owners’ conduct as a novel category. More 
specifically, it developed two new categories of abuse, depending on which anti-
competitive effect (see above, Section 5.3.3.) may the seeking (or threatening to seek) 
and enforcement of injunctions cause: an exclusionary and exploitative abuse. However, 
the required elements to consider the conduct as one type of abuse or the other, are the 
same. That is to say, the two exceptional circumstances must be present (see above, 
Section 5.3.2. – the widespread adoption of the standards and having given FRAND 
commitments –) and there has to be an absence of objective justifications (see above, 
Section 5.3.4.).   
 
The exclusionary abuse would derive from the enforcement of the granted injunction, 
because it usually entails not only to end the infringement, but also a prohibition of the 
product infringing the patent being sold. Accordingly, the elimination of competing 
                                                
659 ibid [74]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [540]–[542]. 
 164 
products from the market might limit consumer choice and partially eliminate 
downstream competition. This behaviour would infringe the paragraph (b) of Article 102 
TFEU which states that the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it that consist in limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers, shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States. 
 
And the exploitative abuse would arise from the threatening to enforce the injunction that 
was granted by the court, because it might induce the infringer to accept disadvantageous 
licensing terms, compared to those which might have accepted in the absence of 
injunctions being sought. For example, by holding up implementers of the standard by 
demanding excessive royalty fees or by refusing to license the necessary SEPs. The SEP 
owner might also exploit implementers of standards insisting that they give up their rights 
to challenge the validity, essentiality and infringement of its SEP, so they and ultimately 
consumers might end paying for invalid or non-infringed patents660. Note that to consider 
that conduct as abusive, it would be sufficient that tended to restrict competition or was 
capable of having that effect. Accordingly, it would not be required that as a consequence 
of the threat to enforce the injunction, the standard implementer ended by accepting 
licensing terms that were not FRAND. Such distortion of licensing negotiations would be 
detrimental to innovation and could harm consumers. Therefore, this conduct would be 
prohibited according to the paragraph (a) of Article 102 TFEU which states that the abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it that consist in directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions, shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
 
From a legal standpoint, it is problematic, and contrary to best administrative practice, to 
build theories of antitrust liability on the basis of fictional economic assumptions (i.e. that 
the act of seeking an injunction – or the threat of doing so – can induce potential licensees 
to accept unfair terms)661. Moreover, it is also economically inconsistent, because 
although in theory the essential nature of SEPs may lead to a holdup situation, there is a 
debate among economists and legal scholars about whether, in practice, holdup 
constitutes a systemic problem or not (see 1.3.1.1. of Chapter 1) – the theory of holdup 
has not undergone empirical conclusive testing. Consequently, the novel category of 
exploitative abuse defined by the Commission should not be applied.  
 
All in all, even though both the refusal to grant IP licenses and the seeking and 
enforcement of injunctions in SEP infringement proceedings imply, in principle, the 
legitimate exercise of IPRs, they might constitute abusive conducts when different 
                                                
660 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission finds that Motorola Mobility infringed EU competition rules by 
misusing standard essential patents’ IP/14/489, para 7; Commission MEMO/13/403 (n 636), 8th question. 
661 Nicolas Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs: The Quest for 
an Appropriate Test of Abuse Under Article 102 TFEU’ (2013) 9(3) European Competition Journal 677, 
713-716. 
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elements are present. Namely, when the refusal fulfil the requirements defined by the case 
law of the ECJ (Magill and others), it would be an exclusionary abuse. And when the 
seeking (or threatening to seek) and enforcement meet the elements established by the 
Commission in Samsung and Motorola, the behaviour would be abusive since it might 
exclude or exploit competitors. Note that subsequently, in Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ dealt 
with the same issue as the Commission did in Samsung and Motorola, although the Court 
did not apply the same legal argumentation defended by the Commission (see Chapter 4).  
 
6.2. The availability of injunctions for SEP holders 
 
In most cases, when a SEP owner seeks and enforces an injunction, it is a patent that read 
on a standard that had a widespread adoption (first exceptional circumstance), the owner 
gave FRAND commitments (second exceptional circumstance), the conduct is capable of 
restricting competition by excluding or exploiting competitors (an anti-competitive 
effect) and the implementer is a willing licensee (absence of objective justification). Due 
to that fact, it was posed662 the issue of whether in Samsung and Motorola the 
Commission was generally questioning the use of injunctions by patent holders. That was 
a very relevant question, taking into account the high importance attached to effective 
patent protection and an efficient patent system.  
 
According to the Commission, it did not prohibit per se the use of injunctions by SEP 
holders. That, because when those specific circumstances were not present or there were 
but SEP owner’s behaviour was justified, the access to injunctions was not questioned. 
That is to say, even though the standard on which the SEP read had a widespread adoption 
and the holder of the SEP gave a commitment to license it on FRAND terms, if the 
company against which an injunction was sought was unable to pay the royalties or its 
assets were located in jurisdictions that did not provide for adequate means of 
enforcement of damages or it was an unwilling licensee, the availability of injunction for 
SEP holders would not be anti-competitive, for being objectively justified.  
 
Therefore, the Commission stated that its aim was not to eliminate the use of injunctions 
by patent holders. Rather, it took the view that seeking and enforcement of an injunction 
for SEPs could constitute an abuse of a dominant position when the exceptional 
circumstances were present and objective justifications were absent. Accordingly, it 
concluded that the recourse to injunctive relief was generally a legitimate remedy for 
patent holders in case of patent infringements.  
 
Nevertheless, in practice, the exceptional circumstances will be present and usually, the 
implementer will be willing to negotiate a FRAND license, in the sense of accepting to 
be bound by a third party’s (a court or mutually agreed arbitrator) determination of a 
FRAND royalty rate in the event that bilateral negotiations did not come to a fruitful 
                                                
662 Commission MEMO/13/910 (n 518), 8th question; Commission MEMO/12/1021 (n 488), 4th question; 
Commission IP/13/971 (n 490), paras 3 and 4; Commission IP/12/1448 (n 545), para 5; Commission 
MEMO/14/322 (n 537), 6th question.  
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conclusion. The reason why almost always the implementer will be a willing licensee is 
because usually the injunction proceedings have their origin in a lack of agreement of 
what FRAND terms should be (see below, Section 6.3.) and not in the unwillingness of 
the implementer to enter into a license agreement. That, since access to patents which are 
standard essential is a precondition for any company to sell interoperable products in the 
market. In consequence, according to the Commission, it seems that de facto, seeking and 
enforcement of injunctions is prohibited for SEP holders, because in the majority of cases 
it will constitute an abuse of a dominant position (notwithstanding what was subsequently 
established by the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE, see Chapter 4). The above, led some scholars663 
to affirm that Commission’s approach left SEP owners under protected. 
 
6.3. FRAND terms’ definition 
 
Commitments to license on FRAND terms seek to address the issue of market power that 
can be conferred on SEP holders once a standard has been adopted and implementers 
(such as smartphone producers) have invested in developing standard-compliant 
products. However, in practice, there can be disagreement on what FRAND terms should 
be, which might lead SEP holders to enforce their patents when implementers are using 
them without paying royalties664.  
 
Accordingly, the Commission's aim is to prevent SEP holders from using SEP-based 
injunctions in an anti-competitive way, in order to exclude competitors or to extract 
licensing conditions that may restrict competition and ultimately harm consumers. But at 
the same time, SEP holders should be entitled to appropriate remuneration for their SEPs. 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission concluded that the seeking and enforcement 
of an injunction by a SEP holder might be anti-competitive when it committed to license 
its SEPs on FRAND terms and the licensee is willing to take a licence on such terms. 
 
Due to commonly  the origin of initiating injunction proceedings is the lack of agreement 
about what should be FRAND665 and its determination is relevant to assess whether the 
implementer is a willing licensee, the following question is arisen: should the 
Commission define the FRAND terms? The definition could also be useful to consider 
whether the threat of enforcing a granted injunction provoked the acceptance of anti-
competitive licensing conditions by the standard implementer. In that case, the abusive 
conduct would derive from imposing unfair licensing terms and not from the threat of 
enforcing an injunction.  
 
                                                
663 For a critical opinion on Motorola’s case, see Robin Jacob, ‘Competition Authorities Support 
Grasshoppers: Competition Law as a Threat to Innovation’ (2013) 9 Competition Policy International 
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664 Commission MEMO/14/322 (n 537), 3th question.  
665 Huawei AG (n 137) [9] (‘[...] the matters at issue in the dispute before the referring court – the Regional 
Court of Düsseldorf –, […] in my view, stem largely from a lack of clarity as to what is meant by “FRAND 
terms” and as to the requisite content of such terms [...]’). 
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When in Samsung and Motorola the Commission had the opportunity to define FRAND 
terms, it666 did not take a position on what a reasonable royalty rate was, because in its 
opinion, national courts or arbitrators are generally well equipped to do this in cases of 
disputes. And it added that to the extent they seem necessary, national courts may seek 
guidance from the Commission on the interpretation of EU competition law. Indeed, in 
November 2013, the Regional Court of Mannheim asked the Commission a number of 
questions in relation to the setting of FRAND rates in the SEP dispute between Motorola 
and Apple. The Commission667 said it was going to publish the response to these 
questions on its website in due course, although I am not aware of that publication. 
Accordingly, so far, the Commission has not taken any position on the reasonableness of 
the royalty or the royalty base. Hence, the Commission's cases were about the undue 
leverage against willing licensees which the seeking of injunctions based on SEPs might 
give to a SEP-holder who gave a commitment to license those SEPs on FRAND terms668. 
 
As it will be analysed in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.6.), in Huawei v. ZTE ruled by the ECJ, 
this issue of the appropriateness of defining FRAND terms was also under discussion by 
scholars.  
 
6.4. Lack of legal clarity: the preliminary ruling in Huawei v. ZTE 
 
Several times, Joaquín Almunia669 – the former Commission Vice President in charge of 
competition policy – said that the Commission decision in Motorola, together with the 
decision to accept Samsung’s commitments, ‘provides legal clarity on the circumstances 
in which injunctions to enforce SEPs can be anti-competitive’. Moreover, he considered 
that the Commission in Samsung brought clarity to the industry on what constituted an 
appropriate framework to settle disputes over FRAND terms in line with EU antitrust 
rules and he encouraged other industry players to consider establishing similar dispute 
resolution mechanisms670. Note that on the basis of the definition of a ‘willing licensee’ 
provided in Motorola, the assessment of whether a company is a willing licensee needs 
to be determined on a case by case basis taking into account the specific facts. Thus, the 
implementation of the concept is flexible, because the Commission did not establish a 
specific framework. 
 
Nevertheless, basing on Commission’s antitrust assessment in Samsung and Motorola 
consisting of the presence of the two exceptional circumstances (the widespread adoption 
of the standard and FRAND commitments) and the absence of justification, several 
questions remained unanswered. For instance, what would prevail in case the 
implementer was unable to pay the royalties or if its assets were located in a non-
guarantee jurisdiction, but it was willing to negotiate a FRAND licenses? The first two 
                                                
666 Commission MEMO/13/403 (n 636), 6th question. 
667 Commission MEMO/14/322 (n 537), 9th question.  
668 Commission MEMO/13/910 (n 518), 5th question.  
669 Commission IP/13/971 (n 490), para 2; Commission IP/14/489 (n 660), para 2. 
670 Commission IP/14/490 (n 486), paras 2 and 10.  
 168 
scenarios would be considered objective justifications to seek and enforce injunctions, 
but not the third one, so the unwillingness would allow the implementer to use the 
competition law defence.  
 
In the same vein, would it be questioned the seeking of an injunction by a non-SEP holder 
when the implementer is willing to negotiate a license because the patent is essential for 
its activity? In that case, the two exceptional circumstances would not be present, because 
the patent owner did not give FRAND commitments and the patent did not read on a de 
jure standard created by a SSO (but on a de facto one). Indeed, those were the facts in 
IMS Health (see Section 3.2.5. of Chapter 2), although it concerned a copyright (instead 
of a patent) and the investigated conduct was a refusal to license (not the seeking and 
enforcement of an injunction). In the prima facie assessment (before the change in the 
status of competition), the Commission stated that IMS Health infringed Article 102 
TFEU. In both scenarios (in the hypothetical and IMS Health), the subject-matter of the 
dispute is an IPR (patent and copyright) and the conduct of the dominant undertaking 
derives from the exercise of the IPR (seeking of an injunction and refusal to license).  
 
Taking into account Commission’s approach in Samsung and Motorola, it would not treat 
the hypothetical case as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal (although that should be the 
approach, see Chapter 5). And as the ECJ judgment in Huawei v. ZTE is also not clear on 
whether its assessment would be applicable to non-SEPs (see Section 3.3.3. of Chapter 
4), I assume the Commission would treat the conduct of the hypothetical case as a novel 
category of abuse. 
 
Moreover, if the legal clarity provided by the Commission in Samsung and Motorola was 
such regarding the abusive nature of seeking and enforcement of injunctions by SEP 
holders, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf would not have requested for a preliminary 
injunction to the ECJ in the SEP-based litigation between Huawei and ZTE (on 5 April 
2013), that was based on the apparent contradiction between the Orange Book judgment 
ruled by the German Federal Supreme Court and Samsung/Motorola cases. That 
contradiction was not contemplated by the Commission, because in its671 opinion, its 
decisions were not in conflict with the Orange Book case law on injunctions, because it 
did not specifically relate to SEPs and was therefore not directly applicable to the cases 
on which the Commission decided. However, the ECJ shared German court’s opinion, 
because if the legal clarity provided by the Commission was such, the ECJ (on 16 July 
2015) would have simply responded by referring to the anti-competitive assessment made 
by Commission in Samsung and Motorola (on 29 April 2014). However, it developed a 
different legal argumentation to determine under what circumstances seeking a 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products by a SEP holder constituted an abusive 
conduct (see Chapter 4).  
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With respect to the Huawei v. ZTE judgment, it is relevant to highlight Commission’s672 
statement that regarding its investigations in Samsung and Motorola, it was going to fully 
take account of any guidance on questions of law by the European ECJ that were of 
relevance for them. The fact was that before the Commission handed its decisions, the 
request for a preliminary ruling by the Regional Court of Düsseldorf was already 
presented. And from that statement, it might be deduced that the ECJ was going to be the 
first one ruling on the issue. Nevertheless, finally, the Commission’s decisions were 
rendered first. Therefore, in order to explain the link between its decisions and the request 
for a preliminary ruling, it stated that it provided observations outlining its position to 
the European ECJ in the pending Huawei v. ZTE case and it added that ‘the Commission 
will naturally fully take account of any further guidance by the ECJ’673. After Huawei v. 
ZTE, the Commission handed two Communications (in 2016674 and 2017675) where it 
seems to consider that the judgment did not appropriately solved the conflict between 
bringing infringement actions and the abuse of a dominant position (see the ‘Conclusion’ 
of Chapter 4).  
 
During its investigations, the Commission also alluded to the Orange Book judgment, 
albeit it concerned a non-SEP. And it also referred to the Consent Order adopted by the 
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)676 in its investigation of Google/Motorola, 
although this order only applied to the future seeking and enforcing of injunctions, so it 
did not cover agreements that were the result of behaviour occurring prior to the Consent 
Order, such as the one that the Commission was examining in its investigations. 
Notwithstanding, the Commission's concerns about the potential anti-competitive use of 
SEPs were similar to those that underlay the proposed Consent Order677. The order set 
out the procedure that Motorola and Google had to follow before a SEP-based injunction 
against a potential licensee can be sought. Accordingly, it established a framework that 
protected licensees not unwilling to enter into a FRAND licence on terms set by a US 
court or arbitral tribunal from SEP-based injunctions. According to the Consent Order, 
challenging the validity, value, infringement or essentiality of a SEP did not amount to 
unwillingness on the part of a licensee to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. 
Note that the Commission in Motorola, defined the concept of ‘willing licensee’ on those 
same terms.  
 
These references made by the Commission were the consequence of the fact that when it 
was investigating the issue about the abusive nature of seeking and enforcement of 
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para 7. 
675 COM(2017) 712 final (n 81) 2, para 7. 
676 ‘Motorola Mobility LLC, and Google Inc., In the Matter of’ [Doc ID 174] (Federal Trade Commission, 
July 24, 2013) <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1210120/motorola-mobility-llc-
google-inc-matter> accessed 29 March 2019. 
677 Commission MEMO/13/403 (n 636), 10th question.  
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injunctions by SEP owners, there was a lack of previous Union decisional practice and 
case law and there were diverging judgments by national courts on that issue. 
Conclusion 
 
According to the Commission in Samsung and Motorola, the seeking and enforcement of 
an injunction by a patent holder, including a holder of SEPs, is generally a legitimate 
course of action. However, the context is different with regard to the seeking and 
enforcement of an injunction on the basis of a SEP that read on a standard that has a 
widespread adoption (first exceptional circumstance) and for which a voluntary 
commitment to license on FRAND terms has been given by its owner during a standard-
setting process (second exceptional circumstance). Note that the essence of the 
commitment to license on FRAND terms is a recognition by a SEP holder that its SEPs 
will be licensed in return for FRAND remuneration, in contrast to those patents which do 
not read on a standard (or that read on a de facto standard) and for which no FRAND 
commitment has been given. In that context, if the SEP owner cannot provide a valid 
justification (demonstrating that the conduct produces efficiency gains or that is 
objectively necessary) to seek and enforce and injunction, the behaviour will be abusive 
because it tends to restrict competition or is capable of having that effect (excluding or 
exploiting competitors). 
 
In the majority of cases, the debate will revolve around whether SEP owner’s behaviour 
of seeking and enforcing an injunction is objectively necessary in order to be remunerated 
for the use of its SEPs, because the potential licensee is unwilling to enter into a licence 
on FRAND terms. 
 
In that regard, the Commission stated in Motorola that a willing licensee is who, in the 
event that bilateral negotiations do not come to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be 
bound by a third party’s (a court or mutually agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND 
royalty rate. An example of the implementation of that concept was provided by Samsung 
in its commitments, that were made binding by the Commission. The company stated that 
a willing licensee would be the one that within 30 days of receipt of an invitation to 
negotiate, agreed to the Samsung’s Licensing Framework to settle disputes over FRAND 
terms. The Licensing Framework at issue consisted of: (i) a negotiation period of up to 
12 months and (ii) if no agreement was reached at the end of the negotiation period, a 
third party determination of FRAND terms. 
 
All in all, the Commission concluded that both Samsung (preliminarily) and Motorola 
abused their dominant positions by seeking and enforcing an injunction against Apple on 
the basis of theirs SEPs, because the two exceptional circumstances were present and 
objective justifications were absent. That behaviour is prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, 
because such misuse of patents could ultimately harm consumers.  
 
 171 
In Commission’s opinion, the general implications of Samsung and Motorola cases for 
patent protection were that they stroke a fair balance between the interests of SEP holders 
to be appropriately remunerated for their IP and the interests of implementers of standards 
to get access to standardised technology on FRAND terms. Although that consideration 
did not seem to be perceived likewise by national courts and the ECJ, judging from the 
content of the German court's request for a preliminary ruling and the antitrust assessment 
established in the preliminary ruling. 
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CHAPTER 4. ACTIONS SEEKING A PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION AND THE 
RECALL OF PRODUCTS IN SEP INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS. ORANGE 
BOOK AND HUAWEI V. ZTE 
Introduction 
 
Before the Commission handed its decisions in Samsung and Motorola (in 2014), the 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf had requested for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ in the 
SEP-based litigation between Huawei and ZTE (in 2013). The preliminary ruling – that 
was issued after those decisions – is the object of analysis of this chapter.  
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ dealt for the first and only time (in 2015) with the issue of 
whether bringing actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products in 
SEP infringement proceedings was abusive according to Article 102 TFEU. What made 
the German court to request a preliminary ruling was the apparent contradiction between 
the antitrust assessment preliminarily developed in Samsung by the Commission and the 
one adopted by the German Federal Supreme Court in Orange Book (2009) – that was 
being applied by lower German courts. Therefore, that German case will be also analysed 
in this chapter (Section 2), in order to better understand the source of the conflict in 
Huawei v. ZTE.  
 
As the Commission did in Samsung and Motorola, the ECJ also treated the Huawei’s 
behaviour as a novel category of abuse, although it developed a different antitrust 
assessment in comparison with the one adopted by the Commission (Sections 3 to 7). 
According to the Court, a SEP owner does not abuse its dominant position, as long as it 
and the implementer follow the licensing framework established by the Court.  
Accordingly, national courts are in charge of assessing whether both parties complied 
with their obligations or not. But in order to do that, the Court does not provide any 
guidance to national courts on how to implement the licensing framework, which brings 
massive legal uncertainty. Namely, the national case law implementing it – particularly 
in Germany – is highly disharmonized, leading to different conclusions depending on the 
judging court. The above creates confusion and generates a real risk of forum shopping, 
when the fundamental objective of European competition rules is precisely to prevent 
distortion of competition. That, is a condition for achieving a free and dynamic internal 
market and promoting general economic welfare. 
 
All in all, the judgment was very criticised due to different reasons and it also posed 
several legal gaps, leading national courts to fill them case by case. As it was already 
mentioned previously, I consider that the ECJ missed the long-awaited opportunity to 
resolve the SEP licensing problem once and for all. Note that the conduct of SEP holders 
– who gave a commitment to grant licences to third parties on FRAND terms – had given 
rise to a plethora of actions before the courts of several Member States and third countries. 
These various actions, based not only on competition law but also on civil law, gave rise 
to a number of divergent legal approaches and, consequently, to a considerable degree of 
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uncertainty as to the lawfulness of certain forms of conduct on the part of SEP holders 
and undertakings – who implemented a standard using the reaching of a SEP678.  
 
On that score and confining my suggestion to competition law and, in particular, to the 
question of abuse of dominant position, I think the ECJ should have treated Huawei’s 
conduct as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license, instead of as a novel category of abuse (this 
proposal will be studied in Chapter 5). 
1. Request for a preliminary ruling: case brief 
 
Huawei, a multinational company active in the telecommunications sector, was the 
proprietor of a European patent granted by the Federal Republic of Germany, that was 
declared essential to the LTE standard developed by ETSI, a standard composed of more 
than 4700 SEPs. Accordingly, Huawei undertook to grant licenses to third parties on 
FRAND terms. And ZTE was a company belonging to a multinational group that was 
also active in the telecommunications sector and which marketed, in Germany, products 
equipped with software linked to that standard679. 
 
Among the products developed and marketed by ZTE in Germany were base stations with 
LTE software, that were unquestionably made for use with LTE software and operated 
on the basis of the LTE standard. Given that the SEP at issue, owned by Huawei, was 
essential to the LTE standard, ZTE inevitably used that patent.  
 
Accordingly, both parties engaged in discussions concerning the infringement of that SEP 
and the possibility of concluding a licence on FRAND terms in relation to those products. 
While Huawei indicated the amount which it considered to be a reasonable royalty, ZTE, 
for its part, proposed a cross-licensing agreement and the payment of a royalty of EUR 
50. However, no offer relating to a licensing agreement was finalised. In consequence, 
ZTE was using Huawei’s SEP without providing it an exhaustive account of past acts of 
use and without paying the amount of the royalty that the defendant had itself calculated 
therefrom680. 
 
After the ‘breakdown’ of the negotiations for the conclusion of a licensing agreement on 
FRAND terms, Huawei brought an action for infringement against ZTE before the 
Regional Court (Landgericht) of Düsseldorf, seeking an injunction prohibiting the 
continuation of the infringement, the rendering of accounts, the recall of products and an 
award of damages681. 
 
The referring court stated that ZTE’s use of the SEP at issue was unlawful. However, it 
considered that the decision on the substance in the main proceedings between Huawei 
                                                
678 Huawei AG (n 137) [7]. 
679 Huawei (n 35) [21]–[23]. 
680 ibid [24]–[26]; Huawei AG (n 137) [26] and [27]. 
681 Huawei (n 35) [27]. 
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and ZTE turned on whether the action brought by Huawei – seeking a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products – constituted an abuse of that company’s dominant 
position on the basis of Article 102 TFEU (the existence of that position was not contested 
before the referring court by the parties nor it was disputed by the national court682).  
 
Nevertheless, it considered that different approaches might be taken in order to determine 
the point at which the proprietor of a SEP infringed the aforementioned Article683. Hence, 
according to the Orange Book684 judgment issued by the German Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof-BGH), the German court would have to order the prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products. Whereas if it based on the SO sent to Samsung685 
by the Commission, Huawei would be regarded as abusing its dominant position. 
Accordingly, the German Regional Court would consider possible to rely on the 
mandatory nature of the grant of the licence in order to dismiss the action for a prohibitory 
injunction686. Note that at the time the German Regional Court requested for a preliminary 
ruling, none of the two investigations against Samsung and Motorola had ended by final 
decisions, this is why the national court only referred to the preliminary antitrust 
assessment established by the Commission in Samsung. 
 
In those circumstances, the German Regional Court decided to stay the proceedings and 
to refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU687, 
because it understood that the legal argument used by the Orange Book case law and the 
one preliminarily applied by the Commission in Samsung, were contradictory.  
2. Apparent contradiction: Orange Book and Samsung 
 
The German court referred several questions to the ECJ, depending on whether the 
‘correct’ approach would be the one developed by the German case law or the one 
preliminarily established by the Commission in Samsung – that was kept in the 
Commitments Decision and it was also applied in the Prohibition Decision addressed to 
Motorola. Before referring to the preliminary questions, it is appropriate to analyse the 
Orange Book judgment.  
 
 
                                                
682 ibid [43]. 
683 ibid [29]. 
684 Case Orange-Book-Standard, BGH of 6 May 2009, KZR 39/06, a translation is available here: 
<https://www.ie-forum.nl/backoffice/uploads/file/IEForum/IEForum Uitspraken/Octrooirecht/EN 
Translation BGH Orange Book Standard - eng.pdf>. 
685 The Landgericht Düsseldorf only referred to the following two documents – press releases – of 
21 December 2012 concerning a Statement of Objections sent to Samsung: (1) Commission IP/12/1448 (n 
545); (2) Commission MEMO/12/1021 (n 488). 
686 Huawei (n 35) [28]. 
687 ibid [39]. 
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2.1. Orange Book 
2.1.1. Background: a non-SEP reading on a de facto standard  
Recordable and Rewritable Compact Disc (CD-R and CD-WR) technology was 
developed jointly by Philips and Sony, which technical specifications were collected in a 
document called Orange Book688. Philips was a company who owned the German patent 
that protected that technology. Therefore, if manufacturers wanted to produce CD-Rs and 
CD-RWs that were interoperable and saleable, they needed to use the technology 
specified in the standard, obtaining a license from Philips. That standard was not a de jure 
or formal standard adopted by a SSO, but a de facto standard, which means it arose from 
the operation of the market because the technology was generally used.  
 
Accordingly, Philip’s patent was not a SEP. It should be recalled that SEPs protect 
technologies that are essential to implement de jure or formal standards and their use is 
indispensable to all implementers of standards who envisage manufacturing products that 
comply with them. On the contrary, non-SEPs, usually from the technical point of view, 
can be circumvented by implementers without compromising any essential function of 
their product689. Notwithstanding, from the competitive effects’ standpoint, if the non-
SEP covers a technology generally used in the market (a de facto standard) and there is 
not any actual or potential substitute of it, its implementation may become essential to 
manufacture products by third parties. 
 
The conflict that led to the issue of the Orange Book judgment was created because the 
German company SK Kassetten was manufacturing CD-Rs without having entered into 
a license agreement with Philips to use its patent, so Philips sued the company for patent 
infringement, seeking a prohibitory injunction and compensation for damages. 
 
The manufacturer argued that the patent was not infringed and if it was, it was entitled to 
a compulsory licence since Philips’ behaviour amounted to an abuse of its dominant 
position in the sense of Article 102 TFEU. In a decision of 6 May 2009 (the Orange Book 
judgment), the German Federal Supreme Court held that the patent was infringed, but it 
accepted that there was a potential ‘competition law-based defence’. But to raise the 
defence and avail itself of a compulsory license, the defendant had to act as a ‘true 
licensee’, in the terms that will be explained below. 
 
Note that there are two main differences between the facts in Orange Book judgment and 
those in Samsung/Motorola and Huawei v. ZTE. Firstly, the Orange Book judgment 
related to specifications that had become a de facto standard and not to specifications 
agreed under the auspices of a SSO, so Philips’ patent was not a SEP. And secondly, as 
a consequence of the above, Philips – the holder of the patent over the de facto standard 
                                                
688 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [80]. 
689 ibid [51]–[53]. 
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– had not made any commitment to license its patent under FRAND terms690. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf – who requested the 
preliminary ruling in Huawei v. ZTE – (see below, Section 2.3.) and the Commission in 
Motorola (see Section 3.2. of Chapter 3), both referred to the Orange Book judgment 
when assessing the antitrust nature of SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking and enforcing 
injunctions in patent infringement proceedings.  
 
In Motorola, the reference was due to the fact that in the German case Motorola v. Apple 
– which gave rise to Commission’s investigation – the Regional Court of Mannheim and 
the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe developed and applied the Orange Book 
judgment to the Cudak GPRS SEP owned by Motorola, granting and enforcing an 
injunction against Apple. They considered that the SEP had been infringed by Apple and 
that it was not entitled to use the ‘competition law-based defence’ provided by the Orange 
Book judgment691.  
2.1.2. Antitrust assessment 
2.1.2.1. Conditions 
 
According to the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof-BGH), these are 
the conditions692 under which a defendant can rely on a competition law-based defence 
against an injunction claim under German and Union law (Article 102 TFEU) by the 
proprietor of a patent that protects a technology relevant to implement a de facto standard. 
Firstly, if the patent owner refuses to conclude a patent licence agreement with the 
defendant on non-discriminatory and non-restrictive terms.  
 
Secondly, if the defendant has made the patent proprietor an unconditional offer to 
conclude a licence agreement. The defendant must consider itself bound by that offer and 
the patent owner cannot reject it without violating the prohibition of discrimination or 
anti-competitive behaviour. In order to consider that the offer is unconditional, it cannot 
be limited exclusively to cases of infringement, that is to say, it cannot relate only to the 
products giving rise to the infringement693. If the defendant considers the patent 
proprietor's licence demands to be excessive or if the patent proprietor refuses to quantify 
the royalties, an offer to conclude a licence agreement in which the licensor determines 
the amount of royalties according to its own reasonable discretion meets the requirement 
of such an unconditional offer. 
                                                
690 ibid [83]. 
691 ibid [84]. 
692 ibid [81] and [82]; Huawei (n 35) [30]–[33]; Huawei AG (n 137) [31]. 
693 In case of portfolio licensing, the licensee must be willing to negotiate its value, and not just for the 
patents in the litigation. In practice, licenses are usually concluded for entire patent portfolios to avoid any 
possibility of litigation, and since the parties are aware that many patents could be invalid or inessential, 
they often consider only a bunch of them when fixing royalties. See Niccolo Galli, ‘The FRAND Defense 
up to Huawei/ZTE’ (2016) 7 Bocconi Legal Papers 155, 187, fn 145; Mark A Lemley and Timothy Simcoe, 
‘How Essential are Standard-Essential Patents?’ (2018) Stanford Public Law Working Paper 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3128420> accessed 25 July 2018. 
 177 
For instance, in the context of patent litigation before the Mannheim Regional Court and 
the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe between Motorola and Apple – which gave rise 
to the Commission’s investigation –, the latter made six Orange Book Offers694. 
Notwithstanding, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe only found that the Sixth offer 
met the requirements of the Orange Book judgment, considering that the previous ones 
were deficient due to several reasons695. For example, the reason to find that the Fifth 
offer was insufficient was that did not include an explicit right for Motorola to terminate 
the agreement if, in the future, Apple sought to challenge the validity of the licensed SEPs 
– it was not included in the second offer either. Therefore, it rejected Apple’s request to 
stay the enforcement of the injunction, so Motorola went on to enforce it. When finding 
that the Apple’s Second Offer did not meet the requirements of the Orange Book 
judgment (when in fact it did meet them), it might be understood that the Higher Regional 
Court of Karlsruhe was overprotecting Motorola, because the judgment did not require 
that the offer must include the aforementioned termination clause. 
 
However, the Commission696 when investigating Motorola’s behaviour, it stated that 
Apple's Second Orange Book Offer was a clear indication that Apple was not unwilling 
to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms. That, because the Second Orange 
Book Offer gave Motorola the right to set the royalties according to its equitable 
discretion and according to FRAND principles, without any limitations (other than 
FRAND and Article 102 TFEU) as regards the royalty rates and the method of calculation 
of the final amount of royalties. The offer also allowed for a full judicial review of the 
amount of FRAND royalties, whereby Motorola and Apple could submit their own 
evaluations, calculations and reasoning for consideration to the court.  
 
As Motorola went on to enforce the injunction, even when Apple had declared in its 
Second Orange Book Offer that would be willing to be bound by a determination of the 
FRAND royalties by the German court, the Commission understood that Motorola’s 
behaviour of seeking and enforcing the injunction was abusive, because it was going to 
be remunerated for the SEP, so there was not need to enforce it697.  
 
However, these discussions on whether Apple’s Orange Book Offers met the 
requirements of the Orange Book Judgment or not, did not affect the Commission's 
assessment of the abusive nature of Motorola's conduct as established by its Decision, 
because it developed a different legal argumentation.  
 
Thirdly, the defendant must comply with the obligations that the future licencing 
agreement imposes in return for the use of the patent. Namely, it has to provide an 
                                                
694 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [188]. 
695 ibid [301] and [302] (Apple’s First Offer); [126], [303]–[306] (Apple’s Second Offer); [142] and [143] 
(Apple’s Fifth and previous Offers). 
696 ibid [307]. 
697 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential 
misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents’ IP/13/406, para 4. 
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exhaustive account of past acts of use and pay the amount of the royalty that has itself 
calculated therefrom. As regards the fulfilment of that payment obligation, the defendant 
is not required to pay the royalty directly to the applicant. The defendant is at liberty to 
deposit a security for payment of the royalty at a local court (Amtsgericht)698. For 
example, in the aforementioned German case, following the Settlement Agreement 
signed between Motorola and Apple that was based on Apple’s Sixth Orange Offer, Apple 
was paying a considerable amount of royalties into escrow that was considered to be in 
line with the requirements of the Orange Book judgment699. 
 
Only if these three circumstances are present cumulatively, the patent proprietor is 
culpable of abusive behaviour. Otherwise, the court should preclude the defendant from 
being able validly to rely on the compulsory nature of the grant of the licence and, 
accordingly, it ought to uphold patent owners’ action for a prohibitory injunction. 
 
2.1.2.2. Application to Huawei: ordering SEP enforcement measures 
 
In the case Huawei v. ZTE, the defendant would not be entitled to use the ‘competition 
law-based defence’ because it did not make Huawei an unconditional offer to conclude a 
license agreement. It only made an offer for a cross-licensing agreement limited 
exclusively to the products giving rise to the infringement and proposed, but did not pay, 
a royalty due to Huawei (EUR 50) – regardless of whether or not the amount of the royalty 
was correctly determined. Moreover, it did not provide an exhaustive account of past acts 
of use either700. Therefore, the second and third circumstances established by the Orange 
Book judgment would not be present. We do not know if Huawei refused to conclude a 
patent licence agreement with ZTE on non-discriminatory and non-restrictive terms (the 
first circumstance), but Huawei did indicate ZTE the amount which it considered to be a 
reasonable royalty. Nevertheless, that does not change the aforementioned conclusion 
regarding the impossibility of using the ‘competition law-based defence’ by ZTE, 
because as said, the three circumstances must be present cumulatively in order to be its 
application possible.  
 
All in all, the consequence of applying the Orange Book judgment to Huawei v. ZTE 
would be that the referring court ought to uphold Huawei’s actions and prohibit 
the continuation of the infringement (the prohibitory injunction) and order to stop the 
commercialization of the infringing products (the recall of products). That, because the 
SEP infringer did not fill the requirements that entitled it to use the ‘competition law-
based defence’ provided in that judgment. That defence consisted of pleading that the 
patent holder was abusing its dominant position when seeking an injunction in patent 
(non-SEP) infringement proceedings.  
 
                                                
698 Huawei AG (n 137) [31 in fine]. 
699 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [259]. 
700 Huawei AG (n 137) [34]–[36]. 
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2.1.3. Preliminary questions  
The Regional Court of Düsseldorf when referring the questions to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling, it firstly701 asked if the proprietor of a SEP which informed a 
standardisation body that was willing to grant any third party a licence on FRAND terms, 
it abused its dominant market position when bringing an action for a prohibitory 
injunction, for rendering of accounts, recall of products and damages against a patent 
infringer, when the infringer met the requirements established by the Orange Book 
judgment. Namely, whether an abuse of the dominant market position was to be presumed 
where the infringer had submitted to the proprietor of the SEP an acceptable, 
unconditional offer to conclude a licensing agreement which the patentee could not refuse 
without breaching the prohibition of discrimination or unfairly impeding the infringer 
(the second requirement of Orange Book); and the infringer had fulfilled its contractual 
obligations for acts of use already performed in anticipation of the licence to be granted 
(the third requirement of Orange Book). 
 
In case the Orange Book approach was the ‘correct’ one according to the ECJ, the referred 
court also asked about the scope of the requirements contained in the first preliminary 
question that coincided with the second and third requirements established in the Orange 
Book judgment. With respect to the second requirement, it secondly702 asked: ‘If the 
submission of an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a licensing agreement is a 
prerequisite for abuse of a dominant market position: Does Article 102 TFEU lay down 
particular qualitative and/or time requirements in relation to that offer? Must the offer 
contain all the provisions which are normally included in licensing agreements in the field 
of technology in question? In particular, may the offer be made subject to the condition 
that the SEP is actually used and/or is shown to be valid?’ 
 
And regarding the third requirement, the third703 question was: ‘If the fulfilment of the 
infringer’s obligations arising from the licence that is to be granted is a prerequisite for 
the abuse of a dominant market position: Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular 
requirements with regard to those acts of fulfilment? Is the infringer particularly required 
to render an account for past acts of use and/or to pay royalties? May an obligation to pay 
royalties be discharged, if necessary, by depositing a security?’ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
701 Huawei (n 35) [39.1.2] and [39.5]. 
702 ibid [39.3]. 
703 ibid [39.4]. 
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2.2. Samsung  
2.2.1. Antitrust assessment 
2.2.1.1. Criteria 
 
The referring court also noted that, in the press releases No IP/12/1448 and 
MEMO/12/1021 of 21 December 2012 – concerning a SO sent to Samsung – the EC 
appeared to regard the bringing of an action for a prohibitory injunction as unlawful 
(preliminary assessment), under Article 102 TFEU, where that action related to a SEP, 
the proprietor of that SEP indicated to a standardisation body that was prepared to grant 
licences on FRAND terms and the infringer was itself willing to negotiate such a licence. 
Accordingly, in opinion of the referring court, willingness to negotiate would not be 
affected by the fact that the parties could not agree on the content of certain clauses in the 
agreement or, in particular, on the amount of the royalty payable, it would be irrelevant704. 
 
Note that in the press releases concerning a SO sent to Samsung, the Commission had not 
yet explained in what circumstances an infringer might be regarded as being willing to 
negotiate705. 
 
2.2.1.2. Application to Huawei: finding an abuse of a dominant position  
 
If the Regional Court of Düsseldorf applied the Commission’s approach, it ought to 
dismiss Huawei’s actions for a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products, as 
constituting an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, since according to the 
referring court, it was common ground that the alleged infringer (ZTE) was willing to 
enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms706. Namely, the willingness to negotiate 
was apparent from ZTE’s written offers to conclude an agreement (which incorporated, 
in part, Huawei’s proposals). Note that ZTE was obliged to use Huawei’s SEP in order to 
be able to place on the market the disputed LTE-compliant embodiments707.  In 
consequence, applying the Commission’s approach, ZTE could legitimately rely on the 
compulsory nature of the licence. 
2.2.2. Preliminary questions  
Firstly708, the referring court asked whether the proprietor of a SEP – which informed a 
standardisation body that was willing to grant any third party a licence on FRAND terms 
– abused its dominant market position if it brought an action seeking an injunction 
prohibiting that infringement, the rendering of accounts, the recall of products and 
                                                
704 ibid [34]. 
705 Huawei AG (n 137) [33]. 
706 Huawei (n 35) [35]. 
707 Huawei AG (n 137) [37]. 
708 Huawei (n 35) [39.1.1] and [39.5]. 
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damages against a patent infringer, even though the infringer declared that was willing to 
negotiate concerning such a licence. 
 
Secondly709, in the event that according to the ECJ, the ‘correct’ approach was the one 
preliminarily developed by the Commission in Samsung, the Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf also asked it to define the scope of the ‘willingness’, in the following terms: 
‘If abuse of a dominant market position is already to be presumed as a consequence of 
the infringer’s willingness to negotiate: Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular 
qualitative and/or time requirements in relation to the willingness to negotiate? In 
particular, can willingness to negotiate be presumed where the patent infringer has merely 
stated (orally) in a general way that it is prepared to enter into negotiations, or must the 
infringer already have entered into negotiations by, for example, submitting specific 
conditions upon which it is prepared to conclude a licensing agreement?’ 
 
2.3. Referring court’s and Advocate General’s views 
 
Being faced with the apparent contradiction between Orange Book and Samsung 
approaches, the referring court’s view was aligned with the Orange Book approach. 
Accordingly, it710 considered that the fact that the infringer (ZTE) was willing to negotiate 
and the proprietor of the SEP (Huawei) was prepared to grant licences to third parties, 
ought not be sufficient to constitute an abuse of a dominant position (Commission’s 
approach in Samsung).  
 
Nevertheless, recall that according to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 and settled case 
law711, if a Member State court rules on facts that later on can be subject of a Commission 
decision on the implementation of Article 102 TFEU, the national court must avoid giving 
judgments which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in 
proceedings it has initiated. Accordingly, in the case Huawei v. ZTE, the judgment of the 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf based on the Orange Book approach might conflict with 
future Commission’s decisions adopted in Samsung and Motorola – who was assessing 
for the first time in the Union the antitrust nature of SEP owners’ behaviour. Therefore, 
the German court considered necessary to stay its proceedings and referred to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling, because the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU was in question and 
that was necessary for it to give a judgment.  
 
In opinion of the referring court712, in assessing whether the conduct of the proprietor of 
a SEP was abusive, an appropriate and fair balance have to be struck in relation to all the 
legitimate interests of the parties, which, it must be recognised, have equivalent 
bargaining power713. Hence, their positions ought not to make it possible for them to 
                                                
709 ibid [39.2]. 
710 ibid [36]. 
711 See references in (n 311). 
712 Huawei (n 35) [37] and [38]. 
713 See also Huawei AG (n 137) [59] (‘[...] it is necessary, in the light of competition law, to strike a balance 
between the right to intellectual property and the SEP-holder’s (Huawei’s) right of access to the courts, on 
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obtain excessively high royalties (a holdup situation) or excessively low royalties (a 
reverse holdup situation), respectively. For that reason, but also on the grounds of equality 
of treatment between the beneficiaries of licences and the infringers in relation to a given 
product, the German Regional Court added that the proprietor of the SEP ought to be able 
to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction, so the exercise of a statutory right could 
not, in itself, constitute an abuse of a dominant position – such characterisation would 
require other criteria to be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, the referring court did not consider satisfactory to adopt, as a criterion of such 
an abuse, the notion of the infringer’s ‘willingness to negotiate’ preliminarily established 
by the Commission in Samsung, since this might give rise to numerous interpretations 
and provide the infringer with too wide a freedom of action. In any event, if such a notion 
was to be held to be relevant – in the event that the ECJ considered that Commission’s 
preliminary approach in Samsung was the ‘correct’ one to be applied in Huawei v. ZTE –
, the referring court considered that certain qualitative and time requirements must be 
imposed in order to ensure that the applicant for the licence was acting in good faith. This 
is why, it asked to the ECJ how the scope of the ‘willingness’ should be defined.  
 
Thus, the referring court’s view714 was aligned with the Orange Book approach. In that 
sense, it understood that a properly formulated, acceptable, ‘unconditional’ request for a 
licence, containing all the provisions normally found in a licensing agreement, ought to 
be required to be submitted before the patent concerned was used. As regards, in 
particular, requests for a licence from operators which have already placed products using 
a SEP on the market, those operators must immediately comply with the obligations to 
render an account of use of that SEP and to pay the corresponding royalty. In addition, 
the Regional Court of Düsseldorf considered that an infringer ought, initially, to be able 
to provide security instead of paying the royalty directly to the proprietor of the SEP in 
question. And it added that the possibility of the applicant for a licence leaving the 
determination of a fair royalty amount to the proprietor must also be envisaged. 
 
The Advocate General shares partially the referring court’s view. On the one hand, in 
view of the significant factual difference between the Orange Book and Huawei v. ZTE 
(a non-SEP reading on a de facto standard), he is of the opinion that the Orange Book 
standard could not be transposed by analogy to the latter case715.  
 
And on the other hand, although the press releases regarding Samsung deal with SEPs, it 
seems to him that a mere willingness on the part of the infringer to negotiate (either orally 
or in writing) in a highly vague and non-binding fashion cannot, in any circumstances, be 
                                                
the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business which economic operators such as the undertakings 
implementing the LTE standard (ZTE) enjoy under Article 16 of the Charter, on the other hand. After all, 
the grant of an injunction sought by an action to cease and desist places a significant restriction on that 
freedom and is therefore capable of distorting competition’). 
714 Huawei (n 35) [38]. 
715 Huawei AG (n 137) [49]. 
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sufficient to limit the SEP-holder’s right to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction716. 
It considers necessary to impose far more stringent requirements on the infringer. Note 
that when the Advocate General released its opinion (on 20 November 2014) – unlike 
when the referring court requested for a preliminary ruling in 2013 –, the Commission 
had already handed down the Motorola Prohibition Decision (on 29 April 2014) where it 
defined the concept of a ‘willing licensee’. However, the Advocate General merely refers 
to what was stated in press releases, that was only a few pages long and did not have legal 
value. That is to say, they were not binding on the Commission and did not prejudge the 
outcome of the proceedings to which it referred. Their only objective was to inform the 
public that a proceeding had been opened against Samsung under Regulation No 
1/2003717.  
 
All in all, to Advocate General’s mind, a pure and simple application to Huawei v. ZTE 
of the case law established by the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof-
BGH) in Orange Book or the press releases concerning a SO sent to Samsung, it would 
result in the overprotection or under-protection of the SEP-holder, respectively. And that 
would also affect those using the teaching protected by the patents – the implementers – 
and consumers. As a consequence, it considered necessary to find a middle path between 
Orange Book and Samsung718.  
3. ECJ’s antitrust assessment: the abuse  
 
As it was explained in Chapter 1, Article 102 TFEU has four constituent elements: 
defining the relevant market, establishing dominance (see Section 3.2.), assessing 
whether the unilateral conduct is abusive or not and determining if the abuse may affect 
trade between Member States. 
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the referring court only asked the ECJ about the possible abuse of a 
dominant position on the part of a SEP holder. Accordingly, it establishes that bringing 
infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products (the 
rendering of accounts and the award of damages do not raise antitrust concerns, see 
Section 3.1.) by a SEP owner constitutes an exclusionary abuse when the following 
elements are present. First, if two exceptional circumstances are present, that is, if the 
patent is essential and if its owner gave FRAND commitments (Section 3.3.). Second, if 
parties followed the steps established in The Framework, namely, if the patent owner 
complied with specific obligations and the alleged infringer failed to fulfil his (Section 
4). Third, if bringing the aforementioned actions might produce anti-competitive effects, 
that is to say, if it is liable to prevent products complying with the standard in question 
manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the market (exclusion) 
(Section 5).  
 
                                                
716 ibid [50]. 
717 ibid, fn 18.  
718 ibid [51] and [52].  
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If the aforementioned three requirements are present, it could be determined, prima facie, 
that the conduct of the SEP owner is abusive. However, in order to confirm that 
conclusion, it is necessary to examine the claims of the dominant undertaking assuring 
that its conduct is justified, demonstrating that produces substantial efficiencies which 
outweigh any anti-competitive effects on consumers or that is objectively necessary. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ does not consider whether the behaviour of the SEP owner – that 
meets the aforementioned three requirements of the abuse – might be objectively justified 
and if so, in which cases. That should constitute the last element of the abuse (Section 6).  
 
3.1. Prohibitory injunction and the recall of products 
 
The Regional Court of Düsseldorf asked the ECJ whether the SEP owner – who has given 
an irrevocable undertaking to a SSO to grant licences to third parties on FRAND terms –
, abuses its dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, by bringing an 
action for infringement seeking (i) an injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent; 
(ii) the recall of products for the manufacture of which that patent has been used; (iii) the 
rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of that patent (in order to determine 
what use the infringer has made of the teaching of a SEP with a view to obtaining a 
FRAND royalty under that patent); and (iv) an award of damages in respect of those acts 
of use. 
 
As it was already referred several times in this research, the effect of the recall of products 
– a corrective measure – is comparable to that of the prohibitory injunction. Namely, their 
granting has a direct impact on products manufactured by the infringer appearing or 
remaining on the market – exclusion. The above, because they entail the cessation of the 
infringement and the removal from the market of all the products that infringed the IPR 
in question. Whereas the rendering of accounts and the award of damages do not entail 
the exclusion of the competition from the market, but accounting and paying obligations, 
given the sole purpose of such a claim is to compensate the SEP-holder for previous 
infringements of its patent. 
 
Accordingly, the criteria established by the ECJ719 to assess whether a SEP owner abuses 
its dominant position refer only to the behaviour of bringing infringement actions seeking 
a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products, for being the ones that raise antitrust 
concerns. Namely, the considerations set out by the ECJ regarding the action for a 
prohibitory injunction apply mutatis mutandis to the corrective measures provided for in 
Article 10 of the IPRED directive720. 
 
Consequently, Article 102 TFEU does not prohibit an undertaking in a dominant position 
and holding a SEP – which has given an undertaking to the standardisation body to grant 
licences for that patent on FRAND terms – from bringing an action for infringement 
                                                
719 Huawei (n 35) [44]. 
720 Huawei AG (n 137) [100]. 
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against the alleged infringer of its SEP, seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to 
past acts of use of that SEP or an award of damages in respect of those acts of use721. 
 
According to the ECJ, a SEP owner abuses its dominant position when bringing 
infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products, if the 
three previously mentioned elements – that will be studied below – are present 
cumulatively. Hence, in Huawei v. ZTE, for the purpose of resolving the dispute in the 
main proceedings, the referring court – the Regional Court of Düsseldorf – had to 
determine whether those elements that will be studied below were satisfied in that specific 
case. 
 
3.2. Assessment of dominance  
 
Before answering the preliminary questions referred by the Regional Court of Düsseldorf, 
the ECJ alludes to general considerations of the abuse of a dominant position, that have 
already been tackled in this research. For instance, to the concept of an abuse of a 
dominant position as an objective concept722 (see Section 1.3. of Chapter 1). However, 
the ECJ does not assess if Huawei held or not a dominant position and that silence has 
been criticized by some scholars723 – together with the fact that it also does not define the 
relevant market724.  
 
In the order for reference, the referring court stated that Huawei ‘unquestionably’ holds a 
dominant position, without any further explanation or clarification of that finding. That 
is to say, it did not state that had arrived to that conclusion after it had examined all the 
circumstances and the specific context of the case. And the ECJ does not either assess the 
dominance. Consequently, the reason of the criticism is that the silence of the ECJ might 
be interpreted as that it presumes that the mere fact of owning a SEP implies to hold a 
dominant position.  
 
Firstly, the ECJ is right not assessing the dominance, because the preliminary questions 
posed by the referring court related only to the existence of an abuse, in particular, to the 
                                                
721 ibid [101] and [102]; Huawei (n 35) [72] and [76]. 
722 ibid [68]; ibid [45]. 
723 Suñol, ‘Patentes y hold-up’ (n 21) 39, para 2; Björn Lundqvist, ‘The interface between EU competition 
law and standard essential patents – from Orange-Book-Standard to the Huawei case’ (2015) 11(2-3) 
European Competition Journal 367, 386, para 2; Galli, ‘The FRAND Defense’ (n 693) 188, para 1 and 202, 
para 2; Gabriella Muscolo, ‘The Huawei Case. Patents and Competition reconciled?’ (2017) 1 Revista 
Orizzonti del Diritto Commerciale 15, para 6 <www.rivistaodc.eu/media/69987/muscolo.pdf> accessed 25 
July 2018; Giuseppe Colangelo and Valerio Torti, ‘Filling Huawei's Gaps: The Recent German Case Law 
on Standard Essential Patents’ (2017) 12 European Competition Law Review 538, 3-4 (of the version 
available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017072> accessed 25 July 2018); Vincenzo Meli, ‘The CJEU 
judgment in the Huawei/ZTE case: getting around the problem of FRAND commitments and competition 
law’ (2017) 1 Revista Orizzonti del Diritto Commerciale 9 <www.rivistaodc.eu/media/69794/meli.pdf> 
accessed 25 July 2018. 
724 Huawei AG (n 137) fn 22 [‘It is settled case-law that the definition of the relevant market is of vital 
significance for the appraisal of dominant position. See Case C-6/72 Europemballage and Continental 
Can v Commission (ECJ, 21 February 1973), para 32’]. 
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circumstances under which the conduct of Huawei might be abusive under Article 102 
TFEU. Namely, the referring court – Regional Court of Düsseldorf – did not ask the ECJ 
either about the finding of a dominant position or the criteria for determining the relevant 
market725. Therefore, to be congruent, the ECJ’s analysis must be confined to the abusive 
criterion726, in the sense of adapting to what was requested by the referring court.  
 
According to the settled case law727, the ECJ has jurisdiction only to give rulings on the 
interpretation or the validity of a provision of EU law on the basis of the facts put before 
it by the national court. In addition, to alter the substance of the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling would be incompatible with the Court’s role under Article 267 TFEU. 
And also with its duty, under Article 23 of the Statute of the ECJ of the EU728, that is to 
ensure that the governments of the Member States and the parties concerned are given 
the opportunity to submit observations, given that, under that provision, only the order 
for reference is notified to the interested parties729.  
 
Consequently, it was for the referring court to verify and define the elements of Article 
102 TFEU (relevant market, dominance and effect on trade between Member States) on 
a case by case basis730. The criteria to define the existence of a dominant position is 
equally applicable when the undertaking concerned is a SEP holder731, bearing in mind 
the following nuance. Until an independent review (legal and technical) establishes that 
a particular declared SEP is in fact essential, there can be no presumption of market 
power. That, because SEP are self-declared to SSOs who do not evaluate essentiality, 
which may change over time as the standard continues through development732.  
 
And secondly, the interpretation on that the ECJ’s silence might constitute a presumption 
that owning a SEP entails to hold a dominant position, it would be contrary to its settled 
case law733 that states the following. The mere fact of owning and exerting IPRs does not 
imply that their owners hold a dominant position, although they constitute a barrier to 
                                                
725 Huawei AG (n 137) [53]. 
726 ibid [56]; Huawei (n 35) [43]. 
727 Joined Cases 141/81 to 143/81 Holdijk and Others [1982] ECR I-1299, para 6; Case 
C-178/95 Wiljo [1997] ECR I-585, para 30; Case C-352/95 Phytheron International [1997] ECR I-1729, 
para 14; Case C-412/46 Kainuun Liikenne and Pohjohlan Liikenne [1998] ECR I-5141, para 24; Case 
C-138/08 Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden [2009] ECR I-09889, para 22. 
728 Protocol No 3 of TFEU (n 73).  
729 Huawei AG (n 137) [55]. 
730 ibid [57]. 
731 For a discussion on the specific challenges raised by market definition and the assessment of dominance 
in high-technology markets with a specific focus on technology licensing, see Damien Geradin, ‘Abusive 
Pricing in an IP Licensing Context: An EC Competition Law Analysis’ (2007) SSRN Electronic Journal 3-
8 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1174922> accessed 25 July 2018; Damien 
Geradin, ‘Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in a Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe’ 
(2009) 76(1) Antitrust Law Journal 329, 335-339. 
732 Anne Layne-Farrar and Koren Wong-Ervin, ‘Standard-Essential Patents and Market Power’ (2016) 
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 16-47, 2, para 2 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872172 > accessed 25 July 2018.  
733 See references in (n 138).  
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entry. That, not even when the IPR is a SEP734, although that fact may contribute to that 
position (see Sections 1.2.2.3. of Chapter 1 and 5.2.2.1. of Chapter 3). So the finding of 
a dominant position cannot be based on hypotheses, because although the holding of that 
position is not in itself prohibited by Article 102 TFEU735, it imposes on the undertaking 
concerned a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine competition 
(see Section 1.3. of Chapter 1).  
 
As the AG736 states, at most, holding a SEP could give rise to an iuris tantum presumption 
that the owner of a SEP holds a dominant position, as it occurs with the high market share 
(see Section 1.2.2.2. of Chapter 1). That, because anyone who uses a standard set by a 
standardisation body must necessarily make use of the teaching of a SEP, thus requiring 
a licence from the owner of that patent. Nevertheless, due to the nature of that 
presumption, it should be possible to rebut it with specific, detailed evidence. 
 
As a consequence of the above, when national courts applied the Huawei v. ZTE, namely, 
the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in Unwired Planet v. Huawei737  and the 
Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgerichte) of Düsseldorf in Sisvel v. Haier738, they defined 
relevant markets and determined whether SEP holders held dominant positions. 
 
3.3. Exceptional circumstances 
 
The ECJ alludes to the fact that the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an IPR – in 
Huawei v. ZTE, the right to bring an action for infringement – forms part of the rights of 
the proprietor of an IPR and it cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position739 
(see Section 4.4.1. of Chapter 2). However, it also adds that is settled case law740 that the 
exercise of an exclusive right linked to an IPR – namely, the refusal to grant IP licenses 
(studied in Chapter 2) – by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve 
abusive conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU741.  
 
                                                
734 See references in (n 137).  
735 Michelin [ECJ, 1983] (n 93) [57]; Post Danmark (n 148) [21]–[23].  
736 Huawei AG (n 137) [58]. 
737 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat), paras 631-646 and 656-670 (the relevant market is that for licences of owner’s 
SEPs, rather than technology. It also analyses whether the SEP owner has the ability to behave 
independently from customers and competitors). 
738 OLG Düsseldorf of 30 March 2017, I-15 U 66/15, para 182; ‘Sisvel v Haier’ (4iPCouncil), para 3 
(‘proprietorship of an SEP does not automatically constitute a dominant market position because not all 
SEPs necessarily influence competition in the downstream product market. […] A dominant market 
position exists, for example, if it would not be possible to successfully market a competitive product without 
using the respective SEP, or if compatibility and interoperability under the standard could not be 
guaranteed’) < https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/german-court-decisions/olg-dusseldorf/sisvel-v-haier-olg-
dusseldorf-1 - _ftn9> accessed 25 July 2018. 
739 Huawei AG (n 137) [61]; Huawei (n 35) [46]. 
740 Volvo (n 285) [9]; Magill [ECJ, 1995] (n 257) [50]; IMS Health [ECJ, 2004] (n 241) [35]. 
741 Huawei AG (n 137) [62] and [67]; Huawei (n 35) [47]. 
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Nevertheless, the ECJ742 – following the observation of the Advocate General743 – pointed 
out that the particular circumstances of Huawei v. ZTE distinguish that case from the 
cases which gave rise to the case law on refusal to license IPRs. These cases are the ones 
that stated that the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an IPR cannot constitute an 
abuse per se, but under exceptional circumstances. According to the ECJ in Huawei v. 
ZTE, the exceptional circumstances are different regarding those in the case law on refusal 
to license IPRs. Namely, the object is a SEP which use is essential to implement the 
standard on which the patent reads on and its owner gave FRAND commitments (see 
below).  
 
Notwithstanding, in all those cases the antitrust conduct in question is constituted by the 
exercise of an IPR (in the form of a refusal to license or of bringing infringement actions). 
Moreover, in the case law on refusal to grant IP licenses, the essentiality also constitutes 
– albeit not always (see Section 4.5.4. of Chapter 2) – one of the elements to assess the 
antitrust nature of the conduct.  
 
Due to those two similarities, as it will be defended in Chapter 5, I consider that Huawei’s 
behaviour (as well as Samsung’s and Motorola’s that were investigated by the 
Commission, see Chapter 3) should have been treated as a ‘constructive' refusal to license 
IPRs, basing on a revision of the case law on refusal to grant IP licenses – namely, of IMS 
Health. Hence, the abusive nature of the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an IPR 
consisting in refusing to license or bringing infringement actions seeking for a prohibitory 
injunction or the recall of products, could be assess applying the same criteria. The fact 
of having given a FRAND commitment should only be relevant if the SEP owner’s 
behaviour was assessed from the contract law perspective (see Section 3.2. of Chapter 5), 
but not when it is being analysed from the competition law viewpoint – as in Samsung, 
Motorola and Huawei. 
3.3.1. Essentiality 
The first744 particular circumstance of the case Huawei v. ZTE is that the patent at issue 
is essential to a standard established by a standardisation body, rendering its use 
indispensable to all competitors which envisage manufacturing products that comply with 
the standard to which it is linked. That feature – the essentiality – distinguishes SEPs from 
patents that are not essential to a standard (non-SEPS) and which normally allow third 
parties to manufacture competing products without recourse to the patent concerned and 
without compromising the essential functions of the product in question. 
 
As it was mentioned before, according to the ECJ the fact that the patent is essential – 
together with the second exceptional circumstance (see below) –, distinguishes the case 
Huawei v. ZTE from the cases that gave rise to the case law on refusal to grant IP licenses. 
                                                
742 Huawei (n 35) [48]. 
743 Huawei AG (n 137) [70]. 
744 Huawei (n 35) [49] and [50]. 
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However, in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft, the IPRs whose license was refused were 
also considered to be essential for competitors’ activity, because there were no real or 
potential substitutes of the protected IPRs. 
 
The difference is that in Huawei v. ZTE, the patent is essential to a standard and the 
implementation of the standard is necessary to manufacture the product by the competitor, 
so the use of the SEP is per se essential for competitor’s activity.  
 
Whereas in the case law on refusal to license IPRs, it was necessary to assess whether the 
IPR was essential or not. Recall that according to the Magill test (see Section 4.4.3. of 
Chapter 2) and its modified versions (see Section 4.5. of Chapter 2), in general terms, 
four are the elements that must be present in order to consider that the refusal to license 
IPRs is abusive. Namely, that the IPR is essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity 
(the first element); that the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which 
there is a potential demand (the second element); that the refusal is arbitrary (the third 
element); and that the objective of the refusal is to exclude competition from a secondary 
market (the fourth element). The second and fourth elements refer to the anti-competitive 
effect of the refusal, that is to say, the exclusion of competitors from the market, 
provoking that consumers could not enjoy a new product. And the third element alludes 
to the absence of objective arguments that may justify the IP owner’s refusal. Hence, the 
essentiality nature of the IPR – the first element – constitutes the exceptional 
circumstance. Focusing specifically on that first element, all the cases that compound the 
case law on refusal to license IPRs that applied the Magill test (see Section 3 of Chapter 
2), except the CFI745 in Tiercé Ladbroke that concluded that the aforementioned first and 
second elements were alternatives, they considered that the essentiality nature of the IPR 
object of refusal was a sine qua non requirement (see Section 4.5.4. of Chapter 2).  
 
Therefore, the difference is that in Huawei v. ZTE, the patent is essential per se and in the 
case law on refusal to grant IP licenses, the essential nature of the IPR had to be assessed, 
concluding that in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft the IPRs in question were essential. 
But beyond that, both in Huawei v. ZTE and in the case law on refusal to grant IP licenses, 
the ECJ considers that in order to determine if the behaviour of the IP owner is abusive 
the IPR in question must be essential because it constitutes the exceptional circumstance. 
Therefore, it is unclear why in Huawei v. ZTE the ECJ746 states that the fact that the patent 
at issue is essential to a standard distinguishes it from the cases that compound the case 
law on refusal to license IPRs.  
 
When comparing the first exceptional circumstance of the case Huawei v. ZTE with the 
one considered as such by the Commission in Samsung and Motorola (see Section 5.3.2.1. 
of Chapter 3), they are slightly different, albeit in all these cases the SEP owners’ 
behaviour that was being analysed was the same. According to the Commission, the first 
                                                
745 Tiercé Ladbroke [CFI, 1997] (n 294). 
746 Huawei (n 35) [48] and [49]. 
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exceptional circumstance is the widespread adoption of the standards in the EEA, which 
provoked that the access to technologies as specified in the standards technical 
specifications – that were protected by Samsung’s and Motorola’s SEPs –, became 
indispensable for implementers. Therefore, the essential nature of SEPs derives from the 
widespread adoption of the standards on which they read. In consequence, if a standard 
does not have a widespread adoption, the SEP that reads on it would not be considered 
essential, although it would have that feature per se. Hence, the first circumstance would 
not be present. Accordingly, bringing infringement actions seeking and enforcing a 
prohibitory injunction would not be abusive.  
 
Due to the above, I reckon that the exceptional circumstance about the essential nature of 
the IPR adopted by the ECJ – on its case law on refusal to license IPRs and in Huawei v. 
ZTE – is more appropriate than the approach established by the Commission – in Samsung 
and Motorola – (see, in this regard, Section 5.3.2.3. of Chapter 3). That, because the ECJ 
bases the essentiality on whether there are real or potential substitutes of the protected 
IPRs. While the Commission’s evaluation depends on the standard’s widespread 
adoption, on which the patent in question reads on. 
3.3.2. FRAND commitment  
The second747 exceptional circumstance established by the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE is that 
the patent obtained SEP status only in return for the proprietor’s irrevocable undertaking 
given to a SSO that it would grant licenses to third parties on FRAND terms. Through 
that commitment, Huawei did not waive its right to bring actions for prohibitory 
injunctions against implementers using the teaching protected by the SEP without its 
consent. But it expresses its willingness to exploit the SEP, not only by using the patent 
exclusively, but also by licensing it to others. Moreover, Huawei accepts that a royalty 
fixed on FRAND terms constitutes adequate and fair compensation for the use of that 
patent by others748. 
 
The FRAND commitment is required because having the patent obtained that status, its 
proprietor might decide not to license the SEP to its competitors – for whom its use is 
essential to implement the standard in the products they manufacture. Thus, its refusal 
might prevent products manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the 
market and, thereby, reserving to itself the manufacture of the products in question.  
 
This second circumstance was not present in the case law on refusal to grant IP licenses, 
because giving FRAND commitments is linked only to SEPs and in those cases, none of 
the IPRs was a SEP. Accordingly, that exceptional circumstance was also required in 
Samsung and Motorola (see Section 5.3.2.2. of Chapter 3). So both the Commission and 
the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE coincided in establishing the fact of having given FRAND 
commitments as the second exceptional circumstance. 
                                                
747 Huawei (n 35) [51] and [52]. 
748 Huawei AG (n 137) [60]. 
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Nonetheless, as it was already mentioned, I reckon that this circumstance should 
constitute an exceptional circumstance just if Huawei’s behaviour was assessed from the 
contract law viewpoint, but not when it is analysed from the competition law perspective 
– as in Huawei v. ZTE – (Section 3.2. of Chapter 5).  
3.3.3. Essential non-SEPs (de facto standard) 
The ECJ does not make reference to whether the criteria provided for in Huawei v. ZTE 
is also applicable when the object of the license is a patent that protects a technology that 
is essential to implement a de facto standard (see Section ‘Background’ of the 
Introduction). Or, if on the contrary, the criteria is only applicable to SEPs that protect 
technologies essential to implement de jure standards. That question arises because 
whereas the first exceptional circumstance would be present (essentiality), the second one 
would be missing, since not being a SEP, its owner did not commit to license the patent 
on FRAND terms. 
 
If the latter was the case, behaviours regarding non-SEPs should be resolved by applying 
the existing case law on the matter, that is, the IMS Health case ruled by the ECJ (see 
Chapter 2) or the Orange Book judgment solved by the German Federal Supreme Court 
– Bundesgerichtshof – (but only in Germany, see Section 2.1. of this chapter)749. 
 
However, taking into account that Spanish courts (the Judges of Barcelona Commercial 
Courts No. 5 and No. 4750) – in non-SEP infringement proceedings – issued prohibitory 
injunctions and recall of products as provisional measures basing on the criteria 
established in Huawei v. ZTE, the aforementioned first interpretation would also be 
feasible. The issue of these Orders took place during the Mobile World Congress (MWC) 
that took place in Barcelona regarding infringements of non-SEPs that were essential to 
implement de facto standards. 
 
Besides, the Judges agreed to replace these provisional measures with the deposit of a 
bond, in order to avoid seriously restricting the potential infringers’ commercial activities 
during the MWC. That is, they allowed the continuation of alleged infringements, as long 
as alleged infringers lodged guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of right 
holders, an option provided for in Article 9(1,a) of IPRED751 (see Section 6.2. of Chapter 
5). Courts were aware that the doctrine settled in Huawei v. ZTE is not compulsory for 
non-SEPs, but they considered it provided guidance to make a reasonable and fair 
assessment of the rights and interests existing between licensees and licensors when 
                                                
749 Petit, ‘Huaweï v. ZTE: Judicial Conservatism’ (n 161) 7, para 3; Lundqvist, ‘The Interface’ (n 723) 8, 
para 3. 
750 Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil Nº5 de Barcelona de 16 de febrero de 2018, n. 4/2018, Fractus v. 
Wiko, paras 8, 11, 12 and 26; Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil Nº4 de Barcelona de 20 de febrero de 2018, 
Tot Power Control S.L. v. Xiaomi Inc.; Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil Nº5 de Barcelona de 27 de febrero 
de 2018, n. 15/2018, Fractus v. Shenzhen New-Bund Network Technology Co., Ltd., paras 6.7 and 6.8. 
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patent infringement actions are brought, while negotiations for obtaining a license are 
taking place.  
 
In particular, to issue the aforementioned provisional measures, Spanish judges relied on 
the obligation imposed to alleged infringers in Huawei v. ZTE, that is, that from the 
moment their first counter-offer is rejected, they must provide an adequate security to 
guarantee the payment of royalties in relation to the past use of the non-SEP. Thus, Judges 
considered that while negotiations for obtaining licenses were taking place, the alleged 
infringers did not, at no time, constitute a security in favour of patent owners, noticing a 
lack of diligence, loyalty and dilatory intention on their part. For this reason, they 
reckoned appropriate to allow the lodging of bonds (as substitute), so that alleged 
infringers would comply with that obligation, showing they were willing to enter into 
licensing agreements. Bonds would serve as guarantee in case the alleged infringers 
refused the offers made by patent owners752. 
 
The application of the Huawei v. ZTE in cases where the patent is not a SEP but it is 
essential to implement a de facto standard – so no FRAND commitments are given –, 
shows that as mentioned before, the essentiality of the IP in question constitutes the core 
element when assessing the abuse, whereas having given the FRAND commitments is 
accessory (see also Section 7.3.2. of Chapter 5). That is why although in all the cases 
concerning the refusal to grant IP licenses that were studied in Chapter 2 the IPRs in 
question were not the same, the Magill test was applied equally.   
 
Inversely, the Orange Book judgment – in which the object was a non-SEP essential to 
implement a de facto standard – was applied by German Courts (the Regional Court of 
Mannheim and the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe) in Motorola v. Apple, where the 
object was a FRAND-encumbered SEP essential to implement a de jure standard. That 
case was later on investigated by the Commission (see Section 3.2. of Chapter 3). In 
addition, the referring court – Regional Court of Düsseldorf – in Huawei v. ZTE was also 
in favour of applying that German judgment, although the patent was a SEP (see Section 
2.3. of this Chapter). 
4. The Framework and National Courts guidance 
 
Once verified that the aforementioned two exceptional circumstances are present, in order 
to conclude that bringing infringement actions seeking for a prohibitory injunction or the 
recall of products is abusive, the national court has to determine whether parties complied 
with the framework for the negotiation of the licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms (‘The 
Framework’) established by the ECJ, basing on Advocate General’s opinion753. As it will 
                                                
752 Miquel Montañá, ‘Spain: Recent decisions handed down by the Barcelona Commercial courts within 
the context of the 2018 Mobile World Congress’ (2018) 18 Clifford Chance’s Global Intellectual Property 
Newsletter 37, 39, para 2 
<https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2018/06/global_intellecutalpropertynewsletter-18t.html> 
accessed 27 July 2018. 
753 Huawei AG (n 137) [80]–[96]. 
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be studied subsequently, this framework comprises not only mandatory steps – parties’ 
obligations –, but also voluntary ones – FRAND determination by a third party. However, 
the scope of the obligations established by the Advocate General was not always adopted 
by the ECJ.  
 
Moreover, some references will also be made to the application of The Framework by 
national courts754. Given the legal gaps posed by Huawei v. ZTE, it is necessary to analyse 
how national courts – mainly, Germans – interpret them, providing more clarity on what 
is or is not to be considered appropriate behaviour basing on the legal framework provided 
by the ECJ.  
 
In order to prevent an action for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products from 
being regarded as abusive, according to The Framework, the proprietor of a SEP must 
comply with specific conditions which seek to ensure a fair balance between the interests 
concerned. Likewise, the alleged infringer may only rely on the abusive nature of an 
action for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products, if it has complied with his 
obligations.  
 
However, in principle, the SEP proprietor has the right to recourse to legal proceedings 
to ensure effective enforcement of his exclusive rights [Article 17(2) of the Charter, the 
rights linked to IP; and 47(1), the right of access to a tribunal]. And the user of those 
rights, if it is not the proprietor, is required to obtain a licence prior to any use755. 
Therefore, the imposition on SEP holders an obligation to comply with specific 
requirements to exercise their fundamental rights needs a justification.  
 
According to the ECJ, the rationale is based on the irrevocable commitment to grant 
licenses on FRAND terms given to the standardisation body by the proprietor of a SEP. 
Thus, the commitment justifies the imposition on that proprietor of an obligation to 
comply with specific requirements when bringing actions against alleged infringers for a 
prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products. Consequently, albeit giving FRAND 
commitments does not negate the substance of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the 
SEP owner, it conditions their exercise756. As referred in Section 3.3.2. above, I am of the 
opinion that the fact of giving FRAND commitments is relevant only from the contract 
law perspective, so it should not constitute the basis to constrain the exercise of the right 
of access to a tribunal.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
754 ‘National Courts Guidance’ (4iPCouncil) <https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/guidance-national-courts> 
accessed 22 April 2019. 
755 Huawei (n 35) [55]–[58].  
756 ibid [59]. 
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4.1. Prior alert  
4.1.1. ECJ 
Before bringing an action for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products against the 
alleged infringer, the first757 obligation of the proprietor of a SEP – who considers that its 
SEP is the subject of an infringement –, it is to notice or consult with the alleged infringer 
about the infringement complained about. Specifically, the SEP owner must designate the 
SEP in question and indicate the way in which it has been infringed. Otherwise, the SEP 
owner’s behaviour consisting of bringing the aforementioned action would infringe 
Article 102 TFEU. 
 
In ECJ’s opinion – aligned with the Advocate General’s one – the reason for that 
requirement is that in view of the large number of SEPs composing a standard, such as 
that at issue in Huawei v. ZTE that concerned the LTE, it is not certain that the infringer 
of one of those SEPs will necessarily be aware that is using the teaching of a SEP that is 
both valid and essential to a standard. Huawei itself pointed out that it would be unrealistic 
in the telecommunications industry to require the SEP user to be the one who makes an 
offer for a FRAND license on its own initiative before starting to use the standard, given 
the large number of SEPs and SEP owners and the uncertainty over whether (allegedly) 
essential patents are valid and whether they have been infringed. For instance, as far as 
the LTE standard is concerned, it would appear that more than 4 700 patents had been 
notified to ETSI as essential, and that a large proportion of those might not be valid or 
essential to the standard758. Besides, such a step does not place a disproportionate burden 
on the SEP holder, as it is one which it would have to take in any event in order to 
substantiate an action for a prohibitory injunction. 
4.1.2. Advocate General 
Unlike the ECJ, the Advocate General759 states that the SEP owner should be released 
from that obligation if it was established that the alleged infringer was fully aware of the 
infringement. Besides, he considers necessary to alert the alleged infringer in writing and 
giving reasons.  
4.1.3. National Courts  
As it will be analysed below, national courts have provided further clarity on various 
aspects of SEP owners’ first obligation.  
 
 
 
                                                
757 ibid [60] and [61]. 
758 ibid [62]; Huawei AG (n 137) [81] and fn 54. 
759 Huawei AG (n 137) [84]. 
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4.1.3.1. Subjects  
 
The ECJ only refers that the SEP owner is obliged to alert the infringer about the 
infringement. In that regard, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf760 also states that the 
notification of infringement can be made by the SEP holder itself, or by any other 
affiliated company within the same group of companies, especially by the patent holder’s 
parent company.  
 
In relation to the addressee, German courts also nuance that the SEP holder is not obliged 
to notify the patent infringement to third parties (for instance to suppliers of the 
implementer), unless third parties submit a request for a license on FRAND terms to the 
SEP holder761. Hence, it is sufficient to address the notification to the parent company of 
the alleged infringer within a group of companies762. However, the view of an Italian 
court (Tribunale Ordinario di Torino)763 is different, because it understands that if the 
SEP holder brings an action only against the SEP implementer, a notification of 
infringement towards its parent company does not meet the Huawei requirement of 
having notified the implementer of the infringing use of the SEP. 
 
4.1.3.2. Temporal 
 
Regarding the time aspect of the obligation, the ECJ states that SEP holder's notification 
of infringement has to take place before an action is filed. The Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf764 clarifies that at the latest, it has to take place prior to the advance payment 
on costs by the SEP holder – under German procedural law, proceedings are initiated after 
the claimant has made the required advance payment on costs.  
 
4.1.3.3. Content  
 
With reference to the content of the notification, the ECJ states that the SEP owner has to 
designate the SEP infringed and specify the way in which it has been infringed.  
 
In order to consider that the SEP owner complies with its obligation, German courts765 
agree in considering that SEP owner’s notification of infringement has to: (i) specify the 
infringed patent – the name –, including its number; (ii) inform that the implementer uses 
patent’s teachings – the infringing acts of use; and (iii) indicate which technical 
                                                
760 Case Unidentified Parties, LG Düsseldorf of 11 July 2018, 4c O 81/17, para 199.  
761 Case St. Lawrence v. Vodafone, LG Düsseldorf of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14, para 270 et seq.; Case 
St. Lawrence v. Vodafone, LG Düsseldorf of 31 March 2016, 4a O 126/14. 
762 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [199]; Case IP Bridge v. HTC, LG Mannheim of 28 
September 2018, 7 O 165/16, p 25.  
763 Case Sisvel v. ZTE, Tribunale Ordinario di Torino of 18 January 2016, 30308/20215, para 3.  
764 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [195] et seq.; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761). 
765 Case NTT DoCoMo v. HTC, LG Mannheim of 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15, paras 65-69; St. Lawrence 
v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [193]; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761); Case Philips v. Archos, LG 
Mannheim of 1 July 2016, 7 O 209/15; Case Philips v. Archos, LG Mannheim of 17 November 2016, 7 O 
19/16, para 77; Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [198].  
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functionality of the challenged embodiment makes use of the patent – the contested 
embodiments.  
 
Some of those courts766 also consider that the notification has to inform that the patent 
has been declared standard-essential and name the relevant standard, although they add 
that the level of detail depends on the specific circumstances of the case, particularly the 
technological knowledge of the implementer (or the availability of external expertise 
gained by reasonable efforts). However, the information does not need to be as 
substantiated as facts submitted with a statement of claim in patent litigation. While other 
German courts767 do not rule on whether additional information is also required, such as 
an interpretation of the patent claims or information regarding the part of the standard the 
patent reads. 
 
As a rule, courts of Germany768 consider that presenting claim charts (containing the 
relevant patent claims and the corresponding passages of the standard)  to the 
implementer, which according to commercial practice are also used in licensing 
negotiations, is an adequate way to give notification of infringement.  
 
In the same vein, the Regional Court of Mannheim769  concludes that SEP holder's 
notification of infringement does not have to contain either the original written FRAND 
declaration, nor proof that a FRAND declaration has been made during the development 
of the standard, provided that SEP holder leaves no doubt that is bound by a FRAND 
licensing commitment. The Regional Court of Düsseldorf770 mentions that a detailed 
(technical and/or legal) explanation of the infringement is not required and that the SEP 
user is also not required to inform about the essentiality of the patent to the standard 
and/or to attach claim charts to the notification. Regarding the latter consideration, the 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf disagrees with the Regional Court of Mannheim771 that 
requested the SEP holder to inform the user about the essentiality of the patent to the 
standard and/or to attach claim charts to the notification of infringement. 
 
It is interesting what is established by the Regional Court of Düsseldorf772 who considers 
that the notification can be made alongside with SEP holder’s offer for a FRAND licence 
to the SEP user (prior to the initiation of court proceedings). It ads that in this case, the 
second step under the Huawei framework – expressing willingness by the alleged 
infringer (see below, Section 4.2.) – will be skipped, although the SEP user should be 
granted more time than usual to assess and react to both the notification of infringement 
                                                
766 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [65]–[69]; Philips v. Archos [209/15] (n 765); Philips v. Archos [19/16] 
(n 765) [77]. 
767 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [193]; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761). 
768 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [65]–[69]; Case Unidentified Parties, LG Mannheim of 4 March 2016, 7 
O 24/14, pp 34-35; Philips v. Archos [209/15] (n 765); Philips v. Archos [19/16] (n 765) [77]. 
769 Case Pioneer v. Acer, LG Mannheim of 8 January 2016, 7 O 96/14, paras 109 et seq. 
770 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [198].  
771 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [65]–[69]; Case Unidentified Parties, LG Mannheim of 4 March 2016, 7 
O 24/14, pp 34-35; Philips v. Archos [209/15] (n 765); Philips v. Archos [19/16] (n 765) [77]. 
772 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [200]. 
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and the FRAND offer. Taking into account that the telecommunications sector is 
constantly evolving and that undertakings (and therefore potential infringers) must act 
quickly in order to bring their products and services to market773, I consider more efficient 
if the alert and the submission of the offer by the SEP holder – the third step (see below, 
Section 4.3.) – would constitute a single step.  
 
The view of the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille774 regarding the content of the 
notification varies from that of German courts. In its view, SEP holder's notification of 
infringement has to contain the following information: (i) an overview, including each 
SEP and its filing date; (ii) the parts of the standard implementing the respective patented 
technology; (iii) an indication of the devices embodying such use; (iv) an indication of 
the consequences of acts of unauthorized use; as well as (v) information to the recipient 
about its option to contest both the communicated information and the validity of the 
patents at issue. The main difference is that the filling date, the consequences and the 
information about implementer’s options are not mentioned in the German case law. 
 
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales775 is of the opinion that the precise content of 
such a notification depends upon all circumstances of the particular case. In addition, in 
line with the Advocate General’s view (see above, Section 4.1.2.), it considers that if an 
implementer is familiar with the technical details and the SEPs it may be infringing, but 
has no intention of taking a FRAND licence, the SEP holder should not be denied an 
injunction simply because it had not made a formal notification prior to the initiation of 
infringement proceedings. 
4.1.4. Remarks  
This obligation was not required in the Orange Book judgment or in Samsung and 
Motorola, probably because the German Federal Supreme Court and the Commission 
assumed that the alleged infringer will always know about the infringement, not being 
necessary to consider the prior alert as an element of the antitrust infringement. Namely, 
prior to initiating injunction proceedings, usually, parties will have already been engaged 
in discussions concerning the infringement of the SEP and the possibility of concluding 
a licence on FRAND terms in relation to those products, because SEP holder’s aim is to 
be remunerated for the use of its patent. And indeed, the lack of agreement will have led 
the SEP owner to bring the infringement action. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable 
that a SEP owner will bring an infringement action without having that discussion before.   
 
From my point of view, the lack of prior alert by the SEP holder might suggest that it 
does not want to license its SEP. That might be useful in case SEP owners’ behaviour 
was treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license SEPs – the approach I defend in Chapter 
5 –, to reinforce the categorization of the behaviour. In the Orange Book judgment, the 
                                                
773 Huawei AG (n 137) [82]. 
774 Case Wiko v. Sisvel, Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille of 20 September 2016, 2016F01637. 
775 Case Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, para 273.  
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non-SEP owner’s behaviour was not treated as a refusal, but as a novel category of abuse. 
However, it was stated that the patent owner would abuse its dominant position when 
bringing infringement actions (so the defendant could rely on a competition law-based 
defence against the injunction claim) if, in addition to the presence of other two 
requirements, it refused to conclude a patent licence agreement with the defendant on 
non-discriminatory and non-restrictive terms (see above, Section 2.1.2.1.). Therefore, 
according to the German Federal Supreme Court, the refusal in itself constitutes one of 
the elements of the antitrust infringement.  
 
4.2. Expression of willingness 
4.2.1. ECJ 
On its part, the alleged infringer has to express its willingness to conclude a licensing 
agreement on FRAND terms776. The ECJ does not give further indications about this 
requirement. For instance, it does not specify what behaviour should be considered as an 
expression of willingness, when it must express its willingness or in which form. 
According to the Regional Court of Düsseldorf – who referred the preliminary questions 
to the ECJ –, the willingness to negotiate was apparent from ZTE’s written offers to 
conclude an agreement that incorporated, in part, Huawei’s proposals. For instance, the 
fact that the alleged infringer is using the SEP without a licensing agreement, might it be 
considered as an expression of being willing to become a legal licensee?  
 
Likewise, it is also not clear what would be the consequence of not expressing its 
willingness at that stage, because the ECJ literally states: ‘Secondly, after the alleged 
infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND 
terms, it is for the proprietor of the SEP to present to that alleged infringer a specific, 
written offer for a licence on FRAND terms’777.  
 
It might be understood that if the SEP owner, before bringing the infringement action, 
alerted the alleged infringement and subsequently, it did not express its willingness to 
enter into a license agreement, it did not comply with its obligation. Accordingly, the SEP 
owner would not be abusing its dominant position and the court ought to prohibit 
the continuation of the infringement (the prohibitory injunction) and order to stop the 
commercialization of the infringing products (the recall of products). 
 
However, the Advocate General does not consider the expression of willingness as the 
prerequisite for the SEP owner to submit the offer778, because it only makes the following 
statement779 that seems to refer more to the economic capacity of the alleged infringer, 
than to his willingness: ‘To the extent that the infringer is and remains ‘able’ to conclude 
                                                
776 Huawei (n 35) [63]. 
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778 Huawei AG (n 137) [85]. 
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and comply with a licensing agreement on FRAND terms and, in particular, to pay an 
appropriate royalty, the SEP-holder must, given the importance of what is at stake, take 
certain specific steps before bringing an action for a prohibitory injunction in order to 
honour its commitment and discharge its special responsibility under Article 102 TFEU’. 
Accordingly, it might be interpreted that the expression of willingness does not constitute 
a prerequisite, but a mere formality, so even if there is no such expression, the SEP holder 
must submit an offer.  
 
But bearing in mind the ECJ’s concluding statement780, I understand that the alleged 
infringer is obliged to express its willingness: ‘Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as 
meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard [...] does not abuse its 
dominant position [...] as long as [...] has, first, alerted the alleged infringer [...] and, 
secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing 
agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer [...]’.  
4.2.2. National Courts 
4.2.2.1. Active subject 
 
The Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe781 concluded that when a SEP holder requested 
an injunction against the distributor of devices, the declared willingness of the 
manufacturer of the same devices to enter into a FRAND license could preclude the 
granting of an injunction. Note that a patent holder could seek injunction orders against 
any business in the supply chain of the product that infringes the respective SEP – which 
includes manufacturers and distributors. 
 
4.2.2.2. The form and content  
 
The Regional Court of Düsseldorf782 considers that given the circumstances of the 
specific case, SEP users’ declaration of willingness to obtain a FRAND licence can be 
made even implicitly. 
 
According to the High Court of Justice of England and Wales783, the Huawei requirement 
of ‘willingness to enter into a license’ refers to a willingness which is unqualified. In 
other words, a willing licensee must be one willing to take a FRAND licence on whatever 
terms are in fact FRAND, unconditionally. Those terms might be settled by negotiation, 
by a court or by an arbitrator but to insist on any particular term runs the risk that that 
term is not FRAND.  
 
 
                                                
780 Huawei (n 35) [77.1]. 
781 Case St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, OLG Karlsruhe of 23 April 2015, 6 U 44/15, paras 19 and 21.  
782 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [208].  
783 Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017[ (n 737) [708].  
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4.2.2.3. Without delay  
 
German courts not only consider that expressing willingness is compulsory, but also 
doing it promptly, without delay – although the ECJ does not refer to that last point. 
Nevertheless, the time frame within which the SEP user must declare its willingness must 
be determined on a case by case basis, albeit the more detailed the infringement 
notification is, the less time is available to the implementer to express its willingness to 
conclude a FRAND licensing agreement. Namely, if the SEP holder’s notification of 
infringement contains only the minimum required information, a reaction within a period 
of five or even three months could be expected. In case the infringement notification 
contains information going beyond the required minimum, an even quicker reaction could 
be required from the SEP user under certain circumstances784.  
 
For instance, the Regional Court of Mannheim785 concluded that the SEP implementer 
(manufacturer) was not willing to enter into a license agreement, because after it had 
become aware of the court action brought by the SEP holder against the distributor of its 
products (Deutsche Telekom), it took the defendant more than three months to request a 
license from the SEP holder. In the same vein, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf786 
concluded that the defendant did not comply with its obligation because it took more than 
five months to react to the notification of infringement made by the SEP holder and then, 
it only responded asking for proof of the alleged infringement.  
 
So in both cases, SEP proprietors continued the infringement action without violating 
Article 102 TFEU, but they still had to grant licenses on FRAND terms. 
 
4.3. SEP holder's submission of the offer  
4.3.1. The ECJ  
The second787 obligation of the SEP proprietor is to present to the alleged infringer a 
specific, written offer for a licence on FRAND terms, in accordance with the undertaking 
given to the standardisation body, specifying, in particular, the amount of the royalty and 
the way in which that royalty is to be calculated.  
 
In respect of the content of the offer, the ECJ788 adds that the termination clause – 
consisting of ending the licensing agreement if the licensee challenges the validity or 
essentiality of the patent – should not be included in the offer. That, first, because SSOs 
do not check whether patents are valid or essential to the standard in which they are 
included during the standardisation procedure. And second, due to the right to effective 
                                                
784 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [207]. 
785 Joined Cases St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, LG Mannheim of 27 November 2015, 2 O 106/14 
(paras 146-149), 2 O 107/14 and 2 O 108/14. 
786 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [214]–[220].  
787 Huawei (n 35) [63]. 
788 ibid [69]. 
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judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter. Thus, the ECJ establishes that 
an alleged infringer cannot be criticised either for challenging, in parallel to the 
negotiations relating to the grant of licences, the validity of those patents and/or the 
essential nature of those patents to the standard in which they are included and/or their 
actual use, or for reserving the right to do so in the future (see Sections 5.3.3.2. and 
5.3.4.3. of Chapter 3, where Commission agrees on it). 
 
The ECJ789 – basing on Advocate General’s790 observation – states that the rationale to 
impose that obligation of submitting an offer on the SEP owner, is that if it gave a 
commitment to the SSO to grant licences on FRAND terms, it can be expected that it will 
make such an offer. Furthermore, in the absence of a public standard licensing agreement, 
and where licensing agreements already concluded with other competitors are not made 
public, the proprietor of the SEP is better placed to check whether its offer complies with 
the condition of non-discrimination than is the alleged infringer. In addition, the Advocate 
General adds that such a requirement is not disproportionate, as the SEP-holder has 
voluntarily undertaken to secure a return on its IP in this manner, thus voluntarily 
restricting the way in which it exercises its exclusive right.  
4.3.2. National Courts 
4.3.2.1. Time frame  
 
In general terms, once the alleged infringer expressed its willingness to conclude a 
licensing agreement, the submission of the FRAND offer by the SEP holder must be made 
prior to the commencement of infringement proceedings, in order to avoid being liable of 
infringing Article 102 TFEU. According to the Regional Court of Düsseldorf791, when 
the implementer does not express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement in due 
time, the SEP holder complies with the Huawei requirement to submit a licensing offer 
on FRAND terms even though the offer is made in the course of the ongoing litigation.  
 
4.3.2.2. Addressee 
 
In view of the Regional Court of Düsseldorf792, it is not required that SEP holders submit 
an individual offer to each company within a group of companies, being sufficient to 
make it only towards the parent company of the SEP implementer. However, the view of 
an Italian court (Tribunale Ordinario di Torino)793 is different – in the same vein, see also 
Section 4.1.3.1. above, regarding the notification of infringement –, because it 
understands that if the SEP holder brings an action only against the SEP implementer, 
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790 Huawei AG (n 137) [86]. 
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SEP holder's offer for a licensing agreement towards the parent company of the 
implementer does not meet the Huawei requirement. 
 
4.3.2.3. Worldwide portfolio license 
 
It has been criticized by scholars the fact that The Framework proposed by the ECJ in 
Huawei does not seem to take into account many aspects that come into play in practice, 
when negotiating SEP license contracts. For example, patent pools, cross licensing, 
portfolio licensing794, grant-backs of non-SEPs and global licenses795. 
 
According to national courts, SEP holders’ offer for a worldwide portfolio license is in 
line with the Huawei requirement, so it would not be contrary to competition law. In 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei796, the Judge Birss did not find problematic, in principle, when 
SEP holders demand licenses broader than the ones strictly required by the activities of 
the relevant implementer – cross licenses and global licenses –, as long as: (i) they are 
FRAND; and (ii) SEP owners do not ‘insist on them’ – they do not constitute a sine qua 
non condition for the grant of the required licenses. What is more, he concluded that the 
worldwide licence was the FRAND licence for a portfolio like Unwired Planet’s and an 
implementer like Huawei. Therefore, an insistence by Huawei on a licence with a UK 
only scope was not FRAND. In the same vein, the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales797 stated that there may be circumstances in which only a worldwide licence or at 
least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND. Hence, the fact that they concluded that 
injunctions are appropriate when a licensee refuses to enter into a worldwide license 
covering SEPs, it might cause SEP owners to be particularly inclined to sue for an 
injunction in the UK (forum shopping)798.  
 
The Regional Court of Düsseldorf also considered that offers for worldwide portfolio 
licenses are, in general accepted, unless the circumstances of the specific case require that 
licenses take a different approach. For instance, if the implementer limits its market 
activity to one geographical market, the geographical scope of the licence would have to 
                                                
794 Miguel Rato and Mark English, ‘An Assessment of Injunctions, Patents, and Standards Following the 
Court of Justice's Huawei/ZTE Ruling’ (2016) 7 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 103, 
112, para 7. 
795 Damien Geradin, ‘European Union Competition Law, Intellectual Property Law and Standardization’ in 
Jorge L. Contreras (ed), The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Competition, 
Antitrust, and Patents (Cambridge University Press 2017) 78, 22, para 1 (of the version available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2907632> accessed 26 July 2018). 
796 (n 737) [572]; See also Nicolo Zingales, ‘The Legal Framework for SEP Disputes in EU Post-Huawei: 
Whither Harmonization?’ (2017) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-032, 26, para 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3017102>. 
797 Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2018] (n 775) [56]. 
798 Matthew G. Rose, Jay Jurata and Emily Luken, ‘The UK High Court of Justice issues an injunction 
prohibiting an undertaking from selling wireless telecommunications products in Britain due to its failure 
to enter into a worldwide patent license (Unwired Planet / Huawei)’ (2017) e-Competitions National 
Competition Laws Bulletin, 7, para 2 < http://awa2018.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/article-84684.pdf> 
accessed 24 April 2019. 
 203 
be modified799. In that regard, it ads that when determining whether the geographical 
scope of the licensing agreement offered by the SEP holder complies with FRAND, the 
recognised commercial practice in the relevant sector has to be considered800.  
 
Taking that into account and what has been mentioned above in respect of the addressee, 
in view of Regional Court of Mannheim801, SEP holder's offer for a worldwide portfolio 
license addressed to the parent company of a group of companies complies with the 
Huawei requirement of offering a FRAND license. 
 
4.3.2.4. Content 
 
The ECJ establishes in Huawei that the SEP proprietor has to present to the alleged 
infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on FRAND terms. With regard to the 
specific content of the SEP owner’s offer, it has to specify, in particular, the amount of 
the royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be calculated. And in addition, the offer 
should not include a termination clause.  
 
The Regional Court of Mannheim specified that the offer must contain all essential 
contractual terms and indicate the conditions in a way that, in order to conclude a 
licensing agreement, the implementer only has to accept the offer802. Thus, with the 
information provided by the SEP holder, the SEP implementer has to be able to assess 
the FRAND conformity of the offer803. 
 
For that reason, in the case of quota license agreements, for example, it is not sufficient 
to indicate the royalties per unit without substantiating their FRAND character with 
further explanation. The royalty amount must be made sufficiently transparent, for 
example, by reference to an existing standard licensing program or by indicating other 
reference values allowing to deduce the royalty demanded, such as a pool license fee 
covering patents also relevant for the standard in question804. 
 
4.3.2.5. FRAND royalty assessment 
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ does not provide any guidance regarding the FRAND 
assessment, bearing in mind that a differing view of the parties on what constitutes 
FRAND is to be expected. 
 
                                                
799 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [225] et seq.; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761); Case 
Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [250].  
800 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [225] et seq.; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761). 
801 Pioneer v. Acer [96/14] (n 769) [118]–[129].  
802 ibid; NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765); Philips v. Archos [209/15] (n 765); Philips v. Archos [19/16] (n 
766) [78].  
803 IP Bridge v. HTC (n 762), p 27.  
804 ibid; Philips v. Archos [209/15] (n 765); Philips v. Archos [19/16] (n 765) [84]. 
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According to the Regional Court of Mannheim805, even if the standard implementer 
disputes the FRAND character of the offer, it is not the court’s business – the court 
competent for the injunction proceedings – to determine whether the licensing conditions 
are actually FRAND. Moreover, it considers that a SEP holder meets the Huawei 
requirement, even if its offer lies slightly above the FRAND threshold. However, it would 
not meet it if under the circumstances of the case and without objective justification, the 
offered conditions are manifestly less favourable (in an economic sense) than the 
conditions offered to other licensees. Therefore, the court is only required to determine 
on the basis of a summary assessment, whether SEP holder’s licensing offer evidently 
violates FRAND. 
 
On the contrary, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe806 found that the lower court’s 
rulings (e.g. those of the Regional Court of Mannheim) were manifestly erroneous with 
regard to the standard of review. It considered that as stated clearly by the ECJ, the SEP 
proprietor has to make a licensing offer that qualifies as FRAND – no slightly above 
FRAND – and it is for the respective court to assess the FRAND quality of the offer. 
Besides, a reduced standard of review, consisting merely in a summary assessment of 
whether the offer is evidently non-FRAND, has no basis in Huawei. 
 
In Unwired Planet v. Huawei807, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales stated 
that in each individual case, there is only a single FRAND compliant set of terms 
(including royalty rates), the so-called ‘true FRAND’ terms. In the same line as German 
courts, it concluded that the fact that an opening offered rate is higher than the ‘true 
FRAND rate’ does not mean of itself that SEP owner’s offer is not FRAND.  
 
In variance with the aforementioned decision of the High Court of Justice, the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales808 understood that in a given set of circumstances, a number 
of sets of terms may all be FRAND. The court will normally declare one set of terms as 
FRAND and the patent holder would then have to offer that specific set of terms to the 
implementer. In case the court finds two different sets of terms as being FRAND, then 
the SEP holder will satisfy its FRAND undertaking if it offers either one of them to the 
implementer. Focusing only on royalties, the statement of the Court of Appeal was more 
in line with the Regional Court of Düsseldorf’s809 one, who considered that FRAND 
refers to a range of acceptable royalty rates, so as a rule, there is not only a single FRAND-
compliant royalty rate.  
 
 
 
                                                
805 Pioneer v. Acer [96/14] (n 769) [118]–[129]; NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [58] and [70]–[72]. 
806 Case Pioneer v. Acer, OLG Karlsruhe of 31 May 2016, 6 U 55/16, paras 29-36.  
807 (n 737) [152] and [153].  
808 Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2018] (n 775) [121]–[128].  
809 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [241].  
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4.3.2.6. Non-discrimination 
 
As the Court of Appeal of England and Wales810 asserted, SEP holder's non-
discrimination obligation does not imply a so-called ‘hard-edged’ component, obliging 
the patent holder to offer the same rate to all potential licensees. The FRAND 
commitment prevents the SEP holder from securing rates higher than a ‘benchmark’ rate 
which mirrors a fair valuation of its patents, but it does not prevent the patent holder from 
granting licences at lower rates. 
 
Moreover, as confirmed by German courts, that obligation applies only to similarly 
situated users. Hence, for the assessment of the non-discriminatory character of the offer 
regarding the license fee, information on comparable agreements is needed811. These 
agreements can be subject to ‘external-eyes-only’ restrictions – just towards external 
counsels and independent experts – solely in exceptional cases812.  
 
In addition, when a dominant patent holder chooses to bring infringement actions only 
against certain, but not all competitors in a downstream market (or their suppliers), this 
unequal treatment might also result in a discrimination. Such a conduct is discriminatory 
only if, depending on the overall circumstances of each case, it would have been possible 
for the SEP holder with reasonable efforts to enforce its patent rights against other 
infringers too. Especially in the early stages of the implementation of a standard, the SEP 
holder could lack the means required to enforce its rights against a large number of 
infringers. In this case, the choice to enforce its rights first only against infringers with 
market strength would appear reasonable813. 
 
With respect of relying upon existing comparable licensing agreements that the SEP 
owner concluded with third parties (that were mentioned before), the SEP proprietor may 
seek protection of confidential information contained in such agreements, as long as it 
justifies the existence of confidentiality interests to keep confidential the conditions 
agreed in comparable licensing agreements814.  Inversely, according to the Court of 
Appeal of Paris815,  the disclosure of confidential documents, including comparable 
licensing agreements, will be ordered only depending on which parts or elements of these 
documents may affect business secrets. 
4.3.3. Remarks 
German Federal Supreme Court’s view in Orange Book was the opposite to that of the 
ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE. According to the German judgment, a defendant can rely on a 
competition law-based defence against an injunction claim – so the IP owner would abuse 
                                                
810 Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2018] (n 775) [194] et seq.  
811 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [256] et seq.; IP Bridge v. HTC (n 762), p 27. 
812 Case TQ Delta LLC v. Zyxel [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch), paras 21-28. 
813 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [273] and [274].  
814 Case Unidentified Parties, OLG Düsseldorf of 25 April 2018, I-2 W 8/18, paras 23 and 24. 
815 Case Core Wireless v. LG, Cour d'appel de Paris of 9 October 2018, 15/17037. 
 206 
its dominant position – only if the defendant made the patent proprietor an unconditional 
offer to conclude a license agreement, in addition to the presence of other two 
requirements (see above, Section 2.1.2.1.). The fact that the obligation is on the infringer 
and not on the patent owner might be because in that case, the patent was not a SEP, so 
no FRAND commitment was given by its owner and consequently, it should not be 
expected the owner to make any offer. Hence, it applies the general principle that is the 
infringer who must open negotiations with the patent owner with a view to conclude a 
licensing agreement before committing an infringement816.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to assess the antitrust infringement, the Commission in Samsung 
and Motorola – where SEP owners gave FRAND commitments – did not consider 
relevant that the SEP holder (nor the alleged infringer) had presented a licensing offer on 
FRAND terms either. 
 
4.4. Infringer’s counter-offer 
4.4.1. ECJ and Advocate General 
Once the alleged infringer receives the licensing offer that includes all information 
required for assessing its FRAND conformity817, it is for it diligently to respond to that 
offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, 
a point which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in 
particular, that there are no delaying tactics818.  
 
According to the Advocate General, the conduct of the alleged infringer cannot be 
regarded as dilatory if it asks for FRAND terms to be fixed either by a court or an 
arbitration tribunal when negotiations are unsuccessful. And it ads, that in that event, it 
would be legitimate for the SEP holder to ask the infringer either to provide a bank 
guarantee for the payment of royalties or to deposit a provisional sum (which will be fixed 
by the court or arbitration tribunal) at the court or arbitration tribunal in respect of its past 
and future use of the SEP819. Nor can an infringer’s conduct be regarded as dilatory if it 
reserves the right, after concluding an agreement for such a licence, to challenge before a 
court or arbitration tribunal the validity of that patent, the supposed use of the teaching of 
the patent (if the use was legal or illegal, or even the existence of the use) and the essential 
nature of the SEP in question820. 
 
In that sense, the Advocate General821 ads that if during the negotiations the infringer 
reserves that right, it would be also legitimate for the SEP holder to ask the infringer 
either to provide a bank guarantee for the payment of royalties or to deposit a provisional 
                                                
816 Huawei AG (n 137) [77]. 
817 Case Unidentified Parties [LG Düsseldorf] (n 760) [267]; IP Bridge v. HTC (n 762), p 27. 
818 Huawei (n 35) [65]. 
819 Huawei AG (n 137) [93] and [103.4]. 
820 ibid [103.5]. 
821 ibid [93] and [94]. 
 207 
sum (which will be fixed by the court or arbitration tribunal) at the court or arbitration 
tribunal in respect of its past and future use of the SEP. Indeed, as the Commission, the 
referring court – Regional Court of Düsseldorf – and the Advocate General stated, it is in 
the public interest for an alleged infringer to have the opportunity, after concluding a 
licensing agreement, to challenge the validity of a SEP (as ZTE did in Huawei v. ZTE). 
If undertakings supplying standard-compliant products and services cannot call into 
question the validity of a patent declared to be essential to that standard, not only do they 
run the risk of paying a royalty which is not due (undertakings which implement a 
standard do not have to pay for IPRs which they are not using).  But it could prove 
effectively impossible to verify the validity of that patent (which all operators on the 
market in question are obliged to use) because other undertakings would have no interest 
in bringing proceedings in that regard, since they do not use the teaching of a patent and 
challenging the validity of a patent is very costly822.  
 
If the alleged infringer does not accept the offer, it has to submit to the proprietor of the 
SEP in question, promptly and in writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to 
FRAND terms823. Consequently, not responding to the offer or the mere rejection– 
without making any counter-offer – or making a counter-offer belatedly or not in writing 
or not on FRAND terms, it entails that that the alleged infringer cannot rely on the abusive 
nature of an action for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products, so the court would 
uphold the actions brought by the SEP owner. And conversely, if the alleged infringer 
submits a counter-offer on FRAND terms promptly and in writing, it might use the 
competition law-based defence. Nevertheless, as it will be explained subsequently in 
Section 4.5., once it submits it, it is not clear since when or under what circumstances the 
alleged infringer might use that defence.  
 
According to the Advocate General824, there are no more obligations that parties have to 
comply with. Consequently, it is for the referring court to verify whether – and, if so, to 
what extent – the conduct of parties is in keeping with those guidelines (see Sections 4.1. 
- 4.4.). Nevertheless, the ECJ provides more guidance (see Section 4.5.). 
4.4.2. German Courts 
4.4.2.1. Absolute obligation 
 
It has been also questioned whether the alleged infringer is obliged to submit a counter-
offer when it rejects SEP owner’s offer because it considered it was not FRAND. 
According to the ECJ, the SEP holder is obliged to submit an offer on FRAND terms, so 
if it is not FRAND, it should be concluded that it did not comply with his obligation, so 
it would be abusing its dominant position. In Germany for example, there is not unanimity 
                                                
822 ibid [95], [96] and fn 64.  
823 Huawei (n 35) [66]. 
824 Huawei AG (n 137) [90]. 
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among courts on that regard. Some of them825 are of the opinion that the alleged infringer 
is bound in any case. Whereas other tribunals826 have stated the opposite. And halfway, 
there are courts827 who understand that in case the SEP holder’s offer is evidently not 
FRAND on basis of a summary assessment, the alleged infringer would no longer be 
bound to make a counter-offer.  
 
4.4.2.2. Without delay 
 
In respect of the promptness, the ECJ does not specify the time frame for the exchange 
of offers and counter-offers between the parties or the duration of the licensing 
negotiations. According to the Advocate General828, they must be assessed in the light of 
the ‘commercial window of opportunity’ available to the SEP holder for securing a return 
on its patent in the sector in question. In any case, licensing negotiations must be opened 
(and concluded) quickly, given that the infringer is using the teaching of a SEP (without 
paying for it). In German courts’829 words, a potential counter offer needs to be made in 
due course, which means as soon as possible, taking into account the recognized 
commercial practices in the field and good faith. But at the same time, the SEP user should 
be given sufficient time to assess the SEP holder's offer and eventually make a counter-
offer, before infringement proceedings are initiated by the SEP owner830. 
 
For instance, the Regional Court of Mannheim831 understood that the implementer could 
not use the competition law-based defence because it did not comply with its obligation 
of submitting a counter-offer promptly, since it presented the counter-offer a year and a 
half after receiving the offer from the SEP holder and half a year after being sued for 
patent infringement. 
 
4.4.2.3. Content 
 
Besides the promptness and being in writing, the ECJ does not demand any additional 
requirement in regard to the FRAND counter-offer. Nevertheless, German courts have 
specified the content the counter-offer must have in order to consider it FRAND. Hence, 
a counter-offer will only be considered to be FRAND if it specifies the amount of 
royalties. Otherwise, even if the amount could be determined by an independent third 
                                                
825 Joined Cases Sisvel v. Haier (n 792) [93/14] [98]–[101] and [144/14]; St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom 
[106/14] (n 785) [153]–[160].  
826 Case Sisvel v. Haier, OLG Düsseldorf of 30 March 2017, I-15 U 65/15 [23]–[30] (it is the appeal against 
the Sisvel v. Haier (n 792) [144/14]. It refused to grant an injunction and instead, it ordered Haier to pay 
damages and to render specific sales information). 
827 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [59] et seq.; Case Unidentified Parties [24/14] (n 768), p 25; Philips v. 
Archos [209/15] (n 765); Philips v. Archos [19/16] (n 765) [80].  
828 Huawei AG (n 137) [89] and fn 56.  
829 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [58] and [70]–[72]; Philips v. Archos [19/16] (n 765) [80]; Case 
Unidentified Parties [24/14] (n 768), p 38. 
830 IP Bridge v. HTC (n 762), p 26.  
831 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (n 765) [59] et seq.  
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party, the implementer would not be complying with its obligation in accordance with the 
provisions set in Huawei v. ZTE832.  
 
In addition, if the alleged infringer distributes products using the SEP in question in more 
than one geographical market – hence, infringing the SEP in several countries –, SEP 
implementer’s counter-offer would not be FRAND if it was limited to a license for a 
single market (e.g. Germany)833. 
 
4.5. Uncertainty post counter-offer  
 
Considering that the alleged infringer submitted a counter-offer, the SEP owner might 
reject it (with/without a counter-offer submission) or might directly not respond. 
However, the ECJ only refers to the case in which the alleged infringer’s counter-offer is 
rejected. But it does not give any guidance with respect to other ways in which the SEP 
owner might behave. 
 
In that regard, the ECJ literally states the following: ‘Should the alleged infringer not 
accept the offer made to it, it may rely on the abusive nature of an action for a prohibitory 
injunction or for the recall of products only if it has submitted to the proprietor of the SEP 
in question, promptly and in writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND 
terms’834. And then it ads: ‘Furthermore, where the alleged infringer is using the teachings 
of the SEP before a licensing agreement has been concluded, it is for that alleged 
infringer, from the point at which its counter-offer is rejected, to provide appropriate 
security in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field, for example by 
providing a bank guarantee or by placing the amounts necessary on deposit. The 
calculation of that security must include, inter alia, the number of the past acts of use of 
the SEP, and the alleged infringer must be able to render an account in respect of those 
acts of use’835.  
 
Firstly, it is not clear why the ECJ makes a special reference to ‘the alleged infringer who 
is using the teachings of the SEP before a licensing agreement has been concluded’. The 
issue of discussing whether bringing infringement actions seeking for a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, it is 
because the alleged infringer is implementing the SEP without paying royalties – patent 
infringement. And due to the essential nature of the patent and the given FRAND 
commitments, it raises if the defendant is able to defend himself against the claims by 
pleading that the SEP owner abuses its dominant position on the market.  
Moreover, in the telecommunication industry the agreements to license SEPs on FRAND 
terms are negotiated and concluded ex post, that is to say, after the use of the teaching 
                                                
832 St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom [106/14] (n 785) [158]–[164]; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 
761) [291] et seq.; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761). 
833 Pioneer v. Acer [96/14] (n 769) [131]–[133]; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [291] et seq.; St. 
Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761). 
834 Huawei (n 35) [66]. 
835 ibid [67]. 
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protected by the SEP has begun. That, because even large undertakings are unable to 
verify in advance whether all the patents relating to a standard – which were notified to 
ETSI – were essential and valid or whether being (allegedly) essential and valid patents, 
they have been infringed. The administrative and financial burden involved in that 
assessment would be so onerous and the investment in time so considerable as to make it 
impossible in practice to use the standard. Huawei itself pointed out that is unrealistic to 
require a standard implementer to enter into negotiations to secure a licence for any patent 
declared essential before even making use of that patent836. 
 
Notwithstanding, later on in the concluding statement, the ECJ837 assumes that the alleged 
infringer is using the teachings of the SEP without a licensing agreement, when it states 
that: ‘Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent 
essential to a standard [...] does not abuse its dominant position [...] as long as   prior to 
bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the 
infringement complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in 
which it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its 
willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that 
infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in particular, the 
royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated; and where the alleged infringer 
continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer has not diligently responded 
to that offer [...]’. 
 
Secondly, the ECJ’s statements lead to divergent interpretations about when the alleged 
infringer – who continues to use the SEP – may use the competition law-based defence. 
That is to say, if once the alleged infringer submits the counter-offer or when it provides 
the appropriate security. It might be interpreted that the alleged infringer may use the 
competition law-based defence from the moment it submits the counter-offer, being 
irrelevant the SEP owner’s reaction to the counter-offer, that is, whether it rejects it or it 
does not respond to it. The above, because the ECJ is conditioning the use of that defence 
to the counter-offer submission (‘only if’). Nevertheless, it might be also understood that 
the obligation to provide appropriate security only arises if alleged infringer’s counter-
offer is rejected (submitting or not a counter-offer), but not when it does not respond to 
it. Accordingly, if the SEP owner does not give a response, the alleged infringer – who 
continues using the SEP – might use the competition law-based defence without 
providing security. Whereas if the counter-offer was rejected, the provision of the security 
would be necessary to use that defence. Lastly, if it is considered that the absence of 
response to the counter-offer after a period of time constitutes an implicit rejection, the 
conclusion would be that in order to use the competition law-based defence, the alleged 
infringer would have to provide the appropriate security in any event, regardless of 
whether the SEP owner rejects the counter-offer explicitly or implicitly. 
 
                                                
836 Huawei AG (n 137) fn 54. 
837 Huawei (n 35) [71] and [77.1]. 
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According to what the ECJ states in the concluding statement838 (see above), the first 
interpretation prevails, because it states that the SEP owner abuses its dominant position 
if it complied with its obligations (prior alert and offer submission) and ‘the alleged 
infringer has not diligently responded to that offer’. Hence, once it submits the counter-
offer, it is allowed to use the competition law-based defence. Consequently, the question 
arises of why the ECJ refers to the obligation to provide appropriate security if it is not 
compulsory in order to use the competition law-based defence. It is a mere suggestion (as 
the voluntary step of being the FRAND terms determined by a third party, see below) and 
the fact of not being compulsory protects the alleged infringer, who will probably opt not 
to provide any security.  
 
Nevertheless, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf839 in Sisvel v. Haier and St. Lawrence v. 
Vodafone adopts the second interpretation. Namely, it understands that implementers 
cannot use the competition law-based defence because they did not comply with their 
obligation of providing appropriate security in due time – an obligation that arises when 
the first counter-offer is rejected, regardless of whether further offers and counter-offers 
are submitted. Indeed, implementers provided adequate securities to guarantee the 
payment of royalties in relation to past uses of the SEPs more than a month after their 
counter-offers were rejected. The Court also added that the Huawei requirement is also 
not met, when the implementer only proposes to have the security – if requested by the 
SEP holder – determined by an arbitration tribunal or by a different court. Moreover, the 
Regional Court of Mannheim840 clarifies that the fact that the implementer has allegedly 
terminated its use of the SEP, does not remove its obligation to provide security for past 
periods of use. 
 
I am of the opinion that in order to use the competition law-based defence, the alleged 
infringer always must provide – together with the counter-offer – exhaustive rendering of 
accounts and deposit the payment of royalties according to its own calculation, because 
it is using a SEP without paying royalties. With that conduct, it shows willingness to enter 
into a license agreement and it constitutes an appropriate security for the SEP owner. In 
addition, in any case, as long as the alleged infringer implements the SEP when 
manufacturing its products, it will have to pay royalties (whether it is allowed to use the 
competition law-based defence or not). That suggestion would be in line with the Orange 
Book judgment (see above, Section 2.1.2.1.) and consequently, also with referring court’s 
– Regional Court of Düsseldorf – view (see above, Section 2.3.).  
 
However, the Advocate General841 is of the contrary opinion, because it does not consider 
that in cases concerning the use of a SEP – where the patent owner has made a 
commitment to grant licenses on FRAND terms –, it should be imposed that obligation 
                                                
838 ibid. 
839 Joined Cases Sisvel v. Haier (n 792) [93/14] [103]–[111] and [144/14]; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] 
(n 761) [267] et seq. and [299] et seq.; St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [126/14] (n 761) [304].  
840 Pioneer v. Acer [96/14] (n 769) [124] et seq.  
841 Huawei AG (n 137) [98]. 
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on the infringer before concluding a licensing agreement, because that obligation will 
arise only from the future licensing agreement. It considers that is enough that the 
infringer shows itself to be objectively ready, willing and able (see below, Section 6) to 
conclude a licensing agreement. And that in those circumstances, the SEP holder may 
require the provision of a bank guarantee for the future payment of royalties or the deposit 
of a provisional sum for past and future use of its patent. The Advocate General’s 
suggestion is less vague when he proposes the possibility of requiring that provision of 
security when the alleged infringer asks to be the FRAND terms fixed either by a court 
or an arbitration tribunal or when it reserves the right to challenge the validity, the 
supposed use of the teaching of the patent and the essential nature of the SEP (see above, 
Section 4.4.1.).  
 
All in all, it can be concluded that once the alleged infringer submits the counter-offer 
(without providing the appropriate security), the SEP owner is obliged to accept the 
counter-offer, without being possible to submit an offer in response (although as 
mentioned above, some German courts consider possible the submission of subsequent 
offers and counter-offers) or to submit the determination of FRAND terms to a third party 
– unless the alleged infringer also agrees on the later. That, because from the moment the 
alleged infringer submits its counter-offer or provides the appropriate security in case it 
has been rejected, the implementer might use the competition law-based defence and the 
SEP owner would be liable for abusing its dominant position. The logic behind that 
argument is that accepting the counter-offer, the SEP owner would be remunerated for 
the use of its SEP (thus achieving its goal). Notwithstanding, if it does not respond or it 
rejects it and continues with the patent infringement proceeding seeking for a prohibitory 
injunction or the recall of products, it would be understood that its purpose is to exclude 
competitors from the market (the anti-competitive effect, see below Section 5.1.). 
 
4.6. FRAND terms determination by a third party   
 
As mentioned above, if the SEP owner does not accept the alleged infringer’s counter-
offer (it rejects it or it does not give a response), the alleged infringer may use the 
competition law-based defence. Nevertheless, parties may continue without having 
reached a licensing agreement. That will depend on how the national court decides to 
enforce the competition law, because the ECJ does not give any additional guidance842. 
 
Consequently, it is not clear why the ECJ843 states that where no agreement is reached on 
the details of the FRAND terms following the counter-offer by the alleged infringer, the 
parties may, by common agreement, request that the amount of the royalty be determined 
by an independent third party, by decision without delay. Suggesting this voluntary step, 
                                                
842 On the contrary, see Petit, ‘Huaweï v. ZTE: Judicial Conservatism’ (n 161) 7, para 2 (‘[...] if the SEP 
holder makes a FRAND offer in the upper bound, and the implementer makes a FRAND counter-offer in 
the lower bound, the parties “may” submit their dispute to third-party determination. But if they disagree 
over this, the ultimate question is what happens. And on this, the Court gives no guidance’). 
843 Huawei (n 35) [68]. 
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the ECJ acknowledges that the source of the problem about the lawfulness of bringing 
infringement actions by SEP owners lies on the lack of clarity as to what is meant by 
‘FRAND terms’844. However, the voluntary nature of the mechanism does not contribute 
to solve the problem of lack of licensing agreement. 
 
In that regard, scholars criticised the fact that the ECJ did not define the meaning of fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory845, that is necessary to determine – according to 
Huawei v. ZTE judgment –, if SEP owner’s offer and alleged infringer’s counter-offer are 
FRAND. In this respect, it is applicable the argumentation already used to justify why the 
ECJ was right not defining the relevant market and not assessing the existence of a 
dominant position (see above, Section 3.2.). That is to say, the Court is called upon to 
determine whether – and, if so, under what circumstances – an action for infringement 
brought by a SEP holder who gave a commitment to grant licences on FRAND terms 
constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. The questions raised by the referring court 
do not concern the specific terms of a FRAND licence. In AG’s846 opinion,  they lie in 
the discretion of the parties and, where appropriate, the civil courts and arbitration 
tribunals. 
 
In my opinion, it was not necessary for the ECJ to formally establish a method to calculate 
FRAND royalties, that should apply in any case. Depending on the circumstances of each 
case847 – the SEP in question, the type of standardized market and the SEP holders 
concerned –, one method848  may be more appropriate than another. In case of lack of 
agreement between the parties on royalties, courts and arbitral tribunals are the most 
appropriate to determine them. In contract law, the use of general terms, such as FRAND 
is common, so courts are used to interprete them and to determine the due amount849. 
Besides, they may also appoint experts if necessary. For instance, in Unwired Planet v. 
                                                
844 Huawei AG (n 137) [9]. 
845 Lundqvist, ‘The Interface’ (n 723) 400, para 4 (‘[…] it is unfortunate that the development of the 
standardization/intellectual property/competition law interface has developed in ways, which force national 
courts to become something of pricing authorities’); Galli, ‘The FRAND Defense’ (n 693) 202, para 2; 
Rato and English, ‘An Assessment of Injunctions’ (n 794) 110, para 6; Robin Jacob and Alexander Milner, 
‘Lessons from Huawei v. ZTE’ (4iPCouncil 2016) 2, para 4 <https://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latest-
research-4ip-council-lessons-huawei-v-zte> accessed 26 July 2018; Colangelo  and Torti, ‘Filling Huawei's 
Gaps’ (n 723) 3 and 4; Geradin, ‘European Union Competition Law’ (n 795) 21, para 1; Ioannis Lianos, 
Valentine Korah and Paolo Siciliani (eds), ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property (IP) Rights: 
Analysis, Cases and Materials’ in Competition Law: text, cases and materials (Hart 2017), 145, para 15, 
146-156 (of the version available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2863814> 
accessed 26 July 2018); Meli, ‘The CJEU judgment in the Huawei/ZTE case’ (n 723) 10-13. 
846 Huawei AG (n 137) [40]. 
847 Damien Geradin, ‘Ten Years of DG Competition Effort to Provide Guidance on the Application of 
Competition Rules to the Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents: Where Do We Stand?’ (2013) SSRN 
Electronic Journal 20, para 3 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204359> accessed 26 
July 2018; Geradin, ‘European Union Competition Law’ (n 795) 21, para 1. 
848 Pentheroudakis, Baron and Thumm, ‘Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents’ (n 45) 59-64 and 
84-99 (Regarding the royalty rate: the 15 Georgia-Pacific factors, the bottom-up approach or the top-down 
approach. In relation to the royalty base: the entire market value rule or the smallest saleable patent 
practicing unit). 
849 Geradin, ‘The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable”’ (n 50) 928-930; Galli, ‘The FRAND Defense’ (n 693) 
193, para 1. 
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Huawei850, the Judge offers two possible methods to calculate the FRAND royalties, 
considering they are the most appropriate in that given case. 
 
What is relevant when determining the most appropriate method to calculate FRAND 
royalties is that they must assure the patent holder at least as much profit as it could have 
obtained through refusal to license, as well as compensate the licensor for any incremental 
costs associated with licensing. If the patented technology is clearly superior to other 
technologies that could have been used to form the standard, this minimum royalty is likely 
to be significant. At the same time, the FRAND license must offer the licensee an 
opportunity to profit from the license, if it is able to manufacture the product utilizing the 
IP at a lower cost than the licensor851. 
4.6.1. Suggestion: mandatory nature  
I do not agree with the ECJ when considering that the SEP owner abuses its dominant 
position if it rejects the counter-offer submitted by the alleged infringer (providing the 
appropriate security, if necessary), because each of the parties submits an offer and a 
counter-offer and none of them should prevail over the other, in order to avoid anti-
competitive – exploitative – behaviours such as, reverse holdup (see Section 1.3.1.4. of 
Chapter 1) and holdup (see Section 1.3.1.1. of Chapter 1). 
 
Namely, in Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ opts to protect the alleged infringer over the SEP 
owner, because alleged infringer’s counter-offer on FRAND terms must be accepted by 
the SEP owner in order to consider that is not abusing its dominant position. Moreover, 
it is not clear if the alleged infringer is obliged to provide appropriate security to use the 
competition law-based defence (a strict interpretation of the Huawei judgment suggests 
it is not obliged, while according to German courts it is). That might lead to a reverse 
holdup behaviour that consists of SEP implementers using their leverage to force the SEP 
owner to accept royalties that are lower than the value of the contribution of their 
technologies to a standard – below FRAND.  
 
While the Orange Book judgment overprotects the SEP owner, because although it is 
obliged to accept the unconditional offer – since it cannot reject it without violating the 
prohibition of discrimination or anti-competitive behaviour –, ultimately, the offer will 
include that the licensor is who determines the amount of royalties according to its own 
reasonable discretion. Besides, the defendant who will be using the subject matter of the 
patent, it has to provide an exhaustive account of past acts of use and pay the amount of 
the royalty that has itself calculated therefrom. Accordingly, the SEP owner might holdup 
the alleged infringer demanding it excessive royalties comparing to those it would require 
                                                
850 Jorge L. Contreras, ‘A New Perspective on FRAND Royalties: Unwired Planet v. Huawei’ (2017) 
University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 206, 6, para 2 (the judge offers two possible 
methods of calculating the FRAND royalty, one based on an analysis of comparable license rates, the other 
based on a top-down analysis of the total aggregate royalty that should be attributable to the standards and 
SEPs at issue) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2949449> accessed 26 July 2018. 
851 Alfaro Águila-Real, El abuso de posición dominante (n 109) 247, para 4. 
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ex ante – before the standard was set by the SSO – in breach of its commitment to grant 
licenses on FRAND terms. 
 
Consequently, in my view – that is halfway between what is stated in Huawei v. ZTE and 
Orange Book –, the ECJ should have established that having FRAND terms determined 
by a third party is compulsory. Accordingly, once the alleged infringer submits its 
counter-offer in the second round (hence, four offers would be exchanged), within a 
specific period of time, parties have to submit the FRAND royalties’ determination to an 
independent third party (court or arbitration tribunal) and commit to be bound by its 
decision. Note that in Samsung and Motorola, the Commission defined the ‘willing 
licensee’ (see also Section 6.2.) as the one that in the event that bilateral negotiations do 
not come to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be bound by a third party’s (a court or 
mutually agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate. Ultimately, the aim 
is for patents to be licensed in FRAND terms, because this is why they have the SEP 
status. 
 
Hence, in case the SEP owner does not want to submit the determination of FRAND 
royalties to a third party, it would be abusing its dominant position under Article 102 
TFEU. If it is the alleged infringer who refuses to submit it, it would not be allowed to 
use the competition law-based defence and the court would order the prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products. The same would apply if once the third party 
determines the amount of royalties, the SEP owner does not enable the use of the SEP or 
the alleged infringer does not pay due royalties.  
 
Some852 also suggested that the ECJ should have established that if after a period of time 
parties did not decide to submit the case to a third party, the terms of the license must be 
determined by the court. 
5. Anti-competitive effect 
 
5.1. Exclusion 
 
According to the ECJ, the third element of the abuse refers to the anti-competitive effect 
that SEP owner’s behaviour might cause. It states that bringing actions for a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products might be abusive if those proceedings are liable to 
prevent products complying with the standard in question manufactured by competitors 
from appearing or remaining on the market and, thereby, SEP owners would reserve the 
manufacture of the products in question for themselves853. Indeed, the seeking of these 
measures by the SEP owner is capable of restricting competition, regardless of whether 
the court finally upholds these actions or not, because they entail to cease the infringement 
and to recall the products that infringe the SEP from the market.  
 
                                                
852 Geradin, ‘European Union Competition Law’ (n 795) 19, para 2. 
853 Huawei (n 35) [73]. 
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The absence of that anti-competitive effect is the reason why – as mentioned in Section 
3.1. – bringing actions for infringement seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to 
past acts of use of the SEP or an award of damages in respect of those acts of use, are not 
regarded as an abuse under Article 102 TFEU854. Namely, that behaviour does not have 
a direct impact on the standard-compliant products manufactured by competitors, because 
in case the court upheld these actions, they would only entail an accounting and payment 
obligation on the infringer, because the sole purpose of such claims is to compensate the 
SEP holder for previous infringements of its patent855. 
 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission defined the exclusionary effect of SEP 
owners’ behaviour in those same terms. However, unlike the ECJ – who configured 
Huawei’s behaviour solely as an exclusionary abuse –, the Commission treated SEP 
owners’ conduct as two different abuses, exclusionary and exploitative (see Sections 
5.3.3.1. and 5.3.3.2. of Chapter 3, respectively). Namely, it pointed out that their 
behaviour might lead either to the exclusion from the market of standard-compliant 
products or to the acceptance by a potential licensee of unfavourable licensing terms for 
the future use of a SEP (see Section 6.1. of Chapter 3). 
 
5.2. SEPs owned by NPEs 
 
One of the most extensively discussed issues has been whether the criteria established in 
Huawei v. ZTE is also applicable when SEP holders are NPEs (see Section ‘Background’ 
of the Introduction). NPEs are companies that are dedicated solely to license their SEPs 
to third parties, but do not practice the patented inventions in the market (they do not 
manufacture or sell any products or processes), because SEP implementers would not be 
their competitors.  
5.2.1. Arguments for and against the application 
Some856 are of the opinion that the same legal standard established in Huawei would apply 
to the seeking of an injunction and the recall of products by a pure licensing entity which 
is not a competing manufacturer – NPEs –, because the ECJ857 does not make any special 
reference to these entities in its judgment. Of that same opinion is the Commissioner for 
Competition, Vestager858 and consequently the Commission, who declared that as long 
as alleged infringers were willing to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms, all 
SEP owners – regardless of their nature (NPEs or licensors that are also manufacturers) 
– should not be able to bring actions for prohibitory injunctions against them. Some 
                                                
854 ibid [74]–[76] and [77.2].  
855 Huawei AG (n 137) [112]. 
856 Galli, ‘The FRAND Defense’ (n 693) 191, para 2. 
857 Petit, ‘Huaweï v. ZTE: Judicial Conservatism’ (n 161) 5, para 1 and 8, para 4. 
858 Margrethe Vestager, ‘Intellectual Property and Competition’ (19th International Bar Association 
Conference, Florence, 11 September 2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/intellectual-property-and-competition_en> accessed 26 July 2018; 
COM(2017) 712 final (n 81) 11, para 5 and 12, para 1 (‘PAEs should be subject to the same rules as any 
other SEP holder, including after the transfer of SEPs from patent holders to PAEs’). 
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others859 understand that the ECJ leaves this question open, because the reasoning of the 
judgment refers to ‘competitors’. 
 
And on the contrary, there are those860 who consider that the Huawei legal standard would 
not be applicable to NPEs. Therefore, these entities would not abuse their dominant 
position when bringing actions for prohibitory injunctions or recall of products, because 
that conduct would not seek to exclude competitors’ products from the market. That, since 
there would not exist a competitive relationship between the SEP owner – the NPE – and 
the alleged infringer. 
 
When the ECJ defines the steps required before an injunction or the recall of products can 
be granted in favour of a SEP owner, it is considering that if the SEP owner does not 
comply with them, it abuses its dominant position because it understands that the SEP 
owner brought the actions to exclude competitors from the market and not to remedy the 
infringement. Consequently, if the SEP owner and the alleged infringer are not 
competitors, it cannot be concluded that NPEs’ behaviour of bringing infringement 
actions might have an exclusionary effect. Hence, the legal standard established in 
Huawei would not be applicable to NPEs, because the element regarding the anti-
competitive effect would be missing. Accordingly, NPEs’ conduct of seeking for 
prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products would not be abusive under Article 102 
TFEU.  
5.2.2. Potential consequences of non-application 
Some scholars861 have considered that in case the Huawei criteria does not apply to NPEs, 
these entities could be used opportunistically by SEP holders that are licensors and 
manufacturers. That is to say, as NPEs could not be liable for abusing their dominant 
positions when bringing infringement actions seeking for prohibitory injunctions or the 
recall of products, a SEP holder could transfer their SEPs to a NPE, so that it brings the 
infringement actions against its competitors, in exchange for a pecuniary amount. 
 
In order to assess whether this consequence is negative or not, it would be necessary to 
raise the debate about the role of NPEs in the patent system, if they have negative or 
positive effects on innovation society. Namely, whether NPEs’ business model dissuades 
SEP owners from creating new products. Or, if on the contrary, NPEs provide value by 
serving as intermediaries in the market for inventions, providing liquidity to small and 
medium-sized companies by acquiring their SEPs. 
                                                
859 James Killick, ‘ECJ rips up Orange Book! New standards in Europe for SEP injunctions’ (Kluwer 
Competition Law Blog, September 4, 2015), 4, para 5 
<http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2015/09/04/ecj-rips-up-orange-book-new-
standards-in-europe-for-sep-injunctions/> accessed 27 July 2018. 
860 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 686, para 4; Nicolas Petit, ‘EU Competition Law 
Analysis of FRAND Disputes’ in Jorge L. Contreras (ed), The Cambridge Handbook of Technical 
Standardization Law: Competition, Antitrust, and Patents (Cambridge University Press 2017) 290, 302-
303. 
861 Geradin, ‘European Union Competition Law’ (n 795) 22-23. 
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It has also been argued that if the legal standard established in Huawei is not applicable 
to NPEs because a competitive relationship would be missing, that same argumentation 
might be used by SEP holders – that are licensors and manufactures – to avoid being 
abusing their dominant positions, by bringing infringement actions against SEP 
implementers’ customers – along the supply chain. That, instead of directing the actions 
towards SEP implementers, with whom SEP owners do have a competitive relationship. 
Nonetheless, I do not consider that this legal strategy would be widely used by SEP 
holders, because suing SEP implementers’ customers they do not achieve their final 
objective of excluding from the market all the standard-compliant products manufactured 
by their competitors – SEP implementers –, since they would not be going against the 
source of manufacturing. 
5.2.3. Unaddressed by national courts  
So far, Member State courts have granted prohibitory injunctions in favour of NPEs 
because infringers did not comply with the obligations imposed in Huawei v. ZTE. That 
is, because either they did not express its willingness to enter into a license agreement on 
FRAND terms, did not respond to the SEP owner’s offer diligently and in good faith or, 
in the event their counter-offer was rejected, did not provide adequate security to 
guarantee the payment of royalties. For instance, in St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom862, 
the Regional Court of Mannheim granted a prohibitory injunction in favour of a NPE, 
directed not to the manufacturer of mobile phones, but to one of its distributors (Deutsche 
Telekom). And in Unwired Planet v. Huawei863, the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales also granted the injunction in favour of the NPE. 
 
However, national courts have not yet addressed whether the legal standard established 
in Huawei would be applicable when the NPE did not comply with its obligations, 
whereas the alleged infringer did fulfil its duties. Before bringing an action for a 
prohibitory injunction or the recall of products, the SEP owner has to alert the infringer 
of the infringement complained about by designating that SEP and specifying the way in 
which it has been infringed and it also has to present to the infringer an offer for a licence 
on FRAND terms.  
 
Accordingly, the national court would have to determine whether the NPE abused its 
dominant position for not complying with its obligations or not. If the court considered 
the first, the conclusion would be that the Huawei criteria is applicable to NPEs. And on 
the contrary, if the court granted the prohibitory injunction and the recall of products in 
favour of the NPE to remedy the infringement, the legal standard established in Huawei 
would not be considered to be applicable to NPEs, because there would not exist a 
                                                
862 LG Mannheim of 10 March 2015, 2 0 103/14; (n 781) (it disagreed and suspended the enforcement of 
the injunction, reverting the case to the LG Mannheim); (n 785). 
863 (n 737). 
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competitive relationship between the NPE and the infringer, being irrelevant the non-
compliance of the SEP owner. 
 
In the event the national court opted for understanding that the Huawei legal standard 
would not be applicable to NPEs, the infringer could defend itself from the infringement 
actions brought by the SEP holder, in the framework of contract law (but not using the 
competition law-based defence). That is, as long as it is considered that from the 
commitment to grant licenses on FRAND terms given by SEP owners to SSOs contractual 
obligation arises, the infringer could argue that the SEP holder breached the contract in 
favour of third parties (see Section 3.2. of Chapter 5).  
6. The missing element of the abuse: the objective justifications 
 
6.1. Efficiency gains and objectively necessary  
 
As mentioned before in Section 3, the ECJ did not make any reference to the last element 
of the abuse, that is, to under what circumstances the SEP owner’s conduct – that will be 
prima facie abusive if the aforementioned three requirements are present regarding the 
exceptional circumstances, the Framework and the anti-competitive effect –, would be 
objectively justified. Namely, the dominant undertaking is entitled to demonstrate that its 
behaviour of bringing infringement actions produces substantial efficiencies which 
outweigh any anti-competitive effects on consumers or that is objectively necessary.  
 
In Samsung and Motorola, the Commission did allude to objective justifications in which 
SEP owners’ behaviour might be based on, although it concluded that none of them was 
present in those cases (see Sections 5.3.4.1. – efficiency gains – and 5.3.4.2. – objectively 
necessary – of Chapter 3). In particular, SEP owners claimed that seeking and 
enforcement of injunctions was objectively necessary, among others, to protect (i) their 
commercial interests, (ii) their IPRs and (iii) the public interest in an effective 
standardisation process.  
 
According to the Commission, SEP owners’ behaviour would be considered to be 
objectively necessary to protect their commercial interests, for example, in the following 
scenarios: (1) a potential licensee was in financial distress and unable to pay its debts; (2) 
a potential licensee's assets were located in jurisdictions that did not provide for adequate 
means of enforcement of damages; or (3) a potential licensee was unwilling to enter into 
a licence agreement on FRAND terms. Commission's assessment focused on the latter 
case, because the first two scenarios were clearly not present neither in Samsung nor in 
Motorola. 
 
6.2. ‘Willing licensee’: the undefined legal concept 
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the concept of the ‘willing licensee’ is also present, but unlike in 
Samsung and Motorola, in the judgment its definition is missing which generates legal 
uncertainty. 
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In Commission’s view – embodied in the Motorola Prohibition Decision – a potential 
licensee would be a willing licensee if in the event that bilateral negotiations do not come 
to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be bound by a third party’s (a court or mutually 
agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate (see Section 5.3.4.3. of Chapter 
3).  
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the behaviour that according to the Commission would express the 
willingness of the SEP implementer constitutes the voluntary step of The Framework 
established by the ECJ (see above, Section 4.6.). Notwithstanding, the fact that the alleged 
infringer does or does not follow the suggestion made by the ECJ of accepting having 
FRAND terms determined by a third party, does not entail any consequence with regard 
to the antitrust assessment or the use of the competition law-based defence.  
 
The ECJ refers to the ‘willing licensee’ concept when it requires that the alleged infringer 
– in order to use the competition law-based defence –, it must express its willingness to 
enter into a license agreement (see above, Section 4.2.). Hence, it is one of the alleged 
infringer’s obligation established in The Framework. Nevertheless, the ECJ does not 
define it, that is to say, it does not specify what behaviour should be considered as an 
expression of willingness. According to the Regional Court of Düsseldorf – who referred 
the preliminary questions to the ECJ –, the willingness to negotiate was apparent from 
ZTE’s written offers to conclude an agreement864. Due to the legal gap posed by Huawei 
v. ZTE, it is for national courts to interpret that concept. The following examples in this 
regard were already given in the aforementioned Section. In view of the Regional Court 
in Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom865, the prompt request for a license to the SEP holder 
constitutes an expression of willingness. According to the Regional Court of Düsseldorf 
in St. Lawrence v. Vodafone866, reacting – after more than five months – to the SEP 
owner’s infringement notification asking for proof of the alleged infringement, it does 
not constitute an expression of willingness.  
 
Both in Samsung/Motorola and Huawei v. ZTE, the consequence of not being a ‘willing 
licensee’ is the same, namely, SEP owners would be infringing Article 102 TFEU, so the 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products would be upheld by the court (albeit they 
still would have to grant licenses on FRAND terms). That is to say, according to the 
Commission, if the alleged infringer was not a willing licensee, seeking and enforcement 
of injunctions would be justified, so the SEP owner would not infringe Article 102 TFEU 
(the third element of the abuse, the objective justifications, would be present – the one 
that is missing in Huawei v. ZTE –). Basing on the ECJ’s criteria, if the alleged infringer 
did not express its willingness, it would not have complied with the obligation established 
in The Framework (the second element of the abuse), so it could not use the competition 
law-based defence.  
                                                
864 Huawei (n 35) [35]. 
865 (n 785). 
866 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone [73/14] (n 761) [214]–[220]. 
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Hence, although the concept of ‘willing licensee’ forms part of different elements of the 
abuse defined by the Commission and the ECJ, the difference is that whereas the concept 
was defined in Motorola, it was not in Huawei v. ZTE. Therefore, from the judgment, 
national courts are responsible for defining it. Due to the consequence that entails being 
considered a ‘willing licensee’ or not, if the definition given by national courts varies 
considerably from one court to another, the possibility of forum shopping increases (see 
the definition I suggest in Section 4.3.2.1. of Chapter 5).  
7. Recap of the abuse 
 
It follows from all the foregoing considerations that according to the ECJ, Article 102 
TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a SEP (first exceptional 
circumstance), which has given an irrevocable undertaking to a standardisation body to 
grant a licence to third parties on FRAND terms (second exceptional circumstance), does 
not abuse its dominant position by bringing an infringement action seeking a prohibitory 
injunction or the recall of products, as long as it has complied with its obligations (to alert 
about the infringement and submit a FRAND offer). And that at the same time, the alleged 
infringer has not fulfilled its duties867 (express willingness and react to the offer).  
Namely, the SEP owner prior to bring infringement actions seeking for a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products, has alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement 
complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which it has been 
infringed. And the alleged infringer has not reacted expressing its willingness to conclude 
a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. Or having expressed it, the SEP holder has 
presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, 
in particular, the royalty and the way in which it was to be calculated. But on its part, the 
alleged infringer – who continues to use the SEP –, has not diligently responded to that 
offer.  
In case it has submitted a counter-offer, it is not clear if the alleged infringer is also 
obliged to provide appropriate security from the moment its counter-offer is rejected or 
not. A strict interpretation of the Huawei judgment suggests it is not obliged, so once it 
has reacted to the SEP owner’s offer, the SEP proprietor might be abusing its dominant 
position. While according to German courts it is obliged, so the lack of the appropriate 
provision entails that the SEP owner is not liable under Article 102 TFEU and the alleged 
infringer is not allowed to use the competition law-based defence. I consider it would be 
more equitable if the alleged infringer was obliged to provide appropriate security from 
the moment it submits the counter-offer and regardless of SEP owner’s reaction to it – 
not limited to rejection cases.   
I am also of the opinion that committing to have FRAND terms determined by a third 
party, it should be compulsory for both parties and not a mere suggestion. Accordingly, 
in case the SEP owner did not accept the counter-offer of the alleged infringer, the latter 
                                                
867 Huawei (n 35) [71] and [77.1]. 
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would only be allowed to use the competition law-based defence if the SEP owner 
rejected to submit the determination of FRAND royalties to a third party. And vice versa, 
the SEP owner would not be abusing its dominant position if after that rejection, it 
accepted to submit the determination of FRAND royalties to a third party, but the alleged 
infringer did not.  
If both parties accepted that FRAND royalties were determined by a third party, they will 
be bound by such determination. Once the third party establishes the royalties, it might 
be assumed that the SEP owner will allow the SEP implementer to continue using the 
patent in question (its ultimate aim is to be remunerated). However, it might happen that 
the alleged infringer does not pay the due royalties. In that case, the court would uphold 
the prohibitory injunction and the recall of products in favour of the SEP owner (without 
prejudicing to award damages).  
Conclusion 
 
In the long awaited Huawei v. ZTE judgment, the ECJ treats the SEP owner’s – Huawei 
– behaviour as a novel category of exclusionary abuse under Article 102 TFEU, as the 
Commission did in Samsung and Motorola – although in these two cases, the Commission 
also considered that threatening to seek injunctions was likely to constitute an exploitative 
abuse.  
 
Notwithstanding, unlike the Commission, when the ECJ conducts the antitrust 
assessment, it does not follow the classic method used in the application of Article 102 
TFEU. In particular, when determining whether the competitive damage arising from the 
exclusionary abuse is present and in which scenarios the SEP owner’s behaviour 
constitutes an objective justification. Its judgment is limited to establish the negotiation 
framework for SEP licenses in a very formal way. That is, it stipulates the specific steps 
the SEP holder has to perform and the specific obligations the alleged infringer must 
comply with, so that the conduct of the SEP holder does or not constitute an exclusionary 
abuse. 
 
Some may consider that the Huawei v. ZTE judgment provides legal certainty to SEP 
holders who bring actions for patent infringement against those who violate their rights. 
Notwithstanding, in general terms, the judgment has been widely criticized, in addition 
to the above, mainly because it does not exhaustively address several aspects that are 
fundamentals to apply the established Framework by national courts. Consequently, they 
are clarifying them on a case by case basis. As a consequence, taking into account the 
international nature of companies involved in patent infringements’ issues, we are 
heading towards dis-harmonization which may lead to the possibility of forum shopping 
by SEP holders. 
 
In my view – that will be defended in Chapter 5 –, the solution is based on treating SEP 
owners’ behaviour of bringing infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and 
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the recall of products as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license SEPs. By doing so, a more 
balanced protection of both parties is achieved, unlike what occurs under the approaches 
of the Commission (in Samsung/Motorola) and the ECJ (in Huawei v. ZTE) that lead to 
an overprotection of the SEP implementer, to the detriment of its proprietor; and of the 
Orange Book, that would entail the overprotection of SEP owners.  
 
Applying the Commission criteria, that overprotection of SEP implementers is even 
greater. That, because it states that if the alleged infringer is willing to enter into a license 
agreement on FRAND terms – i.e. if it in the event that bilateral negotiations do not come 
to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be bound by a third party’s determination of a 
FRAND royalty rate –, the SEP owner – who gave a commitment to grant license on these 
terms – abuses its dominant position when bringing an action seeking for a prohibitory 
injunction. Whereas according to the ECJ, the SEP owner would abuse its dominant 
position if it does not react to the alleged infringer’s counter-offer – who already 
expressed its willingness to enter into a license agreement –, regardless of whether the 
alleged infringer accepts to be bound by a third party’s determination of royalties (see 
Section 4.6.1. above). 
 
Therefore, what is positively remarkable about the Huawei v. ZTE judgment is that the 
approach taken by the ECJ does not entail, in practice – as the Commission’s one does 
(see Section 6.2. of Chapter 3) –, that in most of the cases courts will not issue prohibitory 
injunctions and recall of products. That is to say, it does not fully restrict the availability 
of these measures for SEP owners. Consequently, the ECJ dissociates a bit from 
Commission’s argumentation in Samsung/Motorola.  
 
After the case Huawei v. ZTE (July 2015), the Commission’s position about bringing 
infringement actions by SEP owners is the following. On the one hand, it considers that 
the judgment is the new standard to solve the issue in question, because since that 
judgment, it has not opened any investigation against patentees for seeking prohibitory 
injunctions and recall of products. Note that according to its criteria, SEP holders would 
always abuse their dominant position when bringing infringement actions seeking for a 
prohibitory injunction. Therefore, it might be understood that Commission retreated from 
its Samsung/Motorola criteria. On the other hand, in the aforementioned Communication 
on Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market (April 2016)868, the 
Commission identifies that the uncertainty in enforcement of SEPs should be improved. 
Also in the Communication on Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents 
(November 2017)869, it reckons that there is an urgent need to set out key principles that 
foster a balanced, smooth and predictable framework for SEPs.  
 
Consequently, it seems that the Commission shares the opinion of the majority of legal 
scholars regarding that the approach of the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE, is far from adequately 
                                                
868 Commission COM(2016) 176 final (n 674) 13, para 7. 
869 COM(2017) 712 final (n 81) 2, para 7. 
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resolving the conflict between the protection of IP (bringing infringement actions) and 
competition (the abuse of a dominant position), both key drivers of innovation and 
growth. Ultimately, as pointed out by Joaquín Almunia870 – the former EU Commissioner 
in charge of Competition Policy –, the objective is to ensure that IP is not misused to the 
detriment of healthy competition and, ultimately, of consumers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
870 Commission IP/14/490 (n 486), para 2.  
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CHAPTER 5. ACTIONS SEEKING A PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION AND THE 
RECALL OF PRODUCTS, ENVISIONED AS A 'CONSTRUCTIVE' REFUSAL 
TO DEAL. COMPULSORY LICENSING OF SEPS 
Introduction  
 
The lawfulness of the conduct consisting of bringing infringement actions seeking a 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products by SEP owners against implementers, it 
was not questioned by European decision-making bodies until recently. It was in 2012, 
for the first time, when the Commission decided to initiate antitrust proceedings against 
Samsung and Motorola (see Chapter 3). And later on, in 2015, the ECJ delivered its 
judgment on the preliminary ruling regarding the Huawei v. ZTE case (see Chapter 4). In 
all three cases, the conduct was treated as a specific and novel category of abuse within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. In Samsung and Motorola, the seeking and 
enforcement of injunctive reliefs (preliminary and permanent) was treated as an 
exclusionary abuse and the threat of seeking them, as an exploitative abuse. In Huawei v. 
ZTE, the seeking of a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products was also treated as 
an exclusionary abuse, although using different criteria.  
 
During those years when the Commission and the ECJ were mulling their available 
options before they handed their decisions, an extensive debate took place among scholars 
regarding what should be the appropriate legal qualification of SEP holders’ behaviour, 
both from the prism of competition law and contract law. Albeit I will make some 
reference to some legal standards proposed by them (i.e. to treat the conduct as an act of 
abusive litigation), they will not be described or discussed in detail, because that goes 
beyond the scope of this research.  
 
Its objective – and in particular, of this chapter – is to construe the act of bringing 
infringement actions seeking and enforcing a prohibitory injunction (preliminary and 
permanent) and the recall or products, as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license SEPs, in the 
sense developed by the ECJ in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft. Hence, the proposal 
does not draw a distinction between the acts of seeking interlocutory and permanent 
injunctions and it is focused only on the act of seeking those measures and their 
enforcement, excluding the ‘threat’ of seeking them that the Commission did also 
investigate. 
 
Thereby, the analysis on refusal to grant IP licenses made in Chapter 2 constitutes the 
basis to generalize that argument. Qualifying the conduct under that suggested legal 
standard, the Huawei v. ZTE case would be consistent with the case law of the ECJ. 
 
Accordingly, I defend that there was no need to view the seeking of injunctions for 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs as a sui generis or as an ‘independent’ form of abuse, as the 
Commission (in Samsung and Motorola) and the ECJ (in Huawei v. ZTE) did.  
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In Magill and Microsoft where the refusal to license IPRs was considered to be abusive, 
the measure imposed to remedy the infringement was the compulsory license (it was also 
imposed in IMS Health, but as an interim measure). Consequently, according to the legal 
qualification proposed regarding the ‘constructive’ refusal to deal, the compulsory license 
emerges as the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end – where applicable – the 
violation of Article 102 TFEU. 
1. The sui generis abuse: the ‘willing licensee’ standard  
 
As it has been analysed in previous chapters, the Commission and the ECJ construed the 
act of seeking injunctions as a specific and novel category of abuse and also did the 
German Federal Supreme Court in Orange Book regarding non-SEPs – where that 
category was first introduced. Note that according to their interpretation, it was not 
relevant whether courts ultimately granted injunctions or not, because the matter was to 
assess if SEP owners’ conduct of seeking and enforcing injunctions was consistent with 
their obligations – to license on FRAND terms – under Article 102 TFEU871.  
 
The main element of the antitrust assessment of this novel substantive legal standard 
revolves around the concept of ’willing licensee’. That is to say, in general terms, SEP 
owners’ behaviour is abusive if it brought actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and 
the recall of products against a licensee who is willing to enter into a license agreement. 
In contrast, seeking them against an ‘unwilling licensee’ would remain lawful.  
 
Nevertheless, it exists several versions of that abuse and the definition given to the 
‘willing licensee’ concept is also divergent. In the German judgment the ‘willing licensee’ 
test served as a procedural defence against injunctions and the given definition is the 
narrower one. While the Commission (in Samsung and Motorola) and the ECJ (in Huawei 
v. ZTE) viewed SEP owners’ conduct as a substantive competition law offense872. With 
respect to the definition of the ‘willing licensee’, the Commission provided the wider one 
among the three definitions given and the ECJ adopted a definition that would be between 
the one adopted by the German court and that by the Commission, although it was more 
aligned with that provided by the latter.  
 
Below, in Section 4.3.2.1., I will also refer to the concept of the ‘willing licensee’ that 
constitutes one of the elements of the abusive ‘constructive’ refusal to license SEPs – the 
category of abuse under which I consider SEP owners’ behaviour should be assessed. 
Namely, once it is determined that prima facie seeking a prohibitory injunction and the 
recall of products constitutes an abusive conduct, it must be analysed whether that 
conduct might be objectively justified. Thus, if dominant undertakings show the presence 
of valid objective justifications, that provisional conclusion could not be corroborated and 
consequently, the behaviour in question would not be abusive. Among the available 
justifications, the fact of being an ‘unwilling licensee’ would be one of them. Hence, 
                                                
871 See references in (n 597).  
872 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 689, para 4.  
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unlike what occurs when SEP owners’ behaviour is treated as a novel category of abuse 
(as the Commission and the ECJ did), the concept of the ‘willing licensee’ does not 
constitute the core element to assess prima facie the unlawfulness of the conduct. Because 
when construing the behaviour as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license, the essential nature 
of the IP (see below, Section 4.1.) and the anti-competitive effects (see below, Section 
4.2.) constitute the fundamental elements for that assessment.  
 
1.1. German Federal Supreme Court: Orange Book   
 
In order to consider that the infringer is a willing licensee under the Orange Book 
approach (see 2.1.2.1. of Chapter 4), (i) the infringer must make an unconditional offer – 
not limited exclusively to cases of infringement – and the patent owner cannot reject it 
without violating the prohibition of discrimination or anti-competitive behaviour. In case 
the infringer considered that the licensor demanded excessive royalties or it refused to 
quantify them, its offer will be considered unconditional if it states that the licensor will 
determine the amount of royalties according to its own reasonable discretion. And (ii) the 
defendant must comply with the obligations that the future licencing agreement imposes 
in return for the use of the patent. Namely, it has to provide an exhaustive account of past 
acts of use and pay the amount of the royalty that it has itself calculated therefrom. 
 
Note that to be an unconditional offer, the Orange Book judgment does not consider it 
necessary for the offer to also include the termination clause consisting of an explicit right 
for the licensor to terminate the agreement if, in the future, the licensee seeks to challenge 
the validity of the licensed patent. Nevertheless, it seems that in the case Motorola v. 
Apple – in which Commission’s investigation against Motorola was based on – the Higher 
Regional Court of Karlsruhe interpreted that it was necessary, because it rejected Apple’s 
Fifth Orange Book Offer due to the absence of that clause in the offer873.  
 
Consequently, the Orange Book standard might be described as patentee-friendly. 
 
1.2. EC: Samsung/Motorola  
 
In the press releases concerning a SO sent to Samsung – in which the Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf based on to argue its apparent contradiction with the Orange Book judgment 
when it requested for a preliminary ruling in Huawei v. ZTE –, the Commission had not 
yet explained in what circumstances an infringer might be regarded as being willing to 
negotiate. It was in the Motorola Prohibition Decision – that was adopted before the ECJ’s 
preliminary ruling – where the Commission defined the concept of a ‘willing licensee’, 
keeping what it already stated preliminarily in the SO874. And then, Samsung’s 
commitments implemented the concept in practical terms (see Section 5.3.4.3. of Chapter 
3), stating that a willing licensee would be the one that within 30 days of receipt of an 
                                                
873 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [142]. 
874 Commission MEMO/13/403 (n 636), 4th question.  
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invitation to negotiate, agreed to the Samsung’s Licensing Framework to settle disputes 
over FRAND terms.  
 
In Commission’s875 view, a willing licensee is the one that in the event that bilateral 
negotiations do not come to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be bound by a third party’s 
(a court or mutually agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate, being 
irrelevant in that respect if the potential licensee challenges the validity, essentiality or 
infringement of the SEP or not.  
 
The view of Regional Court of Düsseldorf in Huawei v. ZTE was aligned with the Orange 
Book approach. Therefore, it did not agree with the perspective of the Commission and it 
considered that the declaration consisting of the mere ‘willingness to negotiate’ on the 
part of the infringer might be made very easily and in such a way as to impose little 
obligation – non-binding nature –, since it might be changed, withdrawn and, if necessary, 
renewed at any time. Furthermore, it added that ‘such a declaration does not include any 
specific terms, even though the licensing terms must be known in order for it to be 
possible to determine whether they are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Even 
where a declaration does include specific terms, it is open to question whether those terms 
are serious. After all, the infringer may change or withdraw those terms at any time, or 
propose terms which are manifestly unreasonable’876. 
 
In the same vein, the ZTE company pointed out in its observations in Huawei v. ZTE that 
placing reliance only on the alleged infringer’s mere ‘willingness to negotiate’ – as it was 
stated by the Commission – would result in pricing which falls well below the true 
economic value of the SEP (a reverse holdup situation). Conversely, placing reliance on 
the case law established by the BGH in Orange Book judgment would create the opposite 
problem, that is, the imposition of excessively high royalties877 (a holdup situation).   
 
1.3. ECJ: Huawei v. ZTE  
 
In the same vein of the Advocate General878, the ECJ also considered that the definition 
of ‘willing licensee’ given by the Commission was not sufficient to limit the SEP holder’s 
right to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction. That standard was too licensee-
friendly and in practice, it led to a per se rule against preliminary injunctions for SEP 
owners. For that reason, the ECJ did not keep Commission’s standard on that regard.  
 
According to the ECJ, the willing licensee is the one that (i) expresses its willingness to 
conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms once it receives the notification 
regarding the infringement by the SEP owner; (ii) diligently accepts the FRAND offer 
made by the SEP holder or submits a counter-offer promptly and in writing; and (iii) from 
                                                
875 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [438]. 
876 Huawei AG (n 137) fn 19.  
877 ibid, fn 20. 
878 ibid [50].  
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the point at which its counter-offer is rejected, provides appropriate security in 
accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field, for example by providing 
a bank guarantee or by placing the amounts necessary on deposit. 
 
Thus, unlike it was established by the Commission, according to the ECJ the submission 
of FRAND determination to a third party is not compulsory to consider the implementer 
as a willing licensee. The possibility of that submission is a mere suggestion for the patent 
owner and the alleged infringer. Nor it requires that the implementer’s counter-offer 
includes the clause conferring the right to determine the amount of royalties to the SEP 
owner, according to its own reasonable discretion, as it was demanded in Orange Book. 
 
All in all, although the ECJ’s view of the ‘willing licensee’ is halfway between the 
definitions given by the BGH and the Commission, it is more licensee-friendly – as it was 
the approach of the Commission. Namely, the standard developed in the preliminary 
ruling also leads to an overprotection of the SEP implementer, to the detriment of its 
proprietor due to the following. Once the alleged infringer submits the counter-offer, the 
SEP owner is obliged to accept it. Because if it does not respond or once rejected the 
alleged infringer provided the appropriate security, the alleged infringer might use the 
competition law-based defence and the SEP owner would be liable for abusing its 
dominant position.  
 
The logic behind that argument is that accepting the counter-offer, the SEP owner would 
be remunerated for the use of its SEP (thus achieving its goal). Notwithstanding, if it does 
not respond or rejects it and continues with the patent infringement proceeding seeking a 
prohibitory injunction or the recall of products, it would be understood that its purpose is 
to exclude competitors from the market (the anti-competitive effect, see Section 5 of 
Chapter 4). Consequently, if the SEP owner wants to avoid being liable for abusing its 
dominant position, it cannot submit an offer in response of the implementer’s counter-
offer or submit the determination of FRAND terms to a third party in response of that 
counter-offer – unless the alleged infringer also agrees on the latter – (see Section 4.5. 
and the ‘Conclusion’ of Chapter 4).  
2. No need for a novel category of abuse  
 
According to some competition economists, new legal standard should be adopted to 
avoid errors of type I (false convictions, or over enforcement). On FRAND licensing, for 
instance, the United Brands (see Section 2.1. of Chapter 2) standard has been described 
as unduly prohibitive and too licensee-friendly879. Whereas others believe that agencies 
and courts should develop them to avoid type II errors (false acquittals, or under 
enforcement). On the seeking of injunctions for SEPs, for instance, it has been stated that 
the Magill/IMS Health/Microsoft (see Section 4 of Chapter 2) test is unduly permissive, 
and very patentee-friendly880 (see in this regard, Section 7.1. of this Chapter).  
                                                
879 Geradin, ‘Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders’ (n 731).  
880 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 696, para 4 and 697, para 1.  
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In mi view, there was no need to view the seeking of injunctions for FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs as a sui generis or as an ‘independent’ form of exclusionary abuse, as the 
Commission (in Samsung and Motorola) and the ECJ (in Huawei v. ZTE) did. Instead, it 
should have been treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to license SEPs – in the sense 
developed by the ECJ in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft.  
 
As it was explained in the previous two chapters, there are several negative consequences 
derived from that new construction based on the ‘willing licensee’ to assess the legality 
of SEP owners’ behaviour. Nevertheless, it is convenient to mention them again here in 
a more systematic manner. There is no universally accepted rule to consider when a 
substantive test of abuse is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. However, rules based on the notion of 
‘economic welfare’, ‘legal certainty’ and ‘consistency’ make possible to assess if they 
derive positive or negative consequences from using the new legal standard. Moreover, 
there are also other rules on which to base to choose the ‘good’ legal standard,  such as, 
innovation, efficiency, predictability, fairness or economic freedom881, albeit they will 
not be studied here.  
 
Notwithstanding, when selecting the ‘best’ category of abuse taking into account the 
criteria of economic welfare and legal certainty, economists and lawyers often disagree 
amongst themselves regarding what legal standard should prevail. Economists typically 
praise legal standards that limit decisional errors and promote economic welfare882 and in 
contrast, many lawyers prefers tests of abuse that privilege legal certainty883.  Regarding 
the latter, it also exists a wealth of conflicting views on whether legal certainty is 
promoted by ‘forms-based’ or ‘effects-based’ standards of abuse.  
 
Those divergences result from the fact that ‘economic welfare’ and ‘legal certainty’ are 
subjective concepts. That is to say, they are the result of educational, ideological, 
psychological, social and other subjective biases. More specifically, antitrust lawyers and 
economists often (and justifiably) support tests of abuse that are aligned with their clients’ 
interests (which may coincide with the public interest). And antitrust officials often 
support tests that promote the interests of their agency (which is often deemed to coincide 
with the public interest).  
 
Whereas the rule based on the notion of ‘consistency’ considers that the use of a given 
legal standard is coherent when it is applied to scenarios that are related from a factual, 
legal and economic standpoint. Unlike other rules, ‘consistency’ is objective because it 
leaves little space for ideology, conflicts of interests, and other sources of bias and 
                                                
881 ibid 696-698.  
882 Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, ‘Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment’ in M Merola and J Derenne (eds), The Role of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in Competition Law Cases (Bruylant, 2012), 21.  
883 Jorge Padilla, ‘Standards, Essential Patents and Antitrust’ (2012) 3(6) Journal of European Competition 
Law and Practice 509. 
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prejudice. The concept of consistency is a derivative of general principles of EU law, 
such as the principle of legal certainty and the rule of protection of legitimate 
expectations, upheld by the Court in all areas of EU law884. 
 
2.1. No promotion of economic welfare: overprotection of licensees 
 
The first negative consequence of treating SEP owners’ conduct of bringing infringement 
actions seeking a prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products as a novel category of 
exclusionary abuse based on the ‘willing licensee’ concept, it is that overprotects 
implementers. Consequently, it does not promote economic welfare.  
 
Under the legal standard developed in Samsung and Motorola by the Commission, the 
use of injunctions by SEP holders was prohibited per se885, because in practice, the 
exceptional circumstances – that the standard on which the SEP read had a widespread 
adoption and that the holder of the SEP gave a commitment to license it on FRAND terms 
– will be present. Moreover, virtually always, the implementer will be willing to negotiate 
a FRAND license, in the sense of accepting to be bound by a third party’s (a court or 
mutually agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate in the event that 
bilateral negotiations did not come to a fruitful conclusion. Therefore, in the majority of 
cases, SEP owners’ conduct will constitute an abuse of a dominant position (see Section 
6.2. of Chapter 3).  
 
As it was mentioned previously in Section 1.3., the legal standard developed by the ECJ 
in Huawei v. ZTE obliges the owner to accept the counter-offer submitted by the alleged 
infringer in order to avoid being liable for abusing its dominant position, without the 
possibility of not responding, of presenting a counter-offer or of submitting the 
determination of the FRAND terms to a third party. That, because from the moment the 
alleged infringer submits the counter-offer or provides the appropriate security – in case 
the counter-offer has been rejected –, it is allowed to use the competition-law based 
defence.  
 
Accordingly, it might be concluded that under the ‘willing licensee’ category of abuse, 
the right to an injunction ceases when a FRAND commitment is given. Namely, it implies 
that the SEP holder implicitly waives its right to judicial remedies against third parties. 
However, the forms customarily used for FRAND declarations contain no explicit waiver 
of injunctive relief, and in the rules of all major SSOs there is no such a waiver (usually, 
their IP policies say nothing about injunctions). The exception would be the 
aforementioned patent policy of the IEEE-SA886 (see Section ‘Background’ of the 
Introduction) that since 2015, it limits the use of injunctions to the case the implementer 
                                                
884 Nicolas Petit, ‘The future of the Court of Justice in EU competition law – New role and responsibilities’ 
(2012) SSRN Electronic Journal, 8, para 4 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060831> accessed 6 June 2019; Petit, 
‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 696, 697 and 698, paras 2-4. 
885 Padilla, ‘Standards, Essential Patents’ (n 883) 510.  
886 IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws 2017 (n 66). 
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refuses to accept a third party adjudicated rate. That implied waiver would breach the 
general principle of law regarding that implied waivers are not allowed, so the novel 
category of abuse would infringe that general principle of the EU law, so it would not be 
consistent from a constitutional perspective887. 
 
As a consequence, SEP owners’ incentives to invest in innovation would be diminished, 
because they could not seek for judicial measures – prohibitory injunction and the recall 
of products – to protect their SEPs when they are being infringed. Moreover, when 
licensing their SEPs, although they would recover the production costs, they would not 
recover the heavy costs that they have to bear in research and development nor gain a 
reasonable profit, because they would be obliged to accept the counter-offer submitted by 
the implementer – which terms might be below FRAND –, in order to avoid being liable 
for abusing their dominant position.  
 
2.2. Legal uncertainty  
 
The second negative consequence is that the legal standard developed by the Commission 
and the ECJ brings legal uncertainty.  
 
If the legal clarity provided by the Commission in Samsung and Motorola was such as it 
was stated by Joaquín Almunia – the former Commission Vice President in charge of 
competition policy – (see Section 6.4. of Chapter 3), the Regional Court of Düsseldorf 
would not have requested for a preliminary injunction to the ECJ in the SEP-based 
litigation between Huawei and ZTE, that was based on the apparent contradiction between 
the Orange Book judgment ruled by the German Federal Supreme Court and Samsung 
case. 
 
In particular, as it was analysed above, the Framework established in Huawei v. ZTE does 
not exhaustively address several aspects that are fundamentals for its application by 
national courts, thus creating many legal loopholes that are being clarified case by case 
by them, which may lead to the possibility of forum shopping by SEP holders. Note that 
after the case Huawei v. ZTE, the Commission – in two Communications888 – has 
identified that the uncertainty in enforcement of SEPs should be improved and it has 
reckoned that there is an urgent need to set out key principles that foster a balanced, 
smooth and predictable framework for SEPs (see Section ‘Conclusion’ of Chapter 4). 
 
2.3. Internal inconsistency 
 
The third negative consequence of treating SEP holders’ behaviour as a novel category 
of exclusionary abuse based on the ‘willing licensee’ concept by the Commission (in 
Samsung and Motorola) and the ECJ (in Huawei v. ZTE), it is that is not internally 
consistent with existing law under Article 102 TFEU, in particular, with the legal standard 
                                                
887 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 711, para 5 and 712, para 1.  
888 Commission COM(2016) 176 final (n 674) 13, para 7; COM(2017) 712 final (n 81) 2, para 7. 
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of ‘refusal to license IPRs’ (see Section 4 of Chapter 2) developed by them previously. 
The above, because the case Huawei v. ZTE is not a new one – it is not distinguished 
enough from older ones such as Magill, IMS Health or Microsoft.  
 
Even if that was the case, the new standard would not be internally consistent either if the 
Commission or the ECJ would not explicitly reverse the old legal standard and give 
cogent reasons for such reversal, especially where they seek to avoid existing limiting 
standards. That was the case regarding the case law on refusal to grant IP licenses (see 
Section 4.6.2. of Chapter 2). That is the reason why when I suggest that SEP owners’ 
behaviour should be treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant IP licenses, I consider that 
a critical review of IMS Health jurisprudence is needed (see below, Section 3.1.2.).  
 
All in all, although there was no decisional practice or case-law regarding the lawfulness 
of SEP owners’ behaviour consisting of bringing infringement actions seeking a 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products in the EU, it should have been treated on 
the basis of an existing test of abuse – the refusal to grant IP licenses –, rather than under 
a novel category of exclusionary abuse as the Commission and the ECJ did. That, because 
existing legal standards are by definition lawful, practicable and predictable and new 
standards are not889. 
3. Application of existing legal standards  
 
As aforementioned before, I defend that Huawei’s – SEP owner – conduct should have 
been qualified by the ECJ as an abusive refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses –, instead 
of as a novel category of exclusionary abuse within the framework of Article 102 TFEU. 
Accordingly, when the elements of the antitrust are not present, the prohibitory injunction 
and the recall of products will be granted. In addition, when the competitive relationship 
does not exist between the SEP owner and the implementer, the latter might defend itself 
through the contract law approach (that falls generally under the jurisdiction of the 
Member States), suing the SEP owner (i.e. the NPE) for the breach of the contract based 
on third-party beneficiary status.  
 
From the competition law perspective, there is a scholar890 (Petit) who also considers that 
there was no need for a new legal standard, albeit his argument is different from the one 
proposed below. In his view, the existing ‘abusive or vexatious litigation’ is a priori 
applicable to SEP owners’ conduct and it should be the relevant legal test in the context 
of the ongoing global smartphone war. When Motorola was investigated by the 
Commission891, the SEP owner was also of the opinion that the ‘abusive litigation’ was 
the applicable standard. This abusive behaviour was set out in ITT Promedia892 and the 
                                                
889 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 698, para 7 and 699, para 1.  
890 ibid 684, paras 3 and 4, 686, para 5, 687, para 2 and 719, para 2; See more on ‘abusive or vexatious 
litigation’ at: Ioannis Lianos and Pierre Regibeau, ‘“Sham” Litigation. When Can It Arise and How Can It 
Be Reduced’? (2017) 62(4) Antitrust Bulletin 643. 
891 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [527]–[534]. 
892 ITT Promedia (n 151) [55]–[60] and [72]; For a discussion of this case and of its implications in relation 
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required conditions to find an infringement were nuanced by the GC in Protégé 
International 893 and the CFI in Tetra Pak894. In order to consider that the behaviour of a 
SEP owner constitutes an abusive litigation, it would have to be demonstrated that seeking 
a prohibitory injunction: (i) cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish 
the rights of the SEP owner and therefore only serves to harass its competitor; and (ii) 
that it has been conceived in the framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate 
competition895. Nevertheless, the scholar also recognizes that this is a very restrictive test, 
since the two cumulative criteria constitute an exception to the fundamental right of 
access to the courts. So the conditions for its applicability limit the application of ‘abusive 
litigation’ to the act of seeking injunctions by SEP owners.   
 
3.1. ‘Constructive’ refusal to license 
3.1.1. General description  
The act of bringing infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall 
of products in court reveals that the SEP holder has not concluded a licence with the 
defendant. And this will typically occur because the patent holder has offered the 
defendant a licence to its patents on terms that the defendant does not consider to be 
FRAND, so it uses the SEP without paying royalties. Against that infringement, the SEP 
owner may bring infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction, the recall of 
products, the rendering of accounts and damages.  
 
The antitrust concern arises when the aim of bringing the aforementioned actions is not 
to seek measures against the infringement, but to exclude the competitor – who is 
infringing its SEP – from the market. The ultimate aim of the SEP owner should be to be 
remunerated for the use of its SEP. That would occur if the court ordered the payment of 
FRAND royalties in the form of awarding damages – increased, where appropriate, to 
stimulate implementers to apply for a license –, as long as the infringer is not in financial 
distress. However, taking into account the essential nature of the SEP for competitor’s 
activity, if instead of seeking the award of damages the SEP owner seeks a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products, it might be interpreted that its ultimate aim is not to 
be remunerated but to exclude the competitor from the market. 
 
Namely, the SEP holder has other actions available to fight against patent infringement, 
such as the action for the rendering of accounts relating to past acts of use of the patent 
or compensation for damages caused by those acts. These actions keep open the 
possibility for the parties to conclude a license agreement in the future, since they do not 
pursue the exclusion of the product of the competitor/infringer from the market. 
 
                                                
to injunctions, see Miguel Rato and Nicolas Petit, ‘Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: 
Established Standards Reconsidered?’ (2013) 9(1) European Competition Journal 1. 
893 Case T-119/09 Protégé International Ltd v Commission (GC, 13 September 2012), paras 52 and 57. 
894 Tetra Pak [CFI, 1994] (n 93) [151]. 
895 Alfaro Águila-Real, El abuso de posición dominante (n 109), para 96 in fine.  
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In my view, the fact that a SEP owner committed to grant licenses on FRAND terms 
means that it cannot refuse to grant them unless it is justified by some objective reason 
that is verifiable. Consequently, actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of 
products may be envisioned as an implied ‘refusal to supply’, or, to be more accurate, as 
a ‘constructive’ refusal to supply. Refusals to license IPRs are categorized as ‘refusals to 
supply’ by the Commission896  and it would be ‘constructive’ in the sense that there is no 
‘actual’ refusal: at most, only a refusal to grant a licence on terms that the alleged infringer 
considers not to be FRAND. As the Commission states, the concept of a refusal to deal 
covers not only situations of pure or straightforward refusal, but also instances of 
agreement by the dominant company to deal but under unreasonable or uneconomic 
conditions. Namely, it is not necessary for there to be actual refusal on the part of a 
dominant undertaking, ‘constructive’ refusal is sufficient. In the case of SEP owners, 
‘constructive’ refusal would involve the imposition of unreasonable conditions in return 
for the license, which causes the implementer to infringe the SEP and for the patent owner 
to bring infringement actions.  
On the contrary, there are those who897 consider that the conduct of SEP holders does not 
constitute a refusal to grant licenses, but it rather evidences a desire to grant them and it 
also shows that owners will not tolerate continued infringements anymore. Accordingly, 
in their view, bringing infringement actions may serve as a tool for the parties to negotiate 
license agreements. 
 
The refusal to deal – to grant IP licenses – is an existing category of exclusionary abuse 
developed by the ECJ in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft (see Chapter 2). Under this 
case law, a refusal to grant a licence to an IPR can only be abusive in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ that prevent the development of a secondary market. By and large, those 
circumstances are present if four cumulative conditions are met, namely that the refusal: 
(i) concerns a product or service ‘indispensable’ for carrying on a particular business; (ii) 
prevents the emergence of a ‘new product’ for which there is potential consumer demand; 
(iii) is unjustified; and (iv) is such as to exclude any competition on a secondary market 
which the dominant firm seeks to ‘reserve’ for itself898. 
 
Therefore, as it was noted before, I consider that Huawei v. ZTE should have been treated 
as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license SEPs in the sense developed by the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft899. Accordingly, the starting point to qualify 
                                                
896 Commission, ‘Commission note Roundtable on refusals to deal’ DAF/COMP/WD(2007)100, para 9; 
Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), paras 78 and 79. 
897 Rato and English, ‘An Assessment of Injunctions’ (n 794) 106, para 3 (according to them, injunction 
requests in respect of SEPs are likely to evidence a desire to grant a license rather than tolerate continued 
infringement and they can serve as a powerful call to the negotiation table). 
898 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 682, para 5 and 683, para 1. 
899 Cyril Ritter, ‘Refusal to Deal and Essential Facilities: Does Intellectual Property Require Special 
Deference Compared to Tangible Property?’ (2005) 28(3) World Competition: Law and Economics Review 
281, 13 (‘There are at least four more or less strong arguments why IP probably does not deserve ‘special 
deference’ compared to tangible property’) (of the version available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=726683> 
accessed 31 July 2018); Padilla, Ginsburg and Wong-
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as abusive the fact of bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction and the recall of 
products, it is to consider that conduct as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant SEP licenses, 
in consistency with a critical review of IMS Health jurisprudence (see below, Section 
3.1.2.).  
 
Although the Magill/IMS Health/Microsoft standard has been abundantly commented in 
the literature, its applicability to the issue of patent injunctions, however, has been less 
discussed. For instance, basing on Commission’s decision in Google/Motorola 
Mobility900, scholars such as Petit901 interprets that the Magill/IMS Health/Microsoft does 
not seem to be the appropriate legal standard to apply to the seeking of injunctions over 
SEPs. That, because in that decision the Commission expressly accepted that the Magill 
test could apply to the seeking of injunctions over non-SEPs. And in contrast, the decision 
envisioned a distinct and somewhat unclear legal test in relation to SEPs. On the contrary, 
Camesasca and others902 understand that ‘a decision to seek an injunction cannot be seen 
mechanically as a refusal to license, but merely as an option in the context of procedures 
that balances the incentives of both SEP holder and prospective licensee’. For instance, 
Jones903 also shares the opinion of the ECJ, because she understands that the issue in 
Huawei v. ZTE does not correspond to the abusive category established in Magill, IMS 
Health or Microsoft – i.e. refusal to grant IP licenses.  So she considers it is preferable to 
use that category only in generic form to solve the issue raised in Huawei v. ZTE. 
 
Emanuelson904 and Körber905 – although with distinct arguments – are of the opinion that 
it would be difficult to apply the four circumstances established in the Magill test to SEP 
owners’ behaviour. Accordingly, they suggest to consider that the FRAND commitment 
in and of itself would qualify as an ‘exceptional circumstance’. That is to say, in order to 
conclude that the behaviour of SEP holders is abusive, the presence of the following two 
circumstances is sufficient. First, that the SEP owner did not grant licenses on FRAND 
terms – when being committed to grant them – and second, that it brought the 
infringement actions against the alleged infringer. However, this truncated refusal to 
supply approach has been criticised906 for not being logical, as it would mean that ‘whole 
sectors of industry might find themselves in so-called exceptional circumstances, which 
                                                
Property’ (n 386) 22, para 4 (‘Conduct(s) involving IP, including FRAND-assured SEPs, will be analyzed 
under the same antitrust analysis applied to conduct involving other forms of property, taking into 
consideration the special characteristics of IPRs, such as ease of misappropriation’). 
900 (n 523) [59].  
901 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 684, para 2.  
902 Peter Camesasca and others, ‘Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents: Justice is not Blind’ (2013) 
9(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 285, 286, para 3 and 287, para 4. 
903 Alison Jones, ‘Standard-Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone 
Wars’ (2014) 10(1) European Competition Journal 1, 21, para 2 (‘[…] as the seeking of an injunction does 
not seem to fall squarely within either of these categories of abuse, it might be preferable to rely on these 
lines of cases more generally […]’). 
904 Anna Emanuelson, ‘Standardisation Agreements in the Context of the New Horizontal Guidelines’ 
(2012) 2 European Competition Law Review 75. 
905 Torsten Körber, Standard Essential Patents, FRAND Commitments and Competition Law (Nomos 
2013), 216. 
906 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 705. 
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could be considered somewhat bizarre’907. Nonetheless, their approach – that was 
suggested before the Commission adopted its decisions in Samsung/Motorola – is in line 
with that sustained by the Commission in those cases. The Commission stated the conduct 
of a SEP holder was abusive when these three elements were present: the owner had 
committed to grant licenses on FRAND terms; the alleged infringer was willing to enter 
into a license agreement to use the SEP on those terms; and the owner's conduct was not 
objectively justified. 
 
A different view is expressed by Maume908 who considers that the judgment of the ECJ 
in Huawei v. ZTE is a straight continuation of IMS Health, with the difference that the 
Court did not mention the new product requirement – i.e. the second requirement 
established in the Magill test that requires that the refusal prevents the emergence of a 
new product for which there is a potential demand. Thus, he concludes that the Huawei 
decision should not be considered a typical application of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine, but a refusal-to-deal discrimination case, because Huawei refused to grant a 
license to a specific implementer – ZTE –, excluding arbitrarily its products from the 
market.  
 
In view of Rato and English909, once the ECJ stated that the conduct of Huawei could not 
be qualified as a refusal to grant IP licenses in the sense defined in Magill, IMS Health 
and Microsoft, it should have concluded that the conduct was not abusive. However, the 
ECJ relied on two exceptional circumstances – that the patent was essential and the SEP 
owner committed to license it on FRAND terms – to justify its decision of construing a 
novel category of exclusionary abuse.  
3.1.2. Critical review of IMS Health 
As it was concluded in Section 4.6. of Chapter 2, the subsequent application of the Magill 
test to diverging facts, as ocurred in IMS Health or Microsoft, it provoked the 
modification of the ‘original’ circumstances established in that test without an appropriate 
legal reasoning to substantiate these amendments. Consequently, legal standards applied 
in IMS Health and Microsoft were not internally consistent910 with each other nor with 
the one developed in Magill. Thereupon, the above created a legal uncertainty about 
which were the required circumstances to consider a refusal to license IPRs as an abuse 
of a dominant position. 
 
                                                
907 Bo Vesterdorf, ‘IP Rights and Competition Law Enforcement Questions’ (2013) 4(2) Journal of 
European Competition Law and Practice 109. 
908 Philipp Maume, ‘Huawei ./. ZTE, or: How the CJEU Closed the Orange Book’ (2016) 6(2) Queen Mary 
Journal of Intellectual Property 207, 224, para 1. 
909 Rato and English, ‘An Assessment of Injunctions’ (n 794) 107, paras 3-5 and 112, para 4. 
910 On the contrary, see Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 701, para 5 (he considers that 
reviewing requests for injunctions or threats of injunctions under the abusive refusal to supply standard 
meets the requirement of internal consistency, because that test is rooted in established Article 102 TFEU 
case law). 
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Therefore, in order to treat the Huawei v. ZTE case as a ‘constructive’ refusal to license 
SEPs, it is necessary first to undertake a critical review of the IMS Health jurisprudence. 
The criteria established in Magill should have been reviewed in IMS Health, where the 
refusal prevented the emergence of an existing product and the object of the license was 
an essential copyright to implement a de facto standard. Both facts differed from those of 
Magill, where the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product and the object of the 
license were weekly television programme listings protected by copyright.  
 
With the proposed critical review of the IMS Health jurisprudence, a double objective 
would be achieved. One, it would prevent the GC, the ECJ and the Commission from 
issuing decisions that are not internally consistent with each other in relation to the 
circumstances that should be present in order to consider a refusal to grant licenses as an 
abuse of a dominant position (note that the Magill test was subsequently applied in Tiercé 
Ladbroke, Bronner, IMS Health and Microsoft).  
 
And two, the reviewed legal criteria would be applicable to any refusal to grant IP 
licenses, whatever the type of IPR. For instance – as it will be broadly analysed in the 
following Sections from 4 to 7 –, it would be applicable to the ‘constructive’ refusal to 
grant SEP licenses, that are relevant to implement de jure standards (e.g. Huawei v. ZTE). 
But also when the object of the license is an essential IPR to implement a de facto standard 
(e.g. Orange Book – a non-SEP – and IMS Health – a copyright).  
 
It would be applicable to IPRs that read on de facto and de jure standards, because the 
fact of having granted FRAND commitments – the licensing rule under which SEPs that 
read on de jure standards must be licensed – by the SEP holder does not constitute a 
relevant circumstance according to the suggested legal standard of ‘constructive’ refusal 
to license SEPs, that is based on the critical review of the IMS Health jurisprudence (the 
competition law approach). Recall that the ECJ in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft 
considered as abusive the refusal of the owners who did not give any commitment to grant 
IP licenses. Hence, it may be even more likely to be considered as abusive, the refusal of 
SEP owners who did commit to grant licenses on FRAND terms911.  
 
Nevertheless, according to the Commission in Samsung/Motorola and the ECJ in Huawei 
v. ZTE, SEP owners’ commitments to licence on FRAND terms were considered an 
exceptional circumstance.  According to the proposal studied in this research, the fact of 
having granted a FRAND commitment and above all, its contractual nature is 
indispensable only to apply the breach of contract approach (see below, Section 3.2.), but 
not to assess SEP owners’ behaviour from the competition law perspective. 
 
                                                
911 Urska Petrovčič, Competition Law and Standard Essential Patents: A Transatlantic Perspective (Kluwer 
Law International 2014) 105 and 106. 
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As it will be studied in detail below in Section 4, the suggested critical review is based 
on the following. Firstly, the ‘indispensability’ requirement – that constituted the first 
element in Magill – remains as it was originally defined. 
 
Secondly, I will refer to the anti-competitive effects that seeking a prohibitory injunction 
and the recall of products may be capable of causing on competition and consumer 
welfare. Regarding consumers, I will broadened the second element of the Magill test that 
requires that the refusal prevents the emergence of a ‘new product’. Hence, I will consider 
necessary that the no-emergence of a product may affect consumer welfare on the whole, 
either because consumers will not be able to enjoy a new product, a more economical one 
or an interoperable one. Concerning competitors, I will also extend the fourth element of 
the Magill test concerning the ‘reservation of the secondary market’. I argue that although 
it is indispensable the existence of a competitive relationship between the SEP owner and 
the alleged infringer, it is not needed the presence of two separate markets, being 
sufficient to exist two different stages of production interconnected, inasmuch as the 
upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream product.  
 
And thirdly, I allude to the possible objective excuses that the SEP owner may allege to 
justify its behaviour. In Magill, the ECJ referred to the ‘arbitrary refusal’ as the third 
element of the test. Thus, albeit prima facie the behaviour of the SEP owner may 
constitute an abuse of a dominant possition according to the antitrust assessment 
proposed, that conclusion will not be confirmed if the dominant undertaking shows an 
objective excuse for that conduct.  
 
3.2. Breach of contract 
 
When the competitive relationship does not exist between the SEP owner (i.e. a NPE, a 
pure licensor with no productive activity) and the implementer, the latter might use the 
contract law approach. That, because the legal standard of ‘constructive’ refusal to license 
that I propose would not be applicable, since seeking a prohibitory injunction or the recall 
of products would not cause the exclusion of a competitor from the market (the anti-
competitive effect on competition would be missing).   
 
In order to use that approach as a defence against the patent infringement lawsuit, it must 
be interpreted that from the commitment to grant licences on FRAND terms given by 
SEP owners to SSOs, a contractual obligation to license arises, and that the seeking of 
injunctions breaches that contractual duty. More specifically, the infringer could argue 
that the SEP holder breached the contract in favour of third parties. Thus, according to 
the proposal of applying existing legal standards to assess SEP owners’ behaviour, as 
mentioned before (see above, Section 3.1.2.) FRAND commitments are only relevant 
from the contract law perspective, but not when the conduct is treated as a ‘constructive’ 
refusal to license SEPs, where what matters are the anti-competitive effects.  
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Indeed, several are of the opinion that when SEP owners give a FRAND commitment, 
they actually sign a license agreement, because it is not just an obligation or commitment 
to license and negotiate the terms afterwards912. Consistent with that view, multiple US 
courts913 have adopted the general theory of liability that patent holders – who make 
FRAND commitments to an SSO – may be liable in contract. In addition, US courts 
perform more actively in determining the licensing terms when negotiations are 
deadlocked. 
 
In the same vein, in the EU, the Advocate General Wathelet914 and some scholars915 
consider that in any case – even when there is a competitive relationship between the SEP 
holder and the alleged infringer – the matters in Huawei v. ZTE could be adequately – if 
not better – resolved in the context of other branches of law, referring to contract law, 
relying on the breach of the third-party-beneficiary contract916. 
 
Albeit most of the scholars base their argument on the breach of the third-party-
beneficiary contract, there are some917 who rely on the breach of the plaintiff’s duty to 
perform in good faith. That is to say, if the plaintiff is obliged to grant a license under 
competition law and the defendant has declared that it will accept reasonable licensing 
conditions, the defendant can argue that it contradicts good faith and constitutes an abuse 
                                                
912 Geradin and Rato, ‘FRAND Commitments and EC Competition Law’ (n 167) 145, para 2; Suñol, 
‘Patentes y hold-up’ (n 21) 17, para 2. 
913 Case Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008);  
Case Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (‘The court agrees 
with Microsoft that through Motorola’s letters to both the IEEE and ITU, Motorola has entered into binding 
contractual commitments to licence its essential patents on RAND terms’); Case Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (‘In this case, the combination of the policies and 
bylaws of the standard-setting organizations, Motorola’s membership in those organizations and 
Motorola’s assurances that it would licence its essential patents on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms constitute contractual agreements’); Case In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 
2d 903, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (N.D. Ill. 2013) (‘The longstanding rule in Illinois, and elsewhere, is that ‘the 
promisee of a third-party-beneficiary contract may bring suit for a breach of that contract and recover 
damages therefor’). 
914 Huawei AG (n 137) [9]. 
915 Ginsburg, Wong-Ervin and Wright, ‘The Troubling Use of Antitrust’ (n 167); Suñol, ‘Patentes y hold-
up’ (n 21) 40, para 4; Delrahim Makan, ‘Good Times, Bad Times, Trust Will Take Us Far: Competition 
Enforcement and the Relationship Between Washington and Brussels’ (College of Europe in Brussels, 21 
February 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-
remarks-college-europe-brussels> accessed 3 December 2018; Francisco Marcos Fernández, ‘Remedios y 
obligaciones impuestos por las autoridades de defensa de la competencia’ (2018) 10(1) Cuadernos de 
Derecho Transnacional 331, 364, para 104. 
916 The AG also referred to the fact that the matters at issue in the dispute before the referring court, could 
be better resolved by mechanisms other than the rules of competition law, alluding to the intervention of 
SSOs, see Huawei AG (n 137) [9] and [11]: (‘[...] it seems clear to me that the risk of the parties concerned 
being unwilling to negotiate or of the negotiations breaking down could, at least in part, be avoided or 
mitigated if standardisation bodies were to establish minimum conditions or a framework of ‘rules of good 
conduct’ for the negotiation of FRAND licensing terms. Without these, not only actions for a prohibitory 
injunction but also the rules on abuse of a dominant position, which should be employed only as solutions 
of last resort, are being used as a negotiating tool or a means of leverage by the SEP-holder or the 
undertaking which implements the standard and uses the teaching protected by that SEP’).  
917 Thomas Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for a Compulsory 
License Defence under Article 102 TFEU’ (2011) 7(2) European Competition Journal 297, 306, paras 1 
and 2. 
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of rights to use the IP to ask for an injunction. Basing on the Roman law principle dolo 
agit qui petit quod statim redditus est – that is a general principle of present day private 
law –, nobody can demand something by way of an injunction which, as a consequence 
of a counterclaim by the other party, he will immediately have to return (here in the form 
of the grant of a license). Such an action would infringe the principle of good faith as 
contained in Member States’ and US contract law. 
 
The Advocate General also refers that the issue would be better resolved using 
mechanisms other than the rules of competition law, that is, with a greater intervention of 
SSOs. That is to say, he918 states that if FRAND licensing terms are a matter entirely for 
the discretion of the parties and, where appropriate, the civil courts or arbitration 
tribunals, it seems clear for him that the risk of the parties concerned being unwilling to 
negotiate or of the negotiations breaking down could, at least in part, be avoided or 
mitigated if standardisation bodies were to establish minimum conditions or a framework 
of ‘rules of good conduct’ for the negotiation of FRAND licensing terms. 
 
In that regard, it has also been suggested by some scholars919 that when licensing 
negotiations break down, SSOs should adopt the following proposal (instead of SEP 
owners seeking an injunction against infringers). In case parties would not reach an 
agreement on royalties, the portfolio royalty rate would be determined through binding 
arbitration. Specifically, throught baseball-style arbitration, under which each party 
submits its final offer to the arbitrator, who then must pick one of those two offers. 
 
At any event, the contract law approach will not be subject of further study in this 
research, that is focused on the competition law perspective.  
4. The legal test for the abuse 
 
The aim of this section is to establish the substantive conditions that must be present to 
find an infringement defined as a ‘constructive’ refusal to licence SEPs, based on the 
critical review of the IMS Health jurisprudence. Accordingly, it is focused on the test of 
abuse and it does not analyse the other constituent elements that must be present to find 
an infringement under Article 102 TFEU – i.e. relevant market, dominant position and 
effects on trade between Member States. For the purpose of suggesting this legal standard 
based on the aforementioned critical review, the presence of those other elements is 
presumed. Moreover, the peculiarities that may exist regarding those other elements when 
the possible antitrust behaviour involves a SEP, they were already studied in Sections 
5.1., 5.2. and 5.4. of Chapter 3.  
 
I suggest that in order to consider that bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction or the 
recall of product constitutes a ‘constructive’ refusal to license SEPs, the following 
                                                
918 Huawei AG (n 137) [11]. 
919 Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro, ‘A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents’ (2013) 28(2) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1135, 1138, para 4, 1141, para 2. 
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circumstances must be present cumulatively. Firstly, the SEP must be essential for the 
exercise of the competitor’s activity. Secondly, actions seeking a prohibitory injunction 
and the recall of products must be capable of causing anti-competitive effects on 
competition and consumer welfare. And thirdly, the objective justifications of the SEP 
owner’s conduct must be absent.  
 
4.1. Essentiality  
 
First, the IP in question must be objectively essential or indispensable for the exercise of 
the competitor's activity and to be able to compete effectively on the market, in the sense 
that there is no real or potential substitute of the IPR. This requirement remains as it was 
defined in originally in Magill (see Section 4.4.3.1. of Chapter 2). In addition, the 
definition of the ‘potential substitute’ concept established in Bronner (see Section 4.5.1.1. 
of Chapter 2) also remains unmodified.  
 
In that regard, according to the ECJ in Bronner, if there were any technical, legal or 
economic obstacles capable of making impossible or even unreasonably difficult for other 
competitors to create or invent a substitute of the protected creation or invention by the 
IPR, it will be considered that no potential substitutes exist. When assessing the presence 
of these obstacles to determine the existence of potential substitutes, different entry 
barriers (see Section 1.2.2.3. of Chapter 1), such as sunk costs or regulation, that are taken 
into account to determine if the undertaking holds a dominant position, they might be 
considered as economic or legal obstacles.  
 
When the IPR in question is a SEP, it does not imply per se that there are no other 
alternative technologies available on the market (real substitutes). Or that there is not a 
possibility of inventing an alternative to the SEP – of designing around the patent – that 
does not infringe the protected patent nor compromise the essential functions of the 
product (potential substitute). 
 
Consequently, it is important that the assessment of the essential nature of the IPR is made 
thoroughly. That is to say, not defining it too narrowly. But neither too broadly, as it 
might have occurred in IMS Health, where the ‘1860 brick structure’ was considered 
essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity, when potential substitutes existed (see 
Section 4.5.1.1. of Chapter 2 and the ‘Conclusion’ of the same one). Indeed, as it was 
pointed before920, more often than not, the ability of a determined rival to compete around 
the protected IPR – with resulting benefits to consumers – has been underestimated, 
particularly with respect to fast moving technologies, where technological and market 
developments can present multiple opportunities to work around a competitor’s IPR. 
 
Notwithstanding, in most of the cases the SEP in question will be essential because they 
protect a technology necessary to implement a de jure interface standard. Recall that 
                                                
920 See references in (n 386).  
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interface standards address especially the needs for interconnection and interoperability 
between products in a multi-vendor, multi-network and multi-service environment, which 
refers to the fact that complex ICT systems must communicate and interwork on all 
levels921 (see Section ‘Background’ of the Introduction). Accordingly, competitors 
willing to manufacture a product compliant with that standard, will need to use the SEP. 
Therefore, albeit it might be technically possible to design around the technology 
protected by the SEP, the manufactured product that implements the alternative 
technology will not be interoperable for not being compliant with the de jure standard. 
Namely, the election of a technology that reads on a de jure standard – protected by a 
SEP – or that does not read on it – covered by a non-SEP –, it will compromise the 
interoperable function of the manufacturer’s product, which constitutes one of its 
essential functions.  
 
Subsequently, the potential alternative technology would not be considered as a substitute 
of the technology protected by the SEP. Thus, the SEP would be regarded as objectively 
essential or indispensable for the exercise of competitor's activity and to be able to 
compete effectively on the market. 
 
4.2. Anti-competitive effects  
 
The second element that comprises the reviewed refusal to licence standard is that the 
refusal – i.e. the fact of bringing infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction or 
the recall of products – must be capable of causing anti-competitive effects on 
competition and consumer welfare. 
4.2.1. Competitors’ exclusion and market reservation  
The refusal – i.e. the act of seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products – 
must be capable of excluding competitors from the market, so that market might be 
reserved by the IP owner for itself. For the purpose of Article 102 TFEU, it is irrelevant 
whether the desired result – the exclusion and subsequent market reservation – is finally 
achieved or not.  For example, in SEP cases, the exclusion will be effective only when 
the court orders the prohibition of the continuation of the SEP infringement and the recall 
of the goods that it found to be infringing the SEP and the SEP holder enforces them. 
 
In Magill, the definition of the market is limited to a secondary, ancillary or downstream 
market. That is to say, it requires that the dominant IP owner must be present in both the 
main and the ancillary markets and the refusal is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate, 
immediately or over time, all effective competition in the downstream market. 
Accordingly, it required the presence of vertically integrated firms who supply products 
implementing their technology, because the theory of harm underpinning the 
aforementioned case law is a ‘transfer of power’ theory: a firm refuses to license in order 
                                                
921 See references in (n 4) and (n 5).  
 244 
to leverage its dominant position into a secondary, adjacent market922 (see Section 4.4.3.4. 
of Chapter 2).  
 
In IMS Health, the IP owner was not present in a secondary market, but in a vertically 
related one, so the refusal was capable of causing the reservation of another stage of 
production – different from that in which the dominant one was located. Consequently, 
the ECJ stated in that case that is sufficient that the refusal may cause the exclusion of 
competition in a vertically related market, that is to say, in a downstream production stage 
(see Section 4.5.3 of Chapter 2).  
 
In my view, the ECJ should have gone further when broadening this element in IMS 
Health. Thus, in line with the extension of the concept of ‘market’ established in that 
case, this element should have been reviewed in the sense of requiring that the refusal – 
i.e. SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking exclusionary measures – must be capable of 
preventing the entry or continuation of competitors: (i) in a secondary market, regarding 
the one that is dominated; or (ii) in a vertically related market, hindering the entrance of 
competitors to another stage of production – different from that in which the dominant 
one is located923; or (iii) in a market where the dominant is present924. At any event, with 
the aim of reserving the market from which competitors might be excluded, to itself – to 
the SEP owner.  
 
Indeed, in standardized markets such as the market for mobile devices, it is common that 
the patent owner and the implementer compete in the same market with similar products, 
because the existence of the standard makes necessary the use of the same technology, so 
they are competing for instance, on the trademark, designs and marketing925.  
4.2.2. Consumer welfare  
In addition, the refusal – i.e. the act of seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of 
products – must be also capable of harming consumer welfare, because it might hinder 
the emergence of a product for which there is a potential, constant, specific and regular 
demand on the part of consumers.  
 
                                                
922 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 683, para 2.  
923 Alfaro Águila-Real, ‘Delimitación de la noción de abuso’ (n 434) 221, para 2 (‘ [...] y así se habla de 
exclusión en el mismo mercado donde está presente el dominante; exclusión en un mercado adyacente a 
aquel que está dominado y exclusión en un mercado relacionado verticalmente, es decir, la exclusión tiene 
lugar en el mercado en el que se desarrolla otra fase de la producción distinta a aquella donde se encuentra 
el dominante [...]’). 
924 Fernando Carbajo Cascón, ‘La problemática de las patentes indispensables en estándares técnicos y la 
eficacia de los compromisos de licencia en términos FRAND’ (2016) 3 Revista Electrónica de Direito 43, 
para 1 (‘[...] la obstaculización a la competencia no tiene que darse en un mercado derivado o conexo, sino 
que puede tener lugar en el mismo mercado donde compite el titular de la patente esencial’) 
<https://www.cije.up.pt/revista-red-ultimas-edicoes-search?keys=fernando+carbajo> accessed 31 July 
2018.  
925 ibid. 
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In Magill, the ECJ requires that the refusal prevents the emergence of a strictly ‘new’ 
product in the sense that it was not limited essentially to duplicate the product already 
offered on the secondary market by the IP owner. That would happen when the IP owner 
and the competitor competed for innovation or substitution (see Section 4.4.3.2. of 
Chapter 2).  
 
In IMS Health, the refusal prevented the emergence of a product that duplicated that 
already offered by the IP owner. In order to apply the Magill test overcoming that absence 
– because otherwise, the refusal would not be abusive –, the Commission reviewed 
erroneously that element and it considered that was not necessary that the refusal 
prevented the emergence of a new product. Fortunately, the President of the CFI – who 
suspended the application of the Commission’s decision – and the ECJ – in the 
preliminary ruling – stated that the element regarding the emergence of a new product 
established in Magill must always be present (see Section 4.5.2.1. of Chapter 2).  
 
Nevertheless, decision-making bodies in IMS Health should have gone further and review 
that element in the sense of requiring that the refusal prevents the emergence of a ‘new’ 
product, understood as a different product from that offered by the IP owner, which does 
not allow the welfare of consumers to increase. In that sense, when a product implements 
a technology protected by a SEP and its emergence is hindered when the SEP owner 
brings infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products, 
consumers – who demand the presence of that product in the market – will be harmed. 
That, because they cannot enjoy the product in question that might be, for instance, a new 
product, a more economical product or an interoperable product, compared to the product 
offered by the SEP owner.  
 
As mentioned before, in the market for mobile devices where SEP owners and 
implementers use the same standardized technologies, they compete for imitation926 – e.g. 
competing on the design or quality – and not for innovation or substitution. Namely, albeit 
it would be possible to design around the SEP from the technical viewpoint, the product 
that implements the alternative technology would not be substitutable by that 
manufactured by the SEP owner, because its interoperable function – which constitutes 
one of its essential functions – would be compromised (see above, Section 4.1.). 
 
4.2.2.1. Strictly ‘new’ and ‘new’ as different  
In non-standardized markets where competitors do not need to use the same technology, 
consumers could be harmed if they could not enjoy (i) a wholly-new product (competition 
for innovation) – as it was the case in Magill regarding the emergence of comprehensive 
weekly television guides (see Section 4.4.3.2. of Section 2); (ii) a close substitute of the 
existing product, that improves it (competition for substitution)927; or (iii) a product that 
                                                
926 ibid. 
927 ibid.  
 246 
is likely to contribute to technical development928. It is known that technical change (due 
to product and process innovations) results in rapid increases in productivity and 
improves standards of living around the world929. 
 
The latter was the case in Microsoft, where the Commission and the CFI considered that 
albeit Microsoft's competitors' products would implement the same set of protocols as 
Windows work group server operating systems did – so the product would not be 
innovative or substitutable –, they would differ widely in terms of performance, security 
and functionality – the new product would be technically more developed, so the refusal 
to supply the relevant information limited technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers930. Therefore, it understood that the requirement established in Magill and IMS 
Health regarding that the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product, it was present 
in that case (see Section 4.5.2.2 of Chapter 2).  
 
Whereas in markets where the use of SEPs is indispensable because they cover 
standardized technologies that all operators need to use, such as the market for mobile 
devices, it exists a competition by imitation. Namely, competitors manufacture new 
products compared to those offered by the IP owner, but not in the sense of innovative, 
substitutable or technically developed products, but ‘new’ in the sense of different. 
Hence, duplicated products manufactured by competitors might be different with respect 
of the design or the quality, for instance. Modern economic research shows that new 
products, including even small changes in product design, can result in significant 
increases in social welfare, including significant consumer benefits931. Regarding the 
quality, note that it can mean various things: products that last longer or work better, 
better after-sales or technical support or friendlier and better service932. 
 
All in all, in a competitive market, the fact that businesses try to make innovative 
products, with different designs and better quality from the rest, it results in greater choice 
for consumers, who can select the product that offers the right balance between price and 
quality. And consequently, businesses will attract more customers and expand market 
share933. 
 
 
                                                
928 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 87. 
929 Joel Mokyr, ‘Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology’, in Philippe Aghion and 
Steven Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1B (North-Holland 2005), 1113, 1146, para 
3 (‘Technological progress increases the rate of return to human capital, induces more people to have more 
“high quality” (educated) children which provides the positive feedback loop’). 
930 Microsoft [CFI, 2007] (n 156) [648]. 
931 Walter Y. Oi, ‘The Welfare Implications of Invention’ in Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon 
(eds), The economics of new goods (University of Chicago Press 1996), 109. 
932  ‘Why is competition policy important for consumers?’ (Commission), para 3 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html> accessed 16 May 2019. 
933 ibid, paras 4 and 5.  
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4.2.2.2. More economical  
 
Consumers could also be harmed if, as a result of the IP owner’s refusal to license, they 
do not have the possibility to afford a more economical product than the one already 
offered by the right holder934. In this regard, it should be recalled (see Section 4.4.2.2. of 
Chapter 2) that the mere fact that the prices of the product offered by the IP owner are 
higher than those manufactured by competitors, does not of itself lead to the conclusion 
that IP holder’s refusal constitutes an abuse of a dominant position because consumers 
cannot enjoy a more economical product. That, because the owner has the right to recover 
not only the production costs and a reasonable profit, but also the heavy costs that it has 
to bear in research and development935. 
 
Accordingly, when determining whether the product manufactured by the competitor is 
more economical than the one offered by the IP owner, the above must be taken into 
account. National courts should also bear in mind the fact that part of the research and 
development expenditure has probably already been recovered from the sale of those 
products by the IP holder. When the IPR in question is a FRAND-encumbered SEP, it is 
also relevant to consider that the standardization process carried out by SSOs should 
suppose increased compatibility, interoperability and competition, lower production and 
lower sales costs936. 
 
Indeed, in a competitive market, prices are pushed down. And low prices for all is not 
only good for consumers – because more people can afford to buy products –, but it also 
encourages businesses to produce and boosts the economy in general937. 
 
4.2.2.3. Interoperable  
 
IP owners’ refusal to grant licenses might also harm consumers because they could not 
enjoy a product that is characterized by its compatibility and interoperability with 
different products. That anti-competitive effect is common in markets where interface 
standards – de jure and de facto – protected by patents are present. That, because these 
interfaces address especially the needs for interconnection and interoperability between 
products in a multi-vendor, multi-network and multi-service environment.   
 
That was the anti-competitive effect that the refusal of IMS Health provoked (according 
to the prima facie assessment, that was not confirmed in the decision on the merits 
because there was a material change in the status of competition). That is to say, the 
copyright owner refused to license the protected structure to its competitor who would 
also offer data report services in respect of sales of pharmaceutical products, but with 
                                                
934 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 88. 
935 Parke, Davis & Co (n 138) 70, [3] and [4]. 
936 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [284]. 
937  ‘Why is competition policy important for consumers?’ (n 932), para 2. 
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differentiated features. Consequently, it started selling services based on an alternative 
structure. However, potential clients manifested reticence towards them, claiming that the 
data was not usable unless it could be presented within the format of the structure owned 
by IMS Health, that constituted the de facto standard in the industry. Accordingly, IMS 
Health’s refusal prevented the emergence of a product characterized by its 
interoperability with different products, because it could not implement the standardized 
structure (see Section 3.2.5. of Chapter 2).  
 
In high standardized markets where technologies are protected by SEPs – as it is the case 
in Huawei v. ZTE –, the ‘constructive’ refusal of bringing infringement actions seeking a 
prohibitory injunction or the recall of products, it would harm consumers because 
competitors could not manufacture interoperable products that complied with de jure 
standards. 
 
4.3. Absence of objective justifications  
 
In Magill, the ECJ referred to the ‘arbitrary refusal’ as the third element of the test, 
alluding that the refusal could not be justified by requirements of secrecy, research or 
development or other objectively verifiable considerations (see Section 4.4.3.3. of 
Chapter 2). That circumstance did not suffer any clarification or alteration in IMS Health, 
where also became clear that the infringement of IPRs by competitors does not constitute 
a justified refusal, nor the fact that the competitor offered only a nominal sum for a licence 
(Section 4.5.4. of Chapter 2).  
 
According to the proposed legal standard based on the critical review of the IMS Health 
jurisprudence, once it is determined the presence of the previous two elements – the 
essentiality of the IPR and the causation of anti-competitive effects –, it could be 
considered that prima facie the refusal to grant IP licenses is abusive. Nevertheless, in 
order to confirm the above conclusion, it is necessary to examine the claims of the 
dominant undertaking that assure that its conduct is justified by objectively verifiable 
considerations (so it is not arbitrary). Either demonstrating that its behaviour produces 
possible advantages in terms of substantial efficiencies which outweigh any anti-
competitive effects or showing that is objectively necessary. In other words, it falls on 
the dominant undertaking to demonstrate any negative impact which an obligation to 
license is likely to have on its own level of innovation938. 
4.3.1. Efficiency gains 
According to the settled case law939, in order to conclude that the dominant undertaking’s 
behaviour produces possible advantages in terms of efficiencies, it has to show that the 
following four cumulative conditions are met: (i) the efficiency gains resulted from the 
                                                
938 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), paras 89 and 90.  
939 See references in (n 618).  
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conduct counteract any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in 
the affected markets; (ii) that those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about as 
a result of that conduct; (iii) that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those 
gains in efficiency; and (iv) that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing 
all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition. 
 
As the Commission stated in Samsung and Motorola, it is unlikely that anti-competitive 
effects of seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products could be 
counterbalanced or outweighed by any advantages in terms of efficiency which also 
benefited the consumer (see Section 5.3.4.1. of Chapter 3).  
4.3.2. Objectively necessary 
With regard to the justifications to consider the conduct of refusing to grant IP licenses 
as objectively necessary and basing on what the Commission stated in Samsung and 
Motorola (see Section 5.3.4.2. of Chapter 3), the IP owner may refer to (i) the need to 
protect its commercial interests or (ii) the need to protect its IPRs when they have been 
infringed. Nevertheless, the latter justification cannot in itself constitute an objective 
justification, because the exercise of IPRs is not an absolute right. Accordingly, the ECJ 
recognises exceptions of that exercise in favour of free competition940 (see Section 5.3.1. 
of Chapter 3).   
 
Focusing on the argumentation related to the need to protect dominant undertaking’s 
commercial interests941, the IP owner could base on that justification in the following 
scenarios942. When (1) the potential licensee is in financial distress and unable to pay its 
debts; (2) the implementer’s assets are located in jurisdictions that do not provide for 
adequate means of enforcement of damages; or (3) the alleged infringer is unwilling to 
enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms.  
 
Unlike the first two scenarios, to assess the presence of the third one, a definition of the 
‘willing licensee’ is required in order to conclude, on a case by case basis, whether the 
licensee is willing to enter into a license agreement or not. Below, I will suggest a 
definition of that concept in the framework of SEP infringement, in order to assess when 
it is considered that the alleged infringer – to whom actions seeking a prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products by the SEP owner are addressed – is a willing 
licensee.  
 
4.3.2.1. The ‘willing licensee’ 
 
As it was previously studied, the Commission – in Samsung and Motorola – and the ECJ 
– in Huawei v. ZTE – relied on different facts to determine when the alleged infringer is 
                                                
940 (n 581) 
941 (n 622), (n 623) and (627).  
942 (n 624).  
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a willing licensee (and also the German Federal Supreme Court in Orange Book regarding 
non-SEPs).  From my point of view, neither of these approaches applied are appropriate 
to determine the willingness of a potential licensee. Accordingly, I suggest a definition 
that combines elements from the three definitions previously referred.  
 
Moreover, note that in the aforementioned cases – where patent owners’ behaviour was 
treated as a novel category of abuse –, the concept of the ‘willing licensee’ constituted 
the core element to assess prima facie the unlawfulness of the conduct (see Section 1 of 
this Chapter). However, when construing the behaviour as a ‘constructive’ refusal to 
license – as it is being proposed in this research –, the essential nature of the IP (see above, 
Section 4.1.) and the anti-competitive effects (see above, Section 4.2.) constitute the 
fundamental elements for that assessment.  And the concept of ‘willing licensee’ is raised 
in order to assess whether the SEP owner’s conduct might be justified for being 
objectively necessary to protect its commercial interests, because the alleged infringer is 
not willing to enter into a license agreement.  
	
Under the Orange Book approach (see Section 2.1.2.1. of Chapter 4), a willing licensee 
is who (i) has made an unconditional offer – not limited exclusively to cases of 
infringement – that the patent owner cannot reject it without violating the prohibition of 
discrimination or anti-competitive behaviour; and it (ii) has complied with the obligations 
that the future licensing agreement imposes in return for the use of the IPR – providing 
the rendering of account of past acts of use and paying the amount of royalties it has itself 
calculated therefrom.  
	
In Commission’s view established in Samsung and Motorola (see Section 5.3.4.3. of 
Chapter 3), a willing licensee is the one that in the event that bilateral negotiations do not 
come to a fruitful conclusion, it accepts to be bound by a third party’s (a court or mutually 
agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate, being irrelevant in that respect 
if the potential licensee challenges the validity, essentiality or infringement of the SEP or 
not. 
	
The ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE (see Section 4.5. of Chapter 4)  considered that the alleged 
infringer is a willing licensee if (i) after being alerted on the infringement, it expresses its 
willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms; (ii) it responds to the 
offer made by the SEP owner diligently and in good faith – presenting a counter-offer 
promptly and in writing; and (iii) in the event its counter-offer was rejected, it provides 
adequate security to guarantee the payment of royalties – by providing a bank guarantee 
or by placing the amounts necessary on deposit, calculated on the basis of the number of 
the past acts of use of the SEP. Hence, the ECJ partially based on the proposal provided 
by the referring court – Regional Court of Düsseldorf –943, who stated that if the ECJ held 
the notion of the infringer’s ‘willingness to negotiate’ established by the Commission to 
be relevant, certain qualitative and time requirements must be imposed in order to ensure 
                                                
943 Huawei (n 35) [38]. 
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that the applicant for the licence is acting in good faith. However, the ECJ did not follow 
its suggestion regarding that ‘a properly formulated, acceptable, unconditional request for 
a licence, containing all the provisions normally found in a licensing agreement, ought to 
be required to be submitted before the patent concerned is used’. 
 
In my opinion, an alleged infringer is willing to enter into a license agreement, if from 
the moment it is fully aware that is infringing a SEP, and that, in consequence, it needs 
to obtain a license to use it – from the Huawei definition –, it performs the following acts: 
(i) it renders the accounts in relation to past acts of use of the SEP and it provides a bank 
guarantee for the payment of royalties or places on deposit a provisional FRAND sum at 
the court or arbitration tribunal for past and future use of the patent (reflecting the value 
of the whole SEP portfolio, and not just for patents in the litigation) – from the Orange 
Book and the Huawei definitions – ; and (ii) it is ready for the amount of the royalty to be 
determined by an independent third party (civil courts or arbitration tribunals) and to be 
bound by such a determination – from the Samsung/Motorola definition. 
 
In case parties opted to enter into a cross-licensing agreement, the implementer would 
recover the guarantee or the deposit in case the royalties would not be due.  If they entered 
into a license agreement with payment of royalties, the guarantee or deposit would be 
used as royalty payments. And in the event they did not reach any agreement, the 
guarantee or deposit would be intended to compensate the damages caused by the 
infraction. 
 
4.4. Outcome 
 
In conclusion, the behaviour of refusing to license IPRs would constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position if the aforementioned three circumstances were present cumulatively. 
That is to say, if the IPR in question is essential for competitor’s activity, if the refusal is 
capable of excluding competitors from the market and of harming consumer welfare and 
if the refusal is arbitrary, in the sense of not being justified by objectively verifiable 
considerations – by efficiency gains or needs to protect IP owners’ commercial interests 
or the IPRs in question.   
 
In particular, when the behaviour in question consists in seeking a prohibitory injunction 
or the recall of products by SEP owners – i.e. a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant SEP licenses 
–, that conduct would be justified by the need to protect the SEP owner’s commercial 
interests in the following scenarios: (i) the implementer is in financial distress and unable 
to pay its debts; (ii) the alleged infringer’s assets are located in jurisdictions that do not 
provide for adequate means of enforcement of damages; or (iii) the potential licensee is 
unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms, because it did not: (1) 
render the accounts in relation to past acts of use of the SEP and it did not provide a bank 
guarantee for the payment of royalties or place them on deposit for past and future use of 
the SEP; and  (2) it was not ready to be the amount of the royalty to be determined by an 
independent third party and to be bound by it.  
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In those three scenarios the SEP owner’s behaviour would be justified because the 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products would be the only effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive measures against SEP infringements944. That is to say, if in 
the first scenario the SEP owner confined to bring actions for damages, the infringer could 
not compensate it (as it might also occur in the second scenario) and furthermore, the 
implementer would continue infringing the SEP because it would be unable to pay the 
due royalties. In the third scenario, albeit the SEP owner might be compensated if it 
brought an action for damages, the implementer would also continue infringing the SEP 
because it would not be willing to enter into a license agreement, holding out the SEP 
owner (see Section 1.3.1.4. of Chapter 1).  
 
Consequently – if seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products would also 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position in those three scenarios –, the ability of SEP 
holders to recover their investments and their incentives to invest in other technologies 
would be diminished. As well as their wish to participate in the standardization processes 
and to commit to grant licenses on FRAND terms. Besides, they might also experience 
losses due to the presence of competitors/infringers in the market – who would be free-
riding on their SEPs – and because the decreasing revenues, due to the decline in sales945.  
 
In that regard, it is well worth recalling that competition policy is about applying rules to 
make sure companies compete fairly with each other. Moreover, competition within the 
EU helps make European companies stronger outside the EU too – and able to hold their 
own against global competitors946. 
5. Antitrust liability for the abuse  
 
In order to analyse the antitrust liability that lies with the SEP owner for the abuse of a 
dominant position for seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products, this 
section is based on a number of assumptions. Firstly, the SEP at stake is valid and 
infringed – consequently, damages will be paid in favour of the SEP owner under Article 
13 of IPRED.  
 
And secondly, seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products constitutes an 
abusive ‘constructive’ refusal to license, according to the suggested criteria based on the 
critical review of the IMS Health jurisprudence, which is prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. 
Accordingly, (i) the SEP is essential for the implementation of an industrial de facto/de 
jure standard which is indispensable for the exercise of competitors’ activities and to be 
able to compete effectively on the market; (ii) the fact of seeking the aforementioned 
exclusionary measures is capable (1) of preventing the continuation of competitors in a 
secondary market, in a vertically related or in a market where the dominant is present, so 
                                                
944 See IPRED (n 68), Art 3(2). 
945 Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [283]. 
946  ‘Why is competition policy important for consumers?’ (n 932), paras 1 and 6. 
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the SEP holder would reserve that market in question for itself; and (2) of harming 
consumer welfare because they could not enjoy a product that is characterized by its 
compatibility and interoperability with different products; and (iii) SEP owner’s 
behaviour does not produce efficiency gains nor it is objectively necessary to protect its 
commercial interests, because (1) the infringer is not in financial distress and it is able to 
pay its debts; (2) its assets are not located in jurisdictions that do not provide for adequate 
means of enforcement of damages; nor (3) it is an unwilling licensee since it rendered the 
accounts of past acts of use of the SEP, it provided a bank guarantee for the payment of 
royalties or placed on deposit a provisional sum for past and future use of the SEP and it 
is ready for the amount of the royalty to be determined by an independent third party and 
to be bound by such a determination.  
 
Note that in case the court determined that the SEP is not valid or infringed, implementers 
would recover the guarantee or the deposit, because the royalties would not be due. Recall 
that during the standardization procedure, SSOs do not check whether patents are valid 
to the de jure standard in which they are included. 
 
If the SEP protects a technology essential to implement a de jure standard, it could also 
be assumed that a FRAND commitment has been made by the patent holder. However, 
as I stated above in Section 3.1.2., that fact is not relevant from the competition law 
approach taken in this research, but from the contract law perspective.   
 
5.1. Compulsory license together with a periodic penalty payment  
 
The appropriate measures to bring the infringement of Article 102 TFEU to an end are 
provided for in Regulation 1/2003947 and they are divided into three categories (remedies, 
sanctions and binding commitments), as they were studied in Section 2 of Chapter 1. 
When treating SEP owners’ conduct of seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of 
products as a refusal to grant IP licenses in consistency with the critical review of IMS 
Health jurisprudence proposed above, the compulsory license – together with a periodic 
penalty payment – emerges as the most proportionate and necessary measure to end 
effectively the infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Actually, that was the case in Magill 
(see Section 5.4.1. of Chapter 2) and Microsoft (see Section 5.4.3. of Chapter 2). 
 
Namely, in compliance with Article 7(1) of the aforementioned Regulation, the remedy 
of compulsory licensing is directly proportional to the infringement because it forces the 
dominant undertaking to do exactly which it refused to do – to grant licenses of its SEPs. 
And for that same reason, it also constitutes a necessary measure to bring the infringement 
of Article 102 TFEU effectively to an end, that is, to end with the behaviour consisting 
of refusing to grant SEP licenses (see Section 5.2.3. of Chapter 2). In other words, the 
compulsory license is a remedy capable of restoring competition in the sense of 
eliminating the consequences of the abuse.  
                                                
947 (n 252). 
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The aim of imposing together with the compulsory license, a periodic penalty payment 
for each day of delay in compliance is to prevent the non-compliance with the obligation 
to grant licenses by the SEP holder. Therefore, if the sanction is imposed once the order 
to grant licenses has been breached (as the Commission did in Microsoft), it would not 
fulfil its purpose. That combination of measures – compulsory license together with a 
periodic penalty payment – is the most effective one to remedy and, where appropriate, 
to punish the abuse of a dominant position. Moreover, that combination is the one with 
the greatest deterrent effect regarding future infringements, compared to the sole 
imposition of a compulsory license or a fine.  
 
I do not consider it appropriate to also impose a fine on SEP holders to punish the abuse 
– either if the undertaking acted intentionally or negligently –, because it might act as a 
disincentive to invest in innovation and it might also dissuade SEP owners from 
participating in the standardization processes. Consequently, consumers would be harmed 
because they would be deprived of the pro-competitive benefits of standardized 
technologies (see Section ‘Background’ of the Introduction). 
 
5.2. Mechanisms for licensing terms’ determination 
 
When drafting the terms of the compulsory license, there might be discrepancies among 
parties, especially in relation to determine the royalties due. In order to avoid that those 
discrepancies cause that the IP owner does not grant licenses within the deadline 
established by the Commission, it is appropriate that the EC includes some mechanisms 
to prevent the non-compliance. 
 
Indeed, in the case of compulsory licenses whose object is a SEP, the main issue will be 
related with determining FRAND royalties, because the disagreement on that issue will 
have been the reason why the implementer decided to infringe the IPR and why the SEP 
holder brought infringement actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of 
products. 
 
Therefore, regarding the determination of royalty rates, I suggest that the Commission 
always includes a mechanism for determining the remuneration when issuing a 
compulsory license, taking as reference the solution it provided in IMS Health (see 
Section 5.4.2.2. of Chapter 2). In that case, when the Commission ordered a compulsory 
license as an interim measure – which application was suspended and subsequently 
withdrawn –, it provided a solution in case parties failed to reach a mutual agreement 
about the royalties to be paid. According to it, royalties would be determined by one or 
several independent experts chosen by agreement of the parties. And if they did not reach 
an agreement on the identity of the expert(s), they would be appointed by the Commission 
from a list of candidates provided by the parties or, if appropriate, the Commission would 
choose one or several suitably qualified person(s).  
 
 255 
For those cases where parties disagree about other terms of the license other than 
remuneration, such as license duration, it would be appropriate to include in the 
compulsory license the mandatory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism (albeit 
parties involved could also voluntarily decide to include it). That mechanism would be 
useful to settle the disputes between the licensor and the licensee, as well as to determine 
the consequences of the incorrect compliance or non-compliance with the obligation to 
grant licenses, by subject matter experts and in a faster way. In fact, the Commission often 
requires mandatory arbitration commitments to be attached with compulsory licensing in 
merger control cases, where compulsory licences are often exclusive for specific and 
named licensees, with royalty free offers. But it rarely pushes an arbitration clause in 
compulsory licensing to remedy an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of preserving competition, abuse of dominant position and 
merger control should share their design as to compulsory licensing with each other948. 
 
Moreover, although FRAND determinations by arbitration tribunals would be 
confidential, non-confidential versions could be made public in accordance with the 
applicable rules of the tribunal, in particular the method applied to calculate the FRAND 
rate. This would contribute to the creation of a body of case law of past determinations 
upon which future FRAND determinations could draw949. 
 
Furthermore, if the mechanism for determining the remuneration and the dispute 
resolution mechanism were included in the compulsory license, they would serve not only 
to determine the licensing terms, but they would also help to track the compliance with 
the order to grant compulsory licenses imposed on the SEP owner. Hence, it would not 
be necessary for the Commission to control it. That is to say, indirectly, experts or 
arbitrators would assume the tracking, becoming de facto, the monitoring trustees. 
 
Note that in contrary to structural remedies, the compliance with behavioural remedies 
has to be monitored950. In the EU, the Commission might be responsible for monitoring 
or it may seek assistance of external technical experts, as long as the designation of a 
monitoring trustee strictly follows the legal provisions and the costs of monitoring 
trustees are on the Commission. 
 
The above is in line with the US Supreme Court951 who is of the opinion that a regulatory 
agency should not impose a compulsory licensing remedy that it cannot adequately and 
reasonably supervise – a compulsory license without monitoring measures –, because it 
would require the court to assume the day-to-day control characteristic of a regulatory 
agency.  
                                                
948 Wei Wang, ‘Compulsory Licensing as Antitrust and Merger Remedy in EU’ 19, para 2, 22, para 2 and 
26, para 4 <https://mycourses.aalto.fi/mod/resource/view.php?id=345614> accessed 31 July 2018 
(unpublished). 
949 Samsung Commission Decision (n 7) [90], [103] and [111]. 
950 (n 261). 
951 Verizon Communications (n 473) [415]. 
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6. De facto compulsory licenses to remedy patent infringements  
 
In this section, I will make particular mention to how de facto compulsory licenses have 
been used as a solution in US case law to remedy patent infringements, in order to make 
SEP licenses available to all – ‘ongoing royalties for future infringements’. In the same 
vein, I will also allude to the possibility of imposing that remedy in the EU, albeit different 
premises are required – ‘pecuniary compensation as a substitute’.  
 
Accordingly, the legal approach in which the issuing of compulsory licenses is based in 
this section diverges from the one suggested in the previous section, namely, to remedy 
infringements of competition law – abuses of dominant positions – for refusing to license 
IPRs.  
 
6.1. Ongoing royalties for future infringements  
 
In the US, due to the lack of presence of the required elements to issue prohibitory 
injunctions, courts have imposed ongoing royalties on infringers to remedy patent 
infringements, that de facto constitute compulsory licenses on SEP holders.  
6.1.1. Requirements to issue prohibitory injunctions: eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
In most cases, it is understood that the prohibitory injunction deters the infringement, 
encourages parties to enter into licensing agreements, promotes innovation952 and entails 
an increase in consumer welfare953. However, in some cases, such as when the patent 
protects a component of minor importance, the prohibition to continue infringing the SEP 
may cause harmful consequences. That is to say, patent owners may take advantage of 
the prohibitory injunction to force implementers to pay excessive royalties, what is known 
as patent holdup (see Section 1.3.1.1. of Chapter 1). That would lead to an increase in the 
costs and it would dissuade the innovation development954.  
 
Therefore, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange955, the Supreme Court of the US held that 
according to Section 283 of the Patent Act (35 U.S. Code)956, a court may issue a 
permanent (prohibitory) injunction following a finding of patent infringement, only if the 
patent holder shows the fulfilment of the following four requirements cumulatively (the 
four-factor test). One, that it has suffered an irreparable injury. Two, that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury. 
                                                
952 Vincenzo Denicolò and others, ‘Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries 
with Non-Practicing Patent Holders’ (2008) 4(3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 571, 603, para 
5 and 604, para 1. 
953 Jacob Seifert, ‘Welfare effects of compulsory licensing’ (2015) 48(3) Journal of Regulatory Economics 
317, 342, para 1. 
954 Suzanne Michel and others, ‘A Report of the Federal Trade Commission, The evolving IP marketplace: 
aligning patent notice and remedies with competition’ (Federal Trade Commission 2011) 233, 244 < 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-
and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf> accessed 1 August 2018. 
955 Case eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
956 (n 71). 
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Three, that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted. That is, that issuing a prohibitory injunction would be 
justified weighing the injury suffered by the SEP holder and the harm the injunction 
would cause to the infringer. And four, that the public interest would not be disserved by 
a permanent injunction, in the sense that it would not stifle innovation.   
 
Notwithstanding, for SEP owners – and particularly for NPEs –, it is difficult to prove the 
fulfilment of the requirements set by the Supreme Court. It turns especially complicated 
for them to show that they have suffered an irreparable harm957 – the first element of the 
test – , because they could receive royalties from the infringer. Likewise, it is complicated 
to prove that they would not be adequately compensated with pecuniary damages958 – the 
second element of the test. Consequently, the prohibitory injunction to cease the 
continuation of the infringement is not always ordered by US courts. That, not because 
there exists a per se rule foreseeing that prohibitory injunctions are not available for SEP 
holders959, but because they do not always constitute the most appropriate remedy. 
6.1.2. The equitable remedy of ongoing royalty 
Accordingly, when the existence of the four circumstances that comprise the test 
established in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange is not proved, the court does not issue a 
prohibitory injunction. Nonetheless, according to Section 283 of the Patent Act (35 U.S. 
Code), it imposes an equitable remedy of ongoing royalty to compensate SEP owners for 
the harm caused by the infringement. Namely, the court orders the infringer to pay the 
royalties for the future uses of the SEP, as a compensation for the future infringements 
that it will commit.  
 
When in a given case, SEP holders request for a prohibitory injunction because they 
consider it is the most proportionate and necessary remedy, their aim is that the court 
prohibits infringers from continuing to infringe their SEPs. Nevertheless, when the court 
imposes on them an equitable remedy of ongoing royalty, it forces patent holders to allow 
infringers to continue using – infringing – their SEPs. Therefore, it is understood that de 
facto, the court is ordering SEP owners to grant licenses (de facto compulsory licenses).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
957  Case Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 LEXIS 170587, at *25 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012) 
(‘Because Motorola cannot show irreparable harm or that monetary damages would be inadequate, the court 
agrees with Microsoft that injunctive relief is improper in this matter and grants Microsoft’s motion’).  
958 Case Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (‘By committing to license 
its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to license its patent to anyone willing to pay a FRAND 
royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty (monetary damage) is adequate compensation for 
a license to use that patent’). 
959  Case Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 and 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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6.1.3. Determination of the ongoing royalty rate  
In principle, royalties are determined by the parties, unless they do not reach an 
agreement. In that case, they would be determined by the court960. 
 
According to the US Federal Circuit961, the ongoing royalty rate for future infringement 
should be calculated differently from the reasonable royalty for past infringement, 
although it does not provide any particular method to calculate it. In accordance with its 
case law, typically, the rate for the ongoing royalty is higher than the rate for past 
infringement, holding that the ongoing royalty should reflect the change in circumstances 
now that the defendant has been adjudicated liable for infringing a valid patent – 
improving the bargaining position of the patent owner. Namely, if the ongoing royalty 
rate is not higher than the one for past infringement, implementers would not be 
stimulated to apply for a license. In fact, the purpose of an ongoing royalty is to reduce a 
party’s incentive to infringe962.  
 
Hence, changes in the economic conditions between the time of first infringement and 
the time of the hypothetical negotiation for an ongoing royalty will typically support the 
court‘s award of an ongoing royalty that exceeds the reasonable royalty that the jury 
awarded for past infringement963. Although it is unusual, in the case XY, LLC v. Trans 
Ova Genetics, L.C.964, the judge awarded an ongoing royalty using lower rates than the 
royalty awarded by the jury for past infringement.  
 
On the contrary, there are those965 who consider that the ongoing royalty rate should be 
calculated in the same way that the royalty rate for past infringements. 
6.1.4. Compliance with TRIPS Agreement 
Scholars966 have questioned whether the imposition of the remedy of ongoing royalty – 
instead of a prohibitory injunction – that constitutes a de facto compulsory license, it 
                                                
960 Case Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sidak, ‘Ongoing 
Royalties’ (n 72) 163, para 3. 
961 Paice LLC (n 960) [1317]; Case Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Case 
Activevideo Networks Inc. v. Verizon Communications Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
962 Case Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1607, at *8 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 3, 
2017). 
963 Sidak, ‘Ongoing Royalties’ (n 72) 212, para 3. 
964  Case XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1297 and 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (the court 
remanded for the district court to recalculate an ongoing royalty rate). 
965 Mark A. Lemley, ‘The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties’ (2011) 76(3) Missouri Law Review 
695, 695, 696 and 707; Thomas F. Cotter, ‘Federal Circuit Remands for Recalculation of Ongoing Royalty’ 
(Comparative Patent Remedies Blog, May 23, 2018) (‘[...] since the rate for past infringement is supposed 
to reflect the bargain the parties would have struck ex ante knowing the patent to be valid and infringed, 
the rate for past and future infringement should be identical’) 
<http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2018-05-30T06:51:00-
07:00&max-results=7&start=14&by-date=false> accessed 1 August 2018. 
966 James Packard Love, ‘Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory Licenses on Patents’ (2007) 
Knowledge Ecology International Key Research Note 2, 5 (the denial of injunctions in patent cases as 
compulsory licensing) <www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf.> accessed 1 August 2018; 
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complies with the TRIPS Agreement. It would not meet the specific provisions stipulated 
in Article 31 (see Section 5.3. of Chapter 2). However, the de facto compulsory license 
would meet the substantive requirements set forth in Articles 8(2) and 30.  
 
Article 8(2) of the TRIPS states that Members may adopt appropriate measures ‘to 
prevent the abuse of IPRs by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology’. And Article 30, 
specifically establishes that Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, as long as the exceptions do not unreasonably: (i) conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent; and (ii) prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties (see Section 5.2.2. 
of Chapter 2).  
 
In any event, as Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS deal with ‘rights’ and the eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange ruling is about remedies against patent infringements, it is more accurate 
to conclude that Article 44(2) of the TRIPS – which deals directly with injunctions – is 
the one that empowers the court to impose the remedy of ongoing royalty. That is to say, 
this provision allows judicial authorities to order infringers to pay a remuneration to 
compensate SEP holders967, instead of ordering them to stop the patent infringement. 
Hence, that Article envisages the possibility that has been used by US courts when SEP 
owners do not prove the fulfilment of the requirements contained in the four-factor test 
established in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange. 
 
6.2. Pecuniary compensation as a substitute 
 
In line with Article 44(2) of TRIPS, in the EU there is also the possibility of ordering a 
pecuniary compensation as a substitute for a prohibitory injunction – as a permanent or 
provisional measure –, as the US courts do basing on Section 283 of the Patent Act (35 
U.S. Code), when they impose an equitable remedy of ongoing royalty to compensate 
SEP owners for the harm caused by the infringement. 
6.2.1. Permanent measure:  unintentional and non-negligent  
According to Article 12 IPRED968, Member States may provide that the competent 
judicial authorities may order – in the decision on the merits – a pecuniary compensation 
                                                
Christopher Anthony Cotropia, ‘Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United 
States' Decision in eBay v. MercExchange’ in Toshiko Takenaka and Rainer Moufang (eds), Patent Law: 
A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2008); Andrew C. Mace, ‘TRIPS, eBay, and 
Denials of Injunctive Relief: Is Article 31 Compliance Everything?’ (2009) The Columbia Science and 
Technology Law Review 232; Jarrod Tudor, ‘Compulsory Licensing in the European Union’ (2012) 4(2) 
George Mason Journal of International Commercial Law 222, 222, para 1; Jorge L. Contreras, ‘A Brief 
History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical 
Lens’ (2015) 80(1) Antitrust Law Journal 39, 45, para 2. 
967 Cotropia, ‘Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS’ (n 966) 17, para 4 and 20, para 4; Suñol, ‘Patentes y 
hold-up’ (n 21) 22, para 6. 
968 (n 68). 
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to be paid to the injured party instead of imposing a prohibitory injunction or the recall 
of products, as long as the following five requirements are present: (i) it is an appropriate 
case; (ii) the option is requested by the liable person; (iii) that person acted unintentionally 
and without negligence; (iv) the execution of those other measures – prohibitory 
injunction and the recall of products – would cause the alleged infringer disproportionate 
harm; and (v) the pecuniary compensation to the injured party appears reasonably 
satisfactory. 
 
Accordingly, it depends on each Member State to provide judicial authorities with the 
possibility of imposing pecuniary compensation as a substitute. That differs from 
prohibitory injunctions (Article 11 IPRED) and the recall of products [Article 10(1)] 
IPRED, because Member States must ensure that judicial authorities may issue these 
measures.  
 
Nevertheless, in the EU, due to the third element required by Article 12 IPRED – that the 
infringer acted unintentionally and without negligence –, it would be difficult for a court 
to order the pecuniary compensation as a substitute in SEP infringement cases. That, 
because implementers are aware that they are infringing SEPs and as they continue doing 
it instead of entering into licensing agreements, SEP owners decide to bring infringement 
actions against them. 
 
As mentioned before, issuing a pecuniary compensation as a substitute for a prohibitory 
injunction or the recall of products is more prejudicial to the SEP owner, whose aim is 
that the court prohibits infringers from continuing infringing its SEPs and to order the 
recall of products that infringed them. That, because damages might not be sufficient in 
that case due to several reasons. For instance, because the implementer was in financial 
distress and unable to pay its debts; or its assets were located in jurisdictions that do not 
provide for adequate means of enforcement of damages; or it was unwilling to enter into 
a licence agreement on FRAND terms.  
 
Therefore, unlike it occurs in the US, in the EU that substitute measure is only available 
when the infringer acted unintentionally and without negligence, because it does not 
constitute the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end the patent infringement 
when the implementer was aware that it was infringing the SEP. Note that the substitution 
of pecuniary compensation constitutes a restriction on the right to bring actions for a 
prohibitory injunction for the purpose of protecting IP. That reflects that it does not 
constitute an absolute and inviolable right and that under certain circumstances, it must 
be reconciled, in the general interest, with the rules on competition laid down, in 
particular, in Article 102 TFEU969.  
 
 
 
                                                
969 Huawei AG (n 137) [63].  
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6.2.2. Provisional measure: in any case  
Notwithstanding, according to Article 9(1,a) IPRED, Member States shall ensure that the 
judicial authorities may, at the request of the applicant, issue against the alleged infringer 
an interlocutory injunction intended to allow the continuation of the alleged infringements 
of IPRs, as long as infringers lodge guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of 
the right holder. The above, instead of issuing against the alleged infringer, on a 
provisional basis, a prohibitory injunction intended to forbid the continuation of the 
alleged infringements. Hence, the legislator provides this possibility, regardless of 
whether the alleged infringer acted intentionally/ negligently or not.  
 
For instance, basing on the aforementioned Article, Judges of Barcelona Commercial 
Courts No. 5 and No. 4970 – regarding non-SEP infringement proceedings –, agreed to 
replace provisional prohibitory injunctions and recall of products with the deposit of a 
bond to ensure the compensation of patent owners. Thereby, alleged infringers were 
allowed to continue infringing the patents – that were relevant to implement de facto 
standards – during the MWC that took in place in Barcelona (see Section 3.3.3. of Chapter 
4).  
7. Positives of treating it as a ‘constructive’ refusal  
 
In this section, it will be studied how treating SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking 
prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant SEP 
licenses – in consistency with the proposed critical review of IMS Health jurisprudence 
–, it brings positives from a double perspective: from the definition of the infringement 
and from the remedy design. 
 
Accordingly, envisioning SEP holders’ conduct as an abusive refusal, it would entail, 
from the legal standard viewpoint, that (i) when the required elements for the abuse are 
not present, injunctions might be granted in favour of SEP owners; (ii) the category of 
abusive refusal to grant SEP licenses would be applied in a harmonized way, not leaving 
room for forum shopping; and (iii) the legal standard would be internally consistent with 
existing law under Article 102 TFEU.  
 
And from the perspective of the competition law enforcement, the fact that the measure 
to remedy the abuse of a dominant position is a compulsory license – together with a 
periodic penalty payment –, it might end with the deadlock situation in which SEP 
licensing negotiations are immersed, both ex ante and ex post.   
 
 
 
                                                
970 Fractus v. Wiko (n 750) [8], [11], [12] and [26]; Tot Power Control v. Xiaomi (n 750); Fractus v. 
Shenzhen New-Bund Network Technology (n 750) [6.7] and [6.8]. 
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7.1. Non-existence of the per se rule for SEP owners  
 
Treating SEP owners’ conduct as a novel category of exclusionary abuse either based on 
the criteria used by the Commission in Samsung and Motorola or on the one employed 
by the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE entails, in practice, that in most of the cases courts do not 
issue actions for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products. Accordingly, as it will 
be referred below, that legal standard creates a rule that implies per se that SEP owners 
cannot enjoy the aforementioned measures.  
 
According to the criteria used by the Commission, in practice, the required exceptional 
circumstances would be always present – that the standard has a widespread adoption and 
that SEP owners granted FRAND commitments. And usually, the implementer will be 
willing to negotiate a FRAND license, in the sense of accepting to be bound by a third 
party’s (a court or mutually agreed arbitrator) determination of a FRAND royalty rate in 
the event that bilateral negotiations do not come to a fruitful conclusion. Consequently, 
the general rule would be that SEP owners abuse their dominant positions when they seek 
prohibitory injunctions (see Section 6.2. of Chapter 3).  
 
With regard to the ECJ’s criteria, the same conclusion is derived. In most of the cases, 
the alleged infringer will have submitted the counter-offer and the SEP owner will have 
rejected it due to a lack of agreement of what FRAND terms should be and that would 
have originated the initiation of infringement proceedings. Therefore, that criteria 
prohibits per se the use of injunctions and the recall of products by SEP holders, because 
is most cases the elements to consider SEP owners’ behaviour as abusive will be present 
(see Section 4.5. of Chapter 4).  
 
The test established by the Supreme Court (in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange) also implies 
that same consequence for SEP owners. Namely, in practice, SEP owners – especially 
NPEs – cannot proof that the IP infringement caused them an irreparable harm and that 
they would not be adequately compensated with monetary damages, which is required to 
grant a prohibitory injunction. In consequence, in practice, the availability of obtaining 
prohibitory injunctions are restricted for SEP holders.  
 
The positive aspect of treating SEP owners’ behaviour as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant 
IP licenses – in consistency with the proposed critical review of IMS Health jurisprudence 
– is that it would not entail, in practice, that in most of the cases courts would not issue 
actions for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products. That, because it requires that 
the following circumstances must be present cumulatively to conclude that SEP owners 
abuse their dominant positions. Firstly, the SEP must be essential for the exercise of the 
competitor’s activity. Secondly, actions seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of 
products must be capable of causing anti-competitive effects on competition and 
consumer welfare. And thirdly, the objective justifications of the SEP owner’s conduct 
must be absent (moreover, the definition of ‘willing licensee’ is more demanding than the 
one employed by the ECJ).  
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Hence, the proposed legal test strikes a balance between the right to exclude (granted by 
patent law); and the right to access to markets (conferred by competition law), ensuring 
that everybody has access to standardised technologies and that fair competition exists in 
an open-market economy. By contrast, the novel category of exclusionary abuse 
established in Huawei v. ZTE leads to an overprotection of SEP implementers, to the 
detriment of SEP proprietors (see Section ‘Conclusion’ of Chapter 4). Due to the fact that 
the proposed legal standard is based on the critical review of the IMS Health 
jurisprudence, it could not be sustained that is unduly permissive and too patentee-
friendly. The above might be argued regarding the ‘refusal to supply’ test as it was 
originally established in Magill971.  
 
7.2. Avoidance of dis-harmonization and forum shopping  
 
Both in the EU and in the US, there is a debate about the circumstances under which a 
SEP holder – committed to grant licenses on FRAND terms – should be entitled to obtain 
a prohibitory injunction without abusing its dominant position. Although the ECJ 
judgment in Huawei v. ZTE dissociates from Commission’s argumentation in Samsung 
and Motorola – which is positive, because it leaves SEP owners less unprotected –, it has 
been widely criticized in general terms, because it does not exhaustively address various 
issues. Namely, in order to consider that the conduct of a SEP owner constitutes an 
exclusionary abuse, national courts must assess whether parties complied with the 
mandatory steps contained in the Framework for the negotiation of the licensing of SEPs 
established by the ECJ (see Section 4 of Chapter 4). However, it did not address several 
aspects that are fundamentals for its implementation.  
 
For instance, it did not take into account many aspects that come into play in practice, 
when negotiating SEP license contracts, such as, portfolio licensing or global licenses. 
One of the most extensively discussed issues has been whether the criteria established in 
the judgment is also applicable when SEP holders are NPEs or when patents in question 
are relevant to implement de facto standards. Last but not least, the judgment also posed 
various legal gaps, such as what is the scope of licensee’s obligation to respond to the 
offer, or what is the solution when after the offer of the SEP holder and the counter-offer 
of the alleged infringer, parties do not reach a licensing agreement. 
 
The consequence of the above is that national courts are filling the legal gaps posed in a 
case by case basis, using different interpretations. Consequently, the scope of the 
obligations contained in the Framework varies from court to court. As a result, the legal 
standard is being applied without harmonization among Member States.  
 
Knowing the above, SEP owners – international companies – may take advantage of it, 
choosing the court in which they want to start legal proceedings, depending on how 
favourably or unfavourably national courts have interpreted the specific elements of the 
                                                
971 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 697, para 1.  
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abuse, for them (forum shopping) (see Section ‘Conclusion’ of Chapter 4).  For instance, 
as it was mentioned before (see Section 4.3.2.3. of Chapter 4), the fact that in Unwired 
Planet v. Huawei the Judge Birss and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales have 
concluded that injunctions are appropriate when a licensee refuses to enter into a 
worldwide license covering SEPs, it might cause SEP owners to be particularly inclined 
to sue for an injunction in the UK. 
 
Hence, the second positive of treating SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking prohibitory 
injunctions and the recall of products as a refusal to grant IP licenses – in consistency 
with a critical review of the IMS Health jurisprudence –  is that it does not pose legal gaps 
that Member State courts have to interpret afterwards. That, because the elements of the 
abuse were already defined thoroughly in Magill and IMS Health. And their review – 
proposed in this Chapter –, it sticks to that line. I am specifically referring to elements 
such as the essentiality of the IPR, markets subject of reservation, harm to consumer 
welfare or willing licensee (see above, Section 4). 
 
Consequently, the suggested category of abuse avoids heading towards dis-harmonization 
and forum shopping, because national courts would have less scope for interpreting the 
elements of the abuse in ways so divergent that finding or not an antitrust infringement 
would be at stake.  
 
7.3. Internal consistency  
 
In contrast to the novel category of abuse established by the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE that 
generates internal inconsistency972 (see above, Section 2.3.), the third positive that derives 
from reviewing requests for prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products by SEP 
owners under the abusive refusal to grant IP licenses – in its reviewed version –, is that 
the standard meets the requirement of internal consistency, due to the reasons will be 
explained subsequently.  
 
Recall that albeit the Magill test proved sufficient to solve that specific case, it was not 
formulated to be applicable – in a consistent manner – to subsequent similar cases (see 
Section 4.6. of Chapter 2), hence the need for the critical review of IMS Health 
jurisprudence.  
7.3.1. Supported by EU precedents 
The suggested category of exclusionary abuse is rooted in established Article 102 TFEU 
case law, such as Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft. As referred above (see Section 2.3.), 
existing legal standards are by definition lawful, practicable and predictable and new 
standards are not. In addition, the proposed legal standard fulfils general principles of the 
law on abuse of dominance in the sense that the refusal to supply might be abusive only 
                                                
972 In the same vein, see ibid 701-707. 
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under specific circumstances and the perpetrator of the abuse must be a dominant firm. 
 
It also leads to determine if the refusal – i.e. the act of seeking a prohibitory injunction 
and the recall of products – is capable of harming consumer welfare, because it might 
hinder the emergence of a product for which there is a potential, constant, specific and 
regular demand on the part of consumers. Hence, it is more consistent with the classic 
competition tests used.  
 
Moreover, the Commission has clearly expressed its willingness to pursue exclusionary 
cases in its Guidance Paper on Enforcement Priorities in applying 102 TFEU973, so the 
suggested test would not contradict the policy expressed in the guidance.  
 
In particular, the Commission applied the refusal to license category of abuse in Magill, 
IMS Health and Microsoft, adopting decisions under Articles 7 (a compulsory license in 
Magill), 8 (a compulsory license together with a periodic penalty payment as interim 
measures in IMS Health), 23 (a fine in Microsoft) and 24 (a periodic penalty payment as 
a permanent sanction in Microsoft) of Regulation 1/2003 that constitute strong 
precedents. Moreover, the decisions where the Commission reached finding of 
infringements (Magill, IMS Health – only prima facie – and Microsoft) were put to the 
test of judicial proceedings before the EU courts, that confirmed the possibility to impose 
on dominant firms compulsory licenses for refusing to grant IP licenses. Besides, in IMS 
Health, the Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main brought a request for a preliminary 
ruling asking whether the refusal to grant IP licenses constituted an abuse of a dominant 
position under Article 102 TFEU (see on that regard, Chapter 2). 
7.3.2. The scope of application  
As mentioned above in Section 7.2., in Huawei v. ZTE the ECJ does not specify whether 
the criteria established in the judgment is also applicable when SEP holders are NPEs or 
when patents in question are relevant to implement de facto standards. It thus remains 
unclear whether this case law can be extended to those cases. Regarding the latter 
scenario, I already referred (see Section 3.3.3. of Chapter 4) to the Orders issued by the 
Judges of Barcelona Commercial Courts where they took the aforementioned judgment 
as a guidance in non-SEP infringement proceedings that were essential to implement de 
facto standards. 
 
By contrast, the use of the suggested reviewed standard of refusal to license IPRs would 
be reserved to solve cases where a competitive relationship exists between the right holder 
and the alleged infringer, being consistent with the ‘last resort’ character that normally 
defines competition law. In case it does not exist (e.g. when NPEs are SEP holders), the 
implementer could base its argument on contract law, alleging a breach of the third-party-
beneficiary contract (see above, Section 3.2.).  
                                                
973 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148). 
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In addition, that category of abuse would be applicable to disputes about patents that are 
relevant to implement de jure standards (SEPs), as well as to implement de facto 
standards. That, because as mentioned before (see Section 3.1.2.), from the competition 
law viewpoint the fact of giving FRAND commitments does not constitute an exceptional 
circumstance to exclude non-SEPs from its scope – albeit it is a relevant element from 
the contract law viewpoint. Indeed, the relevant elements of the suggested abuse are that 
the SEP is essential for the exercise of the competitor’s activity, that the refusal is capable 
of causing anti-competitive effects on competition and consumer welfare and the absence 
of objective justifications by the IP owner (see above, Section 4).  
 
In the same vein, recall that as it was established in Section 3.3.3. of Chapter 4, the 
Orange Book judgment – in which the object was a non-SEP essential to implement a de 
facto standard – was applied by German Courts (the Regional Court of Mannheim and 
the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe) in Motorola v. Apple, where the object was a 
FRAND-encumbered SEP essential to implement a de jure standard. That case was later 
on investigated by the Commission (see Section 3.2. of Chapter 3). In addition, the 
referring court – Regional Court of Düsseldorf – in Huawei v. ZTE was also in favour of 
applying that German judgment, even though the patent was a SEP (see Section 2.3. of 
Chapter 4). 
 
In conclusion, the scope of application of the reviewed refusal to license IPRs would 
include any refusal to license IPRs between parties where a competitive relationship 
exists. 
7.3.3. Legal certainty 
The concept of consistency is a derivative of general principles of EU law, such as the 
principle of legal certainty and the rule of protection of legitimate expectations974. Hence, 
the proposed category of abusive refusal to license IPRs is also consistent, because it 
provides greater legal certainty than the novel category of abuse established in Huawei v. 
ZTE by the ECJ (see above, Section 2.2.).  
 
That is very relevant because the notion of abuse is an objective concept, referring to the 
behaviour of the undertaking in a dominant position, so the general principle of legal 
certainty requires that the dominant undertaking should be able to assess the lawfulness 
of its own conduct on the basis of factors known to it and under its control975. 
 
Besides, as referred above (see Section 7.1.), the fact that the reviewed refusal to license 
approach does not create a per se rule that entails that prohibitory injunctions and the 
recall of products cannot be issued in favour of SEP owners, it is more logical than 
considering that SEP owners abuse their dominant positions at any event.  
 
                                                
974 Petit, ‘Injunctions for Frand-Pledged SEPs’ (n 661) 698, para 4. 
975 Deutsche Telekom (n 156) [198]–[202]; Motorola Commission Decision (n 7) [434]. 
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7.4. Problem-solving approach  
 
From the competition law enforcement perspective, treating SEP owners’ behaviour as a 
refusal to license IPRs would entail to impose on them a compulsory license – together 
with a periodic penalty payment – in case the antitrust infringement was found.  That 
remedy design might end with the deadlock situation in which SEP licensing negotiations 
are immersed – as mentioned, due to the lack of clarity as to what is meant by ‘FRAND 
terms’976 –, both ex ante and ex post.   
 
That is not the case under the category of abuse established by the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE, 
because it suggests that if no agreement is reached on the details of the FRAND terms 
following the counter-offer by the alleged infringer, the parties may, by common 
agreement, request that the amount of the royalty be determined by an independent third 
party (ex ante). Hence, as it is a voluntary step, the alleged infringer may opt not to submit 
the determination of FRAND terms to a third party and to use the competition law defence 
against the SEP owner, who would be liable for abusing its dominant position. 
Nevertheless, parties may continue without having entered into a licensing agreement (ex 
post). That will depend on how the national court decides to enforce the competition law, 
because the ECJ does not give any additional guidance on that regard (see Section 4.6. of 
Chapter 4). 
7.4.1. Ex ante 
Being aware of what are the remedy and the sanction that might be issued, parties would 
be encouraged to enter into licensing agreements so the problem might be solved before 
the SEP owner brings infringement actions (ex ante). That is to say, implementers would 
be spurred to be willing licensees in order to be able to use the competition law defence, 
in case they are sued for patent infringement.  
 
Namely, they would have to render the accounts in relation to past acts of use of the SEPs, 
they would have to provide a bank guarantee for the payment of royalties or place on 
deposit a provisional FRAND sum at the court or arbitration tribunal for past and future 
use of the patent and they would have to be ready for the amount of the royalty to be 
determined by an independent third party and to be bound by such a determination (see 
above, Section 4.3.2.1.). Those actions of implementers might encourage SEP owners to 
enter into licensing agreements, instead of seeking prohibitory injunctions and recall of 
products against them.   
7.4.2. Ex post 
If the previous scenario was not the case – parties did not enter into a license agreement 
– and the SEP owner initiated a patent infringement proceeding and the compulsory 
license is issued, the deadlock situation in which SEP licensing negotiations were before 
                                                
976 See the reference in (n 665). 
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the patent enforcement, it would end (ex post). That, because it would oblige parties to 
enter into a license agreement, so the implementer would make a lawful use of the SEP 
and the SEP owner would be remunerated for it.  
Conclusion  
 
Albeit the Commission in Samsung and Motorola and the ECJ in Huawei v. ZTE treated 
SEP owners’ conduct of seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products as a 
novel category of abuse, there was no need to create a new legal standard. Indeed, several 
negative consequences derive from that new construction that bases on the ‘willing 
licensee’ to assess the legality of SEP owners’ behaviour. Instead, it should have been 
treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to license SEPs – in consistency with a critical 
review of IMS Health jurisprudence.   
 
According to the suggested legal standard, what is relevant is that the following four 
circumstances are present cumulatively. Namely, that the SEP is essential for the exercise 
of the competitor’s activity, that the refusal is capable of causing anti-competitive effects 
on competition and consumer welfare and the absence of objective justifications by the 
IP owner. Regarding the justification of not being a ‘willing licensee’, implementers 
would not be considered as willing licensees if they do not render the accounts in relation 
to past acts of use of the SEPs, they do not provide a bank guarantee for the payment of 
royalties or do not place on deposit a provisional FRAND sum at the court or arbitration 
tribunal for past and future use of the patent and they are not ready for the amount of the 
royalty to be determined by an independent third party and to be bound by such a 
determination. That actions might encourage SEP owners to enter into licensing 
agreements, instead of initiating infringement proceedings.  
 
If an infringement would be found when treating SEP owners’ behaviour as a 
‘constructive’ refusal to license IPRs, the imposition of a compulsory license – together 
with a periodic penalty payment – is proposed as the proportionate and necessary remedy 
to effectively end it. That measure would put an end to the deadlock situation in which 
licensing negotiations were before initiating patent infringement proceedings, obliging 
parties to enter into licensing agreements.  
 
In other jurisdictions such as US, the compulsory license is also being issued regarding 
SEPs, albeit the legal argumentation on which its imposition is based is divergent because 
it is imposed to remedy patent infringements. In the EU, a similar possibility also exists. 
Namely, if it is considered that the SEP owner did not abuse its dominant position and a 
prohibitory injunction or the recall of products can be issued, they could be substituted 
by a ‘pecuniary compensation’ to remedy a patent infringement under Article 12 of 
IPRED. Nevertheless, due to the fact that its imposition requires that the infringer acted 
unintentionally and without negligence, it would be difficult to be applied in SEP 
infringement cases that take place in the EU, where implementers are aware of the 
infringement.  That requirement is no needed under the US approach established in the 
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange case, where SEP holders must show, for example, that due to 
the patent infringement, they suffered an irreparable injury and that monetary damages 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury.  
 
Albeit the divergent legal argumentation in which the US and the category of abuse 
(refusal to license IPRs) suggested in this chapter are based on to issue compulsory 
licenses, the consequence is the same. Namely, the infringer will pay damages for past 
infringement and royalties for the future use of the SEP. The difference is that under the 
US approach, these royalties take the form of damages to compensate the future 
infringements will be committed by the implementer and their rate is higher than the one 
for past infringement, in order to stimulate implementers to apply for a license. Whereas 
under the proposed category of abuse – refusal to grant IP licenses –, that increase is not 
contemplated because the SEP owner abused its dominant position when it brought 
infringement actions arbitrarily, i.e. without an objective justification, as it might be the 
fact that the implementer was an unwilling licensee. Whereas under the US approach, 
there is not an antitrust infringement, only a patent infringement that instead of being 
remedied with a prohibitory injunction, it is compensated with an ongoing royalty that 
constitute a de facto compulsory license.  
 
The above serves to illustrate the possibility to use the compulsory license as a tool, when 
SEP holders and infringers fail to enter into licensing agreements on FRAND terms.  
 
All in all, the category of abuse that has been proposed in this chapter is more consistent 
with the classic competition test used to determine if the exclusionary abuse causes harm 
in competition and consumer welfare. Besides, it provides greater legal certainty, because 
it does not pose legal gaps that Member State courts would have to fill afterwards.  
 
In addition, the suggested category of abuse only applies when there is a competitive 
relationship between the right holder and the alleged infringer. In case this does not exist 
(e.g. when NPEs are SEP holders), other branches of law, such as contract law, would be 
available to the implementer – relying on the breach of the third-party-beneficiary 
contract. Accordingly, the use of competition law would be reserved to solve cases where 
that relationship exists.  
 
Moreover, that category of exclusionary abuse is applicable to disputes about patents that 
are relevant to implement de jure standards (SEPs), as well as, to implement de facto 
standards because under competition law, I do not consider that the fact of giving FRAND 
commitments constitutes an exceptional circumstance to exclude non-SEPs from its 
scope. It is worth to recall that any market power that the SEP owner may enjoy would 
be due to its technology and not to the standardization process977, so patent owners should 
                                                
977 Layne-Farrar and Padilla, ‘Assessing the Link’ (n 137) 25-27. 
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be subject to the same risk/reward trade off when there are standards, as when there are 
not978. However, it is a relevant circumstance from the contract law perspective.  
 
Hence, the category of exclusionary proposed in this chapter is applicable to any refusal 
to grant any IP licenses, as long as a competitive relationship exists between the SEP 
owner and the implementer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
978 Padilla, Ginsburg and Wong-Ervin, ‘Antitrust Analysis Involving Intellectual Property’ (n 386) 18, para 
4. 
 271 
CHAPTER 6. FINDINGS AND FUTURE WORK  
Introduction 
 
In this final chapter, I will refer to the main conclusions that can be drawn from the 
research that contribute to knowledge in the field of SEP licensing and competition law. 
Then, I will discuss how the research questions have been addressed in the thesis. And 
finally, I will mention the future research lines that arise from the results of this research. 
1. Main conclusions  
 
1.1. Lack of unanimity about the existence of exploitative abuses in practice  
 
When SSOs select a patented technology as relevant to a standard, it becomes a SEP and 
the market power of IP owners’ may increase. In consequence, in the framework of SEP 
licensing, patent owners may abuse their dominant positions. Although the subject matter 
of this research are the exclusionary conducts – the refusal to grant IP licenses and seeking 
prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products –, it also exists the possibility of 
licensors or licensees committing exploitative abuses regarding FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs. In particular, SEP owners may demand unreasonable terms – excessive royalties – 
to license their patents, a conduct that may be performed in different manners, being 
classified under three categories: holdup, patent ambush and royalty stacking. And SEP 
implementers may also force SEP owners to accept royalties that are lower than the value 
of the contribution of their technologies to a standard, a conduct known as reverse holdup. 
In addition, implementers may also refuse to take licenses on reasonable terms or delaying 
doing so, known as holdout. 
 
There is an ongoing discussion among economists and legal scholars whether the 
opportunistic behaviours consisting of exploiting competitors by dominant undertakings 
– holdup, royalty stacking, reverse holdup and holdout –, constitute systematic problems 
in practice. That is the previous step to propose solutions against these anti-competitive 
behaviours. In that regard, from the analysis of the extensive literature conducted in this 
research, the following conclusions are drawn.  
 
A large theoretical literature asserts that SEP holders may take advantage of the increase 
in their market power to use the threat of a prohibitory injunction against alleged 
infringers, to demand excessive royalties in comparison with those requested before the 
standard was chosen by the SSO. In that case, SEP holders would be holding up 
manufacturers, who do not have any comparable substitute to the SEP available on the 
market. In addition, when various SEP holders – whose patents are essential to implement 
a specific standard – do not coordinate their royalties, the implementer who need to get 
licenses from all of them, faces the royalty stacking problem. In consequence, they also 
think that royalty stacking is a problem in practice.  
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Nevertheless, as it is very difficult to obtain data to analyse the extension of these 
problems – holdup and royalty stacking –, there are those who consider there is very little 
evidence to conclude that these exploitative conducts actually occur. 
 
With regard to reverse holdup, it seems difficult, even in theory, that SEP owners face 
that problem in practice. That, because once the standard has been developed, all 
implementers want to be the first to market. Therefore, it is not likely they waste their 
time trying to use their leverage to obtain rates and terms below what is reasonable. 
 
There is a lack of empirical studies regarding the holdout problem. But theoretically, even 
if it was a systematic problem, the fact of not being remunerated during a long-term – 
until implementers were forced to do so by a court or an arbitrator –, it would only cause 
serious effects for SEP owners and the competition, if the financial position of 
implementers and SEP owners was not extremely good. Hence, only SEP holders with 
financial constraints would have difficulties to finance further standard related 
innovations. Solely owners with small patent portfolios would suffer the increase of 
litigations costs, because they could not be spread across a large number of patents. And 
just implementers who were financially weak, for whom bankruptcy would be a real 
possibility, could enjoy an unfair competitive advantage lowering their investment costs, 
over implementers who decided to pay the required fees. 
 
1.2. Refusal to deal (tangible/intangible properties): unified criteria  
 
In two early cases (Commercial Solvents, 1974 and United Brands, 1978), the ECJ made 
it clear that the unjustified cutting off of supplies to an existing or new customer for whom 
these inputs are essential might constitute an abuse. And subsequently, it extended that 
conclusion to services (Télémarketing, 1985). It may also constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position if the undertaking refuses to supply in order to reserve to itself an 
ancillary activity that might be carried out by another undertaking on a neighbouring but 
separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition on it, on prejudice of 
consumers.  
 
Then, relying on the previous case law on refusal to supply goods and services, the CFI 
(in Magill, 1991) developed a new criteria to solve cases about refusals to grant IP 
licenses that endorsed the US ‘essential facilities doctrine’. According to it, a company 
which has a dominant position in the provision of facilities – which are essential for the 
supply of goods or services on another market –, abuses its dominant position if, without 
objective justification, it refuses access to those facilities. In general terms, that criteria 
was subsequently confirmed by the ECJ (in Magill, 1995) and it was subsequently applied 
to another case on refusal to grant IP licenses (in Tiercé Ladbroke, 1997). 
 
Therefore, until that moment, it was assumed that there were two different criteria to solve 
refusal issues depending on whether their object was a tangible or intangible property. 
However, in Bronner (1998) – a case about a refusal to supply a service –, the ECJ used 
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the criteria developed in Magill. That fact, together with the fact that the ECJ – in Magill 
– took as a basis the case law on refusal to supply goods or services to develop the criteria 
applicable to IPRs, they support the argument that tangible and intangible properties do 
not need to be treated differently regarding refusal behaviours. 
 
The criticism derived from applying the criteria established in Magill to Bronner by the 
ECJ does not lie in the fact that the object in the latter one was a service instead of an 
IPR, but in the lack of argumentation of that use. It can be inferred implicitly from the 
judgment in Bronner, that the ECJ did it to offer a greater protection to the owner of the 
service (Mediaprint). That is to say, in order to conclude that the dominant undertaking 
abused its dominant position according to the criteria established in Magill, more 
circumstances needed to be present – compared to those required by the case law on 
refusal to supply goods/services –, so it was going to be more difficult to find an antitrust 
infringement.  
  
Nonetheless, in this regard, it is important to recall that the primary purpose of Article 
102 TFEU is to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular to safeguard the 
interests of consumers – rather than to protect the position of particular competitors (e.g. 
dominant undertakings).  
 
1.3. The relevance of conducting a strict assessment of the existence of potential 
substitutes   
 
According to the first circumstance set in Magill, the IPR must be essential or 
indispensable for the exercise of competitor’s activity in the sense that there is no real or 
potential substitute. In Bronner, the ECJ clarified how to determine whether a ‘potential 
substitute’ exists or not, referring to the fact of whether there are any technical, legal or 
economic obstacles capable of making impossible or even unreasonably difficult for other 
competitors (publishers of daily newspapers in Bronner) to commercialize their own 
good, service or creation/invention protected by IPRs, whose owner refuses to supply or 
license (the nationwide home-delivery scheme in Bronner).  
 
In my opinion, in IMS Health, much attention was paid to the determination of the 
presence of the second and fourth circumstances established in Magill, that is to say, that 
the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential demand 
on the part of consumers and that the refusal pursues the aim of reserving the secondary 
market, respectively. However, the focus should have been to determine if there were 
economic obstacles capable of making impossible or even unreasonably difficult for 
competitors to create a brick structure that substituted the one owned by IMS Health. 
 
It should have been concluded that the ‘1860 brick structure’ owned by IMS Health was 
not essential for the exercise of competitors’ activity, because the existing economic 
obstacles were only capable of making a bit difficult the sale of studies based on their 
own structures (but not unreasonably difficult or impossible). The difficulty lied on the 
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fact that without market power, competitors’ only way to compete with IMS Health – 
attracting its customers – was improving the efficiency of their alternative structures.  
This hypothesis could be seen reinforced with the fact that NDC – IMS Health’s 
competitor that filed a complaint with the Commission – parallel to Commission's 
investigation and legal proceedings, it managed to celebrate contracts based on an 
alternative structure it created, even with some of the 20 largest pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 
The consequence of not conducting a rigorous exam of the existence of potential 
substitutes – as occurred in IMS Health – is that the ‘essential’ concept contained in the 
first circumstance of Magill is interpreted too broadly. Therefore, the IPR will be 
considered essential for the exercise of competitor’s activity, when in fact potential 
substitutes exist. Accordingly, inefficient rivals will be protected by competition law, 
damaging therefore the productive efficiency.  
 
Especially in fast moving technologies, the ability of a determined rival to compete 
around a competitor’s IP – with resulting benefits to consumers – is often been 
underestimated. In that regard, it is fundamental not to lose sight of the fact that 
competitors are entitled to compete with their own assets, not with those owned by their 
rivals. 
 
1.4. The rationale to avoid the double inconsistency  
 
In order to sustain the argument about the fact that Huawei v. ZTE should have been 
treated as a refusal to grant SEP licenses, it was necessary to previously study 
Commission’s decisions and ECJ case law on that issue. After the analysis, I drew the 
conclusion that they were not well-reasoned and they were incoherent.  
 
In several cases the decision-making bodies did not justify explicitly why they applied 
the Magill test to cases where the object of the refusal was not an IPR. For instance, in 
Microsoft, the Commission considered that the protocols – that Microsoft refused to 
supply to Sun – were protected by copyright. However, the Commission was of the 
opinion that strictly speaking, they were not protected by the IPR. It can be inferred from 
the Decision that the Commission applied the Magill criteria in Microsoft to protect the 
dominant undertaking, because its application required the presence of more 
circumstances (for the same reason the ECJ applied the Magill criteria in Bronner, see 
above Section 1.2.).  
 
In some other cases, they did not either explain why they modified the indispensability 
of some of the circumstances that composed the Magill test. In IMS Health, the 
Commission did not explain why it considered that the presence of the second 
circumstance set in Magill – that the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product 
for which there was a potential demand – was not necessary, while it took the precise 
opposite view in Tiercé Ladbroke. In the same vein, the ECJ did not argue why it stated 
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that the aforementioned circumstance was necessary in IMS Health, when in Bronner it 
considered that it was not. The President of the CFI did not mention either why in IMS 
Health it considered the presence of the second circumstance necessary and in Tiercé 
Ladbroke, it stated that was sufficient the presence of the first – that the IPR was essential 
for the exercise of competitor’s activity – or the second circumstance, alternatively.  
 
The decision-making bodies neither indicated explicitly the reason to broaden the concept 
of ‘new product’ regarding the second circumstance set in Magill, that was originally 
defined as the product that was not limited essentially to duplicate the product already 
offered by the IP owner. Thus, in order to consider a product as ‘new’ according to the 
CFI in Tiercé Ladbroke, it was sufficient that it was a far more suitable for consumers. In 
the view of the Commission and the CFI in Microsoft, a product was ‘new’ if it contained 
substantial elements contributed by the licensee's own efforts. The same could be said 
regarding the broadening of the scope of the fourth circumstance established in Magill – 
the refusal had to pursue the aim of excluding competition from a secondary market – 
made by the Commission and the ECJ in IMS Health. They considered sufficient that the 
refusal excluded competition from a vertically related market, that is, in a downstream 
production stage, instead of excluding it from a secondary market as it was required by 
the Magill criteria. From their decisions and judgments in Microsoft and IMS Health, it 
might be inferred that the purpose of the broadening was to protect dominant 
undertakings’ competitors, whose aim was not to produce a new product, but an existing 
one.  
 
As it follows from the above, the consequence of the lack of rationale is the double 
inconsistency. Firstly, in IMS Health, the decisions and judgments of the Commission, 
the CFI and the ECJ were not congruent with their own previous decisions and judgments 
(Tiercé Ladbroke and Bronner), but contradictory. And secondly, in the same case (Tiercé 
Ladbroke and IMS Health), divergent argumentations were employed by different 
decision-making bodies. 
 
In conclusion, the Commission and the ECJ instead of applying an existing criteria (e.g. 
the Magill test) directly to different cases, they should first analyse all the circumstances 
of the specific case in detail. And then determine the appropriateness of using the existing 
legal approach. It may occur that it would be more convenient to review the existing legal 
approach to adapt it to the case in question or to suggest a different one. In any case, they 
always have to justify their choices precisely (it is not sufficient that may be inferable 
from the decision or judgment), that should aim to safeguard the interests of consumers 
and not of competitors. 
 
1.5. The Huawei v. ZTE criteria leads to legal uncertainty  
 
When the Regional Court of Düsseldorf requested for a preliminary ruling in Huawei v. 
ZTE, it was expected that the ECJ was going to provide a criteria to determine whether 
the fact of bringing infringement actions – seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall 
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of products – by a SEP owner, it would constitute an exclusionary conduct. That is to say, 
a criteria to evaluate if that behaviour would limit production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumer according to Article 102(b) TFEU.  
 
In the long awaited judgment, the ECJ did not consider that SEP owner’s behaviour could 
be qualified as none of the categories of exclusionary abuse already developed in its case 
law – e.g. refusal to deal. Therefore, it created a novel category of abuse, but without 
reference to how to evaluate if the competitive damage arising from the conduct was 
present. It merely stipulated the specific actions SEP holders have to perform and the 
specific obligations alleged infringers must comply with, so the conduct of bringing 
infringement actions does not constitute an exclusionary abuse. The ECJ did not explain 
why it considered those actions and obligations relevant or why the fact of not following 
them would constitute an abuse of dominant position. 
 
Moreover, it is not clear under what precise circumstances the behaviour would be an 
exclusionary abuse. Nevertheless, it seems to be clear that whenever SEP owners do not 
alert the alleged infringers of the infringement and do not present the specific, written 
offers for a license on FRAND terms, they abuse their dominant positions, regardless of 
whether alleged infringers are willing licensees or not. To be considered that an alleged 
infringer is willing to enter into a license agreement, it would have to respond to the offer 
diligently and in good faith, submitting a counter-offer on FRAND terms in case it rejects 
it. Moreover, if its counter-offer was rejected, it would have to provide appropriate 
security to guarantee the payment of royalties for the past acts of use of the SEP. 
 
In conclusion, the criteria provided by the ECJ is very formal and increases the legal 
uncertainty. That might entail that Member State courts – who determine whether the 
conduct of SEP owners constitutes an abuse of dominant position in a case by case basis 
– apply the new category of abuse in a disharmonized way in the EU, enabling so forum 
shopping.  
 
1.6. Compulsory license and the incentive to invest in innovation  
 
The proposal of treating the case Huawei v. ZTE as a refusal to grant IP licenses offers 
advantages on many aspects, as they were analysed in the previous chapter. Here, I would 
like to focus on the remedy that gives the name to the title of the thesis ‘Compulsory 
licensing of SEPs to remedy abuses of dominant position’.  
 
In accordance with the critical review of IMS Health jurisprudence, the Commission 
could issue a compulsory license to bring the infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
committed by SEP holders, effectively to an end.  
 
It would be advisable to issue the compulsory license together with a periodic penalty 
payment to compel the SEP holder to remedy the consequences of the infringement, by 
granting licenses to third parties. It would be also appropriate to include in compulsory 
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licensing a mechanism to determine the licensing terms, as the Commission did in IMS 
Health – regarding the determination of royalties – or as it occurs in merger control cases, 
where the Commission requires mandatory arbitration commitments. In that way, it 
would be guaranteed, to the extent possible, that in case of disagreement between the 
parties, the SEP owner would comply with the order to grant licenses in the established 
period of time. Furthermore, these mechanisms might also help to monitor the 
implementation of the order.  
 
The common criticism979 of compulsory license is that the obligation – even for a fair 
remuneration – may undermine undertakings’ incentives to invest and innovate and, 
thereby, possibly harm consumers. Hence, the knowledge that they may have a duty to 
supply against their will may lead dominant undertakings – or undertakings who 
anticipate that they may become dominant – not to invest, or to invest less, in the activity 
in question. Also, competitors may be tempted to free ride on investments made by the 
dominant undertaking instead of investing themselves. 
 
Taking as the starting point the fact that any undertaking, whether dominant or not, should 
have the right to choose its trading partners and to dispose freely of its property, the 
remedy of compulsory licence does not necessarily entail these consequences980. The 
remedy would only discourage SEP owners to innovate in the following two cases. First, 
if it would not be clear and predictable for SEP owners to know under which 
circumstances their behaviour – which may entail the imposition of the aforementioned 
remedy – would be abusive, because they could not adjust their conduct to competition 
rules. Hence, companies would be reluctant to innovate (to obtain IPRs) because of the 
risk of being obliged to grant compulsory licenses. With regard to SEP owners’ behaviour 
of seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products, the category of abuse 
suggested in this research – the reviewed refusal to license IPRs981 – brings legal certainty 
                                                
979 Richard J. Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, ‘An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual 
property’ (1996) 93(23) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 12749, 12755, para 2 (‘Our 
analysis has not demonstrated a clear understanding of the conditions that lead to the conclusion that the 
owner of any type of property should, for reasons of economic efficiency, be compelled to share that 
property with others. A more productive channel of inquiry appears to us to focus on the types of products 
that justify intellectual property protection and the appropriate scope of that protection’); Commission, 
‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities’ (n 148), 
para 75. 
980 Ritter, ‘Refusal to Deal and Essential Facilities’ (n 899) 17-22 (he explains why the fact that compulsory 
access reduces the return earned by the right holder, it does not necessarily entail a diminish of investment 
incentives). 
981 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities’ (n 148), para 81 (The Commission will consider ‘refusal to license IPRs’ practice as an 
enforcement priority if all the following circumstances are present: when the refusal (i) relates to a product 
or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market, (ii) is 
likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market, and (iii) is likely to 
lead to consumer harm) and para 82 (‘In certain specific cases, it may be clear that imposing an obligation 
to supply is manifestly not capable of having negative effects on the input owner’s and/or other operators’ 
incentives to invest and innovate upstream. [...] This could also be the case where the upstream market 
position of the dominant undertaking has been developed under the protection of special or exclusive rights 
or has been financed by state resources’). 
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as to the exact boundaries of the infringement. That is to say, the circumstances to 
determine the liability of SEP owners who bring infringement actions are precise. Thus, 
SEP owners would not be discouraged to innovate. 
 
And second, the compulsory license might act as disincentive to invest in innovation and 
research if the compulsory license would not constitute a proportionate and necessary 
remedy. Note that for IP owners, the IPRs are the due recompense for their invention or 
creation. So if they are obliged to grant licenses of their IPRs when that measure is not 
proportionate or necessary to remedy the antitrust infringement, they might be reluctant 
to invest in innovation. Therefore, if that was the case, the Commission would have to 
impose a different measure to remedy or sanction the abusive conduct.  If SEP owners’ 
behaviour of seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products was treated as a 
refusal to license IPRs, the compulsory license would constitute the proportionate and 
necessary remedy that obliges SEP owners to do what they refused to do, that implied to 
be abusing their dominant positions.  
2. Discussion 
 
When implementers use SEPs without obtaining licenses – usually because parties cannot 
agree on the amount of the royalty to be paid –, patent owners may bring infringement 
actions seeking a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products. However, as SEP 
holders gave commitments to SSOs that they will grant licenses on FRAND terms 
(because the technology protected by SEPs is essential to implement de jure standards), 
alleged infringers – that have been sued – use the competition law-based defence. It 
consists of accusing SEP owners of abusing their dominant positions for bringing the 
aforementioned actions. To determine under what circumstances that behaviour 
constitutes an antitrust infringement, it has been subject of an extensive discussion both 
in the EU and US.   
 
Note that it has not been under discussion the lawfulness of bringing infringement actions 
seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of the SEP or an award of 
damages in respect of those acts of use, that are also measures provided by patent law 
(e.g. in Huawei v. ZTE, the dominant undertaking also sought those other measures). The 
reason is because these actions do not have a direct impact on products manufactured by 
competitors appearing or remaining on the market. 
 
The aim of the research – that is focused in EU competition law – is to argue that there 
was no need for a novel category of exclusionary abuse that was what the ECJ established 
in Huawei v. ZTE, when it dealt with that issue for the first time. Until then, there was a 
considerable degree of uncertainty as to the lawfulness of bringing infringement actions 
seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products by FRAND-encumbered SEP 
holders. That is to say, it is defended that SEP owners’ behaviour should have been treated 
as a refusal to grant IP licenses in consistency with a critical review of IMS Health 
jurisprudence. And that the remedy of compulsory license would constitute the 
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proportionate and necessary measure to bring the infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
effectively to an end. In that way, it would terminate the deadlock situation in which SEP 
licensing negotiations were before bringing the infringement actions, as said (see Section 
7.4. of Chapter 5), mainly due to the lack of clarity as to what is meant by FRAND 
terms982. 
 
Accordingly, this research poses the following two questions: 
• Does bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products by SEP 
owners constitute an abuse of a dominant position, because it might be considered 
as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant IP licenses?  
• If yes, is compulsory license the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end 
the violation of Article 102 TFEU? 
 
Hereunder, I will refer to how these questions have been addressed in the thesis. 
 
2.1. First research question  
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf referred the lawfulness of SEP 
owners’ behaviour to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling because the EC’s approach in 
Samsung and Motorola and the one established by the German Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof-BGH) in Orange Book, they were contradictory. Moreover, there was 
an absence of express guidance from SSOs’ patent policies on the issue.  
 
Nevertheless, in that long awaited judgment, the ECJ does not provide a criteria to 
determine whether the competitive damage arising from bringing the infringement 
actions is present or not. Instead, it establishes that if the alleged infringer was willing to 
enter into a license agreement, the SEP owner abuses its dominant position even though 
it had performed the actions required by the ECJ. That is to say, even if the SEP owner – 
before bringing an action for a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products – alerted 
the alleged infringer of the infringement and it presented it a specific, written offer for a 
license on FRAND terms. To consider that the alleged infringer was a willing licensee, it 
had to (i) express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement, (ii) respond to the 
offer diligently and in good faith, submitting a counter-offer on FRAND terms, and (iii) 
if the counter-offer was rejected by the SEP owner, it had to provide appropriate security 
to guarantee the payment of royalties for the past acts of use of the SEP. 
 
Thus, Member State courts have to analyse, case by case, if SEP holders performed those 
specific actions and whether alleged infringers complied with the obligations established 
in the judgment in order to be considered as willing licensees.  
 
All in all, the ECJ treated the issue as a specific and novel category of abuse within the 
meaning of Article 102 TFEU.  Due to the several negative consequences derived from 
                                                
982 Huawei AG (n 137) [9]. 
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that new construction based on the ‘willing licensee’ to assess the legality of SEP owners’ 
behaviour, I am of the opinion that there was no need to create a novel category of 
exclusionary abuse. That, because SEP owner’s conduct should have been treated as a 
refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses –, in consistency with a critical review of IMS 
Health jurisprudence developed by the ECJ. In order to do that, it must be argued that the 
fact of bringing infringement actions by SEP holders is a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant 
IP licenses. In this way, the case Huawei v. ZTE would be consistent with the ECJ 
jurisprudence on refusal to deal.  
 
Considering the above, the thesis raised the following research question:  
• ‘Does bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products by 
SEP owners constitute an abuse of a dominant position, because it might be 
considered as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant IP licenses?’ 
 
The first research question has been answered positively in the thesis. Namely, 
considering that seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products constitutes a 
‘constructive’ refusal to grant SEP licenses – according to the proposed category of abuse 
based on the revision of the IMS Health jurisprudence –, SEP owners would abuse their 
dominant positions, as long as the following circumstances were present cumulatively. 
 
Firstly, the SEP must be essential for the exercise of the competitor’s activity, in the sense 
that there is no real or potential substitute.   
 
Secondly, seeking a prohibitory injunction and the recall of products must be capable of 
causing anti-competitive effects on competition and consumer welfare. Regarding the 
latter, the refusal might be capable of harming consumer welfare if it might hinder the 
emergence of a new product, a more economical product or a product characterized by 
its compatibility and interoperability with different products, for which there is a 
potential, constant, specific and regular demand on the part of consumers. 
 
And thirdly, SEP owners’ behaviour is not justified by objectively verifiable 
considerations. In other words, the dominant undertaking cannot demonstrate that its 
behaviour produces possible advantages in terms of substantial efficiencies which 
outweigh any anti-competitive effects, or show that the conduct is objectively necessary. 
The behaviour would be considered as objectively necessary if the implementer (i) was 
not able to pay its debts, (ii) his assets were located in jurisdictions that do not provide 
for adequate means of enforcement of damages, or (iii) was unwilling to enter into a 
licence agreement on FRAND terms. It is understood that an implementer is a willing 
licensee if it (1) rendered the accounts in relation to past acts of use of the SEP, (2) 
provided a bank guarantee for the payment of royalties or placed on deposit a provisional 
FRAND sum at the court or arbitration tribunal for past and future use of the patent, and 
(3) stated that is ready for the amount of the royalty to be determined by an independent 
third party and to be bound by such a determination. 
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2.2. Second research question 
 
Once the competition authority or courts have determined that SEP owners infringed 
Article 102 TFEU when seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products – 
treating the conduct as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant IP licenses –, they would proceed 
to impose the most appropriate measures to remedy and/or sanction that behaviour.  
 
Accordingly, the thesis posed the second research question: 
• ‘If yes (if the first question was answered positively, i.e. SEP owners’ conduct 
constitutes an abusive refusal to grant IP licenses), is compulsory license the most 
proportionate and necessary remedy to end the infringement of Article 102 TFEU?’ 
 
This question has also been answered affirmatively in the thesis. The compulsory license 
emerges as the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end that infringement 
effectively. That conclusion relies on the fact that the compulsory license was the measure 
issued by the EC and the ECJ in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft to end dominant 
undertakings’ antitrust infringement consisting in refusing to grant IP licenses.  
 
And it is also based on the fact that in other jurisdictions such as US, compulsory licenses 
are also employed as a tool when parties fail to enter into licensing agreements on 
FRAND terms, albeit basing on different legal argumentation. Namely, US courts impose 
ongoing royalties that constitute a de facto compulsory license to remedy patent 
infringements. 
3. Future work 
 
On the basis of the findings of this thesis, I propose the following areas of further research.  
 
Once the ECJ issued the judgment in Huawei v. ZTE in 2015, Member State courts have 
been issuing their decisions filling the legal gaps posed by the ECJ and interpreting 
aspects that were not clear, on a case by case basis. Some of these national judgments 
have been studied in this research, mainly those issued in Germany, but also those 
released in France, Italy, and UK, until 2019.  
 
Hence, studies can be done analysing national courts’ judgments issued in other Member 
States since 2015 (e.g. Netherlands and Romania) and those issued in the countries 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, but from 2019 on. Thus, the analysis of those 
judgments together with the ones studied in this thesis, would be usable in order to do a 
comparative study about the divergent interpretations made by national courts, to see 
whether the new category of abuse established in Huawei v. ZTE is being applied in a 
harmonized way or not among Member States and if SEP owners and implementers are 
making use of forum shopping. The results of the study might be relevant for the EC to 
draft its next Communication, suggesting more specific solutions regarding the issue of 
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SEP licensing and the competition law. Recall that so far, in its last two Communications 
issued in 2016 and 2017983, it merely stated that the uncertainty in enforcement of SEPs 
should be improved. And it also reckoned that there is an urgent need to set out key 
principles that foster a balanced, smooth and predictable framework for SEPs. 
 
It might also be interesting to conduct further research about how the issue of bringing 
infringement actions seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products by SEP 
owners, is being addressed in other jurisdictions, either under competition or contract law 
or using other mechanisms. In particular, in China, South Korea or India, SEP licensing 
disputes are increasingly frequent.  
 
More specifically, it would be intriguing to know if in other jurisdictions would exist the 
possibility of treating SEP owners’ behaviour as a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant IP 
licenses. And if that was the case, what would be the required elements to find that 
antitrust infringement? That analysis would allow to compare them with the elements that 
compound the reviewed category of exclusionary abuse proposed in this research – i.e. 
essentiality of IPR, competitor’s exclusion, harm to consumer welfare and absence of 
objective justifications.  
 
In the same vein, it would also be of great interest to analyse whether the remedy of 
compulsory license might be employed as a tool to get parties into licensing agreements 
under different jurisdictions, either to remedy a patent infringement (e.g. in the form of 
ongoing royalties, as in US) or an antitrust infringement (as it has been proposed in this 
research). It might be also employed as an ADR mechanism, as part of SSOs’ patent 
policies or managed by national patent offices. Regarding the latter, the Japanese 
government recently suggested an ADR system with a compulsory license for SEP 
disputes. However, for the time being, the government has decided not to proceed with 
this proposal984. The proposed ADR mechanism consists of the following points.  When 
negotiations to enter into licensing agreements are deadlocked, the parties can require the 
Japan Patent Office to appoint a mediator, who will set license rates on FRAND terms. 
 
 
 
                                                
983 Commission COM(2016) 176 final (n 674) 13, para 7; COM(2017) 712 final (n 81) 2, para 7. 
984 ‘A study of a new ADR system with a view to the Fourth Industrial Revolution’ (Japan Patent Office 
2017) <https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/newtokkyo_shiryou21.htm> accessed 1 August 
2018; Jacob Schindler, ‘Patent Owners Sound Alarm over Proposed "Compulsory Licensing for SEPs" in 
Japan’ (IAM Blog, July 27, 2017) <http://www.iam-media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=f2d97bca-9a19-4613-
bd0f-ad19c0e20e98> accessed 1 August 2018; 
Jacob Schindler, ‘Japanese Government Will Issue SEP Negotiation Guidelines, but Controversial ADR 
Proposal on Hold for Now’ (IAM Blog, October 3, 2017) <http://www.iam-
media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=3519aeb5-0955-4856-909f-c5b7de395c8b> accessed 1 August 2018;  
Jacob Schindler, ‘Japanese government steps back from controversial SEP ADR proposal’ (IAM Blog, 
November 27, 2017) <http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=96c16e8c-c382-4f0b-a0d1-
5c63471c0cb1> accessed 1 August 2018. 
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Conclusion 
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ treated the issue as a specific and novel category of 
exclusionary abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, there was a 
category of exclusionary abuse already developed in its case law, the abusive refusal to 
license IPRs. Accordingly, the contribution of the thesis is to defend that the case Huawei 
v. ZTE should have been treated as a ‘constructive’ refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses.  
 
In that way – treating SEP owners’ behaviour of seeking prohibitory injunctions and the 
recall of products under the aforementioned category of exclusionary abuse –, the case 
Huawei v. ZTE would be consistent with the ECJ’s previous case law. Moreover, the 
remedy that this category of abuse entails – the compulsory license – would be the most 
effective measure to bring the infringement to an end. And consequently, the deadlock 
situation in which SEP licensing negotiations were before bringing the infringement 
actions – usually due to a lack of agreement of what FRAND royalties are –, would end, 
because the compulsory license would oblige parties to enter into licensing agreements. 
Hence, implementers would have access to technologies essential to implement de jure 
standards – which would enable them to manufacture products interoperable with other 
products – and SEP owners would be remunerated for that use.  
 
Accordingly, the answers to the two main research questions of the thesis is affirmative. 
In addition, along the research, several further contributions to the field of SEP licensing 
and competition law have been made. All in all, the aim of this study is to suggest a 
consistent category of exclusionary abuse to assess the lawfulness of SEP owners’ 
behaviour, which in turn, it entails the imposition of a compulsory license to remedy the 
infringement effectively. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENT  
 
The subject matter of this research is the behaviour of SEP owners – who committed to 
SSOs to grant patent licenses on FRAND terms – that consists of bringing infringement 
actions seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products. As that conduct is 
capable of excluding competitors from the market and harming consumer welfare, the 
question of whether SEP owners abuse their dominant positions – according to Article 
102 TFEU – arises.  
 
In Huawei v. ZTE, the ECJ creates a novel category of exclusionary abuse to assess the 
antitrust nature of that conduct, that is limited to establish a framework for the negotiation 
of the licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms. Due to its formality, the legal uncertainty 
regarding the circumstances required to find an antitrust infringement, increases. In 
Samsung and Motorola, the EC also treated SEP owners’ conduct as two novel categories 
of abuse – exclusionary and exploitative – within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.  
 
Nevertheless, besides that there was no need for the creation of a new category of 
exclusionary abuse based on the ‘willing licensee’ concept to assess the legality of SEP 
owners’ behaviour, several negative consequences derive from that new construction. 
Hence, the thesis proposes that in Huawei v. ZTE the ECJ should have applied an existing 
category of exclusionary abuse, the refusal to grant IP licenses – in consistency with a 
critical review of IMS Health. Thus, a SEP owner who brings infringement actions 
seeking a prohibitory injunction or the recall of products would only abuse its dominant 
position if the following circumstances are present cumulatively. Firstly, the SEP must 
be essential for the exercise of the competitor’s activity. Secondly, actions seeking a 
prohibitory injunction and the recall of products must be capable of causing anti-
competitive effects on competition and consumer welfare. And thirdly, the objective 
justifications of the SEP owner’s conduct must be absent.  
 
Accordingly, the Huawei v. ZTE case would be consistent with the ECJ’s previous case 
law (Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft). And as a consequence, the compulsory license 
would emerge as the most proportionate and effective remedy to end the infringement. 
Hence, parties would enter into licensing agreements, ending the deadlock situation in 
which licensing negotiations were before bringing those infringement actions.  
 
Consequently, licensors would receive an adequate return on their investment – so they 
would continue innovating – and implementers would gain access to standardised 
technologies at a fair and reasonable cost. Furthermore, consumers’ welfare would be 
improved in several ways. They would have a wider choice to select the product that 
offers the right balance between price and quality. Namely, they would obtain lower 
prices, so more people could afford to buy products. And they would enjoy better quality 
of goods and services that would attract more customers and expand market share. 
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Note that the approach suggested in this research would be employed only as a solution 
of ‘last resort’– that normally characterizes competition law –, when the principle of 
the freedom of the competing parties to arrange their own affairs turned out to be 
unsuccessful – i.e. they failed to enter into licensing agreements – and the required 
elements to find the antitrust infringement are present.  
 
Therefore, treating SEP owners’ conduct as a ‘constructive’ refusal to licence IPRs, 
would strike the balance between the following rights. On the one hand, SEP owners’ 
right to exclude – granted by patent law –  and right of access to the courts. And on the 
other hand, implementers’ right to access to markets and in particular, to standardized 
technologies – conferred by competition law. So the suggested category of abuse would 
not involve to overprotect or underprotect any of the parties, because it is not too patentee-
friendly nor too implementer-friendly.  
 
The above would be in line with Article 345 TFEU that provides that ‘the Treaties shall 
in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership’. That is to say, the general rule is that IPRs must be respected. IP owners are 
free to decide if they want to license their rights or not (principle of freedom of the parties 
to arrange their own affairs). However, IPRs are not absolute rights. Accordingly, in 
exceptional circumstances – i.e. when the interest in protection of free competition 
prevailed over the protection of IPRs and the economic freedom of their owners –, IP 
owners may be obliged to allow the use of their rights.   
 
To conclude, the refusal to grant IP licenses proposed in this research – in consistency 
with a critical review of IMS Health – would bring more coherence, legal certainty and 
effectiveness to SEP licensing and enforcement framework in the EU. The above is 
crucial bearing in mind that as a result of the expansion of 5G and IoT across the territory, 
products that implement SEPs will be even more present in our everyday lives than they 
are already nowadays.  
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